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A Manual on Presenting Claims
Tara Melish
In the new millennium, the most critical
problems facing Latin America are
economic, social and environmental.  It is
now clear that free markets and formal
democracy, by themselves, will not guarantee
greater welfare or justice.  In many cases,
political and economic advances have gone
hand in hand with growing inequality,
poverty and environmental degradation.
The Centro de Derechos Económicos y
Sociales (CDES) was established in Quito,
Ecuador in 1997 to confront the most
pressing development threats in Latin
America, including external debt, structural
adjustment, the lack of corporate
accountability, and the destruction of the
Amazon. As a sister organization of the NY-
based Center for Economic and Social
Rights, CDES has many years of experience
undertaking inter-disciplinary investigations,
capacity-building and human rights advocacy
and litigation.  CDES´s work is based on the
belief that lasting solutions require an
engaged and active civil society, and that
economic, social and cultural rights provide
an ideal framework and the means to build
greater participation and accountability.
The Schell Center was founded in 1989 to
honor the late Orville H. Schell Jr., a
distinguished lawyer, vice chairman of
Helsinki Watch and chairman of Americas
Watch from its founding in 1981 until his
death in 1987.  The Center coordinates a
diverse program to serve students and
scholars at Yale and contribute to the
development of the human rights community
locally and internationally.
The Center organizes lectures and conferences
on human rights topics; furthers human rights
scholarship by hosting visiting scholars and
providing research fellowships; promotes
activism through summer and post-graduate
fellowships; supports the Yale Human Rights
and Development Law Journal; and conducts
the Allard K. Lowenstein International
Human Rights Clinic.  The Lowenstein Clinic
provides students with an opportunity to gain
practical experience that reflects the range of
activities in which lawyers can engage to
promote respect for human rights; helps build
the knowledge and skills necessary to be
effective human rights advocates; and
contributes to efforts to protect human rights
through high-quality assistance to appropriate
organizations and individual.
Orville H. Schell Jr.
Center For International Human Rights
Centro de Derechos
Económicos y Sociales
Orville H. Schell Jr.
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Human rights have played a critical role in the dramatic transformation of Latin America over recent decades;
rights advocates have helped expose government abuses, end dictatorships, shape constitutions, and
strengthen civil liberties. Unfortunately, these great advances have not translated into social justice, and much
of the continent is worse off today than it was twenty years ago. Poverty, inequality, destruction of the
environment, labor abuse, and cultural degradation have increased and now threaten to undermine the fragile
progress in civil and political rights.
These developments represent a daunting challenge to the human rights movement, in the Americas as much
as the rest of the world: how to advance the full human rights vision—economic, social and cultural rights
(ESCR) as well as civil and political rights. Latin American advocates are particularly well placed to meet that
task. The region’s formal democracies and relative economic strength offer great potential. At the same time,
the gap between rich and poor, the widest in the world, has created a rising clamor for progressive social and
economic change. Human rights language has become common currency, shaping public debates from the
editorial pages of leading newspapers to the declarations of community activists and political leaders.
Powerful social movements of indigenous people, women, small farmers, the landless, environmentalists and
workers have all turned to human rights to advance their causes, and national constitutions with robust ESCR
provisions are in place to support their efforts.
At the regional level, the inter-American human rights system is the most advanced in the developing world
and has gained the (often grudging) respect of American states. The American Declaration on the Rights and
Duties of Man and the American Social Charter provide a full array of ESCR guarantees. The American
Convention on Human Rights, which allows for individual petitions for rights violations, has been outfitted
with a full complement of ESCR through the recently enacted San Salvador Protocol. Over the past decade,
the OAS bodies charged with protecting human rights have also shown increasing concern about economic
and social problems and have begun to focus greater attention on ESCR.   
Despite these gains, ESCR have suffered from a lack of judicial and political acceptance. The Inter-American
Court has only recently ruled on its first ESCR case, and judges in domestic courts have been ignorant and
even contemptuous of ESCR. The long-standing neglect of these rights by human rights bodies, courts and
lawyers has undermined their effectiveness and left potential ESCR advocates with few precedents to guide
or support their work. This has created an overwhelming need to confront the lack of ESCR jurisprudence and
the general bias against ESCR.
This Manual aims to meet this need. It offers advocates the first comprehensive guide to bringing ESCR
claims in the inter-American human rights system. The Manual is based upon a detailed examination of the
jurisprudence and reports of the Inter-American Commission and Court, as well as relevant precedents and
commentary from courts and experts around the world. By bringing all of this information together, the
Manual provides both procedural and substantive guides for developing and bringing effective ESCR petitions
in the inter-American system. While its main goal is giving practitioners the precedents and arguments
necessary to prepare ESCR petitions for the inter-American system, it should be useful to a broad range of
advocates, activists and academics engaged in legal, social or political efforts to promote ESCR.  
For the Centro de Derechos Económicos y Sociales (CDES), the Manual represents a critical step forward in
its efforts to promote ESCR in Latin America. CDES and its sister organization, the US-based Center for
Economic and Social Rights, have been actively involved in campaigns and capacity-building around ESCR
since the early 1990s. These efforts have increasingly incorporated ESCR petitions and legal training in an
effort to strengthen ESCR jurisprudence generally in the region. The Manual will provide the backbone for a
new round of workshops and conferences aimed at legal advocates, social movement leaders, students, judges,
and ombudsmen.  CDES is grateful to the foundations who have made this and other ESCR work possible and
have proved themselves pioneers in the expanding field of human rights in Latin America: the Ford
Foundation, the MacArthur Foundation, the Swedish NGO Fund for Human Rights, and the Public Welfare
Foundation.
The Manual is the fruit of an important collaboration, increasingly common in the United States and in some
Latin American countries, between human rights organizations and students. By researching cases and
preparing petitions, law students can provide important support to under-funded NGOs, at the same time
raising the profile and legitimacy of ESCR throughout the academic community. The Allard K. Lowenstein
International Human Rights Clinic at Yale Law School is among a growing number of human rights clinics in
the United States.  Founded in 1989, the Lowenstein Clinic gives students first-hand experience in human
rights advocacy. The Clinic undertakes numerous litigation and research projects on behalf of human rights
organizations and individual victims of human rights abuses. The Lowenstein Clinic’s close cooperation with
CDES has been a model student-NGO alliance, allowing students to gain practical human rights experience
by making important contributions to ESCR protection efforts in the Americas. 
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HOW  TO  USE  THIS  MANUAL
This Manual is designed for a wide range of human rights advocates. It is intended
for the legal practitioner who has extensive experience working in the inter-American
system as much as for the practitioner or advocate who has little or no experience. The
Manual is divided into chapters to enable its users to select the sections most useful
to them. The advocate with little or no experience may want to start at the beginning,
and work through the Manual chapter by chapter. Chapters 1 and 2, which provide
background and framework information, describe the purpose, structure, and
governing instruments of the inter-American system, analyze the system’s treatment
of ESCR to date, and explain the procedural requirements for bringing an initial
petition before the Commission. Chapter 3 provides an introduction to the arguments
advocated in the Manual, stressing the importance of establishing a justiciable case.
Chapter 4 discusses applicable rules of treaty interpretation that advocates should
draw upon to urge an expansive reading of the Convention’s protections, while
chapter 5 details the international obligations States Parties assume upon ratifying the
Convention. Chapters 6–9 elaborate arguments for presenting ESCR claims to the
Commission and Court and suggests ways to frame issues to provide the strongest
legal support. Finally, Chapter 10 canvasses additional evidentiary and procedural
considerations relevant to the individual petitions process.  
ABBREVIATIONS USED THROUGHOUT THIS MANUAL
• ESCR = economic, social, and cultural rights
• CPR = civil and political rights
• Commission = Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
• Court = Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Chapter 1
The Inter-American System and
ESCR: Introduction & Background
Chapter  1 
THE  INTER-AMERICAN  SYSTEM  AND  ESCR:
INTRODUCTION  &  BACKGROUND
I. The Inter-American Human Rights System:
Purpose, Structure, and Division of Duties
stablished in 1948, the inter-American system has matured over the last fifty
years into a strong force for the protection of human rights in the Americas. The
Commission and Court, the primary organs of the regional human rights
system, have played an increasingly important role in publicizing and condemning
government policies and practices that violate fundamental rights and basic human
dignity. In order for advocates to work with and to influence these bodies, it is
necessary to understand the basic legal structure of the system in which they operate.
This section provides an overview of the system’s basic purposes, structure, and
division of duties, by introducing the respective roles and functions of its governing
instruments and its primary organs. The former include its framework documents,
their protocols, additional regional conventions, and the respective statutes and rules
of procedure of the Commission and Court. The primary organs of the system are the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights. A lawyer or practitioner planning to bring a case before the inter-
American system should be intimately familiar with all of these instruments and
institutions. 
A. Governing Instruments1
The inter-American system for the protection of human rights is governed by a set of
1 The texts of these documents as well as their current status regarding signature/ratification by the
OAS Member States can be found at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/basic.htm>. All treaties in the inter-
American system can be searched at <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties.html>.
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legal instruments that announce the broad purposes of the system, establish its
constituent bodies, articulate the substantive rights that the system is designed to
protect, and regulate the procedural functions of the constituent bodies. These
instruments can be broken down into four categories: (i) framework documents, (ii)
protocols to the American Convention, (iii) additional regional conventions, and (iv)
statutes and rules of procedure. 
GOVERNING INSTRUMENTS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
Framework Documents
• Charter of the Organization of American States (“OAS Charter”)
(1948)
• American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1948)
• American Convention on Human Rights (1969)
Protocols to the American Convention
• Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human
Rights in the Matter of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(“Protocol of San Salvador”) (1988)
• Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights Relative
to the Abolition of the Death Penalty (1990)
Additional Conventions
• Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Sanction Torture
(1985)
• Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of
Persons (1994)
• Inter-American Convention to Prevent, Sanction and Eradicate
Violence against Women (1994)
• Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Civil Rights to
Women (1948)
• Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Political Rights to
Women (1948)
• Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities (1999)
• Inter-American Convention against Corruption (1996)
Statutes & Rules of Procedure
• Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(1979)
• Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (2001)
• Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1979)
• Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (1997)
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Ratification vs. Signature: There is an important legal difference between ratifying
and signing a treaty. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna
Convention”) establishes the basic principles under which treaties are interpreted in
international law. It defines a “treaty” as “an international agreement concluded
between States in written form and governed by international law . . . .”2 “Treaties”
in the inter-American system include the OAS Charter, the American Convention, its
protocols, and a range of other conventions adopted by member States. 
“Ratification” is “the international act . . . whereby a State establishes on the
international plane its consent to be bound by a treaty.”3 A State that ratifies a treaty
becomes a “State Party” and is legally bound to perform each of the provisions of the
treaty in good faith.4 Failure to comply with any provision of a ratified treaty signifies
a breach of international law.
“Signature,” on the other hand, does not, in itself, establish a State’s consent to be
bound by the treaty. Rather, it is a preliminary step to ratification, a demonstration of
intent to consent to the terms of the treaty at a later time. Signature does, however,
create international obligations. Under the Vienna Convention, a State that has signed
a treaty is “obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of
a treaty.”5 This obligation remains in force until the State makes its intention clear not
to become a party to the treaty.6 Accordingly, while a State that has only signed a
2 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 2(1)(a), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, T.S. No.
58 (1980), U.N. Doc A/Conf 39/28, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969), entered into force Jan. 27, 1980
[hereinafter Vienna Convention], available at < h t t p : / / w w w. u n . o rg / l a w / i l c / t e x t s / t r e a t i e s . h t m >
(“. . . whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever
its particular designation;”).
3 Id. art. 2(1)(b). The international acts of “acceptance,” “approval,” and “accession” have the same
legal effect as “ratification.” See id.
4 Under the principle of pacta sunt servanda , “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to
it and must be performed by them in good faith.” Id. art. 26; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW [U.S.] § 321 cmt. a (1986) (affirming that doctrine of pacta sunt servanda
“is perhaps the most important principle of international law” and “includes the implication that
international obligations survive restrictions imposed by domestic law”). The Restatement goes on
to affirm that a state is responsible for carrying out the obligations of an international agreement; a
federal state may leave implementation to its constituent units, but the state remains responsible for
failures of compliance. See id. § 302 cmt. b.
5 Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 18 (emphasis added).
6 Article 18 provides in full: 
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose
of a treaty when:
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty
subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its
intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or
(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into
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treaty is not bound to take positive measures to fulfill the terms of the treaty, it is
legally obligated not to take any action that directly or indirectly contravenes the basic
purpose of the treaty.7 The basic purpose of the American Convention, like most
human rights treaties, is “the effective protection of human rights.”8
By contrast, a State that has neither signed nor ratified a treaty is not bound by the
treaty’s terms under international law.9 The exception to this rule is where the treaty
or one of its terms has become part of customary international or regional law.10
Customary international law, which is legally binding on all States,11 “results from a
general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation.”12 International agreements “may lead to the creation of customary
7 This is a particularly important distinction for States that have signed but not yet ratified the
American Convention and Protocol of San Salvador. States that have signed treaties will often
argue they do not have any obligations under them. Under the Vienna Convention, they are wrong.
See id.
8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Jun. 26, 1987
(Ser. C) No. 1, para. 30 (“The object and purpose of the American Convention is the effective
protection of human rights.”); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case,
Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Jun. 26, 1987 (Ser. C) No. 2, para. 35 (same); Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. Godínez Cruz Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Jun. 26, 1987 (Ser. C) No. 3, para.
33 (same); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Cayara Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Feb. 3, 1993
(Ser. C) No. 14, para. 37 (same); see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Matter of Viviana Gallardo and
Others, No. 101/81, Resolution of July 15, 1981, Decision of Nov. 13, 1981, para. 16 (“The
Convention has a purpose, which is the international protection of the essential rights of man”);
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention
on Human Rights (Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82 of Sept. 24, 1982 (Ser. A) No. 2,
para. 29 (“object and purpose is the protection of the basic rights of individual human beings.”);
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Convention on
Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-3/83 of Sept. 8, 1983 (Ser. A) No. 3, para. 50 (same); Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R., Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa
Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of Jan. 9, 1984 (Ser. A) No. 4, para. 24 (same).
9 See Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 34 (“Atreaty does not create either obligations or rights
for a third State without its consent.”).
10 See id. art. 38 (“Nothing in articles 34 to 37 precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming
binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international law, recognized as such.”). A rule
may also be recognized as part of regional customary law. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW [U.S.] § 102 cmt. e (1986) (“The practice of states in a regional or other special
grouping may create ‘regional,’‘special,’or ‘particular’ customary law for those states inter se. It
must be shown that the state alleged to be bound has accepted or acquiesced in the custom as a
matter of legal obligation, ‘not merely for reasons of political expediency.’”) (quoting Asylum Case
(Colom. v. Peru), [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 266, 277). 
11 Customary law becomes generally binding on all states through state practice.  In principle,
however, a state that indicates its dissent from a practice while the law is still in the process of
development is not bound by that rule even after it matures. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 102
cmt. d. Historically, such dissent and consequent exemption from a principle that became general
customary law has been rare. Id. A state that enters the international system after a practice has
ripened into a rule of international law is bound by that rule. Id.
12 Id. § 102(2). “State practice” and “opinio juris” are the two general requirements for recognizing
customary international law. “State practice” includes diplomatic acts and instructions, public
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international law when such agreements are intended for adherence by states
generally and are in fact widely accepted.”13
VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (1969)
Ratification: Creates a binding international legal obligation to
perform the terms of a treaty in good faith (art. 26). Failure to
perform the relevant terms signifies a breach of international law,
for which the breaching State may be held internationally
accountable. 
Signature: Creates a binding international legal obligation to
refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the
treaty (art. 18).
No signature/ratification: Confers no binding legal obligation to
comply with treaty terms, unless terms are part of customary
international/regional law.
1.   Framework Instruments
The “framework” instruments are those that represent the “core” of the inter-
American human rights system: they establish its basic structure, organs, purpose,
scope of protection, and rules for expansion. The framework instruments of the inter-
American system include the Charter of the Organization of American States (1948),
the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (1948), and the American
measures, governmental acts, and official statements of policy, whether unilateral, bilateral or
multilateral. It may also include inaction. The practice necessary to create customary law must be
“general and consistent,” but may be of comparatively short duration and need not be universally
followed. There is no precise formula to indicate how widespread a practice must be, but it should
reflect wide acceptance among the states particularly involved in the relevant activity. Failure of a
significant number of important states to adopt a practice can prevent a principle from becoming
general customary law; it may, however, become “particular customary law” for the participating
states. See id. § 102 cmt b.
States must also appear to follow the practice from a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris sive
necessitatis). A practice that is generally followed but which states feel legally free to disregard
does not contribute to customary law.A practice initially followed by states as a matter of courtesy
or habit may become law when states generally come to believe that they are under a legal
obligation to comply with it. In determining when that transformation into law has taken place,
explicit evidence of a sense of legal obligation (e.g., by official statements) is not necessary; opinio
juris may be inferred from acts or omissions. See id. § 102 cmt. c. 
13 Id. § 102(3).
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Convention on Human Rights (1969). These basic documents define the inter-
American system and establish the rights and duties incumbent upon OAS member
states.14
a. Charter of the Organization of American States
(“OAS Charter”)15
The OAS Charter, adopted in 1948 at the Ninth International Conference of American
States in Bogotá, Colombia, is the constitutional instrument of the OAS, the political
body of the American States. The OAS was established for the purposes of
strengthening regional peace and security, promoting and consolidating
representative democracy, ensuring the pacific settlement of disputes, achieving arms
reduction, and promoting economic, social, and cultural development.16 With the
Second World War just over, the regional protection of human rights was a central
concern of the framers of the OAS Charter. Indeed, the Charter proclaims the
“fundamental rights of the individual” as one of the principles on which the
Organization is based.17 The human rights obligations of the OAS Charter derive from
the preamble, articles 3 and 16, and articles 45 and 49. Though generally worded,
these latter provisions establish basic social and economic rights for the individual,
including the rights to education, material well-being, work, fair wages, social
security, strike, collective bargaining, participation in development decisionmaking,
and legal assistance.18
The OAS Charter, as an international treaty, is a binding legal instrument for all
thirty-five American States, each of which has ratified it as a requirement for
admission into the Organization.19 The Charter has been modified by the Protocol of
Buenos Aires in 1967 and the Protocol of Cartagena de Indias in 1985. Additional
modifications were introduced in 1992 through the Protocol of Washington, which
provides that one of the fundamental purposes of the OAS is to promote, through
14 Other regional instruments, such as additional protocols, conventions, and rules and regulations,
have been adopted to further refine the system. See infra.
15 Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
entered into force Dec. 13, 1951, amended 721 U.N.T.S. 324, entered into force Feb. 27, 1990,
O.A.S.T.S. Nos. 1–C, 61 [hereinafter OAS Charter], available at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/Básicos
/charter.htm>. 
16 See id. art. 2. 
17 See id. art. 3(l).
18 See id. arts. 45, 49. 
19 The OAS Member States include: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize,
Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, Suriname,
Trinidad and Tobago, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. For ratification information on the
OAS Charter, see <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/a-41.html>.
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cooperative action, the economic, social, and cultural development of the member
states and to assist in eradicating extreme poverty in the hemisphere. In 1996, the
Protocol of Managua entered into force, establishing the Inter-American Council for
Integral Development. 
b. American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man
(“Declaration”)20
The American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, adopted at the same
conference as the OAS Charter, may be considered the founding instrument of the
inter-American human rights system. The American Declaration also holds the honor
of being the first international human rights instrument of a general nature, having
been adopted seven months before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.21 The
Declaration’s purpose, as established in the foreword, is the “international protection
of the rights of man.” Such international human rights protection was to be “the
principle guide of an evolving American law.”22 Strong emphasis is placed on the
evolving nature of the system—recognizing that the American States “should
increasingly strengthen that system in the international field as conditions become
more favorable.”23 The protection afforded by the Declaration was thus, from the
OAS’s inception, intended to be progressively strengthened and sharpened to provide
the fullest, most effective protection of human rights in a changing society.
The American Declaration establishes a long list of rights, which OAS member states
commit to respect. Like the Universal Declaration, the American Declaration makes
no distinction between ESCR, on the one hand, and CPR, on the other. It protects the
rights to health, education, social security, work, fair remuneration, rest and leisure,
property, inviolability of the home, special protection for mothers, children, and the
family, and the benefits of culture just as fully and integrally as the rights to life,
liberty, personal security, fair trial, vote, due process, equality, expression, religion,
association, assembly, movement, and political participation. The lack of distinction
between the two “sets” of rights is emphasized by the fact that the provisions are
interspersed among each other, not categorized under separate sub-headings. 
20 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, O.A.S. Res. XXX, Int’l
Conference of Am. States, 9th Conference, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/I.4 Rev. XX (1948)
[hereinafter American Declaration], available at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/Básicos/basic2.htm>,
reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS INTHE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 17,
OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L.V/II.71, doc.6 rev.1 (1988) [hereinafter BASIC DOCUMENTS].
21 The American Declaration was adopted on May 2, 1948; the Universal Declaration was adopted on
Dec. 10, 1948. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 67th plen. mtg., art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
22 American Declaration, supra note 20, foreword, para. 3.
23 Id. para. 4. 
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The American Declaration is not a legally binding treaty.24 Despite the early hopes of
its original drafters,25 it was ultimately adopted not as a “treaty” but as a non-binding
“declaration” of proposed intent and common purpose. The Declaration has, however,
been interpreted by both the Commission and the Court as being indirectly binding on
all OAS member states, through the medium of the OAS Charter. As the Charter is a
legally binding treaty for all OAS member states, the human rights defined in the
Declaration may thus be viewed as indirectly binding on the same states. In the
Court’s words, “That the Declaration is not a treaty does not, then, lead to the
conclusion that it does not have legal effect . . . .”26 The Commission follows this
interpretation, applying the rights in the Declaration as an indirectly binding legal text
in its monitoring and petition work.27
c. American Convention on Human Rights
(“Convention”)28
The American Convention on Human Rights, a directly binding treaty, is the most
important legal instrument for vindicating rights through the inter-American system.
It articulates the human rights that the ratifying States have obligated themselves to
respect and to ensure, creates the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and defines
the functions and procedures of both the Commission and the Court. Adopted in
1969—more than twenty years after the Declaration—the Convention did not enter
into force until 1978. As of July 2001, the Convention had been ratified by twenty-
five of the thirty-five American states (see box below).
The “object and purpose” of the Convention is the effective “protection of the basic
rights of individual human beings.”29 As such, it obligates States Parties to “respect
24 The Inter-American Court has explicitly stated: “[T]he Declaration is not a treaty as defined by the
Vienna Convention because it was not approved as such . . . . It was neither conceived nor drafted
as a treaty. . . . [T]he Declaration was adopted as a declaration, without provision for any procedure
by which it might become a treaty.” Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Interpretation of the American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man Within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention
on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89 of July 14, 1989 (Ser. A) No. 10, paras. 33–34.
25 An unsuccessful minority movement sought to put these principles in treaty form, to impose an
obligation on states to honor them, and to create an Inter-American Court of Human Rights as an
enforcement mechanism. See G. POPE ATKINS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 22
(1997). 
26 Id. para. 47. 
27 See e.g., Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Roach and Pinkerton cases, Res. 3/87, Case 9647 (U.S.), in
ANNUAL REPORT OFTHE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1986–1987, at 147, para.
48, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.71 Doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1986–87] (“As a
consequence of articles 3j, 16, 51e, 112 and 150 of the Charter, the provisions of [the American
Declaration, Commission Statute, and Commission Regulations] acquired binding force.”).
28 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at
1, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23 doc. rev. 2, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970), entered into force July 18, 1978 [hereinafter
American Convention], available at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/Básicos/basic3.htm>.
29 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention
on Human Rights (Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82 of Sept. 24, 1982 (Ser. A) No. 2,
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the rights and freedoms recognized [t]herein and to ensure to all persons subject to
their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any
discrimination.”30 The Convention divides the “protected rights” into two categories
under separate chapters: “Chapter II: Civil and Political Rights” and “Chapter III:
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.” Significantly, twenty-three of the
Convention’s twenty-four protected rights fall under the “civil and political rights”
heading.31 Article 26, the sole provision under the ESCR chapter, obligates States
Parties to “undertake to adopt measures . . . with a view to achieving progressively .
. . the full realization of the rights implicit in the economic, social, educational,
scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the [OAS Charter].” 
To ensure protection of these rights, the Convention established the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights as an enforcement mechanism and consultative organ.
Individual petitions alleging a violation of the Convention may be lodged with the
Court by either the Commission or a State Party (not an individual). The Court’s
judgment on liability and reparations is final and not subject to appeal,32 and States
Parties commit to comply with those judgments in all cases in which they are
parties.33 The Convention also empowers the Court to issue advisory opinions on the
interpretation of the Convention and other human rights treaties applicable in the
American states.34
AMERICAN CONVENTION35
States Parties: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
para. 29; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-3/83 of Sept. 8, 1983 (Ser. A) No. 3, para.
50 (same); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the
Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of Jan. 19, 1984 (Ser. A) No. 4, para. 24
(same).
30 American Convention, supra note 28, art. 1(1). 
31 These include the rights to juridical personality, life, personal integrity, freedom from forced labor,
personal liberty, due process, freedom from ex post facto laws, compensation, privacy, reply, a
name, special protection of the family and the child, nationality, property, participation in
government, equal protection, judicial protection, and freedom of conscience, expression,
assembly, association, and movement. Id. arts. 3–25. 
32 See id. art. 67. 
33 See id. art. 68. 
34 See id. art. 64 (“The member states of the Organization may consult the Court regarding the
interpretation of this Convention or of other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in
the American states.”). For a fuller discussion of the Court’s advisory jurisdiction, see infra Chapter
10(VIII). 
35 Ratification status as of July 25, 2001. For updated status, see <http://www.oas.org/juridico/
english/Sigs/b-32.html>.
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Cont...
Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and
Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
Non-Parties: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Canada,
Cuba, Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
St. Lucia, and United States. 36
2. Protocols to the Convention
The framework documents described above were not intended to establish a static
system of human rights protection in the inter-American system. Rather, it was
recognized early that the system established by the Declaration, and subsequently by
the Convention, was incomplete as a mechanism to effectively protect the full
spectrum of human rights in the American States. The Declaration explicitly states
that the system should be “increasingly strengthen[ed] in the international field.”37
Likewise, the Convention expressly provides for amendments38 and protocols39 “with
a view to gradually including other rights and freedoms within its system of
protection.”40 Based on this mandate, two additional protocols have been adopted by
the OAS General Assembly—one on ESCR, the other on the prohibition of capital
punishment. 
a. Additional Protocol to the American Convention on
Human Rights in the Matter of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, “Protocol of San Salvador”41
The Protocol of San Salvador aims to fill the ESCR gap in regional treaty law.
Opened for signature in 1988, the Protocol entered into force with the ratification of
eleven countries in November 1999 (see box below). In contrast to the Convention,
36 The United States has signed the Convention. It thus has obligations under the Vienna Convention
to refrain from acts that defeat the “object and purpose” of the treaty.
37 American Declaration, supra note 20, pmbl., para. 4 (emphasis added). 
38 See American Convention, supra note 28, art. 76.
39 See id. art. 77.
40 See id.
41 Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69 (1988), 28 I.L.M. 156 (1989), entered into
force Nov. 16, 1999 [hereinafter Protocol of San Salvador], available at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/
Básicos/basic5.htm>, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 67.
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Cont...
which provides only a single, vaguely worded ESCR provision, the Protocol
incorporates an impressive list of ESCR. Articles 10, 11, 12 and 13 guarantee the
rights to health, a healthy environment, food, and education, respectively. Other
provisions protect the rights to work (art. 6), just, equitable, and satisfactory
conditions of work (art. 7), trade unionization (art. 8), social security (art. 9), the
benefits of culture (art. 14), and special protection of the family, children, elderly, and
handicapped (arts. 15–18).42
The Protocol underscores the critical need for “permanent protection and promotion”
of ESCR in the Americas; its preamble reaffirms the essential indivisibility of ESCR
and CPR and recognizes ESCR protection as a fundamental predicate to the
consolidation of democracy and development in the hemisphere.43 The Protocol
establishes two institutional mechanisms for such protection at the regional level: (1)
a state reporting system and (2) the individual petitions process governed by the
Convention. 
Under article 19, States Parties are required to submit periodic reports on the
progressive measures they have taken to ensure due respect for each of the rights set
forth in the Protocol.44 These reports are to be transmitted to the Commission and to
other specialized organizations of the inter-American system. The Commission, in
turn, may use these reports to formulate observations and recommendations
concerning the status of ESCR in individual States Parties, which it may publish in its
annual report or in a special country or issue report.45
The Protocol also makes the individual petition system, governed by Convention
articles 44–51 and 61–69, applicable to certain rights in the Protocol. Under article
19(6), victims may invoke the contentious jurisdiction of the Commission and,
through it, the Court for redress whenever a State Party directly violates articles
42 The Protocol is unique among international human rights instruments in expressly recognizing the
right to special protection for the elderly and handicapped. The drafters of the Protocol considered
these rights sufficiently important to warrant two separate articles. The Protocol’s provisions on the
right to a healthy environment and the rights of the child are, moreover, more thoroughly developed
than their counterparts in the ICESCR and ICCPR.
43 Protocol of San Salvador, supra note 41, pmbl. paras. 3, 6. 
44 Id. art. 19(1). The Commission deliberately incorporated the guidelines for preparation of such
reports in its rules of procedure (which can be easily amended), rather than in the Protocol itself.
It thereby hoped to avert the experience of ESCR reporting under article 42 of the Convention,
which established an inadequate system of protection that has not functioned since the Convention
has been in force. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
1985–1986, at 200, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.68 Doc. 8 rev. 1 (1986) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT
1985–86]. 
45 See Protocol of San Salvador, supra note 41, art. 19(7); Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, art. 57(1)(h), (2), approved during Commission’s 109t h
extraordinary period of sessions, Dec. 4–8, 2000, entered into force May 1, 2001 [hereinafter
Commission Rules of Procedure], available at <http://www.oas.org/cidh/básicos/basic16.htm>;
see also American Convention, supra note 28, art. 42.
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8(1)(a) and/or 13. These provisions establish the rights to unionization and education,
respectively.
PROTOCOL OF SAN SALVADOR46
Ratifications: Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, and
Uruguay.
Signature: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Dominican Republic, Haiti,
Nicaragua, and Venezuela. 
b. Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights
Relative to the Abolition of the Death Penalty47
The Protocol to Abolish the Death Penalty, approved by the OAS General Assembly
in 1990, seeks to abolish capital punishment in the Americas by means of State-by-
State ratification. 48 Affirming that “everyone has the inalienable right to respect for
his life, a right that cannot be suspended for any reason,”49 the Protocol goes into
effect immediately upon ratification for each State Party.50 As of July 2001, the
Protocol has been ratified by Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela.51 As the Commission has stated: “[T]he value of
human life must prevail over all others. The death penalty is an extreme attack on
human dignity and its application constitutes cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment
of the condemned person.”52
46 Ratification status as of July 25, 2001. For updated status, see  <http://www.oas.org/juridico/
english/Sigs/a-52.html>.
47 Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, Jun. 8, 1990,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 73 (1990) [hereinafter Protocol to Abolish the Death Penalty], available at <http://
www.cidh.oas.org/Básicos/basic7.htm>, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 80.
48 See id. art. 1 (“The States Parties to this Protocol shall not apply the death penalty in their territory
to any person subject to their jurisdiction.”), art. 2(1) (“No reservations may be made to this
Protocol.”). A concerted effort to include a provision in the 1969 American Convention that would
absolutely prohibit capital punishment failed in the drafting stages.
49 Id. pmbl. para. 2; see also id. pmbl. para. 5 (“[T]he abolition of the death penalty helps to ensure
more effective protection of the right to life.”). 
50 See Protocol to Abolish the Death Penalty, supra note 47, art. 4. 
51 For updated ratification status, see <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/a-53.html>. 
52 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Press Communiqué, No. 14/93, Wash., D.C., Aug. 10, 1993, in ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1993, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.85 Doc. 9
rev. (1994), at 603–04 [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993].
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3. Additional Conventions
Despite the generalized protection afforded by the framework documents and their
protocols, certain practices have proved so invidious, deep seated and enduring in the
American States that separate conventions have been necessary to provide specialized
and detailed protection to victims. Such has been the case with regard to the practices
of torture, forced disappearance, discrimination and violence against women,
discrimination based on disability, and corruption, among others. Under article 29 of
the American Convention, the Inter-American Court may use treaties such as these to
assist in interpreting the provisions of the Convention.53
a. Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish
Torture54
The Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, opened for signature
in 1985, entered into force in 1987. It provides a detailed definition of torture,
indicates who is to be held responsible for the crime, and promotes extradition of
accused torturers to the appropriate jurisdiction. Under the Convention, States Parties
promise not only to sanction perpetrators of torture severely, but to take effective
measures to prevent and punish other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
within their jurisdictions. States Parties also pledge to establish provisions in their
domestic laws to ensure torture victims are adequately compensated. When domestic
remedies are exhausted, alleged victims of torture may submit their cases to any
international forum, including the Inter-American Commission and Court, whose
competence has been recognized by the concerned State.55
INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION TO
PREVENT AND PUNISH TORTURE56
Ratifications: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Signature: Bolivia, Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua.
53 See infra Chapter 3(II) for a discussion of article 29.
54 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Dec. 9, 1985, O.A.S.T.S. No. 67,
entered into force Feb. 28, 1987, available at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/Básicos/basic9.htm>,
reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 83.
55 Id. art. 8.
56 Ratification status as of July 25, 2001. For updated status, see  <http://www.oas.org/juridico/
english/Sigs/a-51.html>.
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b. Inter-American Convention on Forced
Disappearance of Persons57
Recognizing that the forced disappearance of persons “constitutes an affront to the
conscience of the Hemisphere and a grave offense of an odious nature to the intrinsic
dignity of the human person,”58 the OAS General Assembly adopted the Inter-
American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons in 1994. The Convention
entered into force in 1996, following the second ratification. 
The Convention defines the crime of “forced disappearance” and prohibits States
Parties from practicing, permitting or tolerating the practice under any circumstances,
including states of emergency. It obligates States Parties to enact domestic legislation
to sanction the material authors of the crime, their accomplices, and accessories after
the fact (i.e., prohibiting the defense of “due obedience” to superior orders). It also
obligates States to provide reciprocal cooperative assistance in the extradition of
those responsible for forced disappearances, as well as in the search for, identification
of, and restitution of children transferred to other States as a consequence of their
parents’ or guardians’ forced disappearance. Petitions alleging forced disappearance
of persons may be submitted to the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American




Ratifications: Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama,
Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Signature: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua, and Peru.
57 Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons, June 9, 1994, OAS Doc.
OEA/Ser.P AG/doc.3114/94 rev. 1, entered into force Mar. 29, 1996, 33 I.L.M. 1529 (1994),
available at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/Básicos/basic11.htm>.
58 Id. pmbl. para. 3. 
59 Id. art. XIII. 
60 Ratification status as of July 25, 2001. For updated status, see <http://www.oas.org/juridico/
english/Sigs/a-60.html>.
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c. Inter-American Convention to Prevent, Sanction
and Eradicate Violence against Women61
The Inter-American Convention to Prevent, Sanction and Eradicate Violence against
Women, adopted on the same day as the Convention on Forced Disappearance,
entered into force in 1995. The Convention defines “violence against women” as “any
act or conduct, based on gender, [that] causes death or physical, sexual or
psychological harm or suffering to women, whether in the public or the private
sphere.”62 Such violence is proscribed when perpetrated by any person whether it
takes place within the family or household unit, in the community or workplace, or in
any public fora such as educational, health, or social service facilities.  When
perpetrated or condoned by the State or its agents, it is proscribed regardless of where
it occurs.63
The Convention also enumerates specific rights held by women64 and, in article 7,
defines state obligations to ensure those rights. States Parties are obligated to ensure
that state agents and institutions refrain from engaging in any act or practice of
violence against women, to adopt domestic legislation of a criminal, civil, and
administrative nature to sanction perpetrators of such violence, to guarantee effective
judicial protection for women victims of violence (e.g., accessibility of restraining
orders, diligent investigations, timely trials, effective reparation, just compensation),
and to undertake the progressive adoption of programs to raise consciousness in
society about violence against women.65 Importantly, the Convention further provides
61 Inter-American Convention to Prevent, Sanction and Eradicate Violence against Women, Jun. 9,
1994, e n t e red into forc e M a r. 5, 1995, available at  < h t t p : / / w w w. c i d h . o a s . o rg / B á s i c o s /
basic13.htm>.  
62 Id. art. 1. 
63 See id. art. 2. Article 2 provides: 
Violence against women shall be understood to include physical, sexual and
psychological violence:
(a) that occurs within the family or domestic unit or within any other interpersonal
relationship, whether or not the perpetrator shares or has shared the same
residence with the woman, including, among others, rape, battery and sexual
abuse;
(b) that occurs in the community and is perpetrated by any person, including, among
others, rape, sexual abuse, torture, trafficking in persons, forced prostitution,
kidnapping and sexual harassment in the workplace, as well as in educational
institutions, health facilities or any other place; and
(c) that is perpetrated or condoned by the state or its agents regardless of where it
occurs.
Id.
64 Id. arts. 3 (right to be free from violence in public and private spheres), 4 (right to recognition,
enjoyment, exercise, and protection of all human rights embodied in international human rights
instruments), 5 (free and full exercise of CPR and ESCR), 6 (rights to non-discrimination and
education free from stereotyped patterns of behavior or inferiority).
65 Id. arts. 7–9. 
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that “[a]ny person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally
recognized in one or more member states of the Organization, may lodge petitions
with the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights containing denunciations or
complaints of violations of Article 7 of this Convention by a State Party.”66 The
Commission is to consider such complaints in accordance with the norms and
procedures established for lodging and considering petitions under the American
Convention.67
INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION TO
PREVENT VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN68
R a t i f i c a t i o n s : Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas,
Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada,
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Kitts
and Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
d. Inter-American Convention on the Granting
of Civil Rights to Women69
Inter-American Convention on the Granting
of Political Rights to Women 70
A concern for women’s rights was manifest in the region from the inter-American
system’s founding. On the same day the American Declaration and OAS Charter were
adopted in 1948, the American states adopted two conventions extending civil and
political rights to women. Under the Inter-American Convention on the Granting of
Civil Rights to Women, States Parties agree to grant women the same civil rights as
men.71 Under the Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Political Rights to
66 Id. art. 12 (emphasis added). 
67 Id.
68 Ratification status as of July 25, 2001. For updated status, see <http://www.oas.org/juridico/
english/sigs/a-61.html>. 
69 Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Civil Rights to Women, May 2, 1948, O.A.S.T.S.
No. 23, enters into force for each State upon deposit of instruments of ratification, available at
<http://www.oas.org/cim/English/Conventions%20Civil%20Rights.htm>.
70 Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Political Rights to Women, May 2, 1948, O.A.S.T.S.
No. 3, entered into force Dec. 29, 1954, available at <http://www.oas.org/cim/English/Conventions
%20Polit.%20Rights.htm>.
71 See Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Civil Rights to Women, supra note 69, art. 1. 
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Women, States Parties agree that the right to vote and to be elected to national posts
must not be denied or restricted based on sex.72 The convention on women’s civil
rights has been ratified by twenty American states and signed by four,73 while the
convention on women’s political rights has been ratified by twenty-two and signed by
three.74
e. Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Persons with
Disabilities75
“ R e a ffirming that persons with disabilities have the same human rights and
fundamental freedoms as other persons,”76 the OAS General Assembly adopted the
Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Persons with Disabilities on June 7, 1999 in order “to prevent and eliminate
all forms of discrimination against persons with disabilities and to promote their full
integration into society.”77 The Convention defines “disability” as “a physical, mental,
or sensory impairment, whether permanent or temporary, that limits the capacity to
perform one or more essential activities of daily life, and which can be caused or
aggravated by the economic and social environment.”78 It defines “discrimination
against persons with disabilities” as “any distinction, exclusion, or restriction based
on a disability, record of disability, condition resulting from a previous disability, or
perception of disability, whether present or past, which has the effect or objective of
impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment, or exercise by a person with a
disability of his or her human rights and fundamental freedoms.”79
States parties undertake to adopt the legislative, social, educational, labor-related, or
other measures necessary to eliminate discrimination against persons with disabilities
and to promote their full integration in society. Such measures shall include providing
72 Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Political Rights to Women, supra note 70, art. 1. 
73 The American States that have ratified the women’s civil rights convention include: Argentina,
Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Suriname, Uruguay, and
Venezuela. Bolivia, Haiti, Peru, and St. Kitts and Nevis have signed the convention. For updated
ratification status, see <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/a-45.html>.
74 The American States that have ratified the women’s political rights convention include: Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, Suriname,
Uruguay, United States, and Venezuela. El Salvador, Honduras, and Mexico have signed the
convention. For ratification updates, see <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-44.html>.
75 Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons
with Disabilities, Jun. 7, 1999 (not yet in force), available at <http://www.oas.org/cidh/básicos/
disability.htm>. 
76 Id. pmbl.
77 Id. art. II.
78 Id. art. I(1) (emphasis added).
79 Id. art. I(2)(a). 
19
Governing Instr u m e n t s
or making available employment, transportation, communications, housing,
recreation, education, sports, law enforcement, and political and administrative
activities to persons with disabilities. They shall also include ensuring that new
buildings, vehicles, and facilities are constructed to facilitate access by such persons.
All obstacles to access are to be eliminated to the extent possible.80 States parties also
undertake to give priority to early detection and intervention, treatment,
rehabilitation, education, job training, and the provision of comprehensive services to
ensure the optimal level of independence and quality of life for persons with
disabilities. They further commit to increase public awareness through educational
campaigns aimed at eliminating prejudices, stereotypes, and other attitudes that
jeopardize the right of persons to live as equals.81
To promote and monitor compliance with the Convention, a Committee for the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Persons with Disabilities is to be
established following the deposit of the eleventh instrument of ratification. The
Committee is to be composed of one representative appointed by each state party and
shall undertake the task of examining and reviewing state reports on the activities
undertaken, progress achieved, and difficulties encountered under the Convention.82
These reports are to be submitted to the OAS General Secretariat every four years. 
INTER-AMERICAN DISABILITIES DISCRIMINATION
CONVENTION83
R a t i f i c a t i o n s : Argentina, Costa Rica, Mexico, Panama, and
Uruguay
Signatures: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica,
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela.
f. Inter-American Convention against Corruption84
Finally, the Inter-American Convention against Corruption was adopted March 29,
1996, in order to “ensure the effectiveness of measures and actions to prevent, detect,
80 Id. art. III(1). 
81 Id. art. III(2). 
82 Id. art. VI. 
83 Ratification status as of July 25, 2001. For updated status, see <http://www.oas.org/juridico/
english/sigs/a-65.html>.
84 Inter-American Convention against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, entered into force Mar. 6, 1997,
available at <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Treaties/b-58.html>. 
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punish and eradicate corruption in the performance of public functions and acts of
corruption specifically related to such performance.”85 It has since been ratified by
eighteen States. Defining “acts of corruption” in article VI, States Parties agree to take
measures to create, maintain, and strengthen standards of conduct for public
functionaries, mechanisms to enforce those standards, ethical training for government
personnel, systems for registering the income, assets, and liabilities of public
functionaries, transparent systems of government hiring and procurement of goods
and services, laws to deter corruption in revenue collection and tax treatment, systems
for protecting “whistleblowers,” oversight bodies, and mechanisms to encourage
participation by civil society and NGOs in efforts to prevent corruption.86
INTER-AMERICAN CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION87
R a t i f i c a t i o n s : Argentina, Bahamas, Bolivia, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad
and Tobago, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
Signatures: Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Haiti, Suriname.
4. Statutes & Rules of Procedure
The final category of legal instruments regulating the function of the inter-American
human rights system includes the statutes and rules of procedure of the Commission
and Court. These instruments establish the jurisdiction and procedural norms of each
body in more specific terms than those announced in the American Convention.
While the statute of each organ is adopted by majority vote in the OAS General
Assembly, the organs themselves establish their own rules of procedure. The
practitioner interested in lodging a complaint before the Commission and Court
should be intimately familiar with these important jurisdictional and procedural
instruments. 
85 Id. art. II(2). 
86 Id. art. III. 
87 Ratification status as of July 25, 2001. For updated status, see <http://www.oas.org/juridico/
english/sigs/b-58.html>.
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a. Statute of the Inter-American Commission
of Human Rights88
The Statute of the Inter-American Commission was approved by the OAS General
Assembly in 1979. It establishes the nature and purposes of the Commission (art. 1),
its membership and structure (arts. 2–15), its headquarters and meetings (arts. 16–17),
its functions and powers (arts. 18–20), and its Secretariat (art. 21). As established by
its Statute, the Commission was “created to promote the observance and defense of
human rights and to serve as consultative organ of the Organization in this matter.”89
b. Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights90
In accordance with articles 22–24 of its Statute, the Commission approved its Rules
of Procedure in April 1980, modifying them in 1985, 1987, 1995, and 2000. The
Rules establish the precise procedural guidelines governing the work of the
Commission. They provide for the Commission’s composition, membership, and
functions (arts. 1–21); specify the procedures for presenting petitions, undertaking
on-site observations and hearings, and preparing published and unpublished reports
(arts. 22–70); and define the Commission’s relationship with the Court (arts. 71–74).
Adherence to the Commission’s procedures, as set out in its Rules, is crucial to the
success of every petition. Failure to follow the detailed procedures may result in
summary dismissal.  
c. Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights91
The Statute of the Court was approved by the OAS General Assembly in 1979 and
entered into force in 1980. It defines the Court as “an autonomous judicial institution
whose purpose is the application and interpretation of the American Convention on
Human Rights.”92 The Statute defines and explains the jurisdiction and seat of the
Court (arts. 2–3), its composition and structure (arts. 4–14), its rights, duties, and
88 Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Oct. 1979, O.A.S. Res. 447 (IX-
0/79), O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.P/IX.0.2/80, vol. 1, at 88 [hereinafter Commission Statute],
available at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/Básicos/basic15.htm>, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS,
supra note 20, at 93. 
89 Commission Statute, supra note 88, art. 1(1).
90 Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 45. The Commission’s new rules entered into force
May 1, 2001. 
91 Statute of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, Oct. 1979, O.A.S. Res. 448 (IX-0/79),
O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.P/IX.0.2/80, vol. 1, at 98, entered into force Jan. 1, 1989 [hereinafter
Court Statute], available at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/Básicos/basic17.htm>, reprinted in BASIC
DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 133. 
92 Id. art. 1. 
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responsibilities (arts. 15–21), its internal workings (arts. 22–26), and its relations with
governments and organizations (arts. 27–30). 
d. Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights93
In accordance with article 60 of the Convention and article 25 of the Court’s Statute,94
the Court approved the last modification of its Rules of Procedure in September 1996.
Entering into effect in 1997, the Rules provide for the organization and functioning
of the Court (arts. 3–19) as well as the Court’s procedures for such matters as interim
measures, preliminary objections, written and oral proceedings, the taking of
evidence, witness testimony, disqualification, the delivery of judgments, and advisory
opinions (arts. 20–56). 
B. Organs
The primary organs of the inter-American human rights system are the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights. 
1. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
(“Commission”)
The Commission, the “engine” of the regional human rights system, was created in
1959 and has been headquartered in Washington, D.C., since 1960. It is an
autonomous organ of the OAS, representing all of the member states of the
Organization. Its mandate—“to promote the observance and defense of human
rights”95—is set forth in the OAS Charter and the American Convention, while its
procedures and organizational guidelines are defined by the Commission’s Statute
and Rules of Procedure. In terms of the Commission’s mandate, “human rights” are
93 Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, entered into force Jan. 1, 1997
[hereinafter Court Rules of Procedure], available at < h t t p : / / w w w. c i d h . o a s . o rg / B á s i c o s /
basic18.htm>, reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 145. 
94 See Court Statute, supra note 91, art. 25(1) (“The Court shall draw up its Rules of Procedure.”).
95 OAS Charter, supra note 15, arts. 52, 111; American Convention, supra note 28, art. 41 (stating
main function of Commission is “to promote respect for and defense of human rights”); see also
Commission Statute, supra note 88, art. 1 (“The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is
. . . created to promote the observance and defense of human rights.”); Commission Rules of
Procedure, supra note 45, art. 1(1) (stating Commission’s principle function is “to promote the
observance and defense of human rights”). 
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understood to be the rights enshrined in the American Convention for States Parties,
and the rights enshrined in the American Declaration for non-party states.96
The Commission meets in ordinary and special sessions several times a year.97 It is
composed of seven members of “high moral character and recognized competence in
the field of human rights,” who serve for terms of four years and who may be
reelected once.98 They are elected in a personal capacity by secret ballot and majority
vote by the OAS General Assembly from a list of candidates proposed by the member
states.99 No two members may be nationals of the same state.100
The Commission undertakes three general types of activities: (1) consideration of
individual petitions alleging violations of the Convention or Declaration; (2) general
human rights monitoring in OAS member states; and (3) development of human
rights law and education. These activities are further described in the box below.
POWERS & FUNCTIONS OF THE COMMISSION:101
I. CONSIDERATION OF INDIVIDUAL PETITIONS ALLEGING VIOLATION
OF CONVENTION OR DECLARATION.
1. Receive, analyze, and investigate individual petitions
alleging violations of the rights protected in the Convention
or Declaration.102 Any person, group of persons or non-
governmental organization may present a petition to the
Commission, either on their own behalf or on behalf of a third
person.103 Certain admissibility requirements must be met.104
After verifying the facts in the petition, the Commission may
carry out an investigation and may request states concerned to
furnish any pertinent information through oral or written
statements.105 From 1965, when the Commission was first
96 Commission Statute, supra note 88, art. 1(2).
97 Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 45, art. 14. 
98 See Commission Statute, supra note 88, arts. 2(1), 6. 
99 See id. arts. 3, 5. 
100 See id. arts. 2–7.
101 The functions and powers of the Commission are enumerated in articles 18 to 20 of its Statute, in
its Rules of Procedure, and in articles 41 to 51 of the Convention. 
102 See American Convention, supra note 28, arts. 44–51; Commission Statute, supra note 88, arts.
19–20; Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 45, art. 27. 
103 Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 45, art. 23; see also id. art. 24 (“The Commission may
also, motu propio , initiate the processing of a petition which, in its view, meets the necessary
requirements.”). 
104 See infra Chapter 2(II) for a discussion of these admissibility requirements. 
105 See American Convention, supra note 28, art. 48(d), (e). 
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expressly authorized to examine individual complaints, until the
present, the Commission has received tens of thousands of
petitions, which have resulted in more than 12,000 admissible
cases. In recent years, the Commission has been processing as
many as 800 individual cases at a time. 
2. Request precautionary & provisional measures: In serious
and urgent cases, and whenever necessary according to the
information available, the Commission may request that a State
adopt precautionary measures to prevent irreparable harm to
persons.106 Such measures may be requested either on its own
initiative or at the request of a party.107 In cases of extreme
gravity or urgency in a matter that has not yet been submitted to
the Court for consideration, the Commission may also request
that the Court order a State to adopt provisional measures.108
3. Seek friendly settlement: “The Commission shall place itself at
the disposal of the parties concerned with a view to reaching a
friendly settlement of the matter on the basis of respect for the
human rights recognized in th[e] Convention.”109
4. Make recommendations to Governments concerning
individual petitions: If a friendly settlement is not reached, and
after the investigatory stage of the individual petition process is
complete, the Commission may prepare, and transmit to the
State concerned, a confidential report that includes its findings
and recommendations for resolving the violations alleged in the
petition.110 This report may not be made public. 
5. Publish findings of human rights violations: If, within a
period of three months, the matter has not been settled or
submitted to the Court, the Commission may publish its report
and findings in its annual report or in any other appropriate
manner.111
6. Submit meritorious cases to the Inter-American Court:
Rather than publish its report, the Commission may submit a
case to the Inter-American Court for consideration once the
procedures in articles 44–50 have been completed (provided
the State Party concerned has recognized the Court’s
jurisdiction).112 The Commission appears in the litigation of all
106 See Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 45, art. 25(1).
107 See id.
108 See id. art. 74; see also Commission Statute, supra note 88, art. 19(3). 
109 American Convention, supra note 28, art. 48(f). 
110 See id. art. 50; Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 45, art. 43. 
111 See American Convention, supra note 28, art. 51; Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 45,
arts. 45. 
112 See American Convention, supra note 28, art. 51; Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 45,
art. 44. Once the procedures in articles 44–50 have been exhausted, it is advisable that the victim
or her legal representative submit a supplementary brief to the Commission requesting the




cases before the Court.113
II. MONITOR AND PUBLICIZE HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS
IN MEMBER STATES.
1. Undertake on-site visits: The Commission may carry out on-
site visits in OAS member states to undertake a more in-depth
analysis of the general situation and/or a specific situation.114
These visits usually result in the preparation of a published
report regarding the human rights situation observed, which is
sent to the OAS General Assembly. From 1961 to 1999, the
Commission carried out sixty-nine visits to twenty-three member
states.
2. Prepare annual reports: The Commission must prepare and
submit to the OAS General Assembly an annual report.115 The
annual reports are to include an analysis of the human rights
situation in the hemisphere; a brief account of the origin, legal
basis, structure, and purposes of the Commission; a summary
of the Commission’s activities during the preceding year; a
statement on the progress made in attaining the objectives of
the Declaration and Convention; a report on the areas in which
measures should be taken to improve observance of the human
rights set forth in the Declaration and Convention; the set of final
published reports, individual case resolutions, and
recommendations that the Commission considers pertinent;
special reports or updates on the human rights situation in
several countries; and a list of press releases and other
Commission statements, among others.116
3. Publish special country reports:The Commission periodically
publishes special “country reports” analyzing the human rights
situation in particular member states and providing
recommendations to the government on the adoption of
progressive measures to strengthen human rights protection by
statute, constitutional amendment, international treaty
commitment, or other appropriate policy.117
113 See American Convention, supra note 28, art. 57; Commission Statute, supra note 88, art. 19(2);
Court Statute, supra note 91, art. 28 (“The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights shall
appear as a party before the Court in all cases within the adjudicatory jurisdiction of the Court…”).
The procedure for the Commission to follow before the Court is provided in articles 73–76 of its
Regulations.
114 See Commission Statute, supra note 88, art. 18(7); Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 45,
arts. 51–55. 
115 See Commission Statute, supra note 88, art. 18. 
116 See Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 45, art. 57. 
117 See American Convention, supra note 28, art. 41(b), (c); Commission Statute, supra note 88, art.
18(2), (3); Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 45, art. 58. Country reports from 1962 to
2001 are available at <http://www.cidh.org/publications.htm>.
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4. Publish special issue reports: In order to further “develop the
awareness of human rights among the peoples of America,”118
the Commission also carries out and publishes studies on
specific issues.119 Special issue reports have been published on
such themes as judicial independence, irregular armed groups,
human rights of children and women, and human rights of
indigenous peoples. 
5. Receive, request, and make recommendations regarding
States’reports on the realization of ESCR recognized in the
Declaration, OAS Charter, and Protocol of San Salvador.120
Under article 42 of the Convention, the Commission is given the
mandate to “watch over the promotion of the rights implicit in the
economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards
set forth in the [OAS Charter].” To facilitate this mandate, States
Parties are required to transmit to the Commission a copy of the
reports they submit annually to the Inter-American Economic
and Social Council and to the Inter-American Council for
Education, Science, and Culture. Article 19 of the San Salvador
Protocol likewise requires States Parties to submit annual
reports to the Commission on measures they have taken to fulfill
the ESCR enshrined in the Protocol. Based on these reports
(where provided)—and other reports, studies, and information
submitted to the Commission by any person, group, or
organization—the Commission may make observations and
recommendations on the situation of ESCR in all or any of the
OAS member states and include them in its annual report or in
a special report. 
III. DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND EDUCATION.
1. Request advisory opinions from Court: The Commission, as
a specialized organ of the OAS, is competent to request
advisory opinions from the Inter-American Court regarding
questions of interpretation of the American Convention. 121
2. Submit draft protocols and proposed amendments to the
C o n v e n t i o n : The Commission may submit proposed
amendments and protocols to the American Convention to the
OAS General Assembly for consideration and adoption. 122
3. Educational forum: In order to disseminate information and to
increase knowledge regarding issues relating to the inter-
American human rights system,1 2 3 the Commission may
organize and carry out conferences, seminars, and meetings
with representatives of governments, academic institutions,
non-governmental groups, etc.
118 American Convention, supra note 28, art. 41(a); Commission Statute, supra note 88, art. 18(1). 
119 American Convention, supra note 28, art. 41(c); Commission Statute, supra note 88, art. 18(3).
120 Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 45, arts. 57–58; Protocol de San Salvador, supra note
41, art. 19. 
121 See American Convention, supra note 28, art. 64. 
122 See id. arts. 76(1), 77; Commission Statute, supra note 88, art. 19(5), (6). 
123 See American Convention, supra note 28, art. 41(a); Commission Statute, supra note 88, art. 18(1). 27
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All correspondence with the Commission should be directed to its Executive
Secretariat. In accordance with the Commission’s Rules of Procedure, the Executive
Secretariat receives and processes petitions and other communications addressed to
the Commission, requests relevant information from interested parties, and prepares
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2. Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“Court”)
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is defined by its Statute as “an
autonomous judicial institution whose purpose is the application and interpretation of
the American Convention.”125 As a tribunal, its primary purpose is the adjudication of
concrete cases involving protected persons and States Parties to the Convention.  
The Inter-American Court came into being in 1979 following the entry into force of
the American Convention. It is composed of seven part-time, independent judges
nominated in their individual capacity by the States Parties to the Convention and
elected by secret ballot by an absolute majority vote in the OAS General Assembly.126
Judges must be jurists of the “highest moral authority” and of recognized competence
in the field of human rights. They must possess the qualifications required for the
exercise of the highest judicial functions in conformity with the law of the state of
which they are nationals or of the state that proposes them as candidates.127 The first
seven judges of the Court were elected in May 1979. On September 3, 1979, the Court
was officially installed in San José, Costa Rica, where it continues to have its seat.
124 Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 45, art. 13.
125 Court Statute, supra note 91, art. 1; see also American Convention, supra note 28, art. 62(3)
(defining the Court’s jurisdiction as comprising “all cases concerning the interpretation and
application of the provisions of this Convention that are submitted to it”). 
126 See American Convention, supra note 28, arts. 52–53. Only States Parties to the Convention may
participate in the voting procedure.
127 See id. art. 52. 
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The Court adopted its Rules of Procedure in August 1980 and decided its first
contentious case in 1987. Since then, the Court has decided more than fifty
contentious cases and issued sixteen advisory opinions. 
The Court has both contentious and advisory jurisdiction.128 The Court’s contentious
jurisdiction is governed by articles 61–63 of the Convention; its advisory jurisdiction
is governed by article 64. The former refers to the adjudication of concrete cases
concerning alleged violations of the Convention by a State Party, and includes the
power to adopt provisional remedies. A “case” is typified by the existence of an actual
controversy between a State Party and a human person; that is, a person claims to
have suffered concrete injury as a proximate result of an act imputable to the State.
The Court’s advisory jurisdiction, by contrast, deals with human rights concerns in
abstracto. It refers to the issuance of non-contentious opinions that serve to advise the
American community on the interpretation or application of human rights provisions
generally, without regard to any particular case or controversy.
FUNCTIONS OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT
1. Adjudicate individual petitions. The Court shall adjudicate
cases submitted to it by the Commission or States Parties to the
Convention regarding alleged violations of the A m e r i c a n
Convention that have caused concrete injury to human
persons.129 It shall provide an effective remedy to victims where
a breach of the Convention has been found.130
2. Adopt provisional measures. The Court may adopt special
provisional measures, when necessary to avoid irreparable
damage to persons, in cases of extreme gravity and urgency.131
3. Issue advisory opinions. The Court may issue opinions
regarding the interpretation of the Convention or other human
rights treaties applicable in the American States upon request by
the Commission, a State Party, or an OAS organ.132 It may also
issue opinions on the compatibility of domestic legislation with
those treaties, when requested by a State Party.133
128 See id. arts. 61–64; Court Statute, supra note 91, art. 2. 
129 See American Convention, supra note 28, arts. 61–62. 
130 See id. arts. 63(1). 
131 See id. art. 63(2); Court Rules of Procedure, supra note 93, art. 24.
132 See American Convention, supra note 28, art. 64(1). 
133 See id. art. 64(2).
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a. Individual Petitions
The Court’s contentious jurisdiction is limited by Convention article 62(3) to
resolution of “cases” in which a State Party has caused concrete injury to the
guaranteed rights of protected persons. States Parties are subject to the Court’s
contentious jurisdiction only upon making an independent declaration recognizing the
Court’s jurisdiction.134 Once a State has made this declaration, the Court has
automatic jurisdiction in any matter brought before it against that State. States Parties
that have not made such a declaration may accept the Court’s jurisdiction by special
agreement on a case-by-case basis. 135 The Court does not have jurisdiction over non-
party States or States Parties to the Convention that have not made the necessary
declaration under article 62. 
COURT JURISDICTION OVER OAS MEMBER STATES
Mandatory jurisdiction: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and
Venezuela.
Non-mandatory jurisdiction: (may recognize in specific cases):
Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, and Jamaica. 
No jurisdiction: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Canada,
Cuba, Guyana, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia, St. Kitts
and Nevis, and United States.
Only States Parties and the Commission have the right to submit an individual
petition to the Court.136 Individuals, groups, and NGOs must present their complaints
initially to the Commission. The Commission will then make an admissibility
determination, investigate the case, seek a friendly settlement, prepare a report
containing the facts and its conclusions, and send it to the interested State. If no
remedy is forthcoming, the Commission may then submit the case to the
consideration of the Court on the original petitioner’s behalf.
If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by the
Convention, the Court is empowered to remedy the violation for the injured party.
134 See id. art. 62.
135 See id. 
136 See id. art. 61(1).
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Under Convention article 63, the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured
enjoyment of the right that was violated, that the consequences of the measure or
situation that constituted the breach be remedied, and that fair compensation be paid
to the injured party. The judgments of the Court on both liability and reparation are
final and not subject to appeal.137 States Parties undertake to comply with those
judgments in any case to which they are parties.138 In case of disagreement regarding
the meaning or reach of a decision, a party to the case may request that the Court
interpret it to provide the necessary clarification.139
The Convention limits the contentious jurisdiction of the Court to “cases concerning
the interpretation and application of the provisions of th[e] Convention.”140 Absent
supplementary authority,141 the Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate
violations of other international instruments, such as the American Declaration or the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).142 It may
do so in certain circumstances, however, pursuant to the interpretive mandate
enshrined in article 29, as further discussed in chapter 4.143
b. Requests for Provisional Measures
The Court is also empowered to adopt provisional measures “[i]n cases of extreme
gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons.”144
These measures may be adopted sua sponte in matters under the Court’s consideration
or, with respect to a case not yet submitted to it, at the request of the Commission.145
The Court has made a regular practice of ordering such measures to protect the rights
to life and personal integrity of alleged victims and witnesses in cases pending before
it.146
137 See id. art. 67.
138 See id. art. 68. 
139 See id. art. 67. The request must, however, be presented within 90 days of the date of notification
of the decision. Id.
140 See American Convention, supra note 28, art. 62(3) (“The jurisdiction of the Court shall comprise
all cases concerning the interpretation and application of the provisions of this Convention that are
submitted to it, provided that the States Parties to the case recognize or have recognized such
jurisdiction [by special declaration or agreement].”). 
141 Several other inter-American treaties specifically provide that the Court may exercise jurisdiction
over certain rights protected therein. See Protocol of San Salvador, supra note 41, art. 19(6); Inter-
American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, supra note 54, art. 8; Inter-American
Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons, supra note 57, art. XIII; Inter-American
Convention to Prevent, Sanction and Eradicate Violence against Women, supra note 61, art. 12.
142 Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976 [hereinafter ICESCR].
143 See supra Chapter 4(II) discussing direct and indirect application of other international instruments
by Commission and Court pursuant to Convention article 29(b) and (d). 
144 American Convention, supra note 28, art. 63(2). 
145 Id.
146 See, for example, the cases of Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Godínez Cruz , Fairén Garbi and Solís
Corrales, Caballero Delgado and Santana, Blake, Paniagua Morales, Suárez Rosero, Loayza
Tamayo and Cesti Hurtado.
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c. Advisory Opinions
Finally, the Court is competent to issue “advisory opinions” at the request of OAS
member states and organs regarding the interpretation of the Convention or other
treaties related to the protection of human rights in the American states.147 At the
request of a member state, it may also issue opinions concerning the compatibility of
that state’s domestic laws with the Convention or with any other applicable human
rights treaty.148
As the Court has recognized, the advisory jurisdiction conferred upon the Court by
article 64 is “more extensive than that enjoyed by any international tribunal in
existence today.”149 “[It] can be exercised, in general, with regard to any provision
dealing with the protection of human rights set forth in any international treaty
applicable in the American States, regardless of whether it be bilateral or multilateral,
whatever be the principal purpose of such a treaty, and whether or not non-Member
States of the inter-American system are or have the right to become parties thereto.”150
COURT PUBLICATIONS
The Court publishes official copies of its judgments and advisory
opinions in Spanish and English. The Court’s publications are
divided into five series: 151
• Serie A: Judgments and Opinions (Advisory Opinions) 
• Serie B: Pleadings, Oral Arguments and Documents (Advisory
Opinions) 
• Serie C: Decisions and Judgments (Contentious Cases) 
• Serie D: Pleadings, Oral Arguments, and Documents
(Contentious Cases) 
• Serie E: Provisional Measures
Practice Tip
Practitioners should closely examine how other successful
cases were pleaded, argued, and decided before they bring
their own case. 
147 See American Convention, supra note 28, art. 64(1).
148 Id. art. 64(2).
149 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., “Other Treaties” Subject to the Advisory Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64
American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-1/82 of Sept. 24, 1982 (Ser. A) No.
1, para. 14. 
150 Id. para. 52 (emphasis added). 
151 The documents in each of these series are available at the Court’s seat in San José, Costa Rica, and
on the Internet at <http://corteidh-oea.nu.or.cr/ci/PUBLICAT/PUBLICAT.HTM> or <http://www1.
umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/iachr.html>.
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II. Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the
Inter-American System: Obstacles and
Opportunities
The role of the courts in protecting civil and political rights (CPR) has received
substantially increased attention in the inter-American system, at both the domestic
and regional levels, during the past two decades. The same has not been true of
economic, social, and cultural rights (ESCR). This discrepancy is due largely to the
enduring perception that only CPR are properly justiciable, that is, capable of being
adjudicated in courts of law.
The justiciability of ESCR has been hindered both by conceptual misunderstandings
about the precise nature of ESCR and by institutional weaknesses in the instruments
and organs protecting ESCR. This section analyzes both sets of barriers. It begins by
highlighting typical arguments against ESCR justiciability and responses that
advocates may draw upon in rebuttal. It then examines some of the institutional
deficiencies that have hindered ESCR enforcement in the inter-American system and
suggests ways they may be overcome. While substantial obstacles have long impeded
effective legal protection of ESCR, they are slowly beginning to erode. 
A. Typical Arguments against ESCR
Justiciability—and Responses
Most American states recognize ESCR in their constitutions, local laws, and/or
international treaty commitments. Nevertheless, domestic courts and legislatures have
long failed to recognize legal causes of action for such rights. Five interrelated
arguments are often cited by opponents of ESCR justiciability: (1) ESCR norms are
too vague for judicial enforcement; (2) ESCR represent “political goals” to be
achieved progressively within available resources, not “legal rights” enforceable by
courts; (3) ESCR are “positive” rights, which, unlike their “negative” CPR
counterparts, are nonjusticiable; (4) separation of powers prohibits courts from telling
the legislature how to spend public funds; and (5) ESCR are non-redressable because
there is no causal agent for poverty. This section attempts to develop, and respond to,
each of these arguments. 
1. ESCR norms are too vague for judicial
enforcement
It is often argued that ESCR suffer from a high degree of imprecision with respect to
the nature and extent of the obligations that attach to States under international law.
Statements that individuals have a right to “adequate food” or “adequate housing,” it
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is argued, provide no guidance as to the normative content, scope, and legal
implications of such norms. Terminological precision is essential for ensuring rights
in a juridical context. When a right is established in the law without explicit or clearly
implicit elaboration as to its scope, content, and counterpart obligations, such a right
is legally inoperative and cannot be claimed in the courtroom. 
ESCR Response: ESCR provisions are generally no more vague than CPR
provisions, such as those protecting “due process” or “equal protection.” Judges are
accustomed to, and peculiarly suited for, interpreting generalized norms and giving
them legal effect within a juridical context.152 While CPR have benefited from
significantly more authoritative interpretation over the past several decades, ESCR
experts, international human rights bodies, and some domestic courts are increasingly
providing authoritative guidance as to the normative content of ESCR provisions.
Traditional standing requirements, such as “injury in fact” and “proximate causation,”
moreover, provide further legal contour and cognizable limits to the justiciability of
ESCR, as with all rights.  
As the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has affirmed with
regard to the ESCR guaranteed in the International Covenant on Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights: 
In relation to civil and political rights, it is generally taken for granted
that judicial remedies for violations are essential. Regrettably, the
contrary assumption is too often made in relation to economic, social
and cultural rights. This discrepancy is not warranted either by the
nature of the rights or by the relevant Covenant provisions. The
Committee has already made clear that it considers many of the
provisions in the Covenant to be capable of immediate implementation
. . . . [T]here is no Covenant right which could not, in the great
majority of systems, be considered to possess at least some justiciable
dimensions.153
2. Rights to be achieved “progressively” are
development “goals” not “legal rights”
In a related argument, critics often point to the “progressivity” requirement that
generally attaches to ESCR. While CPR are governed by the unambiguous legal
152 The European Court of Human Rights and the West German Constitutional Court, for example,
have given explicit effect in judicial decisions to the concept of “human dignity.” 
153 The Domestic Application of the Covenant, General Comment No. 9, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on
Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., 19th Sess., Agenda item 3, para. 10, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1998/24
(1998) [hereinafter General Comment No. 9], available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/
MasterFrameView/4ceb75c5492497d9802566d500516036?Opendocument> (emphasis added).
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obligation to “respect” and to “ensure” such rights, ESCR are characterized by vague
notions of duties to “undertake measures . . . for the progressive realization” of ESCR
“within available resources.”154 A progressive duty, by definition, it is argued, cannot
be legally challenged in court because a State is not required to take any specific
action at any specific time. Financial constraints may make it impossible for a State
to take any positive action at all. A court may not force a state to do something that it
is financially and technically incapable of doing.
ESCR Response: The “progressivity principle,” and the legal duties it imposes upon
States, has been given explicit meaning by authoritative international interpretation
and is no less rigorous than the duties imposed by CPR. Indeed, international expert
bodies have affirmed that the same duties to “respect,” “protect,” and “fulfill”
protected rights attach to both CPR and ESCR. The Limburg Principles on the
Implementation of the ICESCR affirm, moreover, that “[u]nder no circumstances
shall [the progressivity principle] be interpreted as implying for States the right to
defer indefinitely efforts to ensure full realization [of ESCR]. On the contrary all
States parties have the obligation to begin immediately to take steps to fulfill their
obligations under the Covenant.”155
The U.N. Committee on ESCR similarly asserts that the progressivity principle
imposes an obligation “to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible” toward
the full realization of ESCR.156 This duty exists independently of an increase in
154 Compare International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2 (“Each State Party . . .
undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant . . . .”) with ICESCR, supra note 142, art.
2 (“Each State Party . . . undertakes to take steps . . . to the maximum of its available resources,
with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present
Covenant by all appropriate means . . . .”).
155 See Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 43rd Sess., Annex, para. 21, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1987/17 (1987) [hereinafter Limburg Principles], reprinted in 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 122 (1987)
(emphasis added). The Limburg Principles were agreed upon unanimously by a group of
distinguished experts in international law, convened by the International Commission of Jurists and
several law faculties in Maastricht, Netherlands, in June 1986 to consider the nature and scope of
the obligations of States parties to the ICESCR. The experts believe the principles reflect the
present state of international law. Participants came from twelve countries, the U.N. Centre for
Human Rights, the ILO, UNESCO, WHO, the Commonwealth Secretariat, and the sponsoring
organizations. Four of the participants were members of the ECOSOC Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights. 
156 See The Nature of States Parties Obligations, General Comment No. 3, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on
Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., 5th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 83, para. 9, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (1990)
[hereinafter General Comment No. 3], reprinted in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS:A
TEXTBOOK 442 (Asbjørn Eide et al. eds., 1995), available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/
(symbol)/CESCR+General+comment+3.En?OpenDocument>; see also id. para. 16 (“All States
parties have an obligation to begin immediately to take steps towards full realization of the rights
contained in the Covenant.”); Limburg Principles, supra note 155, para. 21 (“[The progressivity
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available resources and notwithstanding the level of national wealth.157 These bodies
have also recognized that there are certain ESCR that require “i m m e d i a t e
implementation in full by all States parties”—such as the right to non-discrimination
in the provision of ESCR and the right to non-regressivity in ESCR enjoyment.158 The
Inter-American Commission has echoed this duty, stating that OAS member States
are “obligate[d] . . . , regardless of the level of economic development, to guarantee
a minimum threshold of [economic, social, and cultural] rights.”159 Where the failure
of the State to undertake one of these duties leads to concrete impairment of a
person’s protected ESCR, the State in question may be held legally accountable for
the resulting injury.
3. “Positive” vs. “negative” rights dichotomy
Critics often argue, moreover, that ESCR are non-justiciable because they impose
“positive,” rather than “negative,” obligations on the State. Under this view, CPR are
justiciable because they ask only that governments refrain from taking abusive
actions—don’t kill, don’t torture. By contrast, protection of ESCR requires large
government expenditures on social provisions and infrastructure. Courts are
institutionally ill positioned to make the kind of complex fiscal decisions necessary to
create the structures and programs for full realization of ESCR.  Such positive
measures are matters of policy, reserved to the legislature to undertake within
available resources. 
ESCR Response: The “negative/positive” dichotomy between CPR and ESCR is
inapposite as a marker of justiciability: both “negative” and “positive” duties inhere
in all human rights, whether ESCR or CPR. The State, for example, has just as strong
a negative duty to refrain from destroying a family’s food supply as it does from
torturing detainees in custody. At the same time, the State’s positive duty to create an
electoral system in which fair voting by secret ballot can be achieved for all citizens
obligation] requires States parties to move as expeditiously as possible towards the realization of
the [ESC] rights.”). As the ESCR Committee underscores, “the [progressivity] phrase must be read
in the light of the overall objective, indeed the raison d’_tre, of the Covenant which is to establish
clear obligations for States parties in respect of the full realization of the rights in question.” Id. The
same may be said of the obligations in article 26 of the American Convention. 
157 See Limburg Principles, supra note 155, para. 25 (“States parties are obligated, regardless of the
level of economic development, to ensure respect for minimum subsistence rights for all.”); see
also General Comment No. 3, supra note 156, paras. 10 (“In order for a State party to be able to
attribute its failure to meet at least its minimum core obligations to a lack of available resources it
must demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its disposition in
an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations.”), 12 (“[E]ven in times of
severe resource constraints . . . the vulnerable members of society can and indeed must be protected
by the adoption of relatively low-cost targeted programmes.”). 
158 See Limburg Principles, supra note 155, para. 22; General Comment No. 3, supra note 156, para. 5.
159 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 52, at 524 (emphasis added).
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is just as binding as its obligation to create a health care system in which minimal
health services may be reasonably secured by all. Both sets of duties are subject to
judicial review where the State’s failure to reasonably fulfill them leads to concrete
injury to persons’ protected rights. Indeed, while there are definite limits to the
remedies a court can order, courts regularly require States to undertake positive action
to remedy violations of constitutional and international human rights. 
The European Court of Human Rights, for example, has roundly rejected the
contention that the European Convention on Human Rights creates only negative
duties. With regard to the Convention provision protecting freedom of assembly, it
has observed: “[A] purely negative conception would not be compatible with the
object and purpose of [the provision, which] . . . sometimes requires positive
measures to be taken, even in the sphere of relations between individuals, if need
be.”160 The Inter-American Court has likewise insisted that article 1(1) of the
American Convention generates extensive positive duties on the State to regulate
private relations in society that may violate the interests safeguarded by human
rights.161 It has repeatedly imposed liability on the State where such positive action
has not been taken. Likewise, national courts regularly hold governments accountable
for failure to take protective action to preserve fundamental rights. While such courts
often leave the precise parameters of the remedial action to the discretion of the State,
they generally retain jurisdiction over the case until the remedial mandate is fulfilled.
Courts insist on their ability to determine when that point is reached. 
4. The constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers forbids courts from instructing
legislatures how to allocate public funds.
A persistent argument against ESCR justiciability is that the doctrine of separation of
powers prohibits courts from encroaching upon the legislative function of deciding
how to allocate scarce public resources. ESCR require significant public expenditures
on social programs for health care, housing, nutrition, education, environmental
protection, social security systems, etc. Because of these budgetary implications, it is
argued, the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers between the judiciary,
legislature, and executive branch prohibits a court from enforcing ESCR claims;
courts do not have the constitutional power to tell the legislatures how to spend public
monies.
ESCR Response: There are three responses to this argument. First, many ESCR have
no financial implications whatsoever. For example, the right not to be forcefully
160 Plattform “Arzte Fur Das Leben” v. Austria, 139 Eur.Ct.H.R. (ser. A) at 12 (1988). 
161 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C)
No. 4, paras. 164–82.
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evicted from one’s home without a court order or the right to be free from
discrimination in the provision of public services require only that the State refrain
from acting. Second, budgetary implications are simply not a bar to justiciability.
Many CPR with long histories of judicial enforcement have significant budgetary
implications. The right to vote or the right to due process of law, for example, could
not be realized without substantial public expenditure to establish and maintain vast
electoral and court systems. This expenditure is not a bar to their justiciability. The
U.N. Committee for ESCR has explained: 
It is sometimes suggested that matters involving the allocation of
resources should be left to the political authorities rather than the
courts. While the respective competences of the various branches of
government must be respected, it is appropriate to acknowledge that
courts are generally already involved in a considerable range of
matters which have important resource implications. The adoption of
a rigid classification of economic, social and cultural rights which puts
them, by definition, beyond the reach of the courts would thus be
arbitrary and incompatible with the principle that the two sets of
human rights are indivisible and interdependent. It would also
drastically curtail the capacity of the courts to protect the rights of the
most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in society.162
This understanding has been reaffirmed in several recent opinions by the South
African Constitutional Court. The 1996 South African Constitution guarantees the
right of access to housing, to health care, to sufficient food and water, to social
security, to basic education, and to a healthy environment.163 In 1996, the South
African Constitutional Court rejected a challenge to the inclusion of these rights as
justiciable rights in the Constitution.164 Petitioners argued that such inclusion
breached the doctrine of separation of powers as it would result in the courts dictating
to the government how the budget should be allocated. In rejecting this claim, the
Court pointed to the fact that many civil and political rights (including the rights to
equality, free speech, and a fair trial) also have budgetary implications and may
require courts to interfere with the policy choices of the legislature and executive:
“The fact that socio-economic rights will almost inevitably give rise to such
implications does not seem to us to be a bar to their justiciability.”165 The Court has
162 General Comment No. 9 , supra note 153, para. 10. 
163 See S. AFR. CONST. arts. 24, 26, 27, 29, available at <http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/sf00000_.
html>.
164 See In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, CCT23/96, 1996
(10) BCLR 1253 (CC), available at <http://www.concourt.gov.za/judgments/1996/const.html>.
165 See id. para. 77; see also id. para. 78 (“These rights are, at least to some extent, justiciable. . . .
[M]any of the civil and political rights entrenched in the [Constitution] will give rise to similar
budgetary implications without compromising their justiciability. The fact that socio-economic
rights will almost inevitably give rise to such implications does not seem to us to be a bar to their
justiciability. At the very minimum, socio-economic rights can be negatively protected from
improper invasion.”). 
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since enforced ESCR as fully justiciable rights in cases involving the constitutional
right of access to adequate housing and protection against forced evictions.166
Finally, the separation of powers doctrine is about ensuring accountability to the law,
not shielding government branches from it. Under the separation of powers doctrine,
the judiciary should not encroach upon the legitimate law- and policy-making
functions of the coordinate branches by ordering the adoption of a policy that the
legislature or executive has previously rejected or not considered in the first instance.
However, under the related doctrine of judicial review, once the legislature or
executive has created law, ratified a treaty, or undertaken a consistent policy, the court
may hold the other branch accountable to the legal obligations assumed thereunder.
This is not a violation of the separation of powers doctrine; rather, it is precisely the
reason the doctrine was created—i.e., to prevent the arbitrary exercise of public
power by ensuring the political accountability of the most powerful branches.
5. ESCR are non-redressable because there is no
causal agent for poverty
A fifth argument against ESCR justiciability is that poverty, though lamentable, is a
persistent and enduring condition of modern society that cannot be remedied through
judicial action. Legal liability requires a judicial finding of “injury” and “causation,”
and the ability to redress the injury. As there is no legal causation for poverty, ESCR
may not be enforced in the courts. Poverty and inequality will persist whatever
remedial actions the State undertakes.
ESCR Response: There are at least two fundamental flaws with the above logic.
First, it equates ESCR violations with generalized conditions rather than with
concrete injury to specific individuals resulting from acts imputable to the State.
While general conditions are often the focus of state reporting mechanisms and other
political action initiatives, the existence of widespread poverty, in itself, does not state
a justiciable claim; although it may be a good indication that a state is engaging in
injury-causing acts or omissions, which are justiciable.167
As will be discussed in chapter 5, infra, a State Party to an ESCR treaty may be held
internationally liable for ESCR violations where any of its agents engage in acts or
omissions that infringe upon protected rights, where it fails to protect individuals
166 See Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, 2000, CCT 11/00, para. 20 (“The
question is [] not whether socio-economic rights are justiciable under our Constitution, but how to
enforce them in a given case.”).
167 The ESCR advocate must be careful, in a judicial context, not to allege a violation of ESCR solely
on the basis of the existence of conditions of poverty or deprivation among the population. The
violation arises by the express acts or omissions of the state in exacerbating or failing to address
those conditions with respect to individual persons.
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from violations of their rights by private third parties, or where it fails to undertake
measures that are incumbent upon it to take and concrete injury to human persons
proximately results. Whether these acts or omissions were the “cause” of the concrete
injury to protected rights is a question of fact for resolution by the finder of fact. Thus,
the fact that poverty may be “enduring” does not alter the obligations of States to
refrain from engaging in acts that impair protected rights and to protect individuals
from such acts by private parties.
Second, the above argument assumes ESCR violations arise only in conditions of
poverty. While ESCR violations occur most frequently, and create the most harm to
human dignity and physical integrity, in situations of impoverishment, ESCR (like
CPR) belong to all persons—rich, middle-class, and poor. States have special
obligations to ensure the minimum core content of ESCR to the most needy,168 but the
obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill human rights must be met for all persons at
all times. The denial of health care, the cutback of social security programs, and the
inadequacy of basic public education are violations of ESCR for all social strata. 
ESCR CONCLUSIONS:
1. The same legal standards apply to ESCR and CPR.
2. Whether ESCR or CPR are involved, a State’s violation of its
obligations to respect rights and to protect against third-party
violation of rights is always justiciable where concrete injury to
human persons results from illegal acts imputable to the State. 
3. The State duty to fulfill is justiciable for both CPR and ESCR
where the manner of allocation of government benefits has
violated the principles of non-discrimination, due process, and
non-regressiveness, and concrete injury to human persons has
resulted.
4. ESCR are not a “separate sphere” from CPR; ESCR and CPR
are intimately intertwined and interdependent. 
168 As the U.N. Committee on ESCR has explained, basing its opinion on ten years of extensive
experience examining states’reports under the ICESCR: 
[T]he Committee is of the view that a minimum core obligation to ensure the
satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is
incumbent upon every State party. Thus, for example, a State party in which any
significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential
primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of
education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant.
General Comment No. 3, supra note 156, para. 10; see also Limburg Principles, supra note 155,
para. 25 (“States parties are obligated, regardless of the level of economic development, to ensure
respect for minimum subsistence rights for all.”).
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B. Governing Instruments:
ESCR Obstacles and Opportunities
In addition to conceptual misunderstandings concerning ESCR justiciability,
institutional obstacles have long stood in the way of effective ESCR protection in the
inter-American system. These obstacles stem primarily from the fact that justiciable
ESCR are not expressly incorporated into the system’s governing legal instruments.
This section examines the ESCR protected by those instruments, and the obstacles to
and opportunities for their effective enforcement. 
1. OAS Charter
ESCR: The OAS Charter contains a number of ESCR. Most concretely, these include
the rights to education, material well-being, work, fair wages, social security, strike,
collective bargaining, participation in development decisionmaking, and legal
assistance.169 The Charter also makes reference to State obligations to ensure the basic
goals of proper nutrition and availability of food, adequate housing, a healthy urban
environment, stability of domestic prices, fair wages, employment opportunities,
acceptable working conditions for all, rapid eradication of illiteracy, expansion of
educational opportunities, and equitable and efficient land-tenure systems,
distribution of national income, and systems of taxation.170
O b s t a c l e s : Several substantial obstacles impede effective protection of these
provisions, however. Most significantly, neither the Court nor Commission is
competent to adjudicate violations of the OAS Charter. The Court’s contentious
jurisdiction is limited to interpreting and applying the Convention,171 while the
Commission’s competence is limited to promoting the observance and defense of the
rights set forth in the Convention and Declaration.172 While both organs have
competence over additional treaties that specifically provide for their jurisdiction, the
OAS Charter has no such provision. Another major barrier is the Charter’s lack of
textual reference to “rights.” Despite the Charter’s status as a legally binding treaty,
most of its ESCR-related provisions are denominated “principles and mechanisms”173
and “basic goals”174 rather than “rights.” 
O p p o rt u n i t i e s : There are nevertheless several under-utilized opportunities for
indirectly enforcing the ESCR provisions of the OAS Charter. The Charter may be
169 See OAS Charter, supra note 15, arts. 45, 49. 
170 See id. art. 34. 
171 American Convention, supra note 28, art. 62(3).
172 Commission Statute, supra note 88, art. 2. 
173 See OAS Charter, supra note 15, art. 45. 
174 See id. art. 34. 
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interpreted or indirectly applied by the Court pursuant to three treaty authorizations:
(1) Convention article 26; (2) Convention article 29(b); and (3) the Court’s advisory
jurisdiction.
First, and most importantly, States Parties to the Convention are expressly obligated
under article 26 to “undertake to adopt measures . . . with a view to achieving
progressively . . . the full realization of the rights implicit in the economic, social,
educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the [OAS Charter].” Since
the Court’s primary mandate is to apply the provisions of the Convention to
individual cases, article 26 opens up the possibility of holding States accountable,
under the Court’s contentious jurisdiction, for respecting, ensuring, and progressively
achieving the rights implicit in the OAS Charter. This opening, referred to here as the
“article 26 approach,” is further discussed in chapter 8.
Second, pursuant to Convention article 29(b), the Commission and Court are
prohibited from interpreting any provision of the Convention in such a way as to
“restrict[] the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of
. . . another convention to which one of the said states is a party.” Since all OAS
member states are, by definition, party to the OAS Charter, the Convention may not
be interpreted or applied so as to restrict the protections afforded by the OAS Charter.
Petitioners may thus refer to the OAS Charter in their arguments before the
Commission and Court, urging them to interpret Convention principles in light of the
protections afforded by the Charter.
Finally, under its advisory jurisdiction, the Court may issue opinions interpreting any
“treat[y] concerning the protection of human rights in the American States,” including
“opinions regarding the compatibility of any . . . domestic laws with the aforesaid
international instruments.”175 This clearly includes the OAS Charter, which is a treaty,
applicable to the American States, concerning human rights.176 OAS member states
and organs may thus seek authoritative statements by the Court on the ESCR
provisions of the OAS Charter.177 These advisory opinions may be used to assist or
pressure States to enforce the Charter in their domestic legal systems.178 They may
175 American Convention, supra note 28, art. 64.
176 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., “Other Treaties” Subject to the Advisory Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64
American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-1/82 of Sept. 24, 1982 (Ser. A) No.
1, para. 52 (stating that the advisory jurisdiction of the Court can be exercised “with regard to any
provision dealing with the protection of human rights set forth in any international treaty
applicable in the American States.”) (emphasis added). 
177 Individuals may not request advisory opinions. Only OAS member states and organs may solicit
advisory opinions on the interpretation of international human rights treaties. Only OAS member
states may consult the Court about the compatibility of domestic laws with those instruments. See
American Convention, supra note 28, art. 64 . Individuals may, however, lobby their governments
or OAS organs to request an advisory opinion on ESCR justiciability.
178 As the Court has affirmed, “The advisory jurisdiction of the Court is closely related to the purposes
of the Convention. This jurisdiction is intended to assist the American States in fulfilling their
international human rights obligations . . . .” Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., “Other Treaties” Subject to the
Advisory Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory
Opinion OC-1/82 of Sept. 24, 1982 (Ser. A) No. 1, para. 25.
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also open up opportunities for the Court and Commission to look to the Charter when
interpreting the Convention under its contentious jurisdiction.
OAS CHARTER
PROTECTED ESCR: 
• Rights to education, material well-being, work, fair wages, social
s e c u r i t y, strike, collective bargaining, participation in
development decisionmaking, and legal assistance (arts. 45,
49). 
OBSTACLES TO ENFORCEABILITY:
• No contentious jurisdiction: Neither the Court nor Commission is
competent to directly interpret or apply the OAS Charter in the
individual petitions process.
• Lack of textual reference to “rights”: OAS Charter refers to
“principles” and “goals,” rather than “rights”
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT:
• Art. 26: The OAS Charter may be indirectly enforced through
Convention article 26, which enshrines the “rights implied in the
[ESC] standards of the [OAS Charter].”  
• Art. 29(b): The Commission and Court may be urged to
indirectly apply the Charter by interpreting the Convention so as
not to restrict the ESCR protected by the Charter.
• Advisory opinion: Advisory opinions may be requested from the
Court by OAS member states or organs on the scope and effect
of the ESCR provisions in the OAS Charter.
2. American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man
ESCR: Like the OAS Charter, the American Declaration establishes a long list of
ESCR.179 It does so, however, in a much more precise and detailed manner. The
Declaration protects the rights to health, to education, to social security, to work, to
fair remuneration, to rest and leisure, to property, to inviolability of the home, to
special protection for mothers, children, and the family, and to the benefits of
culture.180
179 Indeed, the Declaration has been held to “define[] the human rights referred to in the Charter.”
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
Within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory
Opinion OC-10/89 of July 14, 1989 (Ser. A) No. 10, para. 45.
180 See American Declaration, supra note 20, arts. XI (health), XII (education), XVI (social security),
XIV (work and fair remuneration), XV (leisure), XXIII (property), IX (inviolability of home), VII
(special protection for mothers and children), VI (protection of family), XIII (culture). 
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O b s t a c l e s : Nevertheless, substantial obstacles have historically impeded the
Declaration’s effective enforcement. Most importantly, the Court lacks jurisdiction
over the Declaration under both its contentious and advisory functions. Under article
63(2), the Court may interpret and apply only the Convention under its contentious
jurisdiction. The Declaration does not provide separate authority for the Court’s
jurisdiction. Under article 64, meanwhile, the Court is competent to issue advisory
opinions only on “treaties.” The Declaration is not a treaty as defined by the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.181
The Commission, for its part, may apply the Declaration only to member states that
are not party to the Convention; it must apply the Convention to States Parties.
Because twenty-five of the thirty-five OAS member states have ratified the
Convention, this severely limits the Declaration’s relevance to the legal protection
afforded by the inter-American human rights system. 
A third obstacle is that the Declaration is not binding in a formal legal sense. There is
thus no legal mechanism for enforcing compliance with the Commission’s resolution
of even the limited number of cases to which it is competent to apply the Declaration.
This weakness is compounded by the fact that the Commission lacks specific
enforcement powers. 
Opportunities: Despite these barriers, the Declaration may be indirectly enforced
through Convention article 29(d), particularly as read with article 26, and through the
Court’s advisory jurisdiction. 
Convention article 29(d) provides that no provision of the Convention may be
interpreted as “excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration . . . may
have.” Petitioners may, therefore, urge the Court and Commission to take the
Declaration expressly into consideration when interpreting and applying the
Convention under its contentious jurisdiction. As the Court has itself affirmed:
For the States Parties to the Convention, the specific source of their
obligations with respect to the protection of human rights is, in
principle, the Convention itself. It must be remembered, however, that,
given the provisions of Article 29(d), these States cannot escape the
obligations they have as members of the OAS under the Declaration,
notwithstanding the fact that the Convention is the governing
instrument for the States Parties thereto.182
181 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
Within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory
Opinion OC-10/89 of July 14, 1989 (Ser. A) No. 10, para. 33 (“[T]he Declaration is not a treaty as
defined by the Vienna Conventions because it was not approved as such, and . . . consequently, it
is also not a treaty within the meaning of Article 64(1).”).
182 Id. para. 46 (emphasis added). 
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The potential role of article 29(d) is particularly strong as read with Convention
article 26. Article 26 obligates States Parties to undertake measures to achieve the full
realization of the ESCR implicit in the OAS Charter. The Court has specifically
recognized that, “[f]or the member states of the Organization, the Declaration is the
text that defines the human rights referred to in the Charter”183 and that the OAS
Charter “cannot be interpreted and applied as far as human rights are concerned
without relating its norms . . . to the corresponding provisions of the Declaration.”184
Petitioners may thus urge the Commission and Court to indirectly apply the
provisions of the Declaration, in conformity with article 29(d), in interpreting and
applying Convention article 26 and its incorporation into the Convention of the rights
implicit in the Charter.
Although the Declaration is not a “treaty,” the Court’s advisory jurisdiction may also
be invoked to help determine the scope and effect of the Declaration. The Court has
recognized that “[t]he mere fact that the Declaration is not a treaty does not
necessarily compel the conclusion that the Court lacks the power to render an
advisory opinion containing an interpretation of the American Declaration.”185
Provided the Court remains within the framework of its jurisdiction related to the
Convention, the Charter, and other treaties concerning the protection of human rights
in the American states, it is authorized to render an advisory opinion interpreting the
American Declaration.186 This may be done, the Court has recognized, by invoking
article 29(d) or the preamble of the Convention, both of which refer to the
Declaration.187 It may also be done by interpreting and applying the norms of the OAS
Charter, which require that the Declaration’s corresponding provisions be taken into
account.188 Thus, by framing an advisory opinion request in terms of the American
Convention, the OAS Charter or other human rights treaty applicable to the American
states, such as the Protocol of San Salvador or the ICESCR, the Court may be




• Rights to health, education, social security, work, fair
remuneration, rest and leisure, property, inviolability of the
183 Id. para. 45; see also id. para. 43 (“[T]he Declaration contains and defines the fundamental human
rights referred to in the Charter.”). 
184 Id. para. 43. 
185 Id. para. 35. 
186 See id. para. 48. 
187 See id. para. 36. 
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home, special protection for mothers, children, and the family,
and the benefits of culture.189
OBSTACLES TO ENFORCEABILITY:
• Court is not competent to directly interpret or apply the
Declaration; 
• Commission must apply the Convention, not the Declaration, to
States that have ratified the Convention;
• Declaration is a legally non-binding instrument; 
• Commission lacks enforcement powers.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT:
• Art. 29(d): Declaration can be indirectly applied through
Convention article 29(d); 
• Art. 26:  Declaration is the text that defines the “rights implicit in
the OAS Charter” for purposes of interpreting and applying
Convention article 26;
• Advisory opinion: Advocates may request a competent entity to
request an advisory opinion from the Court on the Declaration’s
ESCR provisions, through the medium of the Convention, OAS
Charter, or other human rights treaty applicable to the American
states.
3. American Convention on Human Rights
ESCR: The Convention’s only express reference to ESCR is found in article 26,
which provides that “States Parties undertake to adopt measures . . . with a view to
achieving progressively, by legislation or other appropriate means, the full realization
of the rights implicit in the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural
standards set forth in the [OAS Charter].” 
Obstacles: The relative absence of specific ESCR provisions is the clearest obstacle
to effective ESCR enforcement under the Convention. This barrier is compounded by
the fact that the Convention formally separates CPR from ESCR. Chapter II, entitled
“Civil and Political Rights,” includes articles 3–25, while Chapter III, entitled
“Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,” includes only article 26. This formal
separation could be interpreted as implying that the two “sets” of rights were intended
to be distinct. 
The second major obstacle is article 26 itself. Article 26 has historically been viewed
as largely inoperative—creating “programmatic goals” for States, but no legally
binding obligations nor justiciable rights. Neither the Commission nor Court has ever
found an article 26 violation in the individual petitions process.
189 For respective article numbers, see supra note 180. 
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O p p o rtunities: Despite these obstacles, significant opportunities are present.
Chapters 6 through 9 of this Manual elaborate four strategic approaches for applying
the Convention to ESCR cases in the individual petitions process: the “indirect
approach,” the “integration approach,” the “article 26 approach,” and the “complex
violations approach.” These strategies build on the established jurisprudence of the
Court and Commission, particularly regarding the interdependence of ESCR and
CPR, the Convention’s “object and purpose,” and article 29.190
The Court’s advisory jurisdiction may also be used to elicit an authoritative opinion
on the protective possibilities for ESCR under the Convention. The Court itself has
noted that it “may have an important role to play in the promotion and protection of
economic, social and cultural rights,” particularly “in light of what Article 29 says
about the interpretation of the Convention.”191
Finally, amendment of the Convention remains open as a possibility under articles 31,
76, and 77. The Commission has explicitly recognized the necessity of improving the
inter-American system through the incorporation of new rights. As stated in its 1988-
89 Annual Report:
[It would] be advisable to review the substantive rights incorporated in
the Convention, many of which were derived from the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights of 1966. One important way of
adding to the protection afforded in the 1969 Convention is by the
adoption of additional protocols, as provided for by articles 31 and 77
of the Convention. In addition, if the Commission deems it
appropriate, it may decide to completely revise the Convention, using
the opportunity to incorporate new rights, both individual as well as
collective, into the Convention, thereby perfecting the inter-American
system for the protection of human rights.192
The Court has supported the incorporation of “new rights” into the Convention
through the use of additional protocols, recognizing that “some economic, social, and
cultural rights can be protected by the same system as is used to protect political and
civil rights, in which the Inter-American Court must play a necessary role.”193 
190 See infra Chapters 6–9 for a detailed discussion of these strategies. 
191 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1986, at 44–45, para. 14,
OEA/Ser.L/III.15 Doc. 13 (1986) [hereinafter INTER-AM. COURT ANNUAL REPORT 1986]; see also
id. at 42, para. 2 (“Economic, social, and cultural rights are the same in substance as political and
civil rights. All derive from the essential dignity of man, all are inalienable right[s] of the
individual, and all must be promoted, guaranteed and protected nationally, regionally and
globally.”).
192 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1988–89, at 244,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.76 Doc. 10 (1989).
193 See, e.g., INTER-AM. COURT ANNUAL REPORT 1986, supra note 191, at 43–44, para. 10 (stating that
“if the intention is to include ‘other rights’under the Convention’s system of protection, what must
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AMERICAN CONVENTION
PROTECTED ESCR: 
• Article 26: “. . . rights implicit in the economic, social,
educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the
[amended OAS Charter].”
OBSTACLES TO ENFORCEABILITY:
• Lack of specific ESCR provisions: Only one of the Convention’s
25 protected rights specifically refers to ESCR.
• Art. 26: Historically viewed as creating programmatic goals,
rather than legal rights.
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT:
• “Indirect approach”: ESCR may be enforced through
“procedural” rights in Convention.
• “Integration approach”: The ESCR dimensions of Convention
rights may be enforced using article 29 and rules of treaty
interpretation.
• “Article 26 approach”: Article 26 may be used to protect the
ESCR implicit in the OAS Charter, at least when faced with
threats of regressivity.
• “Complex violations approach”: A select number of flagrant,
internationally censured ESCR violations may be adjudicated
under the Convention, even where not explicitly recognized
therein, where they violate multiple Convention provisions and
must be addressed in an integral fashion (e.g., as recognized for
crime of “forced disappearance” in Velásquez Rodríguez).
• Advisory opinion: Advisory opinions may be requested on article
26, on article 29, and on the scope of ESCR protection afforded
by the Convention’s other substantive provisions.
• A m e n d m e n t: Convention may be amended to incorporate
ESCR more explicitly.
4. Additional Protocol to the American Convention
on Human Rights in the Matter of ESCR
(“Protocol of San Salvador”)
ESCR: The Protocol of San Salvador was designed to overcome the historic decision
not to include specific provision for ESCR in the Convention. It contains an extensive
list of detailed ESCR provisions, including the rights to work (art. 6), just, equitable,
of necessity be done is to draft an additional protocol” both “because of the essential unity,
interdependence and mutual conditioning of all human rights” and “because some economic,
social, and cultural rights can be protected by the same system as is used to protect political and
civil rights, in which the Inter-American Court must play a necessary role (Arts. 61–63 of the
Convention).”). 
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194 See infra chapter 4 for a more developed discussion of article 29 and how it may be used in
petitions. 
195 Since the legal significance of article 19(6) and its scope is of such critical import, ESCR advocates
might urge either the Commission or a State Party to submit the question to the advisory
jurisdiction of the Court.
and satisfactory work conditions (art. 7), trade unionization (art. 8), social security
(art. 9), health (art. 10), a healthy environment (art. 11), food (art. 12), education (art.
13), the benefits of culture (art. 14), and protection of the family, the elderly, and the
handicapped (arts. 15, 17, 18), as well as the rights of the child (art. 16).
Obstacles: The effectiveness of the Protocol is nonetheless circumscribed by article
19(6), which appears to limit the rights subject to the contentious jurisdiction of the
Court and Commission to the right to unionize and the right to education, governed
by articles 8(1)(a) and 13 of the Protocol, respectively. Apparently, no other right set
forth in the Protocol may be considered in the individual petitions process. 
Opportunities: The Protocol undoubtedly opens up important opportunities for
protecting the rights to unionization and education. Nevertheless, these represent a
fraction of the Protocol’s “protected” rights. Advocates may, therefore, attempt to
enforce other recognized rights in the Protocol through Convention article 29, the
creative interpretation of article 19(6), or, as will likely be necessary, the Protocol’s
amendment procedure. Advocates may also pursue greater domestic accountability
for ESCR commitments by using the Protocol’s state reporting provisions. 
The most likely means of enforcing Protocol provisions other than articles 8(1)(a) and
13 is through Convention article 29, which provides a mechanism for both directly
and indirectly applying applicable human rights provisions in treaties other than the
Convention. As the Protocol is the international instrument that most concretely
gathers the principles of international law on ESCR for the states of the American
continent (and thus may be considered lex specialis on the topic), the Protocol may
be invoked through Convention article 29 to interpret and apply Convention
principles in the light most favorable to ESCR protection. In fact, the article 29
jurisprudence of the Court and Commission suggests that all applicable provisions of
the Protocol might be directly applied in cases involving States that are parties to both
the Convention and the Protocol, when both instruments are applicable to the object
of the complaint.194 Convention article 29 thus presents one mechanism for partially
circumventing the jurisdictional bar imposed by article 19(6) of the Protocol. 
Although the article 29 approach has sounder legal grounding, advocates may also
attempt to creatively interpret article 19(6) of the Protocol to open up possibilities for
enforcing rights beyond those to unionization and education.195 It is possible to argue,
for example, that article 19(6) is not in fact a limitation on the individual petition
process, but rather merely an indication of rights considered particularly suitable for
the petition system. Indeed, no Convention provision—including article 19—
50
The Inter-American System and ESCR: Introduction & Backgr o u n d
explicitly limits the rights that may be invoked in individual petitions.196 Such an
interpretation would be consistent with the fact that labor and education rights have a
long history of special protection in the inter-American system (hence meriting
special mention while not excluding other rights). It would also be consistent with the
view of the U.N. Committee on ESCR, international experts, national courts, and a
former Inter-American Court judge that all ESCR may be justiciable, and subject to
the same protections as CPR, to some degree.197 The determination as to whether a
given aspect of a right can be protected in the inter-American system should rest with
the considered judgment of the Commission and Court.198
As a rule of international law, moreover, a treaty is to be interpreted “in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose.”199 The context of article 19(6) and
the object and purpose of the Protocol both favor expanding the jurisdiction of the
Commission and Court over the ESCR recognized in the Protocol. The Protocol’s
preamble recognizes that although past international and regional instruments have
recognized ESCR, the Protocol is necessary in order that those rights be “reaffirmed,
developed, perfected and p ro t e c t e d .”2 0 0 As state reporting systems exist for
196 Article 19(6) reads: “Any instance in which the rights established in paragraph (a) of Article 8 and
in Article 13 are violated by action directly attributable to a State Party to this Protocol may give
rise, through participation of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and, when
applicable, of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, to application of the system of individual
petitions governed by Article 44 through 51 and 61 through 69 of the American Convention on
Human Rights.” Protocol of San Salvador, supra note 41, art. 19(6). 
197 See, e.g, General Comment No. 9, supra note 153, para. 10 (“[T]here is no [ICESCR] right which
could not, in the great majority of systems, be considered to possess at least some significant
justiciable dimensions.”); In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa,
1996, 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC), para. 78 (“At the very minimum, socio-economic rights can be
negatively protected from improper invasion.”); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Separate Vote of Judge
Rodolfo E. Piza Escalante, Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the
Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of Jan. 19, 1984 (Ser. A) No. 4, para. 6
(“[T]he standards of the Convention itself may be understood to be applicable to the so-called
‘economic, social and cultural rights’. . . .”).
198 In describing the Protocol upon adoption in 1988, a contemporaneous expert commentator noted:
“[T]he draft presented by the IACHR distinguished two different categories of rights to be
protected under the Protocol: (a) rights resembling civil and political rights and protected by means
similar to those . . . namely, protection through individual petition before the IACHR and [the
Court] . . . ; and (b) other rights whose observance would be monitored by means of a system of
reports.” Domingo E. Acevedo, I n t ro d u c t o ry Note: Additional Protocol to the A m e r i c a n
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San
Salvador), 28 I.L.M. 156, 158 (1989). The commentator did not say that the rights in (a) were
limited to articles 8(a) and 13, nor that the rest of the Protocol was relegated to (b). Under such a
view, it would seem most appropriate to leave the decision to the Commission to determine which
rights, under which circumstances, “resembled civil and political rights” and thus were capable of
being enforced in the individual petitions process. The right to education and unionization do not
fall so clearly into that category, nor other rights so clearly outside it, that a restrictive interpretation
of article 19(6) would be warranted. 
199 Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 31 (emphasis added).
200 Id. pmbl. para. 6 (emphasis added). 
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international ESCR instruments, such as the ICESCR, a good faith interpretation of
the preamble would conclude that the Protocol contemplated a different, more
effective mechanism for protecting ESCR. The Preamble further emphasizes the
absolute indivisibility of ESCR and CPR and, accordingly, the need for “permanent
protection” (not just promotion) of both sets of rights in the continent.201 An expansive
interpretation of article 19(6) is also supported by the Commission’s reiterated
insistence, when discussing the Protocol, on the indivisibility of ESCR and CPR, its
own obligation to protect ESCR as actively as it protects CPR, and the “need to
establish institutional mechanisms to effectively protect [ESC] rights.”202 As the
system’s experience shows, declared rights only become effective “legal” rights when
judicial enforcement is available.203 It must be underscored, however, that, in light of
the ordinary meaning to be given article 19(6), the argument that its jurisdictional
reference was intended to merely be illustrative will be difficult to make.204
201 See, e.g., Protocol of San Salvador, supra note 41, pmbl. para. 3 (“[B]oth [ESCR and CPR] require
permanent protection and promotion if they are to be fully realized . . . .”) (emphasis added).
202 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1985–86, supra note 44, at 195 (“In its last six annual reports to the
General Assembly, the Commission has highlighted the importance of ESCR and the need to
establish institutional mechanisms to effectively protect such rights.”) (emphasis added); see also
id. at 192 (“It is essential, under present circumstances [of unprecedented financial crisis], to
institute the means necessary to ensure for every man and woman in the hemisphere the enjoyment
of his or her economic, social and cultural rights. Hence the importance the Commission attributes
to the prompt adoption of an Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights
with regard to these rights.”) (emphasis added).
203 Indeed, despite the declaratory protection afforded by article 26 of the Convention as well as all of
the ESCR provisions in the OAS Charter and the Declaration, ESCR are still generally considered
“development goals” rather than “rights” in the American system. Accordingly, the Commission
has underscored that the “Additional Protocol should treat ESCR as rights that correspond to the
human individual as such, and refrain from referring to them as goals or objectives of
development.” AN N U A L RE P O RT O F T H E IN T E R- AM E R I C A N CO M M I S S I O N O N HU M A N RI G H T S
1983–1984, at 143, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.63, Doc. 10 (1984) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT
1983–84; see also IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1985–86, supra note 44, at 198 (“As human rights,
economic, social, and cultural rights are thus imposed imperatives and not merely desirable
development goals.”).
204 The two strongest legal arguments against recognizing jurisdiction over additional provisions in the
Protocol are based in the drafting history of the Protocol and in the principle that “[a legal] norm
is meant to have an effect and should not be interpreted in such a way as to negate its effect . . . .”
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No. 4, para. 64.
There is little reason to include article 19(6) if it was merely intended to be illustrative. 
The Vienna Convention, provides, moreover, that, when application of article 31 to a treaty term
leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure, “[r]ecourse may be had to supplementary means of
interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion,
in order to . . . determine the meaning.” Vienna Convention, supra note 2, art. 32. The preparatory
work of the Protocol, as reported by the Commission, suggests that the intent of the drafters was to
limit the rights that could be submitted to the individual petitions process to trade union rights and
education rights as a “realistic, flexible and effective system which [the Commission] is confident
may be accepted by the States parties.” IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1985–1986, supra note 44, at 199.
The Commission, which sponsored the draft Protocol, set out the criteria that it believed should lay
the basis for the Additional Protocol in its annual reports for 1983–1984 and 1984–1985. 
The preparatory work of international conventions is, however, only a supplementary means of
interpreting a treaty under the Vienna Convention and is to be accorded little, if any, weight if the
meaning of a treaty provision is not ambiguous or obscure in light of the ordinary meaning to be
given to its terms in their context and in light of the treaty’s object and purpose. The International
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The best long-term solution to the Protocol’s jurisdictional problem will likely be
amendment, which is expressly provided for in article 22. Under that provision, the
Commission and any State Party may submit proposals for amendments to “include
the recognition of other rights” or to “expand rights” recognized in the Protocol.205
ESCR advocates should consider strategies for persuading either the Commission or
a State Party to submit a proposal to amend article 19(6). The Commission is likely
to be an important ally in such efforts.
Finally, the Protocol establishes a more effective reporting system for monitoring
state compliance with ESCR than that provided for by the Convention.206 Under the
Protocol, States Parties are required to submit periodic reports on the progressive
measures they have taken to ensure respect for the rights set forth in the Protocol.207
These reports are to be submitted to the OAS Secretary-General, who shall then
transmit them to the Commission, OAS Councils, and specialized organizations of the
system for their comments, analysis, and summarization.208 The Councils are to
provide summaries of the ESCR reports to the OAS General Assembly, while the
Commission may publish observations and recommendations concerning the status of
ESCR in States Parties to the Protocol in its annual or special reports.209 Perhaps the
greatest opportunity, however, will come in the role civil society plays in publicizing
and holding states politically accountable for the content of the reports. Advocates are
encouraged to write their own “shadow reports” for domestic distribution and
submission to the Commission. 
Court of Justice, like its predecessor, has generally refused to resort to preparatory work if the text
is sufficiently clear in itself. See, e.g., Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of
a State to the United Nations, 1950 I.C.J. 8 (May 28). “Preparatory work is an aid to be employed
with discretion, since its use may detract from the textual approach, and, particularly in the case of
multilateral agreements, the records of conference proceedings, treaty drafts, and so on may be
confused or inconclusive.” IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 636 (1998)
(emphasis added). The preparatory work of the Commission may be entitled to even less weight
since the draft Protocol it prepared was amended before adoption by the OAS General Assembly.
The draft Protocol is reprinted in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1985–1986, supra note 44, at 201.
205 See Protocol of San Salvador, supra note 41, art. 22(1) (“Any State Party and the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights may submit for the consideration of the States Parties meeting on
the occasion of the General Assembly proposed amendments to include the recognition of other
rights or freedoms or to extend or expand rights or freedoms recognized in this Protocol.”).
206 The ESCR reporting system regulated under article 42 of the Convention “established an
inadequate system of protection and therefore has not been applicable” since the Convention came
into force. See IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1985–86, supra note 44, at 200. 
207 See Protocol of San Salvador, supra note 41, art. 19(1). 
208 The reports are to be submitted to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, the Inter-
American Council for Education, Science and Culture, and to the specialized organizations of the
inter-American system of which the States Parties to the Protocol are members. See id. art. 19(2),
(3). The latter may submit reports to the Councils relative to compliance with the provisions of the
Protocol in their fields of activity. See id. art. 19(4). 
209 See id. art. 19(5), (7). 
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PROTOCOL OF SAN SALVADOR
PROTECTED ESCR: 
• Rights to work; to just, equitable, and satisfactory work
conditions; to trade unionization; to social security; to health; to
a healthy environment; to food; to education; to the benefits of
culture; and to special protection of the family, children, the
elderly, and the handicapped.
OBSTACLES TO ENFORCEABILITY:
• Art. 19(6): Suggests that only articles 8(1)(a) (unionization) and
13 (education) may be invoked in individual petitions to the
Commission and Court. 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENFORCEMENT:
• Art. 29: Convention article 29 may be used to urge interpretation
of Convention provisions so as not to restrict the enjoyment or
exercise of any right recognized by virtue of the Protocol. 
• Creative interpretation of article 19: The Commission and Court
may be persuaded to view the potential jurisdictional limitation in
article 19(6) in a permissive manner.
• Amendment: The Commission or a State Party to the Protocol
may be requested to submit a proposal to amend article 19(6) of
the Protocol.
• Political mobilization around Protocol’s reporting requirements:
“Shadow reports” may be prepared and periodic state reports
publicized to hold governments accountable for taking
progressive measures to ensure ESCR in Protocol.
C. The Inter-American Commission’s
Record on ESCR
The Commission has played a mixed role in the protection of ESCR in the inter-
American system. On the one hand, as the organ specifically entrusted by the
Convention with the duty of “watching over the promotion of [ESCR]” in the
Americas,210 it has been a vocal advocate of ESCR progressivity and the indivisibility
of ESCR and CPR; it has long issued general statements in favor of ESCR in its
annual reports and in addresses to the OAS General Assembly. On the other hand,
with few exceptions, it has not applied ESCR principles in the individual petitions
210 American Convention, supra note 28, art. 42 (providing that States Parties shall transmit to the
Commission copies of prepared reports “so that the Commission may watch over the promotion of
the rights implicit in the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth
in the [OAS Charter]”) (emphasis added); see also Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 45,
art. 64.
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that it considers. This section examines the strengths and weaknesses of the
Commission’s treatment of ESCR in its annual reports, special country reports, and
individual petitions process.
Practice Tip
As the Commission is a legal organ of the OAS system, the
statements of the Commission should be used as legal authority to
bolster ESCR claims in individual petitions before the inter-
American human rights system. Note, however, that statements
made under the Commission’s promotional jurisdiction will not
always translate easily into its contentious jurisdiction, which
requires a showing of concrete harm to individuals’protected rights. 
1. Annual Reports211 & Special Country Reports
Strength 1: Strong statements on ESCR/CPR indivisibility. The Commission has
made impressive statements, using very strong language, on the essential
indivisibility of ESCR and CPR in its public statements, general commentary, and
country reports. It has vigorously stressed the interdependence of these rights,
referring to them as an “indissoluble whole,” whose “organic relationship” is one of
“cause and effect.” From this, it has emphatically concluded that both ESCR and CPR
require “constant protection and promotion” at the national and international level.
Such language should be frequently cited in individual petitions to support arguments
that Convention rights must be read to have justiciable ESCR dimensions as well as
CPR dimensions. 
COMMISSION STATEMENTS: ESCR AND CPR
AS “INDISSOLUBLE WHOLE”
• “In the view of the Commission, there is a close relationship
between the effectiveness of economic, social and cultural
211 The Annual Reports of the Commission typically include general statements on the activities and
progress of the Commission, published reports on individual petitions, a section on the status of
human rights in several countries, a section (sometimes) on areas in which steps need to be taken
toward full observance of the rights set forth in the Convention and Declaration, and public
statements/speeches made by the Commission to the OAS General Assembly, Permanent Council
or the Press.
Cont...
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rights and that of civil and political rights , since both groups
of rights constitute an indissoluble whole, upon which the
recognition of the dignity of the human individual is based, for
which reason both groups of rights require constant
protection and promotion in order to achieve their full
realization, and the sacrifice of some rights for the benefit of
others can never be justified.” 212
• “The Commission has always recognized ‘the o r g a n i c
relationship between the violation of the rights to physical
safety on the one hand, and neglect of economic and social
rights and the suppression of political participation.’ A n y
distinctions drawn between civil and political rights and
economic, social and cultural rights are categorical
formulations that detract from the promotion and
guarantees of human rights.”213
• “In speaking of human rights, it is important to bear in mind
always that the linkage between civil and political rights and
economic, social and cultural rights is not only an ethical and
moral imperative but is manifestly a condition for peace and
social stability. Protecting civil and political rights is useless
if there are no economic, social and cultural rights.”214
• “Contemporaneous political thinking has corrected the unilateral
concept of human rights, which cannot consist of vainly
invoking liberty, but must be based on the primary needs of
human beings; the right to life, to work, and to the elements
required to satisfy essential spiritual and material needs.”215
• “All human rights, economic, social, cultural, civil and
political, are universal, indivisible and interdependent and
interrelated. While the significance of national and regional
particularities and various historical, cultural and religious
backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of the
States, regardless of their political, economic and cultural
systems, to promote and protect all human rights and
fundamental freedoms.”216
212 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1983–84, supra note 203, at 137 (emphasis added); see also IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1985–1986, supra note 44, at 197.
213 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 52, at 521 (quoting INTER-AM. COMM. H.R., TEN YEARS
OF ACTIVITIES 1971–1981, at 321 (1982)) (emphasis added).
214 Address by the Chairman of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Dr. Oscar Lujan
Fappiano, at the opening meeting of the 84th Regular Session of the IACHR, Wash., D.C., Oct. 5,
1993, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 52, at 636, 638 (emphasis added).
215 Statement of the Chairman of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Dr. Oscar Lujan
Fappiano, at the opening meeting of the 85th Regular Session of the IACHR, Wash., D.C., Jan. 31,
1994, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 52, at 639, 641 (emphasis added).
216 AN N U A L RE P O RT O F T H E IN T E R- AM E R I C A N CO M M I S S I O N O N HU M A N RI G H T S 1997, at 894,
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• “[T]he interdependence and indivisibility of all human rights
is nowadays unquestionable.”217
• “As to the relationship of indivisibility—now accepted by the
inter-American community—of civil and political rights and
economic, social and cultural rights, it would be difficult to
justify the sacrifice of some of these rights for others.”218
• “The indivisibility of human rights and the interdependence of
civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights
form part of modern civilization. The freedom of a person is
not only violated if he is attacked physically or morally, but
also when he is deprived of the means to live in dignity and
denied the material requisites that are indispensable for a
normal life.”219
• “[P]olitical regimes that deny the well-being of persons are just
as much to be censored as those that seek to build on contempt
for and the destruction of democratic institutions.”220
• “[There is an] organic relationship between violating the
right to physical security on the one hand, and neglecting
economic and social rights and suppressing political
participation on the other. And that relationship, as has been
made clear, is largely a cause and effect relationship. In other
words, neglecting economic and social rights, especially when
political participation is suppressed at the same time, produces
the type of social polarization that leads in turn to acts of
violence by the government and against it.”221
• “When the state does not guarantee [economic, social, and
cultural] rights, it is also indicating an absence of civil and
217 Status of Human Rights in Several Countries, IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 52, at 465
(emphasis added).
218 Statement of the Chairman of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Dr. Oscar Lujan
Fappiano, at the opening meeting of the 85th Regular Session of the IACHR, Washington, D.C.,
Jan. 31, 1994, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 52, at 639, 641 (emphasis added).
219 Status of Human Rights in Several Countries, IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 52, at 466
(quoting U.N. Human Rights Committee independent expert, Luis Valencia Rodríguez, in El
derecho de toda persona a la propiedad individual y colectiva 26–27, E/CN.4/1993/15, 18.12.92)
(emphasis added).
220 Statement of the Chairman of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Dr. Oscar Lujan
Fappiano at the opening meeting of the 85th Regular Session of the IACHR, Washington, D.C.,
Jan. 31, 1994, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 52, at 639, 642.
221 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 216, at 943, para. 31 (emphasis added); see also ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSIONON HUMAN RIGHTS 1994, at 161, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.88,
Doc. 9 rev. (1995) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1994]; ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-
AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1979–1980, at 151, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.50, Doc. 13 rev. 1
(1980) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1979–80].
Cont...
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political guarantees. The ability to participate in society entails
civil and political rights along with economic, social and cultural
rights. From this it is logically clear that if there is no progress
in the area of economic and social rights, civil and political
rights achieved with great effort and human sacrifice
continue being a mere aspiration for poorer and less well
educated segments of the population .”222
• “[W]hile it can be asserted that political participation affords
greater protection of economic, social and cultural rights, it is
also true that the application of those rights creates the
conditions that enable the people in general to be
competent, that is, to be healthy and educated so they are
able to participate actively and productively in the process
of [m]aking political decisions .”223
• “As the Commission has noted previously, there is an organic
relationship between civil and political rights on the one hand,
and economic and social rights on the other, and the
international community has recognized and affirmed the
interrelationship and indivisibility of these categories of
entitlements.”224
• “More than any of the other great human rights instruments
of the modern world, the American Convention emphasizes
economic rights and economic development, as does the
[OAS Charter].”225
Weaknesses: While this language is strong and should be cited frequently, a
weakness in the Commission’s approach to “indivisibility” is its tendency to frame
ESCR as important only, or primarily, insofar as they promote CPR—i.e., not as
important rights in and of themselves. Thus, a country must improve the social and
economic conditions of its citizens not for the sake of improved heath, nutrition, and
education, but rather for the sake of a less volatile political landscape, which could
erupt into violations of CPR.
222 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 216, at 947, para. 44 (emphasis added). 
223 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 52, at 553; see also IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra
note 216, at 943–44, para. 31 (emphasis added).
224 INTER-AM. COMM. H.R., REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ECUADOR 1996, at 22
(1997), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.96 Doc. 10 rev. 1 (1997) [hereinafter ECUADOR REPORT 1996].
225 Address of the President of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Dr. Alvaro Tirado
Mejía, before the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, Wash., D.C., Feb. 6,
1995, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1995, at 275,
278, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91, Doc. 7 rev. (1996) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1995] (emphasis
added).
Cont...
The Commission has, in later reports, noted the inverse relationship as well: effective
protection of CPR is necessary for the full achievement of ESCR as an end goal.
“Through popular participation those who are affected by the neglect of their
economic and social rights are able to participate in the decisions that concern the
allocation of national resources and the establishment of social, education, and health
care programs.”226 Such references, however, are scarce. 
Practice Tip
When citing the Commission’s “indivisibility” language in individual
petitions, stress the importance of ESCR as end goals in and of
t h e m s e l v e s. This will strengthen your argument for ESCR
incorporation into the Convention and push the Commission and
Court to adopt this stance explicitly in their future jurisprudence and
general commentary.
A second weakness is that the Commission’s strong indivisibility language does not
generally carry over into its discussion of protected rights. In almost all of its country
reports—whether special country reports or the briefer “status of human rights in
several countries” found in the annual reports—the Commission divides its
discussion into separate categories that roughly correspond to Convention articles:
“Right to Life” (art. 4), “Right to Personal Integrity” (art. 5), “Right to Personal
Liberty” (art. 7), etc. In recent reports, the Commission has often included a separate
category on either ESCR or minority rights, but they are clearly distinguished from
Convention rights, discussed solely as CPR. The section on the “right to life” deals
almost exclusively with extrajudicial executions, while the sections on “personal
integrity” and “personal liberty” deal with torture and arbitrary detention,
respectively. Any reference to ESCR is organized under a separate heading, distanced
from the Convention articles. Infant mortality rates, easily preventable deaths, or
pesticide contamination of food sources are not addressed under the “right to life” or
“right to personal integrity” sections; they are invariably addressed under a distant
“ESCR” heading. This relegation of ESCR to a separate section disconnected from
the Convention articles contributes to the perception that ESCR are not protected by
the Convention and is at direct odds with the principle of “indivisibility.” 
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226 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 52, at 521.
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Practice Tip
When drafting petitions and briefs,227 ESCR violations should be
discussed under headings that correspond to Convention articles.
If both CPR and ESCR violations arise under a particular article,
petitioners should either discuss them simultaneously or separate
them under subheadings for greater emphasis. 
Strength 2: Strong condemnation of extreme/relative poverty. Another strength in the
Commission’s treatment of ESCR in its annual reports is its express concern for, and
condemnation of, extreme and relative poverty in the American hemisphere. The
Commission has affirmed that “[p]overty is rising as the main challenge to humanity
as the next century approaches”228 and finds “extreme poverty . . . an affront to human
dignity.” It calls “the level of absolute poverty in so many [American] countries . . .
unacceptable, especially when contrasted to the gross national product (“GNP”) and
the dramatic imbalance in the distribution of income in each country.” 229 With regard
to relative poverty, the Commission has noted that Latin America maintains the most
unequal distribution of wealth of any region of the world,230 and has criticized the
extremely unequal distribution of resources within many OAS states as the chief
cause of the economic and social problems in those societies.231
At the same time, the Commission has emphasized that the “basic requirements of
life” (e.g., proper housing, adequate income, education, and culture) and “minimum
economic and social conditions” are essential prerequisites for the full enjoyment of
human rights. Critically, the Commission has linked extreme poverty with the rights
to life, personal security, physical integrity, human dignity, equality of opportunity,
freedom from discrimination, and participation in decision-making. Each of these
rights is protected under the Convention. It has also recognized the fact that “poverty
is partly the result of insufficient state dedication and organization to protect and
promote economic, social and cultural rights.”232 As such, poverty can be viewed as
the effect of insufficient access on the part of large segments of the population to basic
health care, educational, work, and participation systems; the government is
227 See infra Chapter 2(III) for guidance on the basic content and structure of an individual petition. 
228 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1992–93, at 222,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, Doc. 14, corr. 1 (1993) (quoting statement by former Chilean President
Patricio Aylwin and recognizing that “[t]his important statement contains, in a nutshell, the major
challenge that the American hemisphere faces; in many cases, this challenge is undermining the
foundations of the new democratic regimes in the inter-American system.”). 
229 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 52, at 568, 538.
230 Id. at 524.
231 See, e.g., INTER-AM. COMM. H.R., REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN GUATEMALA
1993, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, Doc. 31 (1993) [hereinafter GUATEMALA REPORT 1993].
232 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 216, at 947, para. 44.
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responsible for ensuring equal access to these systems. The Commission recognizes
that States are legally obligated to “assign[] priority to the basic needs of health,
nutrition and education” in all policy-making decisions. 233
COMMISSION STATEMENTS: POVERTY AND ESCR
• “The extreme poverty of many individuals in the hemisphere is
an affront to human dignity. Minimum economic, social and
cultural conditions are an essential prerequisite for the full
enjoyment of human rights.”234
• “Priority shall be given to the protection of human rights and
development of members of the weakest and more vulnerable
groups in society. Extreme poverty and social exclusion are
a violation against human dignity .”235
• “All human beings must enjoy what we might call ‘the basic
requirements of life,’ which consist of a set of circumstances
essential for a truly decent, free and human life, such as those
required for satisfactory access to culture and education,
proper housing, and an income capable of continuously
meeting the needs of the person and his family, without
suffering either anxiety or financial straits.” 236
• “[T]hroughout the region, there are unacceptable numbers of
people who live in conditions that deny them a minimum level of
material well-being which is able to guarantee respect of their
rights to personal security, dignity, equality of opportunity
and freedom from discrimination.”237
233 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1979–80, supra note 221, at 152 (emphasis added); see also ANNUAL
RE P O RT O F T H E IN T E R- AM E R I C A N CO M M I S S I O N O N HU M A N RI G H T S 1980–1981, at 125,
OEA.Ser.L/V/II.54 doc.9 rev. 1 (1981) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1980–81]; IACHR,
TEN YEARS OF ACTIVITIES 322 (1982); ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 1989–1990, at 187, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.77 rev. 1 Doc. 7 (1990) [hereinafter IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1989–90]; ECUADOR REPORT 1996, supra note 224, at 23.
234 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 52, at 568, rec. 8 (emphasis added).
235 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 216, at 894 (emphasis added) (stating one of “the
essential principles established by modern doctrine and practice of human rights, recognized by
international instruments and by the inter-American system; in particular, the A m e r i c a n
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, and the American Convention on Human Rights”).
Cf. World Conference on Human Rights, Final Declaration, paras. 12–13, 25, A.Conf 157/24 Part
I. (1993).
236 Statement of the Chairman of the Inter-American Commission, Dr. Oscar Lujan Fappiano, at the
opening meeting of the 85th Regular Session of the IACHR, Wash., D.C., Jan. 31, 1994, in IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 52, at 639, 641 (emphasis added).
237 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 52, at 538 (emphasis added).
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• “Extreme poverty is described as a condition of life so limited
by malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, low life expectancy and high
infant mortality as to be beneath any rational definition of
human decency and dignity.”238
• “ ‘[E]xtreme poverty and social exclusion constitute a
violation of human dignity.’ . . . The problem of extreme
poverty, which prevents individuals from satisfying fundamental
needs, implicates a range of human rights starting with the
right to physical integrity.”239
• “When the most vulnerable sectors of society are denied
access to the basic needs for survival which would enable
them to break out of their condition, it results in the right to be
free from discrimination; the right to the consequent principles
of equality of access, equity and distribution; and the general
commitment to protect the vulnerable elements in society
being willingly or complicitly contravened. Moreover, without
satisfaction of these basic needs, an individual’s survival is
directly threatened. T h i s o b v i o u s l y diminishes the
individual’s rights to life, personal security, and . . . the right
to participate in the political and economic processes.”240
• “In the judgment of the Commission, poverty is partly the result
of insufficient state dedication and organization to protect
and promote economic, social and cultural rights.”241
• “[T]he essence of the legal obligation incurred by any
government in [the ESCR] area is to strive to attain the
economic and social aspirations of its people, by following an
order that assigns priority to the basic needs of health,
nutrition and education. The priority of the ‘rights of
survival’ and ‘basic needs’ is a natural consequence of the
right to personal security.”242
238 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 52, at 523; see also INTER-AM. COMM. H.R., REPORT ON
THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE REPUBLIC OF NICARAGUA 153 (1981), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.53,
Doc. 25 (1981) (emphasis added). 
239 ECUADOR REPORT 1996, supra note 224, at 25 (emphasis added).
240 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 52, at 522–23 (emphasis added).
241 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 216, at 947, para. 44 (emphasis added). 
242 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1979–80, supra note 221, at 152 (emphasis added); see also IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1980–81, supra note 233, at 126; IACHR, TEN YEARS OF ACTIVITIES 322 (1982);
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1988–89, supra note 192, at 195; IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1989–90,
supra note 233, at 187; ECUADOR REPORT 1996, supra note 224, at 23. 
Cont...
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Weaknesses: Despite the Commission’s strong language, its primary weakness is
that, with very few exceptions, it does not take a “violations approach” to poverty.
Thus, the Commission speaks broadly of poverty as a generalized condition, cites
traditional development indicators, rehearses government policy reports and program
goals, and frequently cites national and regional poverty statistics—particularly in its
special country reports243—but it does not state any legal conclusion. It fails to make
the logical connection between the people directly affected by those conditions and
violations of nationally or internationally protected norms, such as those in the OAS
Charter, the Declaration, or the Convention. This circumscribes the usefulness or
effectiveness of the observations. 
For example, although the Commission has never referred directly to the Convention
while discussing poverty statistics or conditions, its references to the rights to life,
physical integrity, personal security, human dignity, equality of opportunity, freedom
from discrimination, and participation in decision-making directly correspond to
articles 4 (life), 5 (personal integrity), 7 (personal security/human dignity), 23
(political participation), and 24 (equality and non-discrimination) of the Convention.
Making such connections explicit would go far in firmly establishing the legally
obligatory nature of State obligations to make constant, progressive efforts toward
eradicating poverty.
The Commission has suggested a reason for its tendency not to address poverty in
terms of Convention violations. In its 1979-80 report, and again in its 1994 report, it
stated that “in general the Commission has been extremely cautious in this sensitive
area because it has recognized the difficulty of establishing criteria that could be used
to measure compliance by the States with their [ESCR] obligations.”244 Such
compliance criteria, however, have been amply developed by regional and
international ESCR experts245 and are not substantially different from the criteria used
to measure compliance with CPR obligations. In presenting petitions to the
Commission, ESCR advocates should expressly spell out the compliance criteria that
they are using to find violations. 
243 A recent country report, for example, cites facts relating to urban and rural poverty, illiteracy,
access to health services and drinking water, unemployment, and school enrollment, as well as
budget allocations for debt service and military expenditures. See INTER-AM. COMM. H.R., THIRD
REPORT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATIONIN COLOMBIA, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, Doc. 9, rev. 1 (1999)
[hereinafter THIRD COLOMBIA REPORT], available at  <http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Colom99en/
table%20of%20contents.htm>.
244 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1994, supra note 221, at 162; IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1979–80, supra
note 221, at 144. The Commission added that “it has also understood the very difficult choices the
governments have to make in allocating resources between consumption and investment, and,
therefore, between present and future generations.” Id. 
245 For a discussion of state obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, see, for example, General Comment No. 3, supra note 156; Limburg Principles,
supra note 155; and Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
adopted Jan. 26, 1997, reprinted in INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL
RIGHTS: AC OMPILATION OF ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS 79 (1997), available at <http://www.law.uu.nl/
C o m m i s s i o n ’s Record on ESCR
63
A second weakness in the Commission’s treatment of poverty conditions is its
inconsistency. ESCR are not discussed in all of its country reports or all of its annual
reports. When discussed, they are done so in an uneven fashion.
Strength 3: Explicit recognition of States’ legal obligations to protect and promote
ESCR. A third strength in the Commission’s general commentary is its reference to
the legal obligations of States to protect and promote ESCR. The Commission has
stated that all OAS member states have assumed this obligation under the Charter and
Convention (or through the Declaration). It requires them, regardless of the level of
economic development, to guarantee a minimum threshold of ESCR, to ensure that
the observance of ESCR does not diminish in any aspect over time, and to guarantee
conditions that enable people to gain access to food, health services, education,
housing, and employment with minimum wage protections. The Commission has also
recognized that the “essence of the legal obligation” is that state policy-making must
assign priority to the basic needs of health, nutrition and education.
COMMISSION STATEMENTS: STATE OBLIGATIONS
TO PROMOTE & PROTECT ESCR
• “The Inter-American states have pledged in the Charter and
in the Convention [], or through the Declaration [], to
promote and protect civil and political rights, and
economic, social and cultural rights, within a political
framework based on the effective exercise of representative
democracy. These principles have long functioned as basic
tenets of the Inter-American system. The sweeping changes
that have affected the Americas in this era of a new global order
have rearranged priorities and raised new challenges in seeking
the effective realization of human rights; there is a paramount
need to develop strategies in response to these challenges.”246
• “The essence of the legal obligation incurred by any
government in [the ESCR] area is to strive to attain the
economic and social aspirations of its people, by following an
order that assigns priority to the basic needs of health,
nutrition and education.”247
english/sim/instr/maastricht.asp>. For a discussion of state obligations to implement ESCR in the
inter-American region, see Quito Declaration on the Enforcement and Realization of Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights in Latin America and the Caribbean, adopted July 24, 1998, in 2 YALE
HUM. RT. & DEV. L.J. 215 (1999), available at <http://diana.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj>.
246 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 52, at 563 (emphasis added).
247 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1989–90, supra note 233, at 187 (emphasis added); see also IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1980–81, supra note 233, at 125 (same); ECUADOR REPORT 1996, supra note 224,
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• “To date, there is no political or economic system, no individual
model of development, that has demonstrated a clearly superior
capability to promote economic and social rights; but whatever
the system or model may be, it must assign priority to
attaining those fundamental rights which permit the
elimination of extreme poverty .”248
• “[T]he obligation of member states to observe and defend the
human rights of individuals within their jurisdictions, as set forth
in the American Declaration and the American Convention,
obligates them, regardless of the level of economic
development, to guarantee a minimum threshold of these
[ESC] rights.”249
• “Member states should guarantee conditions that enable
people to gain access to food, health services and
education, and should fully enforce minimum wage laws. To
this end, member states should reform basic economic and
political structures that inhibit the development of such
conditions.”250
• “[Member states] should take all measures necessary to
ensure that the observance of economic, social and
cultural rights does not diminish in any aspect over time.”251
• “[M]ember states should guarantee an economic
environment that will enable the poor to participate in the
political and economic decision-making processes. As an
example, member states should promote respect for labor
unions, including their rights to organize, bargain collectively
and conduct strikes with the state playing a neutral role.”252
• “Member states should ensure that socially disadvantaged
groups, particularly minorities, do not suffer
disproportionately from economic adjustment
measures.”253
at 23 (“The priority of ‘survival rights’ and ‘basic necessities,’” explained the IACHR, are a
“natural consequence of the right to personal security”). 
248 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1989–90, supra note 233, at 187 (emphasis added); IACHR ANNUAL
REPORT 1980–81, supra note 233, at 125.
249 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 52, at 524 (emphasis added).
250 Id. at 538, rec. 1 (emphasis added).
251 THIRD COLOMBIA REPORT, supra note 243, at 70, rec. 2 (emphasis added).
252 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 52, at 538, rec. 2 (emphasis added).
253 Id. at 538, rec. 3 (emphasis added).
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• “The public authorities and the legal system should seek to
ensure that no member of the community lives in conditions that
are incompatible with human dignity.”254
• “Article 42 of the American Convention requires member states
to submit to the [Commission] copies of reports submitted to the
Inter-American Economic and Social Council and the Council for
Education, Science and Culture. Adherence to these
reporting requirements is an essential responsibility. . . .
These reports should fully cover, inter alia, education, health,
nutrition and housing.”255
• “Social data is critical to the development of plans for improving
economic, social and cultural rights. Hence, member states
should institute methods for social and economic data
collection and report this information annually . . . as stipulated
in article 42 of the American Convention. In the process of
preparing the reports, wide participation by citizens and [NGOs]
should be encouraged.”256
• “[A]n aspect of the effective protection of human rights must be
recognition of rights of a social, economic and cultural character,
emphasizing the responsibility of the governments of the
member states in the process of promoting cooperation for
hemispheric development.”257
Weaknesses: The weaknesses of this commentary lie primarily in the fact that there
is so little of it, and that it is frequently couched in permissive phrases recognizing the
practical constraints faced by states in meeting their ESCR obligations. Such phrases
signal to States that they will not be held accountable for their ESCR failings. 
2. Individual Petitions Process
While the Commission’s commentary on ESCR has been strong and goes far toward
establishing a framework for ESCR protection in the inter-American system, real
changes in State behavior will occur only when States are forced to respond to the
254 Statement of the Chairman of the Inter-American Commission, Dr. Oscar Lujan Fappiano, at the
opening meeting of the 85th Regular Session of the IACHR, Washington, D.C., Jan. 31, 1994, in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 52, at 642.
255 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 52, at 563, 568, rec. 8 (emphasis added).
256 Id. at 539, rec. 7 (emphasis added).
257 INTER-AM. COMM. H.R., ANNUAL REPORT OFTHE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
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individual petitions process. Unfortunately, the Commission appears reticent to
confront ESCR in this process. The Commission has addressed very few ESCR cases,
has declined to consider ESCR petitions presented to it under its contentious
jurisdiction (preferring to seek non-contentious solutions with the State), and has
overlooked ESCR violations in petitions plainly presenting both ESCR and CPR
abuses.
The Commission has considered extremely few cases dealing with ESCR. Those that
it has addressed have involved almost exclusively complaints under the Declaration
(rather than the Convention). The two principle ESCR cases considered by the
Commission, resolved in 1977 and 1985, respectively, are those of the Aché tribe in
Paraguay and the Yanomami tribe in Brazil. In the Aché case, the Commission found
that the Paraguayan Government’s persecution of the Aché tribe, including the
assassination of its members, the sale of children, the deprivation of medical attention
and medicines during an epidemic, and the inhuman conditions of work to which its
members were submitted, constituted “very serious violations” of the Declaration,
including the rights to life, liberty, and personal security (art. I), to protection of the
family (art. VI), to preservation of health and to well-being (art. XI), to work (art.
XIV) and to rest (art. XV).258
In the Yanomami case, when valuable mineral deposits were discovered under
territory belonging to the Yanomami Indians, the Brazilian government approved a
plan to extract the mineral resources and, in order to improve miners’ access to the
area, built a highway through Yanomami territory. The highway construction, which
brought mining companies, independent prospectors, construction workers, and new
farmers into Yanomami territory for the first time, resulted in the introduction of new
diseases that killed hundreds of Yanomami. The tribe was forced to abandon its
traditional land, its culture and social organization were fractured, and prostitution
was introduced. The Brazilian government tried to resettle the tribe, but failed to
respond with adequate social or health services. The Commission resolved that “the
failure of the Government of Brazil to take timely and effective measures on behalf of
the Yanomami Indians” resulted in violations of the right to life, liberty, and personal
security (art. I); the right to residence and movement (art. VIII); and the right to the
preservation of health and to well-being (art. XI) under the Declaration.259
258 I n t e r-Am. Comm. H.R., Case 1802 (Para.), i n AN N U A L RE P O RT O F T H E IN T E R- AM E R I C A N
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1977, at 36, 37, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.43 doc. 21 (1978) [hereinafter
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1977]. A companion case concerning the indigenous population of
Paraguay was resolved and published in the same Annual Report. In that case, the Paraguayan
government detained a group of persons working in the “Project Marandú” (an initiative “designed
to improve economic and social conditions of the indigenous population”), raided its offices, and
sequestered documents. The Commission resolved that Paraguay had violated the rights to
inviolability of the home (art. IX), inviolability of correspondence (art. X), and freedom of
association (art. XXII). See Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Case No. 2006 (Para.), in IACHR ANNUAL
REPORT 1977, supra, at 37, 37–39.
259 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Coulter et al. Case, Res. 12/85, Case 7615 (Braz.), Mar. 5, 1985, in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1984–85, supra note 257, at 24, 33.
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Four other reported ESCR cases were lodged with the Commission between 1985 and
1996, yet each was declared inadmissible or otherwise closed.260 In 1996, the
Commission, for the first time, found a violation of the Convention with regard to a
case in which ESCR were implicated. In Case No. 11.297, a detainee died from
cholera in police custody due to a negligent lack of adequate medical care. The
Commission found violations of, among others, articles 4 (life) and 5 (physical
integrity) of the Convention. It concluded that, for failing to take the necessary
measures to guarantee the life and health of the detainee and for failing to act
reasonably to prevent his death, the State of Guatemala “violated by omission its duty
to guarantee the health and life” of the victim.261
The Commission has recently made important progress, filing two cases with the
Court that implicate ESCR—one having to do with labor dismissals, the other with
indigenous land rights.262 This is a major breakthrough and may indicate a new
openness to ESCR on the part of the Commission. Considering that the Commission
has processed more than 12,000 petitions, however, it is a very small beginning. 
The Commission has not lacked ESCR petitions for processing. A review of the
Commission’s annual reports reveals receipt of an increasing number of individual
petitions and information alleging Convention violations for labor abuses, land rights
260 I n t e r-Am. Comm. H.R., Application No. 9213, Disabled Peoples’ Int’l vs. United States,
Admissibility Decision (Grenada), in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1986–87, supra note 27, at 184
(alleging violation of rights to health and life for 1983 bombing of insane asylum and failure to
compensate victims with food, clothes, medical attention, and services), case closed upon motion
of petitioners , Report No. 3/96, Case 9213, Report to Conclude Case, Mar. 1, 1996, in IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1995, supra note 225, at 201; Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report Cases Nos. 9777
and 9718 (Arg.), Mar. 31, 1988, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 1987–88, at 31, conclusion 6, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.74 Doc. 10 rev. 1 (1988) (alleging
violation of the right to work and association through obligatory matriculation of lawyers in state
association; Commission holds right to work not protected by Convention); Inter-Am. Comm.
H.R., Res. 90/90, Case 9893, National Vanguard Movement of Retirees and Pensioners (Uru.), in
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1990–1991, at 77,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.79 rev. 1 Doc. 12 (1991) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1990–91] (alleging
violation of rights to social security, property, and equality for readjustment of pensions below
Average Salary Index; found inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies); Inter-Am.
Comm. H.R., Report No. 39/96, Case 11.673, Santiago Marzioni (Arg.), Oct. 15, 1996, in ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1996, at 76, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95,
Doc. 7 rev. (1997) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996] (alleging violation of rights to
property and equality for inadequate workers compensation award; found inadmissible).
261 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 28/96, Case 11.297, Juan Hernández (Guate.), in IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note260, at 406, para. 60 (emphasis added). In 1999, the Commission
resolved a somewhat similar case in which a mentally retarded man died in preventive detention
after being subjected to cruel treatment by a guard. See Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 63/99,
Case 11.427, Víctor Rosario Congo (Ecuador), Apr. 13, 1999, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-
AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1998, at 497, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, Doc. 6 rev. (1999)
[hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998]
262 See IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 261, at 1107, paras. 108–12. 
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violations, industrial contamination, and other ESCR offenses.263 The Commission
appears to prefer to deal with such cases, however, through friendly settlement and
other non-contentious forms of mediation,264 rarely pursuing them in the individual
petitions process. Consequently, ESCR cases are under-reported in the Commission’s
annual reports. This undoubtedly offers a distorted impression of the most common
human rights violations experienced in the inter-American community.
Finally, the Commission tends to overlook ESCR abuses in petitions that plainly
present both CPR and ESCR violations. For example, the Commission often reports
the facts of “disappearance” or “torture” cases that include the plunder of homes, the
destruction of a community’s only health center, and the robbing of a village’s grain
supplies, finding violations of articles 4 (life), 5 (humane treatment), and 7 (liberty)
with respect to the immediate physical torture or disappearance only.265 In so doing,
it overlooks violations of the right to freedom from arbitrary interference with the
home (art. 11), to property (art. 21), and to physical integrity (art 5) resulting from
state agents’ willful destruction of communities’ exclusive sources of food, health
care, and shelter.
263 See, e.g., Status of Human Rights in Several Countries: Suriname, IACHR ANNUAL REPORT
1986–87, supra note 27, at 265 (“[T]he Commission has also received information alleging forced
starvation, cutoffs of welfare entitlements and ethnocide against the groups in question.”)
(emphasis added); Status of Human Rights in Several Countries: Paraguay, IACHR ANNUAL
REPORT 1989–90, supra note 233, at 175 (“The Commission has received complaints . . . about
alleged violations of the right of association set forth in the American Convention . . . through acts
of antiunion discrimination and reprisals by companies.”); id. at 177 (“The Commission received
complaints about human rights violations in Indian communities regarding their right to own
property and to live on their ancestral lands, to protection under the law from plundering of forests
in the areas they live in or own, the settlement of outside campesinos on disputed land with the aim
of diminishing the community’s rights and their right to preserve their religion and beliefs.”); id.
(acknowledging receipt of detailed complaints of harassment and land dispossession of entire
communities); GUATEMALA REPORT 1993, supra note 231, at 419 (“The Commission has received
many charges of attacks attributed to the [PAC] on health clinics, education services, literacy
centers, [etc.] . . . .”); Address of the President of the Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights, Dr. Alvaro Tirado Mejía, before the Permanent Council of the Organization of American
States, Wash., D.C., Feb. 6, 1995, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1995, supra note 225, at 278 (“The
Commission has been receiving more complaints in the form of individual petitions on these
matters [of environmental abuses by States Parties]”). 
264 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 14/97, Case 11.381, Milton García Fajardo (Nicar.),
in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 261, at 638, para. 34 (deciding that, although case was
admissible, the friendly settlement procedure was appropriate to resolve dispute in which 142
public workers were fired for their participation in a peaceful labor strike and state refused to
reinstall them to their jobs despite several court orders to that effect); Inter-Am. Comm. H.R.,
Report No. 90/99, Case 11.713, Enxet-Lamenxay and Kayleyphapopyet (Riachito) Indigenous
Communities (Para.), in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1999.
265 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 48/97, Case 11.411, “Ejido Morelia” (Mex.), in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 216, at 637, 637, 655 (finding Mexico responsible,
“[based on all the de facto and de jure elements [of] law contained in the present report,” for the
violation of articles 4, 5, 7, 8, and 25 for the detention, torture, and summary execution of 3
community members in case in which “events denounced” included essential fact that “soldiers
looted the houses and shops in the village and destroyed the health care station”). 
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Despite these shortcomings, the Commission is clearly a strong ally of ESCR
advocates, and petitions should emphasize the active role the Commission is obliged
to play in the protection of ESCR. The Commission itself has recognized this
obligation, concluding that it is “duty-bound” to take a more active role in protecting
ESCR and to “play as active a role in the protection of [ESCR] as it [i]s playing with
regard to [CPR].”
STATEMENTS ON THE ROLE OF THE COMMISSION
IN PROTECTING ESCR
Commission:
• “[T]he Inter-American Commission on Human Rights[,] as the
organ specifically charged with promoting and defending human
rights, is duty-bound to take a more active role in protecting
economic, social and cultural rights . . . . 266
• The Commission has considered that “as an organization
specifically entrusted with the promotion and protection of
human rights, the Commission had the obligation to play as
active a role in the protection of economic, social and
cultural rights as it was playing with regard to civil and
political rights.”267
OAS General Assembly: 
• “[The General Assembly resolves] . . . [t]o urge the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights to continue with
particular zeal its work in support of economic, social and
cultural rights.”268
D. The Inter-American Court’s Record on ESCR
The Inter-American Court provides little jurisprudential guidance regarding ESCR.
There are, however, strong indications that the Court may be disposed to expand its
jurisprudence into the realm of ESCR, including two recently decided cases in which
ESCR were implicated; one ESCR case that remains pending as of publication; a
266 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1979–80, supra note 221, at 152 (emphasis added).
267 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1985–86, supra note 44, at 196 (emphasis added); see also ANNUAL
RE P O RT O F TH E IN T E R- AM E R I C A N CO M M I S S I O N O N HU M A N RI G H T S 1982–1983, at 38,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.61, Doc. 22 rev. 1 (1983). 
268 OAS General Assembly Resolution, AG/RES.1213 (XXIII-0/93), Jun. 11, 1993, in IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 52, at 13, 15.
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Court statement in support of ESCR jurisdiction; and useful dicta on the nature of
ESCR. 
Recently Resolved Cases: The Court has recently resolved two cases in which
ESCR were implicated. In February 2001, the Court decided the Baena Ricardo case,
which involved the arbitrary dismissal of 270 public workers for their participation in
a labor demonstration.2 6 9 The Court found that, by arbitrarily dismissing the
employees based on their union affiliation and the retroactive application of a hastily
passed law, the State of Panama violated articles 8 (due process), 9 (legality
principle), 16 (freedom of association), and 25 (judicial protection). It ordered that the
State reinstate the dismissed workers to their jobs (or provide them with alternative
employment at the same salary and benefits level), provide them with full back pay,
grant each dismissed worker U.S.$3,000 in moral damages, and pay all costs and
expenses. The decision is a decisive victory for labor rights and ESCR justiciability
in the inter-American system. 
Similarly, in November 1999, the Court decided the “Street Children” case, involving
the systematic abduction, torture, and murder of children living on the streets of
Guatemala. The Court found the State had violated articles 4, 5, 7, 8, 19, and 25 of
the Convention. In discussing the right to life, the Court took the biggest step yet
toward ESCR incorporation by recognizing that “the fundamental right to life
includes, not only the right of every human being not to be deprived of his life
arbitrarily, but also the right that he will not be prevented from having access to the
conditions that guarantee a dignified existence.”270 The Court, in the first published
discussion of article 19 by the Commission or Court, took another leap forward by
recognizing the right of every child to harbor a “project of life” that should be “tended
and encouraged by the public authorities.”271 The Court recognized that States Parties
to the Convention have special obligations to at-risk children, which include
“prevent[ing] them from living in misery” and not “depriving them of the minimum
conditions for a dignified life.”272 In defining the scope of Convention article 19, it
thus emphasized that the “measures of protection” to which all children are entitled
under the Convention encompass “a wide range of social, economic, civil and
political interests,” including “non-discrimination, special assistance for children
deprived of their family environment, the guarantee of survival and development of
the child, the right to an adequate standard of living, and the social rehabilitation of
all children who are abandoned or exploited.”273 This decision will be critical for
further protecting children’s ESCR in the inter-American system, as well as for
extending that protection to other groups under article 26.    
269 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Baena Ricardo et al. Case, Judgment of Feb. 3, 2001 (Ser. C) No. 72. 
270 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Villagrán Morales et al. Case (the “Street Children” Case), Judgment of Nov.
19, 1999 (Ser. C) No. 63, para. 144.
271 Id. para. 191. 
272 Id.
273 Id. para. 196. 
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Pending Case: Another important ESCR case should be decided by 2002. Filed with
the Court on June 4, 1998, it involves a complaint by the Mayagna Awas Tingni
community alleging that the Nicaraguan government violated its rights to private
property (art. 21) and to judicial protection (art. 25) by failing to demarcate their lands
and provide official recognition of their territory.274 The complaint was motivated, in
part, by a government concession to a private lumber company to undertake forestry
activities on the lands of the Awas Tingni. A finding that the State of Nicaragua
violated the property rights of the Awas Tingi in this case would represent another
substantial advance in institutional recognition that ESCR can be judicially protected
in the inter-American system. 
Statements in Support: The Court has itself expressed that “it may have an
important role to play in the promotion and protection of economic, social and
cultural rights.”275 This is particularly clear, the Court said, “in light of what article
29 says about the interpretation of the Convention.”276 Chapter 4 of this Manual
returns to this enforcement strategy, which should be invoked frequently in petitions
lodged with the Commission and Court. 
Useful Dicta on Nature of ESCR: The justiciability of ESCR in the Convention has
been expressly commented upon by former Inter-American Court Judge Rodolfo E.
Piza Escalante. In an advisory opinion concerning the compatibility of a proposed
constitutional amendment with the Convention, he wrote:
[T]he difference between civil and political rights and economic,
social and cultural rights follows merely historical reasons and not
juridical differences among them . . . . [T]he principles of “progressive
development” contained in Article 26 of the Convention . . . should in
my judgment be understood to be applicable to any of the “civil and
political” rights established in the American Convention . . . and vice
versa, that the standards of the Convention itself may be understood to
be applicable to the so-called “economic, social and cultural
rights.”277
In Judge Piza’s view, the distinguishing criteria among rights is not whether a given
right is categorized as an ESCR or CPR, but whether it is capable of being enforced
by the courts. Such a determination is “circumstantial and historically conditioned,”
274 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community Case, Preliminary Objections,
Judgment of Feb. 1, 2000 (Ser. C) No. 66, paras. 3–25.
275 INTER-AM. COURT ANNUAL REPORT 1986, supra note 191, at 44–45, see also id. at 42 (emphasis
added). 
276 Id.
277 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Separate Vote of Judge Rodolfo E. Piza Escalante, Proposed Amendments to
the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of Jan.
19, 1984 (Ser. A) No. 4, para. 6.
but is a technical legal judgment to be made by the courts themselves.278 Thus, ESCR
that may be enforced by a court order, such as the right to strike, should be considered
no less justiciable than comparable CPR. Likewise, CPR that may not be directly
invoked before the courts should be governed by the same “progressive achievement”
requirement that govern many ESCR. In this sense, Judge Piza foresaw many of the
conclusions subsequently reached by the U.N. Committee on ESCR. As he states,
“this flexible and reciprocal interpretation of the Convention’s standards with other
international standards on the subject, and even with those of national legislation, is
consistent with the ‘standards of interpretation’ of Article 29.”279
The current President of the Court, Judge Antonio Cançado Trindade, is also a
proponent of ESCR. His extensive writings on the justiciability of ESCR280 should
inform any petition brought to the Commission or Court.
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278 See id. 
279 Id. 
280 See, e.g., Antonio A. Cançado Trindade, La Justiciabilidad de los Derechos Económicos, Sociales
y Culturales en el Plano Institucional, in REVISTA LECCIÓN Y ENSAYOS 1997-98, at 80 (1998).
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his chapter describes the logistics and procedural requirements for lodging a
petition with the inter-American human rights organs. Section I addresses the
“starting points”: who can present a petition to the Commission and what
rights may be alleged. Section II discusses the admissibility requirements that a
petition must meet before the Commission may formally open a file on the case.
Section III covers the basic content and structure successful individual petitions tend
to follow. Finally, section IV provides a broad overview of the entire procedure for
lodging a petition with the Commission—from the occurrence of a violation to the
publication of the Commission’s final report or its filing of a formal complaint with
the Inter-American Court. 
I. Starting Points
A. Who May Present a Petition to the
Commission?
Any person, group of persons, or non-governmental organization (NGO) may present
to the Commission a petition containing denunciations of a human rights violation.1
Petitions may be lodged by the victims themselves or by third parties acting on the
victims’ behalf. Third-party petitioning is often necessary where the actual victims
lack the financial or technical resources to contact the Commission directly or where
1 See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, O.A.S.T.S. No.
36, at 1, art. 44, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23 doc. rev. 2, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970), entered into force July 18,
1978 [hereinafter American Convention], available at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/Básicos/basic3.
htm>.
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they fear reprisals from state or private agents and want institutional backing.2 All
petitions must, however, be filed on behalf of “natural persons,” i.e., human beings,3
who must be individually named to the extent possible. The Commission is not
competent to consider petitions on behalf of  “juridical persons,” such as companies,
NGOs, unions, corporations or banking institutions.4
ART. 44 (CONVENTION)
“Any person or group of persons, or any non-governmental entity
legally recognized in one or more of member states of the [OAS],
may lodge petitions with the Commission containing denunciations
or complaints of violation of this Convention by a State Party.”
By contrast, only the Commission and States Parties to the Convention are permitted
to lodge petitions directly with the Court.5 The Convention requires that the
Commission participate in all cases submitted to the Court’s contentious jurisdiction.6
Individuals and NGOs participate in the Court’s adjudicatory process through the
Commission, which thereafter acts effectively as the petitioning parties’lawyer. They
may also participate through the independent submission of friend of the court
(amicus) briefs. Victims, their representatives or their next of kin may participate
directly in Court proceedings only at the reparations stage, where they may submit
independent arguments and evidence to the Court.7
2 The Commission will not disclose victims’identities unless specifically authorized by the victim to
do so. 
3 See id. art. 1(2) (“For the purposes of this Convention, ‘person’means every human being.”).
4 See Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 10/91, Case 10.169, Banco de Lima (Peru), in ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1990–1991, at 423, 425, paras.
2–3, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.79 rev. 1 Doc. 12 (1991) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1990–91]
(finding petition by bank stockholders to protect the interests of the bank inadmissible). 
5 See American Convention, supra note 1, art. 61(1) (“Only the States Parties and the Commission
shall have the right to submit a case to the Court.”). 
6 See id. art. 57 (“The Commission shall appear in all cases before the Court.”). 
7 See Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, art. 23, entered into force
Jan. 1, 1997 [hereinafter Court Rules of Procedure], available at  <http://www1.umn.edu/
humanrts/iachr/rule1-97.htm>, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 1991, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/III.25 doc.7, at 18 (1992), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS
PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82 doc.6 rev.1, at
145 (1992). 
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B. What Rights May be Invoked
in a Petition to the Commission
The Commission may consider only those internationally protected rights over which
it exercises jurisdiction. With respect to OAS member states that have ratified the
Convention, the Commission has jurisdiction over all rights enshrined in the
Convention; for those that have not ratified the Convention, the Commission may
consider alleged violations of the Declaration only. Petitions should thus invoke
either the Convention or the Declaration (not both) in framing human rights
violations before the Commission. This jurisdictional requirement stems from the
Commission’s Statute, which defines “human rights” as the “rights set forth in the
American Convention . . . in relation to the States Parties thereto” and the “rights set
forth in the American Declaration . . . in relation to the other member states.”8
The Commission may also consider alleged violations of four other regional treaties,
but only with respect to States that were parties to the respective instruments at the
time of the challenged events. Thus, to the extent the concerned State had ratified the
treaty at the time of the alleged abuse, the Commission may impute violations of the
rights guaranteed in articles 8(1)(a) and 13 of the San Salvador Protocol, article 7 of
the Inter-American Convention to Prevent Violence against Women, and the operative
articles of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture and the Inter-
American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons.9 The Commission is not
competent to impute violations of any other internationally recognized right to OAS
member states, except to the extent those rights help to define the scope of the rights
guaranteed in the Convention, pursuant to the interpretative mandate of Convention
article 29. 
8 Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Oct. 1979, O.A.S. Res. 447 (IX-
0/79), O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.P/IX.0.2/80, vol. 1, at 88, art. 1(2) [hereinafter Commission
Statute], available at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/Básicos/basic15.htm>, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, OEA/Ser.L/V/11.50 doc.13 rev. 1, at 10 (1980),
reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 7, at 93. 
9 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Villagrán Morales Case (the “Street Children” Case), Judgment of Nov.
19, 1999 (Ser. C) No. 63, paras. 239–52 (considering organs’ competence to apply Torture
Convention); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Paniagua Morales Case, Judgment of Mar. 8, 1998 (Ser. C) No.
37, para. 136 (same); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Bámaca Velásquez, Judgment of Nov. 25, 2000 (Ser. C)
No. 70, para. 223 (same); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Cantoral Benavides Case, Judgment of Aug. 18,
2000 (Ser. C) No. 69, para. 191 (same).
It is not enough that a concerned State is signatory to one of these instruments. See Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R., Ricardo Baena Case, Judgment of Feb. 3, 2001 (Ser. C) No. 72, paras. 95–99 (declining to
impute violations of the San Salvador Protocol to the concerned State since the challenged acts had
occurred before the State ratified the Protocol, even though State was signatory to instrument at
time of challenged events). 
77
S t a rting Points
RIGHTS THAT MAY BE DIRECTLY INVOKED IN PETITIONS
BEFORE THE COMMISSION
• American Convention on Human Rights (arts. 1–26)*
• American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (arts. I-
XXVII)
• Protocol of San Salvador (arts. 8(1)(a), 13)*
• Inter-American Convention to Prevent Violence against Women
(art. 7)*
• Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture*
• Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of
Persons*
* Only with respect to OAS member states that had ratified the
treaty at the time of the alleged violation.
Chapters 6–9 of this Manual suggest strategies for framing ESCR violations in terms
of the enumerated rights in the Convention. Most of the protected rights in the
Convention are broad enough to protect ESCR as well as the traditional CPR. 
RIGHTS PROTECTED IN AMERICAN CONVENTION
Art. 3—Right to Juridical Personality
Art. 4—Right to Life
Art. 5—Right to Humane Treatment/Personal Integrity
Art. 6—Freedom from Forced Labor/Slavery
Art. 7—Right to Personal Liberty/Security
Art. 8—Right to Due Process
Art. 9—Freedom from Ex Post Facto Laws
Art. 10—Right to Compensation
Art. 11—Right to Privacy/Inviolability of the Home
Art. 12—Freedom of Conscience and Religion
Art. 13—Freedom of Thought and Expression
Art. 14—Right of Reply
Art. 15—Right of Assembly
Art. 16—Freedom of Association
Art. 17—Rights of the Family
Art. 18—Right to a Name
Art. 19—Rights of the Child
Art. 20—Right to Nationality
Art. 21—Right to Property
Art. 22—Freedom of Movement and Residence
Art. 23—Right to Participate in Government
Art. 24—Right to Equal Protection
Art. 25—Right to Judicial Protection
Art. 26—ESCR Implicit in OAS Charter
State Responsibility for respecting, ensuring, and progressively
achieving each of these protected rights is incurred through articles
1, 2 and 26.
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As a general rule of treaty law, states may not be held internationally responsible for
Convention violations that occurred before the Convention entered into force, i.e.,
July 18, 1978, or before the date the implicated State deposited its instrument of
ratification with the OAS General Secretariat, whichever came later. Thus, if a State
ratified the Convention in 1989, petitions denouncing acts that occurred in 1988 will
be rejected by the Commission. 
Where Court adjudication is ultimately sought, petitioners must also be aware of the
date the concerned State formally accepted the binding nature of the Court’s
contentious jurisdiction (by filing a declaration of acceptance with the OAS General
Secretariat). Because the Court’s jurisdiction over States Parties is not automatic,10 the
Court will dismiss petitions alleging Convention violations that occurred before the
concerned State formally accepted its jurisdiction as binding.11
The single exception to this rule is where a petition alleges a “continuing violation.”
The Court may exercise jurisdiction over such violations even when it lacks
jurisdiction over the original offense.12 The Court has held that, unlike extrajudicial
execution or arbitrary detention, where the fate of the victim is known immediately,
forced disappearance constitutes a “continuing violation”:13 the violation continues
until the fate or whereabouts of the victim is determined.14 The same argument may
be made in regard to certain ESCR violations whose injurious consequences may
continue, and be compounded, well beyond the date of the initial illicit act. Such
would be the case, for example, with respect to severe acts of environmental
contamination where toxicity to human life and well-being may not be realized until
months or years after the initial violation. 
10 American Convention, supra note 1, art. 62.
11 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Blake Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of July 2, 1996 (Ser.
C) No. 27, paras. 23, 24, 40; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Genie Lacayo Case, Preliminary Objections ,
Judgment of Jan. 27, 1995 (Ser. C) No. 21, para. 25. 
12 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case , Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No.
4, para. 184 (“According to the principle of the continuity of the State in international law,
responsibility exists both independently of changes of government over a period of time and
continuously from the time of the act that creates responsibility to the time when the act is declared
illegal. The foregoing is also valid in the area of human rights although, from an ethnical or
political point of view, the attitude of the new government may be much more respectful of those
rights than that of the government in power when the violations occurred.”). 
13 Id. para. 155; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case , Judgment of Jan. 20, 1989 (Ser. C) No. 5,
para. 163.
14 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Blake Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of July 2, 1996 (Ser. C) No.
27, paras. 33–34. The Court supports this principle by citing to article 29(d) of the Convention in
conjunction with the U.N. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforc e d
Disappearances and the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearances of Persons. These
latter instruments define forced disappearances as “continuing offenses” that persist “as long as the
fate or whereabouts of the victim have not been determined.” Id. para. 37. 
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Petitions may denounce as Convention violations
only those acts that occurred: 
• after the Convention entered into force (July 18, 1978);
• after the implicated State Party deposited its instrument of
ratification; and
• (where the Court is involved) after the implicated State Party
filed its declaration of acceptance of the Court’s contentious
jurisdiction.
II. Admissibility Requirements
Four general conditions must be met before the Commission will begin to process a
petition.15 If any of these requirements are not met, the petition will be found
inadmissible and the petitioner will be notified.16
ARTICLE 46: ADMISSIBILITY REQUIREMENTS
FOR INDIVIDUAL PETITIONS
1. Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies. The claimant must have
exhausted all the possibilities of legal redress in the State in
which the violation occurred before contacting the
Commission.17 Redress must be pursued to the highest level of
appeal available in the domestic jurisdiction.
2. Time Limitation (six months from notification). The petition
must be presented to the Commission within six months from
the date on which the party alleging violation of his/her rights
was notified of the final judgment in the domestic jurisdiction.18
15 American Convention, supra note 1, art. 46; Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights, arts. 28, 30–34, approved during Commission’s 109th extraordinary period of
sessions, Dec. 4–8, 2000, entered into effect May 1, 2001 [hereinafter Commission Rules of
Procedure], available at <http://www.oas.org/cidh/básicos/basic16.htm>. 
16 See Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 15, art. 27 (“The Commission shall consider
petitions . . . only when the petitions fulfill the requirements set forth in . . . these Rules of
Procedure.”); art. 29(b) (“[I]f the petition does not meet the requirements of these Rules of
Procedure, [the Commission] may request that the petitioner . . . complete them.”).
17 American Convention, supra note 1, art. 46(a); Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 15, art. 31.
18 American Convention, supra note 1, art. 46(b); Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 15, art.
32(1). However, a victim who has not been able to exhaust local legal channels for one of the
reasons enumerated in article 46(2) of Convention, should present her petition within a reasonable
time. See id. art. 32(2). It is best to present a petition as soon as possible after the occurrence of the
events in question.
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3. No Other International Proceeding. The petition should not
include claims that have been the subject of any other
international procedure.19
4. Petitioner Identity. The petition must contain the name,
nationality, profession, domicile, and signature of the person,
persons, or legal representative of the entity lodging the
petition.20
The Commission may order the file closed if any of the above technical requirements
are not fulfilled.21 After examining the initial merits, the Court may also find a petition
inadmissible if one of the following “substantive” circumstances arises. 
ARTICLE 47: CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WOULD MAKE
A PETITION INADMISSIBLE
1. No Prima Facie Violation of Convention. The petition does
not state facts that tend to establish a violation of the rights
guaranteed by the Convention. 22
2. Manifestly Groundless. Evidence indicates that the petition is
manifestly groundless or obviously out of order.23
3. Substantially Similar Petition Previously Studied. T h e
petition or communication is substantially the same as one
previously studied by the Commission or by another
international organization.24
19 American Convention, supra note 1, art. 46(c); Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 15,
art. 33(1).
20 American Convention, supra note 1, art. 46(d); Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 15,
art. 28.
21 See American Convention, supra note 1, art. 47(a). 
22 Id. art. 47(b); Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 15, art. 34(a). 
23 American Convention, supra note 1, art. 47(c); Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 15,
art. 34(b).
24 American Convention, supra note 1, art. 47(d); Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 15,
art. 33(1)(b). 
Cont...
Each of these admissibility rules is considered below: (a) exhaustion of domestic
remedies; (b) six-month limitation period; (c) no other international procedure or
substantially similar petition previously studied; (d) disclosure of petitioners’identity;
(e) prima facie violation of Convention; and (f) manifest groundlessness.
A. Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies
The first admissibility requirement under Convention article 46 is that all available
domestic remedies “have been pursued and exhausted.”25 The petitioner must have
attempted, without success, to obtain a remedy through the courts or authorities of the
country concerned before contacting the Commission. These remedies must have
been pursued to the highest level of appeal available in the internal jurisdiction. Only
when all available remedies have been exhausted and a final decision has been issued
from the highest level of appeal, may a petition be submitted to the adjudicatory
processes of the inter-American human rights system.
The rule of prior exhaustion is a jurisdictional prerequisite to the authority of the
inter-American system. It serves to maintain the proper balance between regional and
domestic legal systems. That is, it ensures that the Commission and Court do not
unnecessarily infringe on domestic processes, where rights are most effectively
protected, but rather fulfill their treaty mandate of “reinforcing or complementing the
protection provided by the domestic law of the American states.”26 The Court has
stated, “The rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies allows the State to resolve
the problem under its internal law before being confronted with an international
proceeding.”27 “It must not be rashly presumed that a State Party to the Convention
has failed to comply with its obligations to provide effective domestic remedies.”28
The exhaustion requirement, however, is not rigid.29 A number of legal exceptions to
the requirement are recognized in article 46(2) and the Court’s jurisprudence. 
25 American Convention, supra note 1, art. 46(a) (emphasis added); see also Commission Rules of
Procedure, supra note 15, art. 31(1).
26 American Convention, supra note 1, pmbl., para. 2. 
27 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No. 4, para. 61;
see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of Jan. 20, 1989 (Ser. C) No. 5, para.
64 (same); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Judgment of Mar. 15, 1989
(Ser. C) No. 6, para. 85 (same).
28 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No.4, para. 60.
29 The Court has repeatedly insisted, “It is generally accepted that the procedural system is a means
of attaining justice and that the latter cannot be sacrificed for the sake of mere formalities.” Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R., Cayara Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Feb. 3, 1993 (Ser. C) No. 14,
para. 42; see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Certain Attributes of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (Arts. 41, 42, 44, 46, 47, 50 and 51 of the American Convention on Human Rights),
Advisory Opinion OC-13/93 of July 16, 1993 (Ser. A) No.13, para. 43 (same).
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EXCEPTIONS TO RULE OF EXHAUSTION
OF DOMESTIC REMEDIES
• No Due Process.  Domestic legislation does not afford due
process of law (due access to legal procedures) for the
protection of the right(s) allegedly violated;30
• Obstruction of Justice. Alleged victims have been denied
access to available remedies under domestic law or have been
prevented from exhausting them;31
• Unwarranted Delay. There has been unwarranted delay in
rendering a final judgment or in conducting judicial
investigations;32 or
• P o v e r t y / F e a r. Alleged victims cannot access domestic
remedies necessary to protect guaranteed rights because of
indigency (lack of funds) or a general fear within the legal
community to represent them. 33
These exceptions stem from the requirement in article 46(1)(a) that remedies be
pursued and exhausted “in accordance with generally recognized principles of
international law.”34 According to the Court, “Those principles refer not only to the
formal existence of such remedies, but also to their adequacy and effectiveness.”35
Adequate domestic remedies are those which are suitable to address
an infringement of a legal right. A number of remedies exist in the
legal system of every country, but not all are applicable in every
30 See American Convention, supra note 1, art. 46(2)(a); Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note
15, art. 31(2)(a). 
31 See American Convention, supra note 1, art. 46(2)(b); Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note
15, art. 31(2)(b).
32 See American Convention, supra note 1, art. 46(2)(c); Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note
15, art. 31(2)(c).
33 Inter-Am. Ct.H.R., Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Internal Remedies (Art. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and
46(2)(b) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 of Aug. 10, 1990
(Ser. A) No.11, para. 42.
34 American Convention, supra note 1, art. 46(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
35 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No. 4, para. 63;
see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of Jan. 20, 1989 (Ser. C) No. 5, para.
66 (same); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case , Judgment of Mar. 15, 1989
(Ser. C) No. 6, para. 87 (same); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Caballero Delgado and Santana, Preliminary
Objections, Judgment of Jan. 21, 1994 (Ser. C) No. 17, para. 63 (same); see also Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R., Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Internal Remedies (Art. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b)
American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 of Aug. 10, 1990 (Ser. A)
No.11, para. 36. 
circumstance. If a remedy is not adequate in a specific case, it
obviously need not be exhausted. A norm is meant to have an effect
and should not be interpreted in such a way as to negate its effect or
lead to a result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.
. . . . 
A remedy must also be effective—that is, capable of producing the
result for which it was designed. Procedural requirements can make [a
particular remedy] ineffective: if it is powerless to compel the
authorities; if it presents a danger to those who invoke it; or if it is not
impartially applied.36
Where domestic remedies are “inadequate” or “ineffective,” resort to them becomes
a “senseless formality,” and petitioners are not required to exhaust them.37 The
following exceptions illustrate situations where remedies that are formally available
are nonetheless “inadequate” and/or “ineffective.” 
1. Exception 1: No Due Process Guarantees
in Domestic Laws 
Petitioners are exempted from the exhaustion requirement where evidence
demonstrates that the domestic legal system does not afford due process of law, i.e.,
there are no effective remedies to exhaust. The Court has applied the due process
exception in a series of cases dealing with forced disappearance. In the Velásquez
Rodríguez case, for example, the Court found the petition (filed on behalf of an
individual presumed “disappeared” by the Honduran government) was admissible,
even though no final decision had been issued on the remedies pursued, i.e., habeas
corpus and criminal complaint, and the petitioners had failed to pursue other legal
remedies that were formally available, e.g., amparo, rehearing, and cassation. The
Court held that, under the circumstances, domestic remedies were neither “adequate”
nor “effective” and, thus, attempts to exhaust them would be a “senseless formality.”
36 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No. 4, paras.
64, 66; see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of Jan. 20, 1989 (Ser. C) No. 5,
paras. 67, 69 (same); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Judgment of Mar.
15, 1989 (Ser. C) No. 6, paras. 88, 91 (same); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Caballero Delgado and Santana,
Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Jan. 21, 1994 (Ser. C) No. 17, para. 63 (same); see also Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R., Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Internal Remedies (Art. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b)
American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 of Aug. 10, 1990 (Ser. A)
No. 11, para. 36. 
37 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No. 4, para. 68;
see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of Jan. 20, 1989 (Ser. C) No. 5, para.
71 (same); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Judgment of Mar. 15, 1989
(Ser. C) No. 6, para. 93 (same); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Internal
Remedies (Art. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory
Opinion OC-11/90 of Aug. 10, 1990 (Ser. A) No.11, para. 34 (same). 
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[W]hen it is shown that remedies are denied for trivial reasons or
without an examination of the merits, or if there is proof of the
existence of a practice or policy ordered or tolerated by the
government, the effect of which is to impede certain persons from
invoking internal remedies that would normally be available to others
. . . resort to those remedies becomes a senseless formality. The
exceptions of Article 46(2) would be fully applicable in those
situations and would discharge the obligation to exhaust internal
remedies since they cannot fulfill their objective in that case.38
The Court found no need to await a final decision on the petition for writ of habeas
corpus. Under Honduran law, the writ could not issue unless petitioners identified the
place of illegal detention and the authority who ordered it. By definition, a petitioner
seeking release of a “disappeared person” cannot meet this procedural requirement—
i.e., “there is only hearsay evidence of the detention and the whereabouts of the victim
is unknown.”39 Given this procedural bar, the writ of habeas corpus in Honduras is
not “adequate” for finding a person clandestinely held by State officials; it need not
be exhausted. 
The Court also held that, given the government’s policy and practice of intimidation
and obstruction in cases involving the military, domestic remedies for habeas
petitions and criminal complaints were ineffective.40 The Court applied the same
reasoning in rejecting the argument that petitioners were required to pursue other
legal remedies formally available in the domestic jurisdiction (e.g., amparo,
rehearing, cassation): “formal requirements made them inapplicable in practice; the
authorities against whom they were brought simply ignored them, [and] attorneys and
judges were threatened and intimidated by those authorities.”41
The Court has thus expressly recognized that certain procedural requirements and
other actions/omissions by authorities can make a remedy ineffective. The due
process exception may be invoked in ESCR cases where domestic causes of action
are denied for trivial reasons, procedurally barred, or not impartially enforced. “[A]s
a norm of international law and the logical correlative of the obligation to exhaust
internal remedies, the rule is not applicable when there are no remedies.”42 In
38 See supra note 37.
39 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No.4, para. 65.
40 Id. para. 78 (“The evidence offered shows that lawyers who filed writs of habeas corpus were
intimidated, that those who were responsible for executing the writs were frequently prevented
from entering or inspecting the places of detention, and that occasional criminal complaints against
military or police officials were ineffective, either because certain procedural steps were not taken
or because the complaints were dismissed without further proceedings.”). 
41 Id. para. 80 (“[A]lthough there may have been legal remedies in Honduras that theoretically
allowed a person detained by the authorities to be found, those remedies were ineffective in cases
of disappearances . . . .”). 
42 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Judgment of Mar. 15, 1989 (Ser. C) No.
6, para. 110.
E c u a d o r, for example, the procedure for claiming tort damages for medical
malpractice requires certification in a criminal court before a claimant may bring a
damage claim in civil court. Medical malpractice, however, is not in the penal code.
Petitioners are thus procedurally barred from seeking a domestic judicial remedy.
This not only violates article 25, but necessarily triggers the due process exception to
the rule of prior exhaustion. 
Lack of due process may exempt a petitioner from
the requirement of exhausting domestic remedies
where formal remedies:43
• are powerless to compel the authorities;
• present a danger to those who invoke them; 
• are not impartially applied;
• are denied for trivial reasons; 
• are procedurally barred; or
• are denied without an examination of the merits;
or where
• there is proof of the existence of a practice or policy ordered or
tolerated by the government, the effect of which is to impede
certain persons from invoking internal remedies that would
normally be available to others; or
• the judiciary is not independent.
2. Exception 2: Obstruction of Justice 
The second exception to the exhaustion rule arises where victims of human rights
violations have been prevented from exhausting domestic remedies through concerted
State acts or omissions. Such obstruction may occur where, for example, crucial
evidence is lost in police custody, witnesses are intimidated before trial, judges
hearing the case are threatened, State authorities fail to enforce court orders,
authorities engage in consistent delays and inaction, or unnecessary procedural
formalities are imposed to prolong the domestic judicial process. Such arbitrary acts
by State authorities may make a given remedy “ineffective.”44
43 Id. paras. 65, 80, 78.
44 See, e.g. , Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 10/96, Case 10.636, Myrna Mack (Guate), Mar. 5,
1996, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1995, at 125,
paras. 38–45, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91, Doc. 7 rev. (1996) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1995]. 
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3. Exception 3: Unwarranted Delay
Unwarranted delay may also justify a petitioner’s failure to exhaust domestic
remedies. The Court has recently articulated the procedure for analyzing whether a
judicial proceeding has been characterized by such “unreasonable delay” that a
petitioner’s due process rights are violated. Borrowing the analytical framework of
the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court has held that a
“global analysis of the procedure” must be undertaken, in which three elements are
considered: (1) the complexity of the litigation; (2) the procedural activity of the
petitioner; and (3) the conduct of judicial authorities.45
Under this analysis, excessive delay in the various procedural stages of trial will
exempt the petitioner from exhausting domestic remedies where the delay is not
justified by either extreme complexity in the facts or evidence, or gross error or
procedural obstruction by the petitioner. The Commission has exempted petitioners
from the exhaustion rule under article 46(2)(c) for delays ranging from one year46 to
four years,47 finding that such delays rendered the given remedy “ineffective.”
4. Exception 4: Poverty or Fear 
In an important 1990 advisory opinion, the Court was asked by the Commission:
“Does the requirement of the exhaustion of internal legal remedies apply to an
indigent, who because of economic circumstances is unable to avail himself of the
legal remedies within a country?” The Court unanimously replied “no.” “[I]f his
indigency or a general fear in the legal community to represent him prevents a
complainant before the Commission from invoking the domestic remedies necessary
to protect a right guaranteed by the Convention, he is not required to exhaust such
remedies.”48 The Court continued:
Article 46(2)(a) applies to situations in which the domestic law of a
State Party does not provide appropriate remedies to protect rights that
have been violated. Article 46(2)(b) is applicable to situations in which
the domestic law does provide for remedies, but such remedies are
either denied the affected individual or he is otherwise prevented from
exhausting them. These provisions thus apply to situations where
45 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Genie Lacayo Case, Judgment of Jan. 29, 1997 (Ser. C) No.30, paras. 77, 81. 
46 See, e.g. , Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 10/95, Case 10.580 (Ecuador), Sept. 12, 1995, in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1995, supra note 44, at 76. 
47 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 10/96, Case 10.636, Myrna Mack, Admissibility
(Guate.), Mar. 5, 1996, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1995, supra note 44, at 125.
48 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Internal Remedies (Art. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and
46(2)(b) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 of Aug. 10, 1990
(Ser. A) No.11, para. 42.
domestic remedies cannot be exhausted because they are not available
either as a matter of law or as a matter of fact.49
To determine whether a given individual is prevented, in law or in fact, from
exhausting domestic remedies, “the circumstances of each case and each particular
legal system must be kept in mind.”50 As the Court has emphasized, “merely because
a person is indigent does not, standing alone, mean that he does not have to exhaust
domestic remedies, for the provision contained in Article 46(1) is of a general
nature.”51 Rather, the “language of Article 46(2) suggests that whether or not an
indigent has to exhaust domestic remedies will depend on whether the law or the
circumstances permit him to do so.”52
[I]f legal services are required either as a matter of law or fact in order
for a right guaranteed by the Convention to be recognized and a person
is unable to obtain such services because of his indigency, then that
person would be exempted from the requirement to exhaust domestic
remedies. The same would be true of cases requiring the payment of a
filing fee. That is to say, if it is impossible for an indigent to deposit
such a fee, he cannot be required to exhaust domestic remedies unless
the state provides some alternative mechanism. 
. . . [Likewise] if it can be shown that an indigent needs legal counsel
to effectively protect a right which the Convention guarantees and his
indigency prevents him from obtaining such counsel, he does not have
to exhaust the relevant domestic remedies. That is the meaning of the
language of Article 46(2) read in conjunction with Articles 1(1), 24
and 8.53
The Court affirmed that the same basic principles govern the situation in which an
individual is unable to obtain the necessary legal representation due to a general fear
in the legal community of a given country. If such a person “is prevented from
availing himself of the domestic legal remedies necessary to assert a right which the
Convention guarantees, he cannot be required to exhaust those remedies.”54
49 Id. para. 17 (emphasis added). 
50 Id. para. 29. 
51 Id. para. 20.
52 Id.
53 Id. paras. 30–31 (emphasis added).
54 Id. para. 33. 
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Practice Tip
States Parties waive their right to object to non-exhaustion of
domestic remedies by failing to make a timely objection. The
rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies is a rule established
in the interests of the State; it thus is waivable. “[T]he objection
asserting the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, to be timely,
must be made at an early stage of the proceedings by the State
entitled to make it, lest a waiver of the requirement be presumed.”55
B. Six Months from Notification of Final Decision 
The second formal admissibility requirement under article 46(1) is that a petition
must be presented to the Commission within six months from the date on which the
party alleging the violation was notified of the final judgment in the internal
jurisdiction. 56 Where more than six months have passed, the Commission will declare
the petition inadmissible. 
This appears to be a fairly rigid rule for parties that have successfully exhausted
domestic remedies. Under the Commission’s Rules of Procedure, however, a victim
who has not been able to exhaust local legal channels for one of the reasons
enumerated in article 46(2) should present her petition within a reasonable time.57 The
determination of “reasonableness” is made on a case-by-case basis.58 Needless to say,
it is always best to present a petition as soon as possible after the occurrence of the
events in question.
55 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Jun. 26, 1987
(Ser. C) No.1, para. 88. The Court has recently affirmed:  
Indeed, of the generally recognized principles of international law referred to in
the rule on exhaustion of domestic remedies, the foremost is that the State
defendant may expressly or tacitly waive invocation of this rule. Secondly, in
order to be timely, the objection that domestic remedies have not been exhausted
should be raised during the first stages of the proceeding or, to the contrary, it will
be presumed that the interested State has waived its use tacitly. Thirdly, the State
that alleges non-exhaustion must indicate which domestic remedies should be
exhausted and provide evidence of their effectiveness.
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community Case, Preliminary Objections,
Judgment of Feb. 1, 2000 (Ser. C) No. 66, para. 53. 
56 American Convention, supra note 1, art. 46(b); see also Commission Rules of Procedure, supra
note 15, art. 32(1). 
57 Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 15, art. 32(2). 
58 Id.
C. No Other International Proceeding or Decision
on Same or “Substantially Similar” Petition
The third admissibility requirement under article 46(1) is that the subject of the
petition must not be “pending in another international proceeding for settlement.”59
This rule is supplemented by article 47(d), which prohibits the Commission from
considering a petition that is “substantially the same as one previously studied by the
Commission or by another international organization.”60
The rule is not blindly applied. Its application is determined within the context of its
primary objective: to avoid the duplication of international pro c e d u re s. T h i s
avoidance is important for two reasons: (a) to prevent conflicting international
decisions; and (b) to economize on scarce time and resources in the international
human rights system. In determining whether duplication exists, the Commission
considers both the substantive nature and legal effect of the “other international
proceeding” or “substantially similar petition.” In so doing, it is guided by article
33(2) of its Rules of Procedure, which provides exceptions to the “no other
international proceeding or decision” admissibility rule.
ART. 33(2)  OF COMMISSION’S RULES:
EXCEPTIONS TO THE “NO OTHER INTERNATIONAL
PROCEEDING OR DECISION” ADMISSIBILITY RULE
The Commission shall not refrain from taking up and examining a
petition when:
1. The other international procedure is limited to a g e n e r a l
examination of the human rights situation in the state in
question; 
2. There has been no decision on the specific facts that are the
subject of the petition submitted to the Commission; 
3. The other international body’s decision will not lead to an
effective settlement of the violation denounced;61 or
4. The petitioner before the other international body is a third party
or NGO having no mandate from the victim or victim’s family,
and the Commission receives a petition from the victim or family
member.62
59 American Convention, supra note 1, art. 46(c); see also Commission Rules of Procedure, supra
note 15, art. 33(1)(a).
60 American Convention, supra note 1, art. 47(d); see also Commission Rules of Procedure, supra
note 15, art. 33(1)(b). 
61 Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 15, art. 33(2)(a). 
62 Id. art. 33(2)(b). 
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The Commission has applied article 33(2) of its Rules in at least three cases, finding
a petition admissible even where the general subject of the petition had been
considered in another international proceeding. 
In Resolution No. 30/88, the Commission rejected a Peruvian objection to the
admissibility of a petition alleging forced disappearance. The objection was grounded
in the fact that the Working Group on Forced or Involuntary Disappearances of the
U.N. Human Rights Commission had previously conducted a general study on the
practice of forced disappearance in Peru and, in so doing, had considered the case at
issue. The Commission stated that the Working Group’s report did not bar it from
considering the individual petition since the report was limited to an examination of
the general situation of human rights in Peru, no decision was undertaken on the
specific facts of the case, and the Working Group’s product would not lead to an
effective settlement of the violation denounced.63
S i m i l a r l y, in Resolution No. 14/97,6 4 the Commission rejected a Nicaraguan
contention that, because the case in question had previously been filed with the
International Labor Organization’s (ILO) Committee of Labor Freedom, a petition
concerning the arbitrary dismissal of 142 public workers from their jobs after
participating in a labor strike was inadmissible. The Commission ruled that the case
fell within the exception of article 47 of the Convention and article 33 of its Rules of
Procedure based on two grounds. First, the ILO did not make a decision on the
specific facts that were the object of the petition submitted to the Commission. That
is, the ILO considered the right to strike and to unionize, while the Commission was
asked to consider the rights to due process and judicial guarantees.65 Thus, there was
no duplication of decisions. Second, the ILO’s decision did not lead to an effective
solution to the denounced violation. The Commission emphasized that ILO
recommendations did “not entail any binding effect, either pecuniary or restorative,
or indemnitory” on the part of the State.66 As almost no international petition system
has such effect, this is potentially a very useful statement in expanding the number of
petitions that may be considered in multiple international fora. 
63 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Res. 30/88, Case 9748, Luis Máximo Vera Aragón (Peru), Sept. 14, 1988,
in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1988–89, at 30, 31,
para. f, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.76 Doc. 10 (1989) (“[T]he Commission must not refrain from taking
cognizance of the present situation when the procedure followed by the other organization is
limited to addressing the general situation of human rights in a State, and no decision has been
made on the specific facts that are the object of the petition submitted to the Commission or no
steps have been taken toward effective settlement of the alleged violation.”). 
64 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Res. 14/97, Case 11.381, Milton García Fajardo (Nicar.), in ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSIONON HUMAN RIGHTS 1996, at 535, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95,
Doc. 7 rev. (1997) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996].
65 See id. para. 45. The petition alleged violations of Convention articles 8 (due process/judicial
guarantees), 10 (compensation for judicial error), 16 (right to association), and 25 (judicial
protection). Id. para. 9.
66 Id. para. 47. 
Finally, in Report No. 5/96, the Commission was presented with a petition, the facts
of which it had considered in an earlier report.67 While acknowledging that the
principle of res judicata prevented it from reexamining the case facts as they related
to the original petitioner,6 8 the Commission found the new petition included
substantive allegations regarding the petitioner’s wife that had not been asserted in the
previous petition. It thus proceeded to consider those allegations, rejecting the State’s
claim that the entire petition was inadmissible.
The principle set forth in Articles 47 of the Convention and [33(1)] of
the Commission’s Regulations . . . must be interpreted restrictively and
only in relation to those assumptions in which the petition is limited to
“the same petition concerning the same individual.” This means that
its application does not extend to alleged human rights violations
concerning which the Commission or another similar organization has
not yet given its opinion, even when they are included in a petition that
also contains other questions that by their nature are inadmissible.69
D. Disclosure of Petitioner Identity
The fourth article 46 admissibility requirement is that petitioners, whether filing on
behalf of themselves or others, must disclose their identity—including their name,
nationality, profession, domicile, and signature. This is true whether the petitioner is
an individual, a group of individuals, or an NGO. NGOs may file petitions with the
Commission, however, only if they are legally recognized as such in one or more
OAS member states.  
E. Prima Facie Violation of Convention
Fifth, Convention article 47(b) requires, as a condition of admissibility, that petitions
“state facts that tend to establish a violation of the rights guaranteed by this
Convention.” A violation of the Convention is established where four essential
elements are proven: (1) a human person suffers injury in fact to a protected right, (2)
that is proximately caused by an illegal act, (3) that is imputable to the State; and (4)
that breaches an international obligation. To survive an adverse admissibility
67 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 5/96, Case 10.970, Raquel Martín de Mejía (Peru), Mar. 1,
1996, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1995, supra note 46, at 157, 167. 
68 Id. at 168 (“Article 47 of the Convention and Article 39 of the Regulations adopt the principle of
res judicata in the context of the conditions for admissibility of a petition. This principle means that
no State can be submitted afresh to scrutiny by the Commission in the case of petitions that have
already been examined by it or when they are subject to another international human rights
protection body.”). 
69 Id. at 170–171 (emphasis added). 
92
Bringing a Petition Before the Inter-American System
93
Admissibility Requir e m e n t s
determination, all petitions must contain factual information that, viewed in the light
most favorable to petitioner, is sufficient to allow a fact-finder to determine that each
of the four elements could eventually be proved on the merits. Where it is plain from
the face of the petition that one of the above elements cannot be proved—either as a
matter of fact or law—the petition will be found inadmissible and the file will be
closed. 
ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS FOR ESTABLISHING INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE CONVENTION70
1. Injury in fact: A human person must suffer actual or imminent
impairment of a right guaranteed under the Convention. The
injury must be concrete, not speculative or hypothetical.
2. Causation in fact: The injury must have proximately resulted
from an illegal act.
3. Imputability to the State: The illegal act must be imputable to
the State, i.e., undertaken by or with the acquiescence of state
agents.
4. Breach of an international obligation: The illegal act must
violate an obligation established by the Convention, e.g., to
“respect” or “ensure” guaranteed rights. 
1. Injury in fact
The injury-in-fact requirement is jurisdictional and is a key factor in dividing the
i n t e r-American org a n s ’ power between “case” adjudication, which requires
particularized harm, and general human rights promotion, which does not.71 Petitions
70 See Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 47/96, Case 11.436, Victims of the Tugboat “13 de marzo”
(Cuba), Oct. 16, 1996, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 64, at 127, para. 76
(enumerating essential elements for establishing international responsibility).
71 Particularized harm to specific individuals is required under the “contentious” jurisdiction of the
Court and Commission, governed by articles 41(f), 44–51 and 61–63 of the Convention. It is not
required under the Court’s “advisory” jurisdiction, governed by Convention article 64(2), or under
the Commission’s “promotional” jurisdiction, as described in article 41(a)–(e), (g) of the
Convention and article 18 of its Statute. See, e.g., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., International Responsibility
for the Promulgation and Enforcement of Laws in Violation of the Convention (Arts. 1 and 2,
American Convention on Human Rights) Advisory Opinion )C-14/94 of Dec. 9, 1994 (Ser. A) No.
14, para. 49 (“The contentious jurisdiction of the Court is intended to protect the rights and
freedoms of specific individuals, not to resolve abstract questions.”). 
may proceed as “cases” under the Convention only where injury in fact can be
demonstrated for particular persons. That is, case adjudication requires allegations of
concrete, particularized harm to the rights of specific individuals. Such harm must be
both concrete and actual or imminent,72 not speculative or hypothetical. To establish
a violation of the right to life, for example, a petitioner must show that a particular
victim died or was put in imminent risk of death or harm to life-sustaining functions.
This may be done by providing doctors’ reports, autopsies, photos, medical records,
affidavits, witness testimony, etc.73
Although direct and circumstantial proof need not be contained in the initial petition
(it may be submitted later), petitions should demonstrate that such proof can and will
be produced in the course of proceedings. That is, it is not enough in judicial
proceedings simply to assert that a right has been violated, without providing proof of
concrete impairment to the rights of actual persons. Again, this is what separates the
organs’ “contentious” jurisdiction from their “advisory” or “promotional” functions.
2. Causation in fact
To state a justiciable claim under the Convention, petitions must also demonstrate
causation in fact. That is, petitions must identify an act—of commission or omission;
by public or private actors—and state facts tending to demonstrate a causal link
between the alleged injury and the challenged conduct. Where it is impossible or
merely speculative that the challenged conduct caused the alleged injury—i.e., there
was some other intervening cause—the petition fails to state a justiciable claim under
the Convention.  
Showing causation is generally not a problem where state or private actors act directly
upon a particular person or persons—for example, by destroying a home, taking a
72 While all members of the Court agree that “concrete injury” must be shown, there appears to be
some disagreement about whether “imminent”—as opposed to “actual”—harm is enough to create
an adjudicable case, at least where the legitimacy of a law that has not yet been applied to the
petitioner’s detriment is at issue. See id. (declining to decide whether law that had not yet caused
actual injury to a particular victim violated the Convention); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., El Amparo Case,
Judgment on Reparations of Sept. 14, 1996, para. 60 (same); but see id. Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Antonio Cancado Trindade , para. 5 (“It is acknowledged nowadays that an individual may
effectively challenge a law that has not yet been applied to his detriment, sufficing to that effect
that such law be applicable in such a way that the risk or threat that he may suffer its effects is real,
is something more than a simple theoretical possibility.”) (emphasis added). The weight of the law
is on the side of Judge Cancado. See, e.g., id. paras. 1–11. Petitioners are thus encouraged to lodge
petitions with the Commission where the imminency of concrete injury to particular victims can be
demonstrated.
73 Other concrete impairments to protected rights are easier to show. For example, where direct
reprisals are undertaken in response to the exercise of a protected right (e.g., employment
termination, imprisonment, loss of benefits, discrimination, physical mistreatment, deportation),
the petitioner need only substantiate the fact of reprisal.
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person into custody, or paying sub-minimum wages.  It becomes more of a problem
where petitions challenge government policies that have generalized effects on the
rights of the population—such as budgetary decisions and cut-backs in particular
social programs. Where such policies are challenged, petitioners must be able to
demonstrate that concrete injury to human persons was in fact caused by the
challenged policy, rather than by some other intervening factor or event.
Practice Tip
The ESCR advocate must be careful, in a judicial context, not to
allege a violation of ESCR solely on the basis of the existence of
conditions of poverty or deprivation among the population. The
violation arises as a result of the express acts or omissions of the
state and the concrete injury those acts cause particular persons.
Because causation is a necessary element of a legal claim, the link
between the acts of the state and the alleged injury must be made
explicit.
3. Imputability to the State
An illegal act, whether committed by private actors or state agents, violates the
Convention only where it is imputable to a State Party. Thus, all petitions must clearly
spell out how the challenged act is imputable to a State Party. The Court has stated,
“This calls for a detailed examination of the conditions in which a particular act or
omission that impairs one or more of the rights enshrined in the American Convention
may be attributed to a State Party and, consequently, calls into question its
responsibility in accordance with the rules of international law.”74 An act of
commission or omission is always imputable to the State where it is undertaken by
state agents. Acts undertaken by private parties may also be imputed to the State
where State agents supported, tolerated, or failed to respond adequately to those acts.
As the Court has held: 
Unlike domestic criminal law, it is not necessary to determine the
perpetrators’ culpability or intentionality in order to establish that the
rights enshrined in the Convention have been violated, nor is it
essential to identify individually the agents to whom the acts of
violation are attributed.  The sole requirement is to demonstrate that
the State authorities supported or tolerated infringement of the rights
recognized in the Convention. Moreover, the State’s international
74 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Paniagua Morales et al. Case, Judgment of Mar. 8, 1998 (Ser. C) No. 37, para. 90.
responsibility is also at issue when it does not take the necessary steps
under its domestic law to identify and, where appropriate, punish the
authors of such violations.75
Imputability to the State may be shown where
the State or a state agent:
1. directly engages in an act of commission or omission that
impairs a protected right; 
2. fails to take reasonable measures to prevent a human rights
violation; or 
3. fails to carry out proper follow-up after a violation has
occurred—e.g., investigation, sanction of those responsible,
reparation, payment of compensation to victim. 
4. Breach of International Obligation 
F i n a l l y, all petitions must demonstrate that the concerned State breached an
international obligation assumed under the Convention. By ratifying the Convention,
States Parties commit themselves, under articles 1, 2 and 26, to “respect,” “ensure,”
and “achieve progressively” each of the rights guaranteed in that treaty. To establish
state responsibility for a violation of the Convention, therefore, petitioners must
demonstrate that the State, through its conduct, breached an article 1, 2 or 26
obligation with respect to the victim. These obligations are further discussed in
chapter 5. 
F. Manifestly Groundless
Finally, article 47(c) requires petitions that are “manifestly groundless or obviously
out of order” to be declared inadmissible. The Court has held that this language sets
a very high standard, explaining that “[t]he terms of Article 47(c) exclude any
conclusion based solely on appearance and demand a ‘clear, manifest certainty so
perceptible that nobody may rationally place it in doubt . . . .’”76 In so holding,
75 Id. para. 91. For further development of these concepts, see infra Chapter 5.
76 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Genie Lacayo Case, Preliminary Objections , Judgment of Jan. 27, 1995 (Ser.
C) No. 21, para. 36.
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however, it rejected the State’s argument that clear proof that an investigation and
penal process were underway was sufficient to find a petition “manifestly
groundless.”77
Practice Tip
Petitions should be drafted in a simple and straightforward manner,
free of political rhetoric. Use of rhetoric distracts from the substance
of the legal claims being advocated. 
III. Basic Content & Structure of Initial Petition
A. What a Petition Should Include
in Order to Be Considered Valid
Article 28 of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure establishes the requirements that
all petitions addressed to the Commission must meet. The Commission will not
consider petitions that do not fulfill these requirements.78 Of course, in cases of
emergency, where the alleged victim’s life or health might be in danger, petitioners
should not hesitate to file the petition even if certain non-essential information may
be lacking; incomplete petitions may be supplemented later.
1. All petitions should be in writing79
The petition may be presented in any of the four official languages of the OAS
(Spanish, English, Portuguese or French),80 and may be filed either by mail or
facsimile with the Commission. There is no special format that must be followed,81
but a petition should contain all of the relevant information available to the petitioner.
77 Id. 
78 Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 15, art. 27. 
79 Id. art. 23. 
80 Id. art. 22.
81 A suggested format is included below and a standard complaint form provided by the Commission
is included as Appendix A. The latter may be filled out electronically at <http://www.oas.org/cidh/
email.asp>.
2. Name, nationality, address,
signature of petitioner(s)82
All petitions lodged with the Commission must contain the name, nationality, and
signature of the person or persons claiming the Convention has been violated. Where
the petitioner is an NGO, the name and signature of the organization’s legal
representative(s) should be cited. Petitions must also include an address for receiving
correspondence from the Commission, including, if available, a telephone number,
facsimile number, and email address. If the petitioner wishes that his or her name be
withheld from the State, he or she should indicate so directly on the petition.83
3. Description of violation and
identification of State involved84
Each petition must also describe the human rights violation that took place, indicating
the date and place where it occurred and identifying the government involved. If
possible, the petition should include the names of the victims of the violations and of
any officials that may have knowledge of the act or situation constituting the alleged
abuse. Although not required, petitions should specify which human right(s)
mentioned in the Convention or Declaration have been violated. This will focus the
Commission’s attention and ensure that the particular violation is not overlooked. The
petition should include full details of the case and provide all available evidence, such
as declarations by witnesses and pertinent documents that might speed up the
investigation and increase the chances of a successful outcome. It is also important to
demonstrate how the government is involved and in what ways its conduct constitutes
a violation of the rights in question—that is, how the challenged conduct is imputable
to the State and how it has caused concrete injury to the protected rights of actual
persons.85
4. Exhaustion of domestic remedies
and compliance with filing deadlines86
Petitioners must provide information on any steps taken to exhaust domestic
remedies. The claimant should state what she has done to obtain redress from the
judicial authorities and the results achieved. Where relevant, copies of requests for
82 Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 15, art. 28(a)–(c).  
83 Id. art. 28(b); see also id. art. 30(2) (“The identity of the petitioner shall not be revealed without
his or her express authorization.”). 
84 Id. art. 28(d)–(f). 
85 Id. arts. 34(a), 28(h), 31.
86 Id. arts. 28(h), 31. 
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judicial action, responses, and other judicial communications should be enclosed. If
all domestic remedies were not exhausted, the petition should indicate the reasons it
was not possible to do so.  
Petitions must also demonstrate compliance with the rule that petitions be lodged with
the Commission within six months of the date on which the victim was notified of the
decision that exhausted domestic remedies. Petitioners should indicate the date upon
which they were notified of the final decision by domestic authorities. Where an
exception to the rule of prior exhaustion applies, the petition should indicate the date
on which the alleged violation of rights occurred and explain why the petition was
lodged within a “reasonable time.” 
5. Duplication of international procedures
Finally, the petition must indicate whether the complaint has been submitted to
another international settlement proceeding. If it has, the petition should discuss
applicable exceptions under article 33(2) of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure. 
Any claimant failing to meet these requirements will be notified and asked to provide
further information.
ARTICLE 28  OF COMMISSION’S RULES:
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF PETITIONS
“Petitions addressed to the Commission shall contain the following
information: 
a. the name, nationality, and signature of the person or persons
making the denunciation; or in cases where the petitioner is a
nongovernmental entity, the name and signature of its legal
representative(s);
b. whether the petitioner wishes that his or her identity be withheld
from the State; 
c. the address for receiving correspondence from the Commission
and, if available, a telephone number, facsimile number, and
email address; 
d. an account of the act or situation that is denounced, specifying
the place and date of the alleged violations; 
e. if possible, the name of the victim and of any public authority
who has taken cognizance of the fact or situation alleged; Cont...
f. the State the petitioner considers responsible, by act or
omission, for the violation of any of the human rights recognized
in the American Convention on Human Rights and other
applicable instruments, even if no specific reference is made to
the article(s) alleged to have been violated; 
g. compliance with the time period provided [six months] . . . ; 
h. any steps taken to exhaust domestic remedies, or the
impossibility of doing so . . . ; and, 
i. an indication of whether the complaint has been submitted to
another international settlement proceeding  . . . .”
B. Recommended Structure of Initial Petition
There is no special format required for structuring a petition. Successful petitions by
NGOs such as the Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL) and Human
Rights Watch (HRW/Americas), however, generally include, in addition to an
opening statement, five sections: (1) an introduction; (2) a “facts” section; (3) a
discussion of how domestic remedies were exhausted; (4) an analysis of each
Convention article violated; and (5) a formal request to open the case. A model ESCR
petition is included as Appendix B for reference. A standard complaint form made
available by the Commission is included as Appendix A.
RECOMMENDED STRUCTURE OF INITIAL PETITION:
Opening Statement
I. Introduction
II. Description of events constituting alleged violation: The Facts
III. Exhaustion of domestic remedies
IV. Analysis of Convention articles allegedly violated
V. Request to open case
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1. Opening Statement
Petitions should open with one or two paragraphs that identify the petitioner(s) by
name, indicate the State implicated in the violations, and affirm the jurisdictional
bases upon which the petition is brought. The opening statement should succinctly
indicate the act or omission constituting the violation, the names of the victims, and
the provisions of the Declaration, Convention, Protocol or other applicable instrument
that were allegedly violated, including the general obligation of the State to respect
and to ensure the rights of persons within its jurisdiction (arts. 1, 2, 26). A petition
alleging violation of the Convention and Protocol of San Salvador might begin as
follows: 
Esteemed Ambassador Canton, 
The Center for Economic and Social Rights and the Allard K.
Lowenstein International Human Rights Law Clinic at the Yale Law
School present a petition to the Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights (hereinafter “Commission”) against the State of ___ in
accordance with articles 41(f), 44 to 51, and 77 of the American
Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter “Convention”) and article
19(6) of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on
Human Rights in the Matter of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(hereinafter “Protocol”).87
The State of ___ is responsible for numerous violations of the
Convention and Protocol in relation to the conditions of work at the
Maquiladora XX and the summary dismissal of sixteen female
workers for union-related activities and other legitimate exercises of
protected rights. The State of ___ has violated the following rights
guaranteed by the Convention with respect to [list names of individual
victims]: right to humane treatment (art. 5), freedom from involuntary
servitude (art. 6), right to personal liberty (art. 7), right to a fair trial
(art. 8), right to privacy (art. 11), freedom of expression (art. 13), right
to assembly (art. 15), freedom of association (art. 16), rights of the
child (art. 19), right to property (art. 21), right to equal protection (art.
24), and right to judicial protection (art. 25). It has also violated many
of the rights set forth in article 26. Through its acts and omissions, the
State has violated its general obligations to respect and ensure the
above rights (art. 1.1), to adopt legislation to give them domestic legal
effect (art. 2), and to adopt measures to progressively achieve them
(art. 26). The State has also violated the following rights guaranteed by
the Protocol: right to unionization (art. 8(1)(a)) and right to education
(art. 13). 
87 A petition alleging violations of only the Convention would read: “. . . in accordance with articles
41(f) and 44 to 51 of the American Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter “Convention).”
ALL PETITIONS SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO:
Ambassador Santiago A. Canton
Executive Secretary
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
Organization of American States
1889 F Street, NW, Washington, D.C., USA 20006
They can be sent by mail or by fax: (202) 458-3992
2. Introduction 
The introduction (section I) should summarize the entire case concisely in one or two
clearly written paragraphs. It should tell the Commissioner exactly what the petition
intends to demonstrate: what violation occurred, who committed it, under whose
orders, and who was harmed as a result. 
3. Description of Events Constituting
the Alleged Violation: The Facts
Section II should include full details of the case and provide all possible proofs, such
as any declarations made by witnesses and pertinent documents that might speed up
the investigation and increase the chances of success. Any witness or person with
knowledge of any facts surrounding the case should be indicated, as should any
physical or testimonial evidence that might exist regarding the alleged acts, the
motives of the perpetrators, and who may have given orders. It is important to
demonstrate how the government is involved and in what way its conduct constitutes
a violation of the right(s) in question. While including as much information as
possible, this section should not generally exceed four pages. 
4. Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies
All attempts to exhaust domestic remedies, and the results achieved, should be
discussed in section III. If domestic remedies have been exhausted, the petitioner
should describe the procedures undertaken and attach copies of all resulting judicial
orders to the petition. If domestic remedies have not been exhausted, the petition
should indicate the reasons why, explaining how one of the recognized exceptions to
the exhaustion rule applies.88 The petitioner should succinctly describe all anomalies
88 See supra Chapter 2(II)(A) for a discussion of these exceptions.
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in the process, how they transpired, who is responsible for them, and how such
anomalies departed from the legal obligations of the responsible authority.
It is very important that the petitioner present domestic law in a manner that is clear
and accessible to a person who is not a lawyer in the denounced State. As CEJIL
notes, a recurrent problem of petitioners is to assume full knowledge of domestic
legal practice by the Commission. For example, saying that a given judge did not act
diligently in an investigation of “nudo hecho” will inevitably provoke such questions
as: What is “nudo hecho”? Why didn’t the judge act diligently? Did the judge neglect
an obligation necessary for the investigation? These types of questions must be
explained in a clear, precise, and accessible fashion.
5. Analysis of Convention Articles Allegedly Violated 
The fourth section should discuss the specific provision(s) of the Declaration, the
Convention, the Protocol or other applicable instrument allegedly violated by the
denounced act or omission of the State. As it is possible to present later briefs to
further develop the rights violated or to include additional information or evidence,
the imputed articles may simply be listed in a single paragraph. A m o r e
comprehensive petition, however, will develop focused discussions, organized under
separate subheadings, applying the Court’s jurisprudence on each relevant treaty
provision to the facts and evidence (these subheadings are generally organized in
ascending order, i.e., from article 3 to article 26).89 In petitions alleging violations of
the Convention, articles 1, 2 and 26 (duties to respect, ensure, and progressively
achieve) should have their own subheading at the end of this section; they function to
substantiate state responsibility for the violation of the Convention. Chapters 6, 7, and
8 of this Manual discuss each of the Convention articles most applicable to ESCR,
providing the relevant jurisprudence of the Commission and Court as it applies to
each article. This jurisprudence should be drawn upon in ESCR petitions and used
when discussing violations of specific Convention articles. 
6. Request to Open Case
The final section of the petition should reaffirm both that the State in question has an
obligation, by virtue of its treaty ratification (provide relevant date), to respect and to
ensure the rights recognized in the Convention, and that the facts presented in the
89 Thus, a petition alleging violation of the Convention for the death of a child resulting from unsafe
conditions of unemployment would likely discuss, under separate subheadings, how the underlying
acts and omissions of the State constituted a violation of article 4 (right to life), article 5 (personal
integrity), article 6 (forced labor), articles 8 and 25 (due process and judicial protection), article 19
(rights of the child), and article 26 (progressive development of ESCR).
petition establish a violation of the Convention.  Petitioners should request that the
Commission open the case, find it admissible, condemn the State for violating the
rights enumerated in the previous section, and order that the consequences of the
violation be repaired and just compensation be paid. If a victim or witness is in
danger, petitioners may also ask for the adoption of precautionary measures. In
general, petitioners “respectfully request”:
1. That the Commission begin to process the case in accordance with
articles 46 to 51 of the Convention and articles 29 to 43 of the
C o m m i s s i o n ’s Rules of Procedure; and consequently that it
transmit the petition to the State in question in accordance with
article 48 of the Convention. 
2. That the Commission declare the State in question to be in
violation of the relevant articles [list them]; and order the State to
repair the consequences of the violation and pay just compensation
in accordance with article 63 of the Convention. 
3. That the Commission recommend that the Government effectively
investigate the alleged facts and sanction those responsible.
Petitioners should make sure to include their signatures and contact telephone/fax
numbers on the petition. 
LIST OF BASIC QUESTIONS FOR PETITIONERS90
In preparing a petition, it is useful to consider the following
questions and to be sure the petition clearly expresses the
appropriate information.
1. Has the State ratified the Convention? Has it ratified other
conventions that are in effect?
2. When was the Convention ratified? Are there any reservations
or understandings?
3. Is the victim affected by the State—by act or omission—a
“human person”?
4. Which rights in the Convention were violated?
90 This list was produced by the Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL). 
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5. What kind of evidence is available?
6. What judicial procedures have been undertaken to exhaust
domestic remedies? Are any of the exceptions to the rule of
exhaustion of domestic remedies applicable?
7. Have more than six months passed since the final judicial
decision at the domestic level was handed down?
8. Is the case pending before a United Nations committee or other
international body?
9. Is the life or physical integrity of any victim or witness in danger?
IV. Overview of Entire Procedure
Much of the preceding discussion has focused on admissibility considerations. The
following box summarizes each step in the entire process of lodging a petition with
the Commission against a State Party to the Convention.91 The procedure applicable
to States that are not parties to the Convention varies only in that such cases may not
be referred to the Court.92
1. Violation occurs. Injury is suffered by a human person as a
proximate result of an act imputable to a State Party to the
Convention. 
2. Case is filed in domestic court and appeals are pursued.
Remedies must be pursued to the highest available level of
appeal in the domestic jurisdiction. 
3. Domestic remedies are exhausted. A final decision by the
state’s highest judicial authority must be entered. If one of the
exceptions established in article 46(2) of the Convention
applies, domestic remedies need not be exhausted. 
4. Petition is submitted to the Secretariat of the Commission
within six months. The petition must be submitted within six
91 These steps are established in articles 44–51 of the Convention and articles 26–47 of the
Commission’s Rules of Procedure. 
92 See Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 15, art. 50. 
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months of notification of the final decision in the internal
jurisdiction. If exhaustion was impeded, or otherwise not
possible, the petition must be submitted within a “reasonable
time.” 
5. Preliminary admissibility review. The Secretariat will conduct
an initial admissibility review to establish whether the
admissibility requirements provided for in articles 25–41 of its
Statute are met. If they are not, the Secretariat will contact the
petitioner and, where relevant, may request the petitioner to
provide additional information. If the requirements are met, or if
the Secretariat has any doubt about the admissibility of a
petition, it shall submit it for consideration to the Commission. 
6. If formal admissibility requirements are met, the
Commission assigns a number to the petition and begins
to process it as a case. The petitioner is notified of receipt and
initial processing of the petition.
7. Commission may, but is not required to, make a formal
admissibility ruling or do so once more information has
been collected. The Commission may decide to close the file
at any point in the process.
8. Pertinent parts of the petition are sent to the government
with a request for relevant information within 90 days of
the date on which the request is sent. In transmitting the
pertinent parts of a petition to the government of the State in
question, the identity of the petitioner is withheld, as is any
other information that could identify her, except when the
petitioner expressly authorizes in writing the disclosure of her
identity. With justifiable cause, the government may request a
30-day extension for providing the Commission with the
information requested, but in no case will extensions be
granted for more than 180 days after the date on which the first
petition is sent to the government. 
9. The pertinent parts of the reply and the documents
provided by the government are made known to the
petitioner, who is asked to submit observations and any
available evidence to the contrary within 30 days. 
10. On receipt by the Commission, the pertinent parts of the
petitioner’s observations and evidence are transmitted to
the government, which is allowed to submit its final
observations within 30 days. Under article 39 of the
Commission’s Rules of Procedure, the facts reported in an
initial petition, the pertinent parts of which have been
transmitted to the government of the State in reference, shall be
presumed true if, during the maximum period set by the
Commission, the government has not provided information to
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rebut or challenge those facts, as long as other evidence does
not lead to a different conclusion. 
11. Full record is submitted to the Commission for
c o n s i d e r a t i o n . If the government has not provided the
pertinent information after the first 90-day period for the State’s
reply has elapsed, the record is immediately submitted to the
Commission at the first session held thereafter. If the petitioner
has not replied or if the government has not submitted its final
observations, the record shall be submitted to the Commission
after the relevant 30-day time periods have elapsed. 
12. Commission carries out its own investigations, conducting
on-site visits, requesting specific information from the
parties, etc. The Commission may designate one or more of its
members or Secretariat staff members to take specific
measures, investigate facts, or make the necessary
arrangements for the Commission to perform its functions. The
Commission may take any action it considers necessary for the
discharge of its functions.
13. Commission may hold a hearing, in which both parties are
present and asked to set forth their legal and factual
arguments. The Commission may conduct a hearing following
a summons to the parties and proceed to examine the matter
set forth in the petition. At that hearing, the Commission may
request any pertinent information from the representatives of
the State in question and shall receive, if so requested, oral or
written statements presented by the parties concerned. 
14. Commission may offer to assist parties in negotiating a
friendly settlement. At any stage of the examination of a
petition, the Commission may, at the request of the parties, or
on its own initiative, place itself at the disposal of the parties
with a view to reaching a friendly settlement of the matter on the
basis of respect for the human rights recognized in the
American Convention. Upon doing so, the Commission may
designate a Special Commission or an individual to act as the
organ of conciliation. It shall then fix a time for the receipt and
gathering of evidence; set dates for holding hearings, if
appropriate; plan an on-site observation; and fix a time for the
conclusion of the procedure. If a friendly settlement is reached,
the Commission shall prepare a report to be transmitted to the
parties and published by the OAS, containing a brief statement
of the facts and the solution reached. The Commission may, at
any stage of the procedure, declare its role as organ of
conciliation terminated. 
15. When the parties have completed the exchange of briefs,
the investigatory stage has been completed, and the
Commission decides it has sufficient information, the
Cont...
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Commission has 180 days to prepare its decision. If a
friendly settlement is not reached, the Commission must
examine the evidence provided by the government and the
petitioner as well as evidence taken from witnesses and
obtained from documents, records, official publications, or
through on-site investigation.
16. Commission prepares a confidential report that includes
its conclusions and provides recommendations to the
State concerned. This report is not public. After the
evidence has been examined, the Commission prepares a
report (called an “article 50 report”) setting forth the facts and
stating its conclusions regarding the case. In transmitting the
report, the Commission may make such proposals and
recommendations as it sees fit. It generally recommends that
the government repair the breach, investigate what happened,
compensate the victims, and, in general, desist from further
violations of fundamental rights.
17. The State has a period of three months to resolve the
situation and comply with the Commission’s
recommendations. 
18. If this period expires and the State has not complied with
the report, the Commission has two options: (a) prepare
and then publish a second report (“article 51 report”), or
(b) submit the case to the Court. If it decides to take the case
to the Court, it must do so within three months from the date on
which the initial report was transmitted to the State concerned.
If the case is taken to the Court, the Commission may not
publish its second report. If the second report is published, the
Commission may not thereafter submit the case to the Court.
The decision as to whether a case should be submitted to the
Court or published is made on the basis of the best interests of
human rights, in the Commission’s judgment. 
Practice Tip
If a petitioner would like to see her case submitted to the Court, she
should submit a brief (“article 51 brief”) to the Commission within
one month of the Commission’s transmittal of the article 50 report
to the State concerned. The brief should urge that the best interests
of human rights would be served by submitting the case to the
Court rather than issuing an article 51 report. This brief should
include the most detailed and thorough analysis of the facts
possible, including presentation of all documentary, testimonial,
and expert evidence available; a complete discussion of the
exhaustion requirement; the reasons the petitioner believes the
case should be referred to the Court, including the view of the
victim or victim’s family; the personal data relative to the victims;
and all claims concerning reparation and costs.
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Ultimately, it is up to the Commission whether it submits a case to the Court or
publishes an article 51 report. For ESCR advocates looking to send test cases to the
Court, it is important to choose cases that have the greatest likelihood of being
submitted to the Court. As the Convention does not establish criteria for determining
which cases should be sent to the Court, the Commission has established evolving
criteria for its own guidance.93
CRITERIA USED BY COMMISSION WHEN DECIDING
WHICH CASES TO REFER TO THE COURT
1. P e t i t i o n e r’s position: Substantial weight will be given to
whether the petitioner wishes the case to be referred to the
Court. 
2. Nature and seriousness of the violation: Cases involving
widespread or egregious threats to fundamental rights,
particularly those affecting life and personal integrity, will be
favored by the Commission for referral to the Court. 
3. Need to develop or clarify the case-law of the system: The
Commission will give priority to high-profile cases that announce
a new or more forceful principle of human rights protection, thus
a ffecting the entire regional system. In this respect, the
Commission may favor new types of violations, giving ESCR
advocates a potential advantage. 
4. Future effect of the decision within the legal systems of the
member States: The Commission will also privilege petitions
whose resolution by the Court will likely have an enduring
impact on domestic legal systems—for example, by setting
limits on domestic policies or practices of widespread
application in a particular State or States. The Commission is
also likely to favor petitions from countries that have not been
the subject of frequent litigation before the Court. 
5. Quality of the evidence available: Finally, the Commission will
privilege cases that provide substantial documentation and
richly developed supporting evidence as to law and fact. The
more work done by the petitioning parties in preparing the
factual documentation and legal argumentation in the case, the
greater the likelihood of referral to the Court.  
93 See id. art. 44; see also Remarks of Dean Claudio Grossman, Chairman of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, at the Inaugural Session of the 95th Regular Meeting of the
IACHR, Wash., D.C., Feb. 24, 1997, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 1997, at 1128, 1131, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, Doc. 7 rev. (1998).
This Manual aims to promote successful ESCR petitions before the Court, as well as
before the Commission. Because the Commission effectively takes over the legal
arguments once it submits a case to the Court, it becomes all the more important to
frame the relevant issues before the Commission in a way the Court will find
juridically acceptable. The following chapters provide legal arguments for use in
ESCR petitions that may be most compelling to both the Commission and the Court.
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GENERAL STRATEGIES  FOR  PROTECTING
ESCR  AS  JUSTICIABLE  RIGHTS  UNDER
THE  CONVENTION:  INTRODUCTION
his Manual is designed to assist practitioners in bringing justiciable claims
under the contentious jurisdiction of the Inter-American Commission and
Court of Human Rights. Before turning to general strategies, it is important
to define justiciability and to emphasize the difference between international organs
whose primary purpose is to adjudicate cases involving alleged violation of human
rights and those whose primary function is to monitor and p romote g e n e r a l
compliance with human rights obligations. The former is typified by the Inter-
American Court and its contentious proceedings; the latter by the U.N. Committee on
ESCR and its state reporting procedure.1 Practitioners must be aware that arguments
that may be successful before one will not necessarily be successful before the other.
I. ESCR Adjudication vs. ESCR
Monitoring and Promotion
Most of the literature available on ESCR focuses on the normative content of States’
international obligations to respect, protect, and “progressively” fulfill ESCR.
Scholars, U.N. committees, regional organs, and NGOs have spent considerable time
over the last two decades clarifying the scope of obligations assumed by States under
ESCR treaties. In the main, however, this literature has been prepared with a view
toward assisting advocates and activists in holding States politically accountable by
using treaty-based reporting and monitoring procedures designed to assess a State’s
compliance with its international treaty obligations—i.e., by preparing “shadow
1 The Inter-American Commission has both adjudicatory and promotional functions, although it
undertakes them under separate and distinct jurisdictional mandates.
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reports,” measuring progress, and publicizing ESCR backsliding. Issues of party
“standing” do not apply to monitoring procedures; thus, jurisdictional issues that
determine whether or not a case may be heard by a court of law have not tended to be
discussed in the ESCR literature. 
The essential difference between adjudicatory bodies, such as the Court, and
international monitoring bodies, such as the U.N. Committee, is whether the subject
of the proceeding involves an actual controversy between directly interested parties
(i.e., a concrete case) or simply measurement of general progress in ESCR
achievement over time (i.e., assessment of general obligations). Monitoring bodies
are charged with measuring States’ progress (and backsliding) in achieving ESCR,
usually through the use of indicators. The U.N. Committee on ESCR, for example,
collects and analyzes relevant demographic, legal, educational, health, and other
statistical data submitted periodically by States Parties and other actors. It then makes
friendly suggestions and recommendations for improving ESCR conditions in a given
country.2 Where a State reports, without providing a reasonable justification, that
infant mortality rates have increased or the number of girl children in elementary
classrooms has declined, the Committee will note the setbacks as a subject of concern
and make recommendations on how such trends may be reversed. The Commission
follows the same procedure in its monitoring and promotion activities, such as its
annual and special country reports; based on statistical and other indicators of ESCR
achievement, it assesses States’ fulfillment of international ESCR obligations, notes
progress and problem areas, and offers recommendations to the State. 
Sometimes “setbacks” and “failures” in a State’s overall ESCR achievement are
described as “violations” of international treaty law. Thus, the U.N. Committee has
noted that, “a State party in which any significant number of individuals is deprived
of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing,
or of the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its
obligations under the Covenant . . . [i.e.,] to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very
least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights.”3 Under this “violations
approach,” a State that engages in ESCR backsliding or otherwise fails to undertake
requisite ESCR measures is said to have violated its international treaty obligations,
2 The monitoring procedure established under the ICESCR is “based on the assumption that a
constructive dialogue between the Committee and the state party, in a non-adversarial, cooperative
spirit, is the most productive means of prompting the government concerned to take the requisite
action.” Philip Alston, U.S. Ratification of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
The Need for an Entirely New Strategy, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 365, 370 (1990).
3 The Nature of States Parties Obligations, General Comment No. 3, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on
Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., 5th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 83, para. 10, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (1990),
reprinted in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS:AT EXTBOOK 442 (Asbjørn Eide et al. eds.,
1995). While the Committee has discussed setbacks and failures as “violations” in its General
Comments, it has tended to avoid such discussions in its expert assessment of States’ periodic
reports. 
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i.e., to respect, protect, and fulfill ESCR. The focus, again, is on a State’s general
breach of its obligations; it is not on impairment of actual individuals’ rights. The
essential point is that not all State failures to discharge international treaty
obligations—i.e., the central focus of monitoring and reporting procedures—are
susceptible to judicial resolution. A State’s “setbacks” or “failures,” even when
described by monitoring bodies as treaty “violations,” give rise to justiciable claims
only where concrete impairment to the rights of specific individuals is alleged. 
Justiciability—the ability to determine judicially whether or not a protected right has
been violated—is the threshold requirement for having one’s claim addressed under a
court’s contentious jurisdiction. In the inter-American system, this jurisdictional
requirement is intended to safeguard the rights of litigants by ensuring that their
interests are adequately represented in the context of an actual controversy, otherwise
known as a “concrete case.” Article 62(3) of the Convention limits the claims the
Court may consider to judicial “cases.” Distinguished by the Court from an “abstract
question,” a judicial “case” is typified by two essential elements: (1) injury in fact to
a human person, and (2) a causal link to an act imputable to the State. A State’s failure
to discharge its obligations under international law constitutes a justiciable claim only
where the petitioner demonstrates that a human person suffered concrete impairment
of a protected right and that impairment is causally linked to the State failure. The
existence of these two elements—concrete injury and causation—is what
distinguishes the contentious jurisdiction of the Court and Commission from their
“advisory” or “promotional” jurisdictions.4
4 As the Court has affirmed:
The contentious jurisdiction of the Court is intended to protect the rights and
freedoms of specific individuals, not to resolve abstract questions. There is no
provision in the Convention authorizing the Court, under its contentious
jurisdiction, to determine whether a law [or other act imputable to the State] that
has not yet affected the guaranteed rights and freedoms of specific individuals is
in violation of the Convention. As has already been noted, the Commission has
that power and, in exercising it, would fulfill its main function of promoting
respect for and defense of human rights. The Court also could do so in the
exercise of its advisory jurisdiction, pursuant to [Convention] Article 64(2).
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., International Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement of Laws in
Violation of the Convention (Arts. 1 and 2, American Convention on Human Rights) Advisory
Opinion OC-14/94 of Dec. 9, 1994 (Ser. A) No. 14, para. 49 (emphasis added); see also Dissenting
Opinion of Judge Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, El Amparo Case, Judgment on the
Reparations of Sept. 14, 1996, para. 8 (“In my understanding, it is the existence of victims that
provides the decisive criterion for distinguishing the examination simply in abstracto of a legal
provision, from the determination of the incompatibility of such provision with the American
Convention on Human Rights in the framework of a concrete case . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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1. Injury in fact: A human person must suffer actual or imminent
impairment of a protected right. The injury must be concrete, not
speculative or hypothetical.
2. Causation: The injury must be fairly traceable to challenged
conduct that is imputable to the State.  
To fulfill the “injury in fact” requirement, petitions must identify specific persons as
victims and show how they have suffered concrete impairment of a right protected
under the Convention. The injury suffered must be either actual or imminent5; it may
not be speculative or conjectural. For example, a petition challenging a government
policy on the ground that it has a generalized regressive effect on the rights of the
population as a whole (without naming victims or describing their concrete injuries)
will likely be found non-justiciable. The Court and Commission, under their
contentious jurisdiction, will insist that specific victims be identified and that concrete
injury to their rights be alleged.  
The “causation” requirement likewise serves to guard the boundary between the
organs’contentious and advisory jurisdictions. Just as the “injury in fact” requirement
ensures that the petitioner has a direct interest in the litigation, the “causation”
requirement ensures that the alleged injury was a consequence of the State’s actions
and thus can be redressed through contentious proceedings.6
The Court and Commission may consider general backsliding in ESCR achievement
and “hypothetical” or “speculative” injury to individuals or groups—without
reference to specific victims—under their advisory and promotional jurisdiction.
Neither organ may do so, however, in the individual petitions process, a process
established to determine whether or not an alleged victim’s rights have been
concretely violated by an act imputable to the State.7 Practitioners must be sure,
therefore, that petitions lodged in the inter-American system name specific victims
and demonstrate concrete impairment to the rights of those persons. They must also
5 Injury is “imminent” where the risk or threat that a victim will suffer its effects “is real, is
something more than a simple theoretical possibility.” Id. at para. 5. 
6 In the absence of redressability, a judicial decision is simply an advisory opinion. 
7 Of course, the Commission and Court may consider general ESCR backsliding and other evidence
of a State’s failure to fulfill its international obligations in the context of determining whether or
not an individual victim’s rights have been violated.  As discussed in chapter 2, to establish a
violation of the Convention under the organs’ contentious jurisdiction, a petitioner must prove
injury in fact, causation, imputability to the State, and breach of an international obligation.
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demonstrate that the impairment was proximately caused by an act that can be
imputed, under general principles of international law, to the concerned State. 
Practice Tip
To state a justiciable claim, all petitions must state facts tending to
show that (1) a human person suffered concrete injury to a
protected right, and (2) the injury was proximately caused by an act
imputable to the State. A petition that does not state facts tending
to show these two elements—for example, because it does not
name individual victims, alleges only “speculative” injury, or alleges
injury that could not, as a matter of law, have been caused by the
challenged act—will be dismissed.
II. General Strategies for Supporting ESCR
Claims under the Convention  
This Manual advocates four general strategies for protecting ESCR as justiciable
rights under the Convention: (1) the “indirect approach”; (2) the “integration
approach”; (3) the “article 26 approach”; and (4) the “complex violation approach.”
These strategies are discussed in chapters 6 through 9, respectively. Each requires a
finding of concrete injury to a victim’s protected rights under the Convention, in
addition to a State’s breach of an international obligation. 
The “indirect approach” uses the Convention’s procedural guarantees to protect
ESCR from substantive infringement. “Procedural rights” refer to norms that impose
process requirements upon States; they provide a direct right to fair process in the
distribution and receipt of entitlements. They include the rights to due process (art. 8),
non-discrimination (arts. 1, 24), and judicial protection (art. 25). The strength of the
indirect approach comes from two of its essential attributes. First, because procedural
rights protect process generally—and thus are not limited to any specific set of
substantive rights—the traditional CPR/ESCR distinction is irrelevant to their
application. Second, the procedural guarantees protected in the Convention are
applicable not only to the rights recognized in the Convention, but to all rights
recognized in the internal domestic legal order. The indirect approach thus allows a
wide range of conduct to be challenged in the inter-American system. The indirect
approach has already been relied upon by the Commission, the Court, and the
European Court and Commission of Human Rights. 
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The “integration approach” rests on the premise that no right in the Convention
should be treated as exclusively “civil and political” or exclusively “economic, social,
and cultural”; each right has essential CPR and ESCR aspects, both of which require
effective judicial protection. This view is consistent with the repeated insistence of
the Commission and Court that CPR and ESCR constitute “an indissoluble whole . .
. for which reason both groups of rights require constant protection and promotion in
order to achieve their full realization.” Under the integration approach, the “protected
rights” of the Convention should thus be read broadly to encompass their ESCR
aspects in addition to their traditional CPR components. Like the indirect approach,
the integration approach has been endorsed by both inter-American human rights
organs, their European counterparts, and, arguably, the text of the Convention itself. 
The “article 26 approach” has not yet been endorsed by the Commission or Court. It
relies on Convention article 26, the only provision under the chapter “Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights.” Article 26 expressly recognizes the “rights implicit in
the economic, social, . . . and cultural standards set forth in the [OAS Charter]”; these
include the rights to education, food and nutrition, health and sanitation, adequate
housing, social security, unionization and strike, fair wages and just labor conditions,
participation in development decisionmaking, and equal opportunity. While article 26
does not enumerate protected ESCR itself, it creates an express cause of action under
the Convention to hold States accountable for respecting, ensuring, and progressively
achieving a wide range of essential ESCR. It is thus a critical provision for ESCR
protection in the inter-American system.  
Finally, the “complex violation approach” is drawn from the Court’s renowned
Velásquez Rodríguez jurisprudence. It rests on the idea that certain egregious,
internationally censored ESCR violations may be viewed as “complex violations” of
the Convention. This may occur where discrete acts, though not expressly mentioned
in the text or drafting history of the Convention, violate a variety of enumerated
rights, thus representing “a radical treaty breach” in the terms explained in the
Velásquez Rodríguez case. This approach should be used infrequently, reserved for
egregious ESCR violations that implicate a variety of enumerated rights and have
been the focus of explicit international censure. 
FOUR GENERAL STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING ESCR
THROUGH THE CONVENTION:
1. Indirect Approach. Domestically and internationally recognized
ESCR may be protected from restriction or suppression that is
due to lack of due process (article 8), discriminatory treatment
(articles 1, 24), and lack of judicial protection (article 25). 
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2. Integration Approach.Articles 3–23 may be used to protect the
ESCR, as well as CPR, “dimensions” of each respective right.
The right to life (art. 4), for example, should protect against not
only extrajudicial executions and forced disappearance, but also
threats to life from environmental contamination, unsafe work
conditions, and lack of access to essential food, water, and
health care services. 
3. Article 26 Approach. Article 26 expressly recognizes the “rights
implicit in the economic, social . . . and cultural standards set
forth in the [OAS Charter].” Viewed as “protected rights,” these
implied rights may be directly invoked in the individual petitions
process to hold States accountable for respecting, ensuring,
and progressively achieving a wide range of ESCR. 
4. “Complex Violation” Approach. Building on the “forced
disappearance” jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court,
certain egregious, internationally censored ESCR violations
may be viewed as “complex violations” of the Convention. This
may occur where discrete acts, though not expressly mentioned
in the text or drafting history of the Convention, violate a variety
of enumerated rights, thus representing “a radical treaty breach”
in the terms explained in the Velásquez Rodríguez case.
Because the Court is largely limited to entertaining petitions that “concern[] the
interpretation and application of the provisions of this Convention,”8 each of the
above strategies explicitly draws on one or more of the Convention’s “protected
rights,” that is, articles 3 through 26.  
PROTECTED RIGHTS APPLICABLE TO THE FOUR STRATEGIES9
I. Indirect Approach
• Article 8: Due Process 
• Article 24: Equal Protection of Law
• Article 25: Judicial Protection (Effective Remedy)
8 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at
1, art. 62(3), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23 doc. rev. 2, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970), entered into force July 18, 1978,
available at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/Básicos/basic3.htm>. 
9 This synopsis does not include articles 9 (Freedom from Ex Post Facto Laws), 10 (Right to






• Article 3: Juridical Personality
• Article 4: Right to Life
• Article 5: Personal Integrity/Humane Treatment
• Article 6: Freedom from Forced Labor
• Article 7: Personal Liberty/Security
• Article 11: Right to Privacy/Inviolability of Home
• Article 12: Freedom of Conscience and Religion
• Article 13: Freedom of Thought and Expression
• Article 15: Right of Assembly
• Article 16: Freedom of Association
• Article 17: Rights of the Family
• Article 19: Rights of the Child
• Article 21: Right to Property
• Article 22: Freedom of Movement and Residence
• Article 23: Right to Participate in Government
III. Article 26 Approach
• Article 26: ESCR Implicit in the OAS Charter
IV. Complex Violation Approach
• May draw on all of the above Convention articles and
approaches
While each of the above strategies has potential for success, a decision about which
to use will depend on the specific facts and issues of the particular case. Generally
speaking, the indirect and integration approaches should be invoked, to the extent
possible, in all petitions. The best strategy of all, however, is to ensure that every
argument made is logical, well reasoned, and well supported. Does the argument
make sense? Has the petition adequately shown injury in fact, causation, imputability
to the State, and breach of an international obligation? Has the law been applied to
the facts so a reader would be compelled to find a Convention violation in the
particular case? A poorly reasoned petition is risky not only for an individual client,
but for all victims of ESCR violations whose future claims may be foreclosed by a
negative decision.
III. Final Introductory Thoughts
Practitioners must keep constantly in mind that the Inter-American Commission and
Court are international human rights bodies that are entrusted, in the Court’s words,
with preserving “a fair balance between the protection of human rights, which is the
ultimate purpose of the system, and the legal certainty and procedural equity that will
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10 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Cayara Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Feb. 3, 1993 (Ser. C)
No.14, para. 63 (emphasis added); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Caballero Delgado and Santana Case,
Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Jan. 21, 1994 (Ser. C) No.17 (1994), para. 44 (same).
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ensure the stability and reliability of the international protection mechanism.”10 The
structure and procedures of the inter-American human rights system, as described in
chapters 1 and 2, are firmly established. ESCR advocates must, therefore, strive to fit
their cases comfortably within those structures and procedures, using the arguments
and jurisprudence that have been developed over the years.
The legal arguments presented in this Manual stem from this premise and, while
pushing forcefully at the borders, emphasize those aspects of the law that the
Commission and Court have relied upon in their past jurisprudence. From a strategic
standpoint, ESCR petitions should emphasize that ESCR claims are no different from
the CPR claims that the Court is comfortable deciding and that, consequently, the
same legal reasoning must be used in their judicial resolution. Petitions should strive
to highlight what the Court has already said in regard to the substance of individual
rights and State obligations under the Convention. They should focus on applying the
same established norms and precedents to ESCR in a reasonable, consistent way. The
Court has demonstrated openness to the interpretive guidance of other international
bodies charged with human rights supervision. In this regard, the decisions and
commentary of such bodies as the European Court and Commission of Human
Rights, the U.N. Human Rights Commission and Sub-Commission, the U.N.
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the U.N. Human Rights
Committee, among others, should be cited frequently.
Practice Tips
• Emphasize that ESCR claims should be treated no differently
than CPR claims;
• Focus on what the Court has said in its past jurisprudence;
• Incorporate the interpretations of other international courts and
expert bodies charged with human rights protection.
Chapter 4
Using Rules of Treaty Interpretation




USING  RULES  OF  TREATY INTERPRETATION
TO  DETERMINE  AND  EXPAND 
THE  PROTECTIVE  SCOPE
OF  CONVENTION  PROVISIONS
s the Court’s contentious jurisdiction is largely limited to alleged violations
of the Convention, practitioners must use the Convention creatively in
presenting ESCR claims to the Commission and Court. A degree of
interpretive ingenuity is required to overcome the Convention’s overwhelming facial
bias in favor of “civil and political rights” (CPR) and the widely held perception that
only CPR are rightfully justiciable in the inter-American system.
The view that the American Convention is essentially a CPR document is reinforced
by the structural division of rights between Chapter II (“CPR”), comprising twenty-
three rights, and Chapter III (“ESCR”), comprising only one. To overcome the
presumption that articles 3 through 25 were intended to be confined to their civil and
political elements, it is necessary to draw on international rules of treaty
interpretation, and the Court’s interpretation of them, to urge an expansive reading of
the Convention’s provisions.
Fortunately, the Convention’s text and evolving jurisprudence specifically provide for
the interpretative flexibility necessary to achieve ESCR incorporation in the inter-
American human rights system. The internationally accepted rules of treaty
interpretation enshrined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and article
29 of the Convention facilitate a non-restrictive interpretation of the Convention text
and the liberal use of other international human rights instruments as interpretational
aids.
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Practice Tip
The rules of treaty interpretation enshrined in both the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties and article 29 of the Convention
should be expressly invoked in every petition alleging a substantive
violation of the American Convention in which ESCR are
implicated. 
A. The Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties: Article 31
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”) provides
international rules for the interpretation of treaties. Considered “the re l e v a n t
international law principles applicable to this subject,”1 it should be invoked in
petitions to support the expansive interpretation of Convention provisions to cover
ESCR. The Court has consistently turned to article 31 of the Vienna Convention to
interpret the meaning and scope of the specific provisions of the A m e r i c a n
Convention.2 According to these rules, treaties such as the Convention must be
interpreted “in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”3
1 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Convention on
Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-3/83 of Sept. 8, 1983 (Ser. A) No. 3, para. 48.
2 See, e.g. , Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., “Other Treaties” Subject to the Advisory Jurisdiction of the Court
(Art. 64 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-1/82 of Sept. 24, 1982
(Ser. A) No. 1, paras. 33, 45; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force
of the American Convention on Human Rights (Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82 of
Sept. 24, 1982 (Ser. A) No. 2, paras. 19, 20, 26; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Restrictions to the Death
Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-3/83
of Sept. 8, 1983 (Ser. A) No. 3, para. 48; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., The Expression “Laws” in Article 30
of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-6/86 of May 9, 1986 (Ser. A)
No. 6, para. 13; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Enforceability of the Right to Reply or Correction (Arts. 14(1),
1(1) and 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-7/86 of Aug. 29,
1986 (Ser. A) No. 7, para. 21; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts.
27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of Jan.
30, 1987 (Ser. A) No. 8, paras. 14–16; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Preliminary
Objections, Judgment of Jun. 26, 1987 (Ser. C) No. 1, para. 30; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Fairén Garbi
and Solís Corrales Case, Preliminary Objections , Judgment of Jun. 26, 1987 (Ser. C) No. 2, para.
35; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Jun. 26, 1987
(Ser. C) No. 3, para. 33; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Cayara Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of
Feb. 3, 1993 (Ser. C) No.14, para. 37; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Paniagua Morales et al. Case,
Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Jan. 25, 1996 (Ser. C) No. 24, para. 40;
3 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-3/83 of Sept. 8, 1983 (Ser. A) No. 3, para.
49 (quoting article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention) (emphasis added). Citing article 32 of the
Vienna Convention, the Court continues: “Supplementary means of interpretation, especially the
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The Court has made clear that the Convention’s “context, object, and purpose” must
be given “proper weight . . . as a basis for the interpretation of all the applicable
provisions in a given case.”4 It has stressed that “formal defects” do not justify that
“the purely literal meaning of a regulatory norm [be given] preference over the
superior interest [in] the realization of justice in the application of the American
Convention.”5
The structural division of rights into separate CPR and ESCR chapters may be argued
to be precisely such a “formal defect”—one that must not allow “the purely literal
meaning” of the chapter headings to prevail over the “superior interest” in attaining
justice in the application of the American Convention. This view is supported by
statements of former Inter-American Court Judge Piza-Escalante, who has expressly
noted that the formal structural division of CPR from ESCR in the Convention
“follows merely historical reasons and not juridical differences among them.”6 He
has stated that “the standards of the Convention itself may be understood to be
applicable to the so-called ‘economic, social and cultural rights’. . . .”7
VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
Article 31: General Rule of Interpretation
1. “Atreaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose.” 
2.   “The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty
shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and
annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made
between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the
treaty;” 
. . . . 
preparatory work of the treaty, may be used to confirm the meaning resulting from the application
of the foregoing provisions, or when it leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure or leads to a result
which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” Id.
4 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Paniagua Morales et al. Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Jan. 25,
1996 (Ser. C) No. 24, para. 42 (emphasis added). 
5 Id.
6 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Separate Vote of Judge Rodolfo E. Piza Escalante, Proposed Amendments to
the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of Jan.
19, 1984 (Ser. A) No. 4, para. 6. 
7 Id.
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Giving “proper weight” to the “ordinary meaning” of the Convention’s terms, their
“context,” and the treaty’s “object and purpose,” the contention that ESCR and CPR
are equally protected under the Convention appears unassailable.
1. “Ordinary Meaning” of Terms
In interpreting the terms of a treaty, one must first look to their ordinary meaning.
“This method of interpretation respects the principle of the primacy of the text, that
is, the application of objective criteria of interpretation.”8 According to the Court,
“objective criteria of interpretation that look to the texts themselves are more
appropriate [in the case of human rights treaties] than subjective criteria that seek to
ascertain only the intent of the Parties.”9 This is so because human rights treaties are
not “‘. . . concluded to accomplish the reciprocal exchange of rights for the mutual
benefit of the contracting States;’ rather ‘their object and purpose is the protection of
the basic rights of individual human beings, irrespective of their nationality, both
against the State of their nationality and all other contracting States.’”10
The “ordinary meaning” of treaty terms may be equated in practice with the
commonly understood or dictionary meaning11 of the term. To take an example from
the Convention, article 4 protects the “right to life.”12 The ordinary, objective meaning
of “life” is clearly not limited to the absence of extrajudicial executions and forced
disappearance; it refers to the basic biological functions that sustain healthy life.13
8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Convention on
Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-3/83 of Sept. 8, 1983 (Ser. A) No. 3, para. 50 (emphasis
added).
9 Id., citing Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American
Convention on Human Rights (Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82 of Sept. 24, 1982 (Ser.
A) No. 2, para. 29.
10 Id.
11 Judges of the Court have, in certain instances, turned to the dictionary to define a term. See, e.g.,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Separate Opinion of Judge Rafael Nieto Navia, Compulsory Membership in an
Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 of the American
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of Nov. 13, 1985 (Ser. A) No. 5, para.
4 (turning to the Real Academia Española, Diccionario de la Lengua Española to define “liberty”).
The Commission has also turned to Black’s and Ballentine’s Law Dictionaries to define the term
“property.” See Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 39/96, Case 11.673, Santiago Marzioni (Arg.),
in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1996, para. 26 & nn.
6–7, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, Doc. 7 rev. (1997).
12 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at
1, art. 4, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23 doc. rev. 2, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970), entered into force July 18, 1978,
available at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/Básicos/basic3.htm> (“Every person has the right to have
his life respected.”).
13 The American Heritage Dictionary defines life as the “quality that distinguishes living organisms
from dead organisms or inanimate matter, manifested in functions such as metabolism, growth,
reproduction, and response to stimuli.” See AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 783 (3rd
ed.1993) (emphasis added).
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These functions depend most immediately upon access to nutritionally adequate food,
clean water, proper body temperature, and life-saving health care interventions. A
“good faith,” “ordinary meaning” interpretation of the term would thus recognize that
article 4 applies equally to situations in which a person’s life is threatened by
execution or disappearance as to those in which it is threatened by interference with
or lack of access to basic food, clean water, shelter, clothing or health care. 
The same can be said of the terms “humane treatment” or “personal security,”
protected under articles 5 and 7, respectively. There is nothing in their objective
ordinary meaning to suggest that they be limited to their “civil and political” aspects.
Based on “ordinary meaning,” then, there is no reasonable ground on which to
assume that articles 4, 5 or 7, or any other article in the Convention, were intended to
apply only to CPR. 
2. “In Their Context”
The context in which a treaty term is situated is also an essential element in
interpreting its meaning. Under the Vienna Convention, “context” refers to the
t r e a t y ’s text, including its p re a m b l e.1 4 The Court has often referred to the
Convention’s Preamble when interpreting the meaning of the treaty’s provisions,
concluding that “[t]he Court must [] take account of the Preamble” and that the
meaning of Convention provisions “must be judged” by reference to the terms used
in the Preamble.15
The Convention’s preamble evinces strong support for the essential indivisibility of
ESCR and CPR. It reaffirms the intention of States Parties to consolidate in the
hemisphere a system of “personal liberty” and “social justice” based on respect for
the “essential rights of man.” These “essential rights” are recognized as based upon
“attributes of the human personality” and on the same principles that have been set
forth in the OAS Charter, the American Declaration, and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, all of which expressly recognize ESCR on equal terms with CPR.
Indeed, the Preamble is explicit about the necessity of protecting ESCR. It
14 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(2), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, T.S. No.
58 (1980), U.N. Doc A/Conf 39/28, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969), entered into force Jan. 27, 1980, available
at <http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm> [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (“The context
for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise . . . the text, including its preamble
and annexes . . . [and any agreement made between the parties].”).
15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice
of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion
OC-5/85 of Nov. 13, 1985 (Ser. A) No. 5 (1985), paras. 41–42 (“The Court must also take account
of the Preamble of the Convention . . . . [The Preamble and Articles 29 and 32(2)] define the context
within which . . . Article 13(2) must be interpreted. It follows from the repeated reference to
“democratic institutions”, “representative democracy” and “democratic society” that the [meaning
of the Convention provision] . . . must be judged by reference to the legitimate needs of democratic
societies and institutions.”) (emphasis added). 
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specifically recognizes the incorporation of broader ESCR standards in the OAS
Charter in 1967 and reiterates that “the ideal of free men enjoying freedom from fear
and want can be achieved only if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy
his economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights.”16
Petitions should thus argue that the Convention’s provisions “must be interpreted” in
the context of the Preamble’s repeated reference to the indivisibility of ESCR and
CPR and to the need to create conditions whereby everyone may enjoy ESCR as well
as CPR.  It may further be argued that, interpreted in light of the Preamble, the
Convention’s provisions must incorporate those essential ESCR protections that are
necessary for the consolidation of “democratic institutions,” “personal liberty” and
“social justice.” In interpreting the scope of each article, the Court should also be
urged to look to the OAS Charter, the American Declaration, and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights as part of the context in which the treaty provisions
were ratified. 
3. In Light of Treaty’s “Object and Purpose”
Finally, the Vienna Convention instructs that treaty terms are to be interpreted in light
of the treaty’s “object and purpose.” As the Court has consistently emphasized, “the
interpretation [of the Convention] to be adopted may not lead to a result that ‘weakens
the system of protection established by [the Convention],’ bearing in mind the fact
that the purpose and aim of that instrument is ‘the protection of the basic rights of
individual human beings.’”17
The “object and purpose” of the Convention is the “effective protection of human
rights.”18 Emphasis is placed on both the “protection of human rights” and its
16 American Convention, supra note 12, pmbl. para. 4 (emphasis added). 
17 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of
Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of Jan. 19, 1984 (Ser. A) No. 4, para. 24 (citing Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R., The Effect of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human
Rights (Arts. 74 and 75), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82 of Sept. 24, 1982 (Ser. A) No. 2, para. 29). In
a similar manner, the Court has emphasized that “formal defects” should not be given preference
“over the superior interest of the realization of justice in the application of the American
Convention.” See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Paniagua Morales et al. Case, Preliminary Objections,
Judgment of Jan. 25, 1996 (Ser. C) No. 24, para. 42. 
18 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Jun.
26, 1987 (Ser. C) No. 1, para. 30; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case,
Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Jun. 26, 1987 (Ser. C) No. 2, para. 35; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
Godínez Cruz Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Jun. 26, 1987 (Ser. C) No. 3, para. 33;
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Cayara Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Feb. 3, 1993 (Ser. C) No.
14, para. 37 (“The object and purpose of the American Convention is the effective protection of
human rights.”); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Matter of Viviana Gallardo and Others, No. 101/81,
Resolution of July 15, 1981, Decision of Nov. 13, 1981, para. 16 (“The Convention has a purpose,
which is the international protection of the essential rights of man”); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., The Effect
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“effectiveness.” In regard to the former, the Commission has repeatedly affirmed that
the “basic rights of human beings” include both ESCR and CPR, and that one set of
rights cannot be fully achieved without the other.19 When determining whether
remedies for ESCR violations are available under the Convention, therefore, the
Court should be reminded of its duty to consider the Convention’s object and
purpose—i.e., the effective protection of ESCR and CPR, as an “indissoluable
whole.” 
The Court also makes a practice of invoking the “principle of effectiveness” when
discussing the Convention’s “object and purpose.” According to this principle, “the
Convention must . . . be interpreted so as to give it its full meaning and to enable the
system for the protection of human rights entrusted to the Commission and the Court
to attain its ‘appropriate effects,’”20 i.e., “jurisdictional control” over the broadest
sphere of cases alleging human rights violations. This “requires that the Convention
be interpreted in favor of the individual, who is the object of international
protection.”21 Interpretation of the Convention “in favor of” the alleged victim of
ESCR abuse clearly requires recognition of the ESCR dimensions of the
C o n v e n t i o n ’s provisions. The Court has consistently rejected formalistic
interpretations that deny substantive justice to victims. The Vienna Convention
should thus be invoked as authoritative support for the proposition that the
Convention’s provisions should be interpreted to incorporate ESCR protections. Such
of Reservations on the Entry into Force of the American Convention on Human Rights (Arts. 74
and 75), Advisory Opinion OC-2/82 of Sept. 24, 1982 (Ser.A) No. 2, para. 29; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American Convention on Human Rights),
Advisory Opinion OC-3/83 of Sept. 8, 1983 (Ser. A) No. 3, para. 50; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Proposed
Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion
OC-4/84 of Jan. 9, 1984 (Ser. A) No. 4, para. 24 (“object and purpose is the protection of the basic
rights of individual human beings.”). 
19 For quotes by the Commission on ESCR/CPR indivisibility, see supra Chapter 1. 
20 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Jun. 26, 1987
(Ser. C) No. 1, para. 30; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Preliminary
Objections, Judgment of Jun. 26, 1987 (Ser. C) No. 2, para. 35; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz
Case, Preliminary Objections , Judgment of Jun. 26, 1987 (Ser. C) No. 3, para. 33 (quoting term
“appropriate effects” from International Court of Justice decision, Free Zones of Upper Savoy and
the District of Gex , 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 22, at 13 (Aug. 19)). 
21 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Matter of Viviana Gallardo y Others, No. G 101/81 (Ser. A) Res. of July 15,
1981, Decision of Nov. 13, 1981, para. 16 (emphasis added). 
The Convention has a purpose—the international protection of the basic rights
of human beings—and to achieve this end it establishes a system that sets out the
limits and conditions by which the States Parties have consented to respond on
the international plane to charges of violations of human rights. This Court,
consequently, has the responsibility to guarantee the international protection
established by the Convention within the integrity of the system agreed upon by
the States. This conclusion, in turn, requires that the Convention be interpreted
in favor of the individual, who is the object of international protection, as long as
such an interpretation does not result in a modification of the system.
Id. (emphasis added). 
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an interpretation would be in full accordance with the treaty’s “object and purpose”
and the principle of effectiveness.
The principle of effectiveness further compels the Court to adopt an “evolutionary”
view of the Convention as expanding in scope over time, covering an ever-widening
range of rights as conditions on the continent change. The Court has stated, “Both this
Court . . . and the European Court . . . have indicated that human rights treaties are
living instruments, the interpretation of which must evolve over time in view of
existing circumstances.”22 The Court thus understands that what is required for the
“effective protection of human rights” must be determined in light of the current
reality of the American continent. While protection from state-sponsored extrajudicial
execution, forced disappearance, and torture was the primary human rights concern
of the 1980s, the most egregious human rights problems as we enter the twenty-first
century tend to center upon ESCR violations. Responding to this reality is essential
to fulfilling the Convention’s “object and purpose” and must be considered when
interpreting the scope of the treaty’s provisions.
In sum, the Vienna Convention prescribes rules of treaty interpretation that the Court
regularly applies in its jurisprudence. Petitioners should make a point of
demonstrating how the “ordinary meaning” of given Convention terms, their
“context,” and the “object and purpose” of the Convention support an interpretation
of relevant Convention provisions that broadly incorporates ESCR protection. 
B. Article 29 of American Convention
Article 29 of the American Convention is the second essential interpretative tool
available to ESCR petitioners in the inter-American system. It contains the norms of
interpretation that the Court and Commission are required to use when determining
the scope of the protected rights in the American Convention. Article 29, “restrictions
regarding interpretation,” prohibits the Commission and Court from interpreting the
Convention’s provisions in such a way as to restrict, exclude, or limit the effect of
rights recognized in the Convention, domestic laws, other ratified treaties, the
American Declaration, and “other international acts of the same nature” as the
Declaration. It also prohibits any interpretation that precludes rights “inherent in the
human personality” or “derived from representative democracy.” 
22 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the
Guarantees of Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Oct. 1, 1999 (Ser. A) No. 16,
para. 114 (emphasis added); see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Villagrán Morales et al. Case (the “Street
Children” Case), Judgment of Nov. 19, 1999 (Ser. C) No. 63, para. 193 (same). 
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ARTICLE 29: RESTRICTIONS REGARDING INTERPRETATION
“No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as:
(a) permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress the
enjoyment or exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in
this Convention or to restrict them to a greater extent than is
provided for herein; 
(b) restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom
recognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue
of another convention to which one of the said states is a party;
(c) precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the
human personality or derived from representative democracy as
a form of government; or
(d) excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man and other international acts of the
same nature may have.” (emphasis added).
Article 29 is an extraordinary tool for ESCR advocates, a fact recognized by both the
Commission and Court. 23 Finding article 29’s “innovating breadth . . . unmatched in
any other international document,” former Inter-American Court Judge Piza E.
Escalante has described the provision as incorporating into the Convention, to some
degree, the “principles in other international instruments, in the country’s own
internal regulations and in the trends in effect in the matter of human rights.”24 These
principles and norms can be invoked in petitions as interpretive aids for determining
the scope of Convention provisions. As the Court has recognized, “[article 29] was
designed specifically to ensure that [the Convention] would in no case be interpreted
to permit the denial or restriction of fundamental human rights and liberties,
particularly those rights that have already been recognized by the State .”25
23 See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1986, at 44–45, para.
14, OEA/Ser.L/III.15 Doc. 13 (1986) (“[This Court] may have an important role to play in the
promotion and protection of economic, social and cultural rights . . . . This is particularly clear in
light of what Article 29 says about the interpretation of the Convention.”); see also id. at 42.
24 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Separate Opinion of Judge Rodolfo E. Piza Escalante, Proposed Amendments
to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of
Jan. 19, 1984 (Ser. A) No. 4, para. 2 (“[B]oth the principles of interpretation established in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and those stemming from Article 29 of the American
Convention . . . serve as a basis for the application of criteria of interpretation . . . . These criteria
. . . point to the need to interpret and integrate each standard of the Convention by utilizing the . .
. principles in other international instruments, in the country’s own internal regulations and in the
trends in effect in the matter of human rights, all of which are to some degree included in the
Convention itself by virtue of the aforementioned Article 29, whose innovating breadth is
unmatched in any other international document.”) (emphasis added). 
25 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of
Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of Jan. 19, 1984 (Ser. A) No. 4, para. 20 (emphasis added).
Domestic and international human rights norms may be given legal effect through the
Convention whenever such “other” norms and Convention norms are concurrently
applicable and the former are more expansive or less restrictive than the latter.26 This
ensures that application of the Convention does not restrict any concurrently
applicable, but more expansive, right enjoyed by the victim. The Commission has
been applying other human rights norms to individual cases, either directly or
indirectly, for more than two decades. The Court, for its part, has expressly approved
this practice, finding it “entirely consistent with the object and purpose of the
Convention.”27 The sections below consider each of article 29’s four clauses.
Practice Tip
Be cautious when invoking article 29. While clear precedent and
legal bases exist for using article 29 as described below, the Court
has full discretion to decide to what degree it will draw on other
international instruments, or whether it will at all. In terms of tone
and legal analysis, it is better to urge the Court to apply article 29
expansively—emphasizing its consistency with the “object and
purpose” of the treaty—rather than to assert that the Court is legally
obligated to accept such an interpretation. 
1. Article 29(a): No restriction on
any right recognized in the Convention
Article 29(a) prohibits the Court and Commission from interpreting any Convention
provision in a way that restricts the enjoyment of any other Convention right. For
ESCR purposes, clause (a) is especially notable when read in conjunction with
26 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 55/97, Case 11.137, Juan Carlos Abella (Arg.), Nov.
18, 1997, in ANNUAL REPORT OFTHE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSIONON HUMAN RIGHTS 1997, at 271,
309, para. 164, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, Doc. 7 rev. (1998) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997]
(noting that in situations where American Convention and humanitarian law are concurrently
applicable, Article 29(b) of the American Convention requires taking due note of it and, when
appropriate, giving legal effect to the applicable norms of humanitarian law).
27 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., “Other Treaties” Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64
of American Convention of Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-1/82, Sept. 24, 1982 (Ser. A)
No. 1 (1982), para. 43 (“The need of the regional system to be complemented by the universal finds
expression in the practice of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and is entirely
consistent with the object and purpose of the Convention, the American Declaration and the Statute
of the Commission. The Commission has properly invoked in some of its reports and resolutions
‘other treaties concerning the protection of human rights in the American states,’regardless of their
bilateral or multilateral character, or whether they have been adopted within the framework or
under the auspices of the inter-American system.”) (emphasis added).
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Convention article 26. Article 26 obligates States Parties to adopt measures for the
“progressive” achievement of “the rights implicit in the economic, social . . . and
cultural standards set forth in the [OAS] Charter.” These include the rights to
education, work, fair wages, employment opportunities, acceptable working
conditions, social security, adequate housing, proper nutrition, a healthy urban
environment, strike, collective bargaining, legal assistance, and participation in
development decisionmaking, among others. Reading articles 29(a) and 26 together:
no provision in the Convention may be interpreted to suppress the present enjoyment
or exercise of any ESCR implicit in the OAS Charter, i.e., to restrict the
“progressivity” requirement with respect to any of these rights. 
The interpretive potential of article 29(a) is particularly strong in petitions applying
the “integration approach.” An ESCR petition might allege, for instance, that a State
violates article 11 of the Convention by forcefully evicting squatters from their homes
without a court order. Article 11 protects against “arbitrary or abusive interference
with . . . [the] home.”28 Article 11 has never been invoked in the context of forced
evictions, but article 33(k) of the OAS Charter implicitly recognizes the right to
“[a]dequate housing for all sectors of the population.” Freedom from arbitrary
evictions is an essential aspect of the right to adequate housing.29 It may be argued,
therefore, that the failure of the Commission or Court to recognize a cause of action
under article 11 for forced evictions directly violates the interpretive mandate of
article 29(a). Indeed, a restrictive interpretation of article 11 in this context would
function to permit the State Party to “suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights
and freedoms recognized in [article 26 of] th[e] Convention”—namely, the
progressive achievement of the right to “[a]dequate housing for all sectors of the
population.” 
ESCR ARGUMENT:
• Article 29(a) prohibits the interpretation of any Convention
article so as to restrict or suppress the present enjoyment or
exercise of the ESCR implicit in the OAS Charter.
28 American Convention, supra note 12, art. 11(2).
29 See, e.g., The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11.1): Forced Evictions, General Comment No. 7,
U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., 16th Sess, U.N. Doc. E/1998/22, annex
IV (1997) [hereinafter General Comment No. 7], available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/
MasterFrameView/959f71e476284596802564c3005d8d50?Opendocument>.
While essentially the same ESCR progressivity argument may be made under article
26 directly,3 0 the article 29(a) interpretive approach underscores the essential
indivisibility of ESCR and CPR in the Convention and provides added textual support
for application of the “integration approach.”  
2. Article 29(b): No restriction of any right
recognized in domestic law or another
Convention
Of the four clauses, article 29(b) has been recognized as the “most-favorable-to-the-
individual clause.”31 It mandates that the Convention may not be interpreted as
“restricting the enforcement or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue
of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of another convention to which one of the
said states is a party.”32 As the Commission has pointed out, “The purpose of this
Article is to prevent States Parties from relying on the American Convention as a
ground for limiting more favorable or less restrictive rights to which an individual is
otherwise entitled under either national or international law.”33
Accordingly, where rights in domestic law or in a ratified international treaty are
governed by higher legal standards than the same or comparable rights in the
Convention, the relevant inter-American organ is “duty bound to give legal eff[ect] to
the provision(s) . . . with the higher standard(s) applicable to the right(s) or freedom(s)
in question.”34 In other words, “the rule most favorable to the individual must
prevail.”35
ESCR are recognized in the domestic laws and constitutions of a large number of
OAS States. A similarly large number of OAS States are party to international human
30 See infra Chapter 8. 
31 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 55/97, Case 11.137, Juan Carlos Abella (Arg.), Nov. 18, 1997,
in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 26, at 271, 309, para. 164.
32 American Convention, supra note 12, art. 29(b) (emphasis added). 
33 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 55/97, Case 11.137, Juan Carlos Abella (Arg.), Nov. 18, 1997,
in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 26, at 271, 309, para. 165.
34 Id. (“[W]here there are differences between legal standards governing the same or comparable
rights in the American Convention and a humanitarian law instrument, the Commission is duty
bound to give legal eff[ect] to the provision(s) of that treaty with the higher standard(s) applicable
to the right(s) or freedom(s) in question.”). 
35 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice
of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion
OC-5/85 of Nov. 13, 1985 (Ser. A) No. 5, paras. 51–52 (“[I]t is frequently useful—and the Court
has just done it—to compare the American Convention with the provisions of other international
instruments in order to stress certain aspects concerning the manner in which a certain right has
been formulated. . . . Hence, if in the same situation both the American Convention and another
international treaty are applicable, the rule most favorable to the individual must prevail.”)
(emphasis added).
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rights instruments that guarantee ESCR, such as the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC), the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW), and the various ILO Conventions. Article 29(b) covers
all duly ratified international treaties. 
Practice Tip
Pursuant to article 29(b), draw readily on a State’s domestic
law, political constitution, and other ratified treaties protecting
ESCR to help interpret the scope of obligations assumed by
States Parties under the American Convention.36
OAS States that expressly recognize ESCR in their political
c o n s t i t u t i o n s: Argentina, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Uruguay, etc.
OAS States that are parties to the ICESCR: A r g e n t i n a ,
Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada,
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, St. Vincent and Grenadines,
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
Such domestic and international ESCR norms may be invoked pursuant to article
29(b) to interpret the scope of Convention provisions; they may be applied either
indirectly or directly. When applied indirectly, ESCR norms in other instruments are
used to interpret provisions of the Convention; the Convention provisions, so
interpreted, are then applied directly to the facts of a case. When applied directly,
other domestic and international norms, as “the rule most favorable to the individual,”
are applied directly to the facts of the case, without the intervening medium of the
Convention. Both applications are considered below.
36 This may be illustrated with the following example: State X guarantees free access to health care
for all indigent persons under domestic law. It is also party to the ICESCR, under which States
Parties commit to guarantee conditions assuring access to medical service in the event of sickness
(art. 12). Ms. Y, who is indigent, is denied emergency care at the public hospital and, as a result,
dies after extreme physical suffering. Presuming petitioners adequately prove state responsibility
for the injury, the Commission and Court will have a much easier time finding a direct violation of
article 4 (right to life) and/or article 5 (right to personal integrity) in this situation than if no
domestic legal provision existed guaranteeing the right to health and the State was not party to the
ICESCR. This may be done either by interpreting article 4 in light of the ICESCR or domestic norm
or by applying the more protective norms directly.
a. Indirect Application of Other Legal Norms
In resolving individual petitions, the Commission often gives “indirect” legal effect
to international norms that are more favorable to the petitioner than those in the
Convention. This is done by using the more specific or protective provision to
interpret the scope of the relevant Convention provision. In the custodial rape case of
Raquel Martín de Mejía, for example, the Commission relied upon the Inter-
American Convention to Prevent and Sanction Torture to determine the scope of
Convention article 5(2), which proscribes “torture.”  The Commission held that, while
“[t]he letter of the Convention does not specify what is to be understood by torture,”
acts constituting torture in the inter-American sphere are established by the Inter-
American Torture Convention.37 That Convention specifically proscribes rape as a
form of torture. The Commission concluded that rape—which is not mentioned in the
Convention—constitutes “torture” for the purpose of finding an article 5(2)
violation.38
The same interpretive strategy may be used to assist in determining what acts
constitute a violation of the “right to life” under Convention article 4, for example.
Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also
protects the “right to life.” The U.N. Human Rights Committee, charged with
receiving petitions alleging violations of the ICCPR, has concluded that the right to
life protected by article 6 includes such factors as infant mortality, malnutrition, and
epidemics.39 As the ICCPR (thus interpreted) provides equally applicable, but “more
favorable” protection to victims of ESCR abuses that cause death or severe biological
impairment, petitioners should urge the Commission and Court to rely on ICCPR
article 6 when determining the scope of Convention article 4. 
Pursuant to article 29(b), this same interpretive approach may be used with countless
other Convention provisions, such as article 19’s special protection of the child.40 That
37 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 5/96, Case 10.970, Raquel Martín de Mejía (Peru), Mar. 1,
1996, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1995, at 157,
185, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91, Doc. 7 rev. (1996) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1995]. 
38 Id.
39 The Right to Life (Art. 6): General Comment No. 6, 37 U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 16th Sess.,
Supp. No. 40, Annex V, para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/37/40 (1982) (“[T]he right to life has been too often
narrowly interpreted . . . . [T]he protection of this right requires that States . . . take all possible
measures to reduce infant mortality and to increase life expectancy, especially in adopting
measures to eliminate malnutrition and epidemics .”) (emphasis added).
40 Both Convention article 19 and ICCPR article 24(1) recognize the “right of children to special
measures of protection.” According to the U.N. Human Rights Committee, “such measures,
although intended primarily to ensure that children fully enjoy the other rights enunciated in the
Covenant, may also be economic, social and cultural.” 
[E]very possible economic and social measures should be taken to reduce infant
mortality and to eradicate malnutrition among children and to prevent them from
being subjected to acts of violence and cruel and inhuman treatment or from
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is, jointly applicable, but more protective, legal norms in domestic law or binding
international law may be indirectly applied to determine whether a State Party has
violated the Convention.  
b. Direct Application of Other Legal Norms
The Commission has also made a practice of giving direct legal effect to international
norms other than the Convention in the individual petitions process. It has declared
itself competent, for example, to directly apply international humanitarian law norms,
such as common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and article 4 of Geneva
Protocol II, in situations of internal armed conflict.41 The Commission has explained
that direct application of such norms is justified by the fact that the respondent State
is party to both instruments, the two instruments are both applicable to the object of
the complaint, and the two instruments are “reciprocally reinforcing” as one offers
generalized protection and the other offers “greater and more concrete protection” to
the victims of particular acts.42 The instrument offering more concrete protection is
being exploited by means of forced labour or prostitution, or by their use in the
illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs, or by an other means. In the cultural field,
every possible measure should be taken to foster the development of their
personality and to provide them with a level of education that will enable them
to enjoy the rights recognized in the Covenant, particularly the right to freedom
of opinion and expression.
Rights of the Child (Art. 24): General Comment No. 17, 44 U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 35th
Sess, Supp. No. 40, Annex VI, para. 3, U.N. Doc. A/44/40 (1989). The Court, moreover, has
specifically recognized that “[b]oth the American Convention and the Convention on the Rights of
the Child form part of a very comprehensive international corpus juris for the protection of the
child that should help this Court establish the content and scope of the general provision established
in Article 19 of the American Convention.” Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Villagrán Morales et al. Case (the
“Street Children” Case), Judgment of Nov. 19, 1999 (Ser. C) No. 63, para. 194. 
41 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 1/99, Case 10.480, Lucio Parada Cea, et al. (El Sal.),
in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1998, paras. 65–66,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, Doc. 6 rev. (1999); see also Report No. 26/97, Case 11.142, Arturo Ribón
Avila (Colom.), in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 26, at 444, para. 132 (“Article 29 of
the American Convention establishes that no provision of the Convention may be interpreted as
‘excluding or limiting the effect’ of other international acts of the same nature, or of another
convention, to which a State is party. Consequently, the Commission is competent to directly apply
norms of international humanitarian law, i.e. the law of war, or to inform its interpretation of the
Convention provisions by reference to these norms. This position of the Commission is confirmed
in the Court’s advisory opinion on “Other Treaties,” where the Court considered the precedents of
the Commission and noted with approval that it had made reference to treaties other than the
American Convention, ‘regardless of their bilateral or multilateral character, or whether they have
been adopted within the framework or under the auspices of the inter-American system.’”) (internal
citations omitted) (emphasis added); Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 55/97, Case 11.137, Juan
Carlos Abella (Arg.), paras. 164–66, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 26.
42 See id. paras. 157-67. 
considered “lex specialis” (specialized law) in relation to the more generalized
instrument on the same subject; this justifies the direct application of the more
concrete norms through mechanisms to enforce the generalized norms. 
The Protocol of San Salvador and the ICESCR both offer “more specific and concrete
protection” than the general ESCR protection afforded by the Convention.
Accordingly, they may be considered “lex specialis” in terms of the concrete
obligations assumed under the Convention by States that are parties to both. ESCR
petitioners may want to urge the Commission or Court to directly apply these
instruments where the above conditions are met.43
Practice Tip
Legal norms recognized in states’ domestic laws and/or other
international instruments may be directly applied to individual
petitions under the American Convention where:
1. the State is legally bound by both the Convention and the
other instrument/law;
2. both instruments are applicable to the object of the
complaint;
3. both instruments are “reciprocally reinforcing”— o n e
offering general protection and the other more specific and
concrete protection (lex specialis) for the given right.
In this situation, the more specific and concrete norm—that is, the
one most protective of the rights of the petitioner—should be
directly applied.  Where one of the above conditions is not met, the
legal norms of other instruments may be indirectly applied to
interpret the scope of a particular Convention provision.
3. Article 29(c): No preclusion of rights that are
inherent in the human personality or derived from
representa-tive democracy as a form of
government.
Article 29(c) prohibits any interpretation of the Convention that would “preclud[e]
other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human personality or derived from
43 Article 29(b) may thus offer a partial means to circumvent the apparent jurisdictional limitation in
article 19(6) of the San Salvador Protocol, which restricts the cases susceptible to the individual
140
Rules of Treaty Interpr e t a t i o n
141
A rt. 29´s Interpretive Mandate
representative democracy as a form of government.”44 These rights do not necessarily
have to be recognized in any law, treaty, or other international human rights
instrument. Though article 29(c) has never been applied in the individual petitions
process, it provides another important tool for interpreting the Convention broadly to
protect against ESCR violations. 
This is particularly true since the inter-American organs have broadly recognized that
ESCR represent “the primary needs of human beings” and are essential requisites for
“representative democracy.” In regard to the former, the Commission has repeatedly
stated that ESCR and CPR together form an “indissoluble whole” upon which the
recognition of human dignity is based.45 The “concept of human rights . . . must be
based on the primary needs of human beings; the right to life, to work, and to the
elements required to satisfy essential spiritual and material needs.”4 6 T h i s
understanding of human rights, in which ESCR are integral, should be viewed to
undergird the Convention’s recognition that “the essential rights of man . . . are based
upon attributes of the human personality.”47 Petitioners may thus use article 29(c) to
argue that certain ESCR, particularly those necessary for survival and well-being,
must be recognized as rights “inherent in the human personality.”
The Commission has also insisted that ESCR protection is an essential requisite for
“representative democracy.” It has consistently emphasized the indissoluble link
between the enjoyment of minimum ESCR and the ability to engage in political
participation, the core element of representative democracy. In the Commission’s
words, “the implementation of economic, social and cultural rights creates the
condition in which the general population is able, i.e. is healthy and educated, to
participate actively and productively in the political decision-making process.”48
“When the most vulnerable members of society are denied access to the basic needs
for survival which would enable them to break out of their condition . . . [t]his
obviously diminishes the individual’s . . . right to participate in the political and
economic processes.”49 Building on the Commission’s own statements that basic
subsistence rights are necessary for the political participation from which
petitions process under the Protocol to those concerning the rights to education and unionization.
This argument should be espoused with caution, however. It will likely be countered by the
argument that the Protocol’s “other” provisions are not “applicable” because the Commission and
Court lack jurisdiction to enforce them. If this argument prevails, the Protocol may still be applied
indirectly under article 29(b) or (d). 
44 American Convention, supra note 12, art. 29(c).
45 See supra Chapter 1, notes 201–220 and accompanying text.
46 Statement of the Chairman of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Dr. Oscar Lujan
Fappiano, at the opening meeting of the 85th Regular Session of the IACHR, Wash., D.C., Jan. 31,
1994, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1993, at 639,
641, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.85 Doc. 9 rev. (1994) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993].
47 American Convention, supra note 12, pmbl. para. 2. 
48 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 46, at 522.
49 Id. at 522–23; see also IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 26, at 947, para. 44.
representative democracy is derived, therefore, article 29(c) may be used to urge the
Court to expressly consider ESCR when interpreting the scope of Convention
provisions.  
4. Article 29(d): No exclusion or limitation of the
effect of the American Declaration and other
international acts of the same nature
Finally, article 29(d) prohibits the Court and Commission from interpreting any
provision of the Convention as “excluding or limiting the effect that the American
Declaration . . . and other international acts of the same nature may have.” “Other
international acts of the same nature” include international declaratory acts that are
legally non-binding (e.g., American Declaration of Social Guarantees) and
international treaties that have not yet entered into force or been ratified by the State
concerned (e.g., Protocol of San Salvador). International expert statements on the
nature and scope of ESCR under international law may also fall under article 29(d),
although whether these statements rise to the level of “international acts,” as
contemplated in article 29(d), is less certain.50
In determining what “effect” such non-binding treaties and declarations “may have,”
it is tempting to conclude that article 29(d) refers to those instruments that comprise
customary international law, and thus are binding on all States notwithstanding
ratification status. According to the Commission, the American Declaration and
Universal Declaration of Human Rights have risen to this level: “Although these
instruments are not legally binding, they establish universal and regional rules which
have become rules of international customary law and, as such, are considered
obligatory in the doctrine and practice of international law.”51
The Court has adopted a more expansive view of article 29(d), however, invoking it
whenever a declaration or treaty embodies relevant principles of international law,
irrespective of its status as customary law. In the Blake Case, the Court invoked a
non-binding U.N. declaration and a regional treaty that had not yet been ratified by
the state concerned,5 2 without indicating that either constituted customary
international law. “Although the latter has not yet entered into force for [the
concerned State], these instruments embody several principles of international law on
the subject and they may be invoked pursuant to Article 29(d) of the American
Convention.”53
50 International expert statements are not subject to the same international procedures and processes
of state negotiation that govern the adoption of international declarations and treaties and, thus,
may not rise to the level of the “international acts” contemplated in the Convention. 
51 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 46, at 465.
52 Guatemala did not ratify the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons until
July 27, 1999.  
53 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Blake Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of July 2, 1996 (Ser. C), No.
27, at 97, 103, para. 36 (using principles in U.N. Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
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Article 29(d) thus appears to permit the Commission and Court to invoke any
international act that embodies principles of international law on a given subject and
is helpful in interpreting the terms of the Convention. Three categories of such
international acts are considered below.
Practice Tip
Petitions should cite frequently to the increasing number of ESCR
declarations, treaties, resolutions, and expert statements that
establish and define ESCR in international law. The Court has
indicated its openness to receiving such interpretational aids,
stating that, in light of article 29(d), the Court has “an important role
to play in the promotion and protection of economic, social and
cultural rights.”54
a. International declaratory acts 
Though non-binding in a formal legal sense, international declarations may be
invoked pursuant to article 29(d) as an interpretive aid for determining the scope of
Convention provisions. Of particular note for ESCR purposes are the American
Declaration, the American Declaration of Social Guarantees, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, and the Universal Declaration on the Eradication of
Hunger and Malnutrition. 
The Court has affirmed, for example, that the “important role” it has to play in the
promotion and protection of ESCR is underscored by Convention article 29(d), since
the American Declaration includes ESCR. 55 It has underscored that, given paragraph
(d), “the American Declaration is for [all OAS Member] States a source of
international obligations.”56 The same could be said for many other international
Enforced Disappearance and the Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons
to help interpret the Convention).
54 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1986, at 44–45, para. 14,
OEA/Ser.L/III.15 Doc. 13 (1986) (“[The Court] may have an important role to play in the
promotion and protection of economic, social and cultural rights. . . . This is particularly clear in
light of what Article 29 says about the interpretation of the Convention. All the criteria of the
Article (a), (b), (c), and (d) are applicable, but paragraph (d) should be particularly noted, since the
Inter-American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man includes economic, social and cultural
rights, and the American Declaration of Social Guarantees is an international declaratory act
approved by the same supreme organ of the system that adopted the [OAS Charter and American
Declaration].”).
55 Id.
56 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
Within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory
declaratory acts that incorporate ESCR. Since no provision of the Convention may be
interpreted as “excluding or limiting the effect” of such acts, they should be expressly
invoked in petitions.  
The role of the Declaration in interpreting the Convention is further underscored by
article 26. Article 26 obligates States Parties to adopt measures for the progressive
realization of the “rights implicit” in the ESC standards of the OAS Charter. The
Court has specifically recognized that, “the Declaration contains and defines the
fundamental human rights referred to in the Charter.”57 It has concluded, the OAS
Charter “cannot be interpreted and applied as far as human rights are concerned
without relating its norms . . . to the corresponding provisions of the Declaration.”58
Advocates should echo the Court’s statement, arguing that, under Convention article
29(d), the rights protected in article 26 cannot be interpreted without specific
reference to the corresponding provisions of the Declaration.
ESCR HIGHLIGHTS IN AMERICAN DECLARATION
Article 7: “All women, during pregnancy and the nursing period,
and all children have the right to special protection,
care, and aid.”
Article 8: “Every person has the right to fix his residence . . . and
to move about freely . . . .”
Article 9: “Every person has the right to the inviolability of his
home.”
Article 11: “Every person has the right to the preservation of his
health through sanitary and social measures relating
to food, clothing, housing and medical care, to the
extent permitted by public and community resources.”
Article 12: “Every person has the right to an education . . . that
will prepare him to attain a decent life, to raise his
standard of living and to be a useful member of society
. . . .”
Opinion OC-10/89 of July 14, 1989 (Ser. A) No. 10, paras. 45–46 (“[G]iven the provisions of
Article 29(d), these States cannot escape the obligations they have as members of the OAS under
the Declaration, notwithstanding the fact that the Convention is the governing instrument for the
States Parties thereto.”).  
57 id. para. 43.
58 Id.
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Article 13: “Every person has the right to take part in the cultural
l i f e of the community, to enjoy the arts, and to
participate in the benefits that result from intellectual
progress, especially scientific discoveries.”
Article 14: “Every person has the right to work, under proper
conditions, and to follow his vocation freely, insofar as
existing conditions of employment permit. Every
person who works has the right to receive such
remuneration as will, in proportion to his capacity and
skill, assure him a standard of living suitable for
himself and for his family .”
Article 15: “Every person has the right to leisure time . . . .”
Article 16: “Every person has the right to social security which will
protect him from the consequences of unemployment,
old age, and any disabilities arising from causes
beyond his control that make it physically or mentally
impossible for him to earn a living.”
Article 23: “Every person has a right to own such private property
as meets the essential needs of decent living and
helps to maintain the dignity of the individual and of
the home.”
ESCR HIGHLIGHTS IN UNIVERSAL DECLARATION
Article 22: “Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to
social security and is entitled to realization . . . of the
economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for
his dignity and the free development of his
personality.”
Article 23: “Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of
employment, to just and favourable conditions of work
and to protection against unemployment. (2)
Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to
equal pay for equal work. (3) Everyone who works has
the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring
for himself and his family an existence worthy of
human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by
other means of social protection. (4) Everyone has the
right to form and join trade unions for the protection of
his interests.”
Article 24: “Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including




Article 25: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and
of his family, including food, clothing, housing and
medical care and necessary social services, and the
right to security in the event of unemployment,
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack
of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.”
Article 26: “Everyone has the right to education.”
Article 27: “Everyone has the right freely to participate in the
cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to
share in scientific advancement and its benefits.”
b. Non-ratified international treaties 
While ratified treaties should be invoked pursuant to article 29(b), paragraph (d)
provides authority to invoke non-ratified treaties in the individual petitions process as
interpretive aids for determining the scope of specific Convention provisions. Using
treaties, as distinct from declaratory acts, is often desirable as the former tend to
employ more concrete terminology: they were intended to impose enforceable legal
obligations upon States. Invoking the Protocol of San Salvador, for example, is
generally preferable to reliance on other purely declaratory acts, as it is the instrument
that most concretely gathers the principles of international law on ESCR in the inter-
American system.59
Pursuant to article 29(d), advocates should also refer to the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) in petitions lodged against non-
ratifying States. Like the Protocol of San Salvador, the ICESCR sets forth detailed
provisions on ESCR on the international plane. It also benefits from the authoritative
interpretation of its provisions by the U.N. Committee on ESCR.
59 See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1991, O.A.S.
Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/III.25 doc.7, at 289 (1992) (“The adoption of the Protocol of San Salvador
represents the culmination of the efforts accomplished by the international community of the
Americas to translate all the preceding declarations [e.g., American Declaration, American
Declaration of Social Guarantees] into operative rules. . . . Attention is drawn to the important
contribution made by this instrument in enabling individuals to lodge complaints against violations
of economic, social and cultural rights at the international and regional levels.”). 
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OAS member states for whom Protocol of San Salvador is not
in force (as of July 2001):60 Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina,
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Canada, Chile, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica,
Nicaragua, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and
Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, United States, and Venezuela.
OAS member states for whom ICESCR is not in force (as of July
2001):61 Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Haiti, St. Kitts and
Nevis, St. Lucia, and United States.
c. International expert statements
The Court has expressly recognized that the article 29(d) reference to all
“international acts of the same nature [as the American Declaration]” extends to
international declaratory acts and not-yet-ratified international treaties. Advocates
may argue that it extends further: to international expert statements on the topic of
human rights generally, and on ESCR specifically. Of particular importance are the
authoritative statements on the interpretation of ESCR prepared by the U.N.
Committee on ESCR in its “General Comments” and by international experts in the
Limburg Principles, the Bangalore Declaration and Plan of Action, the Maastricht
Guidelines, and the Quito Declaration (see box below). 
Article 29(d) may provide limited legal grounding for attempts to persuade the Court
to give these ESCR statements of interpretation and principle a high degree of
deference. Although such statements are generally adopted by international law
experts in their individual capacity, rather than as representatives of States, the
drafters are often representatives of international organizations composed of States,
such as the ILO, WHO, UNESCO and the human rights committees of the United
Nations. It may be argued that this gives their international declarations a degree of
authority that parallels that of statements adopted by States as such and that elevates
them to the level of “international acts” as contemplated in article 29(d).
In urging the Court to consider these statements when interpreting the Convention,
petitioners may also make reference to article 38(1) of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice (“ICJ Statute”). This instrument defines the interpretive sources that
the ICJ “shall” apply in determining the content of international law. In addition to
“international conventions,” “international custom,” and “the general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations,” they include “judicial decisions and the
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary
60 For ratification status, see <http://www.cidh.oas.org/Básicos/basic6.htm>.
61 For ratification status of the ICESCR as of July 16, 2001, see  <http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.
pdf>.
means for the determination of rules of law.”62 The inter-American organs are not
bound by the ICJ Statute. Nevertheless, it may be argued that the principle of
interpretation set forth therein is a general principle of legal interpretation applied by
all international tribunals when deciding “in accordance with international law such
disputes as are submitted to [them].”63 The Commission has invoked the ICJ Statute
to interpret the scope of its own Regulations in the past.64
Advocates may thus urge that article 29(d) of the Convention and article 38(1) of the
ICJ Statute provide sound legal grounding for resort to authoritative international
interpretation of ESCR in interpreting the scope of Convention provisions. A brief
description of the most relevant international expert statements on ESCR follows. 
AUTHORITATIVE INTERNATIONAL STATEMENTS ON
THE SCOPE OF LEGAL PROTECTION FOR ESCR:
• General Comments of the U.N. Committee on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights. The U.N. Committee on ESCR is
charged with monitoring State compliance with, and interpreting
the scope of the provisions of, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). It has
developed the practice of publishing General Comments on
particular provisions of, or special topics related to, the ICESCR.
Since 1987, when the Committee first met, it has adopted
fourteen general comments. These include:65
— General Comment No. 1 (1989): Reporting by States
parties
— General Comment No. 2 (1990): International technical
assistance measures (art. 22)
— General Comment No. 3 (1990): Nature of States parties’
obligations (art. 2(1))
62 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1), 59 Stat. 1031, available at
<http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm> (emphasis added). 
63 Id.
64 See Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 5/96, Case 10.970, Raquel Martín de Mejía (Peru), Mar.
1, 1996, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1995, supra note 37, at 157, V(B)(1) (looking to Article 53 of
the ICJ Statute, as incorporating “principles of general international law,” to assist in interpreting
Article 42 of the Commission’s Regulations concerning States’ obligations to appear before
international agencies whose jurisdiction they have accepted). The only distinction made by the
Commission was that while the “ICJ must seek to preserve the interests of the parties in dispute,”
the Commission’s Regulations “must be interpreted in light of the basic purpose of the Convention,
i.e. protection of human rights.” Id. 
65 The text of the Committee’s General Comments are available in pdf and word formats at
< h t t p : / / w w w. u n h c h r. c h / t b s / d o c . n s f / ( S y m b o l ) / 2 6 b d 1 3 2 8 b e e 3 b d 1 3 c 1 2 5 6 a 8 b 0 0 3 8 e 0 a 2 ? O p e n d o c u m
ent>.
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— General Comment No. 4 (1991): Right to adequate housing
(art. 11(1))
— General Comment No. 5 (1994): Persons with disabilities 
— General Comment No. 6 (1995): Economic, social, and
cultural rights of older persons
— General Comment No. 7 (1997): Right to adequate housing
(art. 11(1)): forced evictions
— General Comment No. 8 (1997): Relationship between
economic sanctions and respect for economic, social, and
cultural rights
— General Comment No. 9 (1998): Domestic application of
the Covenant
— General Comment No. 10 (1998): The role of national
human rights institutions in the protection of economic,
social and cultural rights
— General Comment No. 11 (1999): Plans of action for
primary education (art. 14)
— General Comment No. 12 (1999): The right to adequate
food (art. 11)
— General Comment No. 13 (1999): The right to education
(art. 13)
— General Comment No. 14 (2000): The right to the highest
attainable standard of health (art. 12).
• Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR).66 Adopted by a group of international law
experts in Maastricht, the Netherlands, in 1986, the Limburg
Principles represent an authoritative summary of the state of
international human rights law on the subject of ESCR. Although
the principles have no legally binding force, they draw upon the
expert opinion of prominent leaders in the field, including legal
scholars, lawyers, and members of the U.N. Committee on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. 
• Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights.67 The Maastricht Guidelines represent an
elaboration and updating of the Limburg Principles. Providing a
conceptual guide to the interpretation of the rights protected in
the ICESCR, it is designed to be of particular use to monitoring
and adjudicating bodies at the national, regional, and
international levels. As such, it contains sections on the
significance of ESCR; the meaning of violations of these rights,
including minimum core obligations; responsibility for ESCR




• Quito Declaration on the Enforcement and Realization of
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Latin America and
the Caribbean.68 The Quito Declaration is a further elaboration
of ESCR principles, but with a regional focus on the Americas.
Its aim is both legal and political. On the one hand, it confronts
the glaring gap of jurisprudence around ESCR, enumerates the
most common violations of ESCR in Latin America, and
provides an authoritative description of the legal obligations of
governmental and other actors to respect, protect and fulfill
ESCR. On the other, it stresses the need to recognize and
confront massive and systematic violations of ESCR by a range
of actors and provides a call to action aimed at NGOs,
government bodies, judges, international institutions,
corporations, and the general public. 69
66 Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 43rd Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1987/17
(1987), reprinted in 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 122 (1987). 
67 The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 26, 1997,
reprinted in INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, ECONOMIC, SOCIALAND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A C OMPILATION
O F ES S E N T I A L DO C U M E N T S 79 (1997); 20 HU M. RT S. Q. 691 (1998), available at
< h t t p : / / w w w. l a w.uu.nl/english/sim/instr/maastricht.asp>. These Guidelines were adopted
unanimously by a group of more than thirty international experts at a January 1997 meeting in the
Netherlands. They reflect these experts’understanding of how international law has evolved since
the adoption in 1986 of the Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the ICESCR, considered
an authoritative guide of State obligations under the ICESR. See Limburg Principles, supra note
66.
68 Quito Declaration on the Enforcement and Realization of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in
Latin America and the Caribbean, adopted July 24, 1998, in 2 YALE HUM. RT. & DEV. L.J. 215
(1999), available at <http://diana.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj>.
69 See Chris Jochnick & Javier Mujica Petit, Preface to the Quito Declaration on the Enforcement and
Realization of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2 YALE
HUM. RT. & DEV. L.J. 209 (1999), available at <http://diana.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj>.
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SUMMARY OF RULES OF TREATY INTERPRETATION
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (art. 31).
• Treaty terms must be given their “ordinary meaning”
• Interpreted “in their context” (including preamble)
• In light of the treaty’s “ object and purpose.”
American Convention (art. 29). Convention may not be
interpreted so as to limit or restrict effect of: 
• rights recognized in the Convention;
• rights recognized in domestic laws or other ratified treaties; 
• rights inherent in human personality or derived from
representative democracy; 
• rights recognized in the American Declaration or other
international acts of same nature.
Statute of the International Court of Justice (art. 38(1)).
Interpretive sources that the ICJ shall apply in determining the
content of international law include:
• international conventions; 
• international custom;
• general principles of law; 
• judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified
publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.
Chapter 5
Establishing State Responsibility:
Duty to Respect, Duty to Ensure
& the Principle of Progressivity
(Arts. 1, 2 & 26)
Chapter  5
ESTABLISHING  STATE  RESPONSIBILITY:
DUTY TO  RESPECT,  DUTY TO  ENSURE, 
& THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  PROGRESSIVITY
(ARTS.  1,  2  &  26)
he international system for the protection of human rights is based on the
principle of state responsibility. By ratifying human rights treaties, States
recognize that there are limits to and responsibilities in the exercise of public
power. They recognize, too, that they may be held responsible under international law
for any act or omission undertaken by—or with the acquiescence of—public authority
that surpasses those limits and results in injury to protected persons’ rights.
Accordingly, human rights instruments generally include a set of protected rights and
a set of state obligations. Where a State violates the obligations it has assumed under
international law for guaranteeing protected rights, it may be held accountable in
international proceedings for any resulting injury. Every petition challenging state
conduct under a human rights treaty must, therefore, demonstrate impairment of a
specific individual’s protected right and breach of a state obligation with respect to
that right. This chapter describes state obligations; chapters 6–9 describe the
Convention’s protected rights. In preparing a petition, it is just as important to
demonstrate how a State breached its international legal obligations as it is to explain
how the victim’s rights were impaired.
State obligations under the Convention are described in articles 1, 2 and 26. Under
article 1, States Parties commit to respect and to ensure the free and full exercise of
each right set forth in articles 3–26. The obligation to ensure, amply developed in the
article 1 jurisprudence of the Commission and Court, is further refined in articles 2
and 26. Under article 2, States Parties commit to adopt legislative and other measures
to ensure that all protected rights have domestic legal effect—that is, that their
violation can be effectively redressed in domestic legal or administrative proceedings.




courtroom. Those aspects are governed by article 2. Article 26 governs those aspects
of rights that cannot, in themselves, be given domestic legal effect through the
adoption of specific legislation. It imposes an obligation on States Parties to adopt,
without delay or backsliding, legislative and other measures for the progressive
achievement of rights that are not “immediately requirable in themselves,” e.g.,
through the adoption, and good faith implementation, of a plan of action. A violation
of a protected Convention right by a State Party always implicates a violation of
article 1, and often a violation of articles 2 and/or 26.
STATE OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CONVENTION
ARTICLE 1(1): Obligation to Respect and Ensure Rights. “The
States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights
and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons[1]
subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights
and freedoms, without any discrimination . . . .”
ARTICLE 2: Obligation to Adopt Measures to Give Domestic
Legal Effect to Rights. “Where the exercise of any of the rights or
freedoms referred to in Article 1 is not already ensured by
legislative or other provisions, the States Parties undertake to
adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the
provisions of this Convention, such legislative or other measures as
may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms.”
ARTICLE 26: Obligation to Adopt Measures for Progressive
Achievement of Rights. “The States Parties undertake to adopt
measures, both internally and through international cooperation,
especially those of an economic and technical nature, with a view
to achieving progressively, by legislation or other appropriate
means, the full realization of the rights implicit in the economic,
social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the
Charter of the Organization of American States as amended by the
Protocol of Buenos Aires.”
To substantiate state responsibility for violating a protected right, every petition
should allege a breach of Convention article 1(1). According to the Court: 
1 Article 1(2) provides: “For the purposes of this Convention, “person” means every human being.”
This clause has been interpreted by the Commission to exclude legal entities such as financial
institutions from the jurisdictional competence of the inter-American human rights organs. See
Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 10/91, Case 10.169, Banco de Lima (Peru), in ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1990–1991, at 423, 425, paras. 2–3,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.79 rev. 1 Doc. 12 (1991) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1990–91].
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[Article 1(1)] specifies the obligation assumed by the States Parties in
relation to each of the rights protected [in the Convention]. Each
claim alleging that one of those rights has been infringed necessarily
implies that Article 1(1) of the Convention has also been violated . . .
. Article 1(1) is essential in determining whether a violation of the
human rights recognized by the Convention can be imputed to a State
Party. In effect, that article charges the States Parties with the
fundamental duty to respect and guarantee the rights recognized in the
Convention. Any impairment of those rights which can be attributed
under the rules of international law to the action or omission of any
public authority constitutes an act imputable to the State, which
assumes responsibility in the terms provided by the Convention.2
Violation of a protected right also leads to a strong presumption that article 2 has been
violated (i.e., the general duty to harmonize national legislation with the norms of the
Convention). While the inter-American organs have demonstrated reluctance to
declare article 2 violations in the past,3 increasing attention has been given to the
provision for its important structural role in preventing human rights abuse.4 Judge
Antonio Cançado Trindade, President of the Court, has observed: 
Articles 1(1) and 2 of the American Convention . . . are [] ineluctably
intertwined . . . . The interrelatedness of those two general duties can
hardly be questioned. A breach of Article 2 is bound always to bring
about a violation likewise of Article 1(1). A violation of Article 1(1)
takes place whenever there is a breach of Article 2. And in cases of
violation of Article 1(1) there is a strong presumption of non-
compliance with Article 2, by virtue, e.g., of insufficiencies or lacunae
in the domestic legal order as to the regulation of the conditions of the
exercise of the protected rights. There is, likewise, no underestimating
the obligation of Article 2, inasmuch as it confers precision on the
immediate and fundamental obligation of Article 1(1), of which it
appears as almost a corollary.5
2 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No. 4, paras.
162, 164; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of Jan. 20, 1989 (Ser. C) No. 5, para.
171, 173; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Neira Alegría et al. Case, Judgment of Jan. 19, 1995 (Ser. C) No. 20,
para. 85 (emphasis added).
3 The Commission, for example, did not begin to find violations of article 2 until 1994; even then, it
has continued to be inconsistent in its application of this general duty to specific cases.
4 The Court has reversed its previously constrictive view of article 2 in several recent opinions. See
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Loayza Tamayo Case, Judgment of Sept. 17, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 33; Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R., Castillo Páez Case, Judgment of Nov. 3, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 34; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Suárez
Rosero Case, Judgment of Nov. 12, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 35. 
5 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Dissenting Opinion of Judge A.A. Cancado Trindade, Caballero Delgado and
Santana Case, Reparations (Art. 63(1) American Convention on Human Rights), Jan. 29, 1997
(Ser. C) No. 31, para. 9 (emphasis added). 
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A finding of an article 2 violation, while not technically necessary once an article 1(1)
violation is found, underscores States’ duties to ensure that protected rights have
immediate practical and legal effect in the domestic jurisdiction—i.e., that internal
conduct is regulated by law, monitoring bodies exist, and effective judicial remedies
are available to ensure that human rights violations are promptly investigated,
punished, and repaired.  Article 2 aids the process of reparation under article 63,
moreover, by focusing the Court’s attention on the legislative and policy arenas in
which the State must take affirmative measures of remediation and prevention.
Finally, violation of a protected right should also lead to a strong presumption that
article 26 has been violated. Article 26 imposes the “obligation of progressive
achievement” upon States Parties. Where a right cannot be given immediate effect in
the internal jurisdiction, article 26 obligates States to immediately adopt measures
with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of that right within the
shortest time frame possible. While article 26 technically refers to ESCR only, a
former member of the Inter-American Court has recognized that article 26, like article
2, applies to all rights protected in the Convention—whether ESCR or CPR. In his
words: 
[T]he principles of “progressive development” contained in Article 26
of the Convention, although they refer literally to the economic, social,
educational, scientific, and cultural standards contained in the [OAS
Charter], should in my judgment be understood to be applicable to any
of the “civil and political” rights established in the A m e r i c a n
Convention, to the extent and in the ways in which they are not
reasonably requirable in themselves, and vice versa, that the standards
of the Convention itself may be understood to be applicable to the so-
called “economic, social and cultural rights,” to the degree and in the
ways in which they are reasonably requirable in themselves (as occurs,
e.g., with the right to strike).6
Practice Tip
Petitions should always allege breach of a state obligation (as set
forth in articles 1, 2 and/or 26) in conjunction with violation of a
protected right (as enshrined in articles 3–26). 
6 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Separate Vote of Judge Rodolfo E. Piza Escalante, Proposed Amendments to
the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of Jan.
19, 1984 (Ser. A) No. 4 (1984), para. 6.
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The Commission and Court have given increasingly specific content to the general
state obligations, enshrined in articles 1, 2, and 26, to “respect,” to “ensure,” and to
“achieve progressively” the full realization of all protected rights. These obligations
are discussed below. Together with concrete injury and causation, these three general
state obligations should be specifically discussed in petitions, as applicable, to
demonstrate state responsibility for alleged violations of protected rights.
I. Duty to Respect (Art. 1)
The first, most basic obligation assumed by States Parties under article 1(1) is “to
respect the rights and freedoms” of all persons subject to their jurisdiction. This duty
is principally negative in nature; it says “thou shalt not.” It constitutes an absolute,
definitive injunction upon abusive state power. Under international law, a State is
responsible for the acts of its agents. Accordingly, the duty to respect is violated
whenever a State organ, official, public entity, or person acting under color of state
law participates in , authorizes, or is complicit in acts or omissions that impair the
exercise of protected rights.7 This is true “even when those agents act outside the
sphere of their authority or violate internal law.”8
The duty to respect attaches equally to CPR and ESCR. The Court has regularly found
violations of the duty to respect where state agents participate in extrajudicial killings,
torture, disappearance or illegal detention. The duty is violated no less, however,
where state agents destroy subsistence crops, burn homes, poison water sources, fire
public workers for participation in union activities, or disregard minimum labor
protections in public workplaces. In each case, the State breaches its obligation to
respect protected rights and freedoms. 
The duty to respect has been specifically recognized, in the ESCR context, to consist
of “noninterference by the State in the freedom of action and in the use of the
resources of each individual or group in order to meet by themselves their economic
and social needs.”9 When the State restricts or suppresses individuals’ ability to
7 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No. 4, paras.
169–72 (“According to Article 1(1), any exercise of public power that violates the rights recognized
by the Convention is illegal. Whenever a State organ, official or public entity violates one of those
rights, this constitutes a failure of the duty to respect the rights and freedoms set forth in the
Convention . . . . [U]nder international law a state is responsible for the acts of its agents . . . and
for their omissions, even when those agents act outside the sphere of their authority or violate
internal law. . . . Thus, in principle, any violation of rights recognized by the Convention carried
out by an act of public authority or by persons who use their position of authority is imputable to
the State.”).
8 Id. para. 170. 
9 Quito Declaration on the Enforcement and Realization of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in
Latin America and the Caribbean, para. 28, adopted July 24, 1998, in 2 YALE HUM. RT. & DEV. L.J.
215 (1999), available at <http://diana.law.yale.edu/yhrdlj>.
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satisfy such essential needs (adequate food, clean water, affordable housing, basic
education, product markets, minimum health care), it violates its obligations under
article 1 of the Convention. 
II. Duty to Ensure (Arts. 1 & 2) 
The “duty to ensure” is the second general obligation recognized in article 1(1); it is
refined in article 2. This obligation is positive in nature. It requires States Parties to
take affirmative measures, of a judicial, legislative, and executive nature, “to organize
the governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which public
power is exercised, so that they are capable of juridically ensuring the free and full
enjoyment of human rights.”10 “As a consequence of this obligation, the States must
prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the rights recognized by the
Convention and, moreover, if possible attempt to restore the right violated and
provide compensation as warranted for damages resulting from the violation.”11
Significantly, the duty to ensure protected rights and freedoms requires States Parties
to protect individuals from the harmful acts and omissions of not only state agents but
also private persons or groups (e.g., private employers, landlords, polluters, hate
groups, etc.). As recognized by the Court, “when the State allows private persons or
groups to act freely and with impunity to the detriment of the rights recognized by the
Convention . . . the State has failed to comply with its duty to ensure the free and full
exercise of those rights to the persons within its jurisdiction.”12 Acts of private
persons “lead to international responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself,
but because of the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as
required by the Convention.”13 “What is decisive is whether a violation of the rights
recognized by the Convention has occurred with the support or the acquiescence of
the government, or whether the State has allowed the act to take place without taking
measures to prevent it or to punish those responsible.”14
The duty to ensure consists of five principle state obligations: the duty to prevent, the
duty to investigate, the duty to sanction, the duty to remedy, and the duty to ensure
the minimum core content.  Each is discussed below.
10 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No. 4, para. 166.
11 Id. (emphasis added).
12 Id. para. 176.
13 Id. para. 172. 





The State obligation to “ensure” protected rights
under articles 1 and 2 includes the duty to: 
1. Prevent violations by public and private actors 
2. Investigate all allegations of human rights abuse 
3. Sanction all human rights violators
4. R e m e d y violations (i.e., repair consequences, provide
restitution/compensation)
5. Ensure the minimum core content of rights are enjoyed by all
persons.
A. Duty to Prevent
“The State has a legal duty [under article 1(1)] to take reasonable steps to prevent
human rights violations” by public and private actors.15 The “duty to prevent”
“includes all those means of a legal, political, administrative and cultural nature that
promote the protection of human rights and ensure that any violations are considered
and treated as illegal acts, which, as such, may lead to the punishment of those
responsible and the obligation to indemnify the victims for damages.”16 It is not
possible to make a detailed list of all such measures, as they will vary with the law
and the conditions of each State Party.17 Such measures may, however, be broken
down into four sub-categories of preventative obligations: to (1) regulate; (2)
monitor; (3) conduct impact studies; and (4) remove structural obstacles.
The failure of a State to undertake any one of these measures is not dispositive of its
responsibility for a violation of a protected right. It may, however, be a good
indication of a State’s “lack of due diligence to prevent the violation,” and thus strong
evidence of state responsibility.18 In determining responsibility for violations of the
Convention, what a State does not do is often just as important as what it does do. By
contrast, it would be difficult to argue that a State was in violation of its obligation to
prevent breaches of the Convention where it undertook diligent measures to regulate
industry and service provision, to monitor compliance with domestic laws and
regulations, to conduct impact studies concerning the effects of new policies and
projects, and to remove structural barriers impeding access to basic goods and
services necessary for survival and well-being.
15 Id. para. 174. 
16 Id. para. 175.
17 Id.
18 Id. para. 172–73. 
1. Duty to regulate
As part of their legal duty to “prevent” human rights abuse, States have a duty to
“regulate” the means through which domestic institutions, corporations, private
parties, and other entities affect individuals’ enjoyment of protected rights. That is,
States must impose legal limits on public and private conduct that affects human
rights realization and establish sanctions for failure to comply with those limits. The
duty to regulate is so important in the inter-American system that the Convention
reinforces the article 1(1) duty with a separate provision in article (2). Under article
2, States Parties commit to harmonize domestic legislation with the Convention,
“establish[ing] a legal regime which adequately works to prevent” violation of
protected rights.19 Where a State Party has established no domestic law to prevent
violations of protected rights or where domestic legislation exists but is inadequate
for effective prevention, any concrete impairment of those rights—whether
committed by public authority or private parties—may be imputed to the State for
purposes of establishing State responsibility under articles 1(1) and 2 of the
Convention.20
A State Party that failed to regulate abusive industry practices, for example, may be
found in violation of the Convention where individuals’ protected rights are
concretely impaired as a result of those practices. This might occur where the State
did not recognize civil or criminal penalties for employers who pay sub-minimum
wages (arts. 6, 21), restrict union formation (art. 13), contaminate food or water
19 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 3/98, Case 11.221, Tarcisio Medina Charry (Colom.), Apr. 7,
1998, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1997, at 482,
504, para. 108, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, Doc. 7 rev. (1998) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997].
20 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Certain Attributes of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Arts.
41, 42, 44, 46, 47, 50 and 51 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion
OC-13/93 of July 16, 1993 (Ser. A) No. 13 (1993), paras. 26–27 (“A state may violate . . . the
Convention . . . by failing to establish the norms required by Article 2. Likewise, it may adopt
provisions which do not conform to its obligations under the Convention. Whether those norms
have been adopted in conformity with the internal juridical order makes no difference for these
purposes. . . . Said in another way, that it is a question of ‘domestic legislation’ which has been
‘adopted pursuant to the provisions of the Convention,’ is meaningless if, by means of that
legislation, any of the rights or freedoms protected have been violated.”).
See also Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 22/94, Case 11.012, Horacio Verbitsky (Arg.), in
ANNUAL REPORT OFTHE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSIONON HUMAN RIGHTS 1994, at 44–45, para. 22,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.88, Doc. 9 rev. (1995) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1994] (“[I]n the event
a law is found to be incompatible with the Convention, the State Party is obligated, under Article
2, to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights and
freedoms guaranteed in the Convention.”); Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 1/94, Case 10.473
(Colom.), Feb. 1, 1994, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 1993, at 116, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.85 Doc. 9 rev. (1994) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT
1993]; Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 26/97, Case 11.142, Arturo Ribón Avila (Colom.), in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 19, at 444, para. 201; Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report
No. 3/98, Case 11.221, Tarcisio Medina Charry (Colom.), Apr. 7, 1998, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT





sources (arts. 4, 5, 7), or employ children in exploitative labor conditions (arts. 6, 19).
The need “to regulate industrial uses in ways that provide for protection of rights
guaranteed by the American Convention” has been expressly recognized by a former
Commission President.21 Linking the failure of States to regulate industrial practices
to Convention article 4 (right to life), he has suggested that States Parties may be held
internationally liable for unregulated industrial processes, such as discharge of toxic
effluents, that cause concrete health risks to individuals—e.g., “increases in disease,
stillbirths, malformation of fetuses, disease and diminish[ed] life expectancy.”22
The Court has likewise established the principle that, by failing to regulate the power
of abusive institutions, a State may breach its duty to “prevent” under the Convention
simply by “subjecting a person” to that institution—even if the particular person was
not harmed or harm cannot be proved in a concrete case.23 While this principle was
stated in the context of “official, repressive bodies that practice torture and
assassination with impunity,” the same principle must apply with respect to
unregulated industries widely known for severe ESCR violations affecting physical
integrity (art. 5) and/or workers’freedom of association (art. 16). To allow workers to
continue to be subjected to labor abuses in such industries, without taking legislative
and punitive action to regulate, is to breach the state duty to prevent under the
Convention. Indeed, where the State fails to effectively regulate such sectors, it
actually aids in the commission of human rights violations, thereby making the State
responsible on the international plane. 
The duty to regulate also mandates the legislation of appropriate penalties for
noncompliance with standards of conduct. The Commission has specifically found
that a State’s failure to criminalize human rights abuses in domestic law may give rise
to international responsibility for those abuses.24 While criminal penalties are not
required for all human rights violations, States are obligated under articles 1 and 2 to
legislate appropriate sanctions, whether criminal or civil, for all acts that violate
protected Convention rights.  Such penalties serve to prevent abuse by acting as a
deterrent.
21 Address of the President of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Dr. Alvaro Tirado
Mejía, before the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, Wash., D.C., Feb. 6,
1995, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1995, at 275,
278, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91, Doc. 7 rev. (1996) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1995].
22 Id. (“Article 4 of the American Convention requires governments to protect the right to life . That
right is in jeopardy for example when water, without which life cannot be imagined, is polluted by
unregulated industrial processes. When toxic effluents are poured directly into the drinking water
of the population, the epidemiological consequences are well known—increases in disease,
stillbirths, malformation of fetuses, disease and diminish[ed] life expectancy.”) (emphasis added).
23 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No. 4, para. 175.
24 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 3/98, Case 11.221, Tarcisio Medina Charry (Colom.), Apr. 7,
1998, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 19, at 482, 504, para. 108 (finding State
breached duty to prevent violations of the Convention by failing to establish forced disappearance
as a crime in domestic law). 
2. Duty to monitor
Written regulations are not enough. Widespread human rights abuses often persist in
States with comprehensive industrial, labor, and environmental regulations formally
on the books. “[T]he problem is ineffective enforcement of those regulations.”25
Effective prevention requires the active vigilance of reliable inspection, monitoring,
and assessment services. The duty to monitor public and private compliance with
regulatory norms affecting protected rights is thus a distinct duty under the article 1(1)
duty to “prevent.” 
The duty to monitor is recognized under similar provisions in the ICESCR. The U.N.
Committee on ESCR affirms that States Parties must “monitor[] the actual situation
with respect to each of the [protected] rights on a regular basis” and that “the
essential first step towards promoting the realization of economic, social and cultural
rights is diagnosis and knowledge of the existing situation.”26 Indeed, prevention and
promotion of protected rights require the State to be aware of the extent to which the
various rights are, or are not, being enjoyed by all individuals under its jurisdiction.
This requires active monitoring of private and public compliance with human rights
norms and domestic legislation. 
Most American States have labor ministries, for example, charged with monitoring
compliance with national workplace wage and safety standards. In many cases,
however, they are grossly underfinanced, understaffed, and incapable of effectively
preventing workplace abuse. Where injury to protected rights results, States Parties
may be held accountable under the Convention for this ineffectiveness. While no such
case has yet been submitted to the contentious jurisdiction of the Court or
Commission, the Commission has underscored the need for effective state monitoring
of labor standards in its country reports.27
25 Tirado Mejía Address, supra note 21, at 278 (“Virtually every state in our hemisphere has such
regulations on its books, indicating that there is a general appreciation of the obligation. . . . [T]he
problem is ineffective enforcement of those regulations. The Commission has been receiving more
complaints in the form of individual petitions on these matters.”).  
26 See Reporting by States Parties, General Comment No. 1, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Econ., Soc.
and Cultural Rts., 3rd Sess., para. 3, U.N. Doc. E/1989/22 (1989) [hereinafter General Comment
No. 1] (emphasis added), available at < h t t p : / / w w w. u n h c h r. c h / t b s / d o c . n s f / M a s t e r F r a m e Vi e w /
38e23a6ddd6c0f4dc12563ed0051cde7?Opendocument>.
27 See, e.g., Status of Human Rights in Guatemala, IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1994, supra note 20, at
188–89 (“Guatemalan labor laws are flagrantly violated particularly in rural zones where there are
no effective agencies, either administrative or judicial, to facilitate the peaceful settlement of
disputes . . . . [L]abor laws, particularly those with respect to unionization, wages, and working
conditions, are not observed in a large number of farming sectors . . . . [The Commission, therefore,
confirms] the need for strengthening such institutions as the Ministry of Labor’s services of






3. Duty to conduct impact studies
A third element of the “duty to prevent,” the duty to conduct impact studies, is
triggered when major public or private projects, programs or policies are
implemented. States are obligated to ensure that prior studies are conducted to assess
the effects of such undertakings on the protection and promotion of basic human
rights, particularly for the most vulnerable sectors. While not explicitly recognized in
the caselaw, this duty should be viewed as a natural outgrowth of States Parties’
general obligations to “respect” (for public projects) and “ensure” (for private
projects) under article 1(1). The Commission has recognized the importance of prior
impact studies in relation to economic adjustment programs,2 8 i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y
financed development projects and loans,29 and “any plan, program or proposal
affecting the rights or living conditions of indigenous people.”30
A State might violate its duty to “respect,” for example, by undertaking a structural
adjustment program that removed state subsidies from all essential food items without
making alternate provision for the most impoverished, whose rights could be
demonstrated to be concretely impaired. The duty to conduct a prior impact study
would function to prevent such violations by making the State aware of any adverse
impact before undertaking the project; it would then have the opportunity to
restructure the project to avoid the adverse impact to the extent possible. 
Similarly, the undertaking of a large publicly or privately financed development
project may violate the Convention where the rights of affected community members
are concretely impaired. Such impairment could be avoided by carrying out a prior
impact study to assess the situation and elicit the suggestions and approval of the
28 See, e.g., IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 20, at 538, rec. 3 (“Member states should
ensure that socially disadvantaged groups, particularly minorities, do not suffer disproportionately
from economic adjustment measures.”); rec. 4 (“When formulating the initial study for economic
structural adjustment programs . . . member states should avoid programs that exacerbate the
conditions of the poor.”). 
29 See, e.g., The World Conference on Human Rights and the Inter-American System for the
Protection of Human Rights: Reaffirming Promotion and Protection, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT
1993, supra note 20, at 569, rec. 14 (“[The Commission recommends] [t]hat the General Assembly
direct OAS permanent organs to make arrangements with the Inter-American Development Bank
and public institutions for international financing to ensure that prior studies required for approval
of projects and loans should include an impact study on the protection and promotion of basic
human rights. The [IACHR] offers the assistance of its experienced staff to accomplish this.
Hereafter, the IACHR will officially send its reports to the international financial institutions.”)
(emphasis added).
30 See, e.g., Draft of the Inter-American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, AG/RES
1022 (XIX-0/89), in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1995, supra note 21, art. XXI(2) (“The states shall
take necessary measures to ensure that decisions regarding any plan, program or proposal affecting
the rights or living conditions of indigenous people are not made without the free and informed
consent and participation of those peoples, that their preferences are recognized and that no such
plan, program or proposal that could have harmful effects on the normal livelihood of those
populations is adopted.”) (emphasis added).
affected community. In the Yanomami case, for example, the Brazilian government
approved a plan to build a highway through the Yanomami territory in order to
improve access for mineral miners. The Commission found that Brazil had violated
its international obligations under the Declaration by failing “to take timely and
effective measures on behalf of the Yanomami Indians”31 to prevent the violation of
protected rights (i.e., life, liberty, security, residence, movement, health, and well-
being). A prior impact study, which the government did not undertake, would have
constituted one such measure. 
The failure of a State to conduct an impact study before undertaking a new policy or
project does not, in itself, constitute a violation of the Convention. When protected
rights are concretely impaired as a result of that undertaking, however, it is an
important indicator that the State did not take the preventive measures required of it
under the Convention. This lack of due diligence can, in appropriate circumstances,
implicate the international responsibility of the State. 
4. Duty to remove structural obstacles
Finally, the duty to prevent requires that States Parties actively remove structural
obstacles that impede individuals’ ability to gain access to essential goods and
services necessary for human rights enjoyment. Particularly for the poor, such
obstacles are often the greatest barrier to effective human rights protection. They may
include administrative obstacles such as literacy or language requirements for social
service eligibility or structural obstacles such as lack of roads and low-interest loans. 
The State is responsible for removing such obstacles. The Commission has affirmed,
“Member States should guarantee conditions that enable people to gain access to
food, health services and education, and should fully enforce minimum wage laws. To
this end, member states should reform basic economic and political structures that
inhibit the development of such conditions.”32 The Limburg Principles similarly
affirm the State obligation to “remove promptly obstacles . . . to permit the immediate
fulfillment of a right.”33 The failure of a State to remove such barriers to access,
particularly where the State has had notice of the negative implications thereof for
human rights enjoyment, can render the State internationally responsible for concrete
impairments of protected rights that are shown to be caused by those barriers to
access. 
31 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Res. 12/85, Case 7615, Coulter (Braz.), Mar. 5, 1985, in INTER-AM. COMM.
H.R., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1984–1985, at 13,
OAS/Ser.L/II.66, doc. 10 rev 1.
32 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 20, at 538, rec. 1 (emphasis added). 
33 Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 43rd Sess., Annex, para. 72, U.N. Doc.






B. Duty to Investigate
Where concrete injury to a protected right occurs despite a State’s good faith efforts
at prevention, States Parties have the additional duty to undertake a serious
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the violation. This obligation arises
for every alleged violation brought to the attention of public authorities.
The State is obligated to investigate every situation involving a
violation of the rights protected by the Convention . . . . In certain
circumstances, it may be difficult to investigate acts that violate an
individual’s rights. The duty to investigate, like the duty to prevent, is
not breached merely because the investigation does not produce a
satisfactory result. Nevertheless, it must be undertaken in a serious
manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An
investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as
its own legal duty, not as a step taken by private interests that depends
upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of
proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government. This
is true regardless of what agent is eventually found responsible for the
violation. Where the acts of private parties that violate the Convention
are not seriously investigated, those parties are aided in a sense by the
government, thereby making the State responsible on the international
plane.34
States’ failure to investigate ESCR abuse is often most egregious with respect to
alleged violations of domestic industrial, labor, and environmental regulations by
private actors. Where a protected right is implicated, the State’s failure to respond
adequately to consumer, worker and community complaints by undertaking a timely
and serious investigation of the allegations, “assumed by the State as its own legal
duty,” may incur state responsibility for the alleged violation. 
C. Duty to Sanction
Closely related to the duties to “prevent” and to “investigate,” article 1(1) also
incorporates the duty to sanction. Sanctioning human rights violators is essential to
the State’s obligation to “ensure” protected rights; it aids in deterring violations by
sending a strong message to potential abusers that violations will not be tolerated by
domestic authorities.35 Both the Court and the Commission have consistently
34 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No. 4, paras.
176–77 (emphasis added).
35 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 3/98, Case 11.221, Tarcisio Medina Charry (Colom.),
Apr. 7, 1998, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 19, at 482, 504, para. 108 (“The State,
emphasized the duty to sanction in individual cases.36 The Commission has been
particularly critical of amnesty laws that foreclose entirely the possibility of
sanctioning human rights violators, finding such laws to conflict directly with article
1(1).37
The duty to sanction has been repeatedly affirmed in the major international expert
statements on ESCR enforcement. The Maastricht Guidelines recognize that “States
should develop effective measures to preclude the possibility of impunity of any
violation of economic, social, and cultural rights and to ensure that no person who
may be responsible for violations of such rights has immunity from liability for their
actions.”38 The Quito Declaration similarly affirms the State’s “obligation to sanction
offenses committed by public servants, as well as by [private] persons or other
judicially-recognized actors in cases of corruption that infringe or endanger ESCR.”39
Like state agents who violate ESCR, “private actors must be held accountable for
their actions and for the consequences of those actions under domestic law.”40
D. Duty to Make Reparation 
The article 1(1) duty to “ensure” also obligates States to make reparation for harm
brought about by the violation of an international obligation. As the Court has
by not criminalizing the forced disappearance of persons, has squandered an opportunity to make
a statement condemning and discouraging such heinous activity. The State has also failed to
provide tailored criminal sanctions which would . . . provide an effective deterrent against the
commission of such a crime. As a result, the State has not established a legal regime which
adequately works to prevent forced disappearances.”) (emphasis added).
36 Commission and Court merits decisions generally conclude with a unanimous finding that the State
“must investigate . . . identify and sanction those responsible and adopt internal measures necessary
to guarantee fulfillment of this obligation.”
37 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 20/99, Case 11.317, Rodolfo Robles (Peru), in ANNUAL REPORT
O F T H E IN T E R- AM E R I C A N CO M M I S S I O N O N HU M A N RI G H T S 1 9 9 8, paras. 159–60,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, Doc. 6 rev. (1999) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998] (stating that,
through such laws and decrees, “a State precludes ‘any judicial possibility of continuing the
criminal trials intended to establish the crimes denounced; to identify their authors, accomplices
and accessories after the fact, and to impose the corresponding punishments.’ . . . Consequently,
amnesty laws directly prevent exercise of the right to prompt and effective recourse to judicial
guarantees and they violate the State’s obligation of ensuring free and full exercise of the rights
recognized in the Convention [art. 1(1)].”) (internal citations omitted); see also Report No. 36/96,
Case 10.843 (Chile), Report No. 34/96, Cases 11.228, 11.229, 11.231, and 11.282 (Chile), in
AN N U A L RE P O RT O F T H E IN T E R- AM E R I C A N CO M M I S S I O N O N HU M A N RI G H T S 1 9 9 6 ,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, Doc. 7 rev. (1997); Reports Nos. 28/92 (Arg.), 26/92 (El Sal.), and 29/92
(Uru.), in 1 INTER-AM.Y.B. OF HUM. RTS. 749, 827, 885 (1992).
38 The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 26, 1997,
para. 27, reprinted in INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: A
COMPILATION OF ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS 79 (1997), and 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 691 (1998), available at
<http://www.law.uu.nl/english/sim/instr/maastricht.asp>. 
39 Quito Declaration, supra note 9, para. 28.





affirmed, “It is a principle of international law, which jurisprudence has considered
‘even a general concept of law,’ that every violation of an international obligation
which results in harm creates a duty to make adequate reparation.”41 Adequate
reparation “consists in full restitution (restitutio in integrum), which includes the
restoration of the prior situation, the reparation of the consequences of the violation,
a n d i n d e m n i f i c a t i o n for patrimonial and non-patrimonial damages, including
emotional harm.”42 Such reparation is “obligatory following a State’s failure to
enforce an international convention or commitment.”43 Consequently, a State’s failure
to make reparation for harm brought about by a human rights violation in its
jurisdiction triggers its international responsibility under the Convention. 
The duty to repair human rights abuse is so important in the inter-American system
that the Convention includes a separate provision requiring the Court to order
reparation upon finding a Convention violation. Article 63(1) provides: “If the Court
finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by this
Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of
this right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the
consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or
freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party.”44
According to the Court, “This article codifies a rule of customary law which,
moreover, is one of the fundamental principles of current international law, as has
been recognized by this Court and the caselaw of other tribunals.”45
41 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Compensatory Damages (Art. 63(1) American
Convention on Human Rights), Judgment of July 21, 1989 (Ser. C) No. 7, para. 25 (citing Factory
at Chorzów, Jurisdiction, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 21; Factory at Chorzów, Merits, 1928
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 29; Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
1949 I.C.J. 184 (Apr. 11); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz, Compensatory Damages (Art. 63(1)
American Convention on Human Rights), Judgment of July 21, 1989 (Ser. C) No. 8, para. 23
(same). 
42 Velásquez Rodríguez Case, supra, para. 26 (emphasis added); Godínez Cruz; supra, para. 24
(same); see also Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 49/97, Case 11.520, Tomás Porfirio Rondin,
“Aguas Blancas” (Mex.), Feb. 18, 1998, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 19, at 662,
682, para. 99.
43 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 20/99, Case 11.317, Rodolfo Robles Espinoza (Peru), in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 37, at 787, para. 161 (“It is a generally accepted
principle of international law that a State’s failure to comply with a commitment causes it to incur
in the obligation of making reparation. Liability is the necessary corollary of a right. All rights at
the international level impose a liability on the State. If the obligation in question is not satisfied,
the liability requires adequate redress to be made. Reparation is therefore obligatory following a
State’s failure to enforce an international convention or commitment.”) (internal citations omitted).
44 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at
1, art. 63(1), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23 doc. rev. 2, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970), entered into force July 18, 1978,
available at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/Básicos/basic3.htm>. 
45 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Aloeboetoe et al., Reparations (Art. 63(1) of American Convention of Human
Rights), Judgment of Sept. 10, 1993 (Ser. C) No. 15, para. 43; see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Compensatory Damages (Art. 63(1) American Convention on Human
Rights), Judgment of July 21, 1989 (Ser. C) No. 7, para. 25; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz,
E. Duty to Ensure Minimum Core Content 
Finally, the duty to “ensure” under the Convention obligates States Parties to
guarantee that all persons within their jurisdictions enjoy the minimum core content
of protected rights. As the Commission has recognized, States Parties are obligated
“regardless of the level of economic development, to guarantee a minimum threshold
of [protected] rights.”46 While no published opinion in the inter-American system
expressly recognizes this duty under article 1(1), it is supported by both the “object
and purpose” of the Convention and evolving international jurisprudence. United
Nations and other international expert bodies on ESCR have consistently affirmed the
absolute obligation of States Parties to ensure the minimum core content of the rights
protected in international ESCR instruments. According to the U.N. Committee on
ESCR: 
[A] minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very
least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon
every State party. Thus, for example, a State party in which any
significant number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of
essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the
most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its
obligations under the Covenant. If the Covenant were to be read in
such a way as not to establish such a minimum core obligation, it
would largely be deprived of its raison d’être.47
Compensatory Damages (Art. 63(1) American Convention on Human Rights), Judgment of July
21, 1989 (Ser. C) No. 8, para. 23; Factory at Chorzów, Jurisdiction, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at
21; Factory at Chorzów, Merits, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 29; Interpretation of Peace
Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, 1950 I.C.J. 228 (July 18). 
The Court has emphasized that its judgments on reparation “must be understood to impose
international legal obligations, compliance with which shall not be subject to modification or
suspension by the respondent State through invocation of provisions of its own domestic law.”
Aloeboetoe, supra, para. 44; see also Velásquez Rodríguez, supra, para. 30; Godínez Cruz, supra,
para. 28; Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 15, at 26–27; Greco-
Bulgarian “Communities,” 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 17, at 32, 35; Free Zones of Upper Savoy and
the District of Gex, 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 24, at 12 (Dec. 6); Free Zones of Upper Savoy and
the District of Gex, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 46, at 167; Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other
Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in the Danzig Territory, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B), No. 44, at 24.
46 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 20, at 524 (“[T]he obligation of member states to
observe and defend the human rights of individuals within their jurisdictions, as set forth in both
the American Declaration and the American Convention, obligates them, regardless of the level of
economic development, to guarantee a minimum threshold of these rights.”).
47 See The Nature of States Parties Obligations, General Comment No. 3, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on
Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., 5th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 83, para. 10, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (1990)
[hereinafter General Comment No. 3] (emphasis added), reprinted in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND





Duty of Pr o g re s s i v i t y
In the ESCR context, the minimum core content of protected Convention rights must
be viewed, at the very least, as minimum subsistence rights. Thus, as affirmed by
U.N. Special Rapporteur on ESCR Danilo Türk, “States are obliged, regardless of the
level of economic development, to ensure respect for minimum subsistence rights for
all.”48 The Limburg Principles assert the same principle.49 The Maastricht Guidelines
echo that failure to satisfy “minimum core obligation[s]” to ensure the satisfaction of
“minimum essential levels” of each right constitutes a violation of the relevant ESCR
instrument, “irrespective of the availability of resources of the country concerned or
any other factors or difficulties.”50 While these international expert statements refer
primarily to the ICESCR, “[t]hey are equally relevant . . . to the interpretation and
application of other norms of international and domestic law in the field of economic,
social, and cultural rights,”51 including the American Convention, Protocol of San
Salvador, OAS Charter, and American Declaration.
Where access to minimum subsistence rights is obstructed by State agents, third
parties, or structural barriers, and no relief or action is taken to redress the harm by
the concerned State, the State may incur international responsibility under article 1(1)
for any concrete injury to a protected right that results. This result accords with the
Commission’s explicit recognition that extreme poverty is “a condition of life so
limited by malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, low life expectancy and high infant
mortality as to be beneath any rational definition of human decency and dignity.52 If
the Convention were to be read in such a way as not to establish a minimum core
obligation to ensure, at the very least, a life that is not beneath any rational definition
of human dignity, it, too, would “largely be deprived of its raison d’être.”
III. Duty of Progressivity/Non-regressivity
(Arts. 1 & 26)
A third general obligation, the obligation of progressive achievement, inheres in
article 26.53 Under that provision, “States Parties undertake to adopt measures . . .
48 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Realization of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, U.N.
ESCOR, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 43rd Sess., Agenda Item 8, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/17
(1991), at 18, para. 52(d)).
49 See Limburg Principles, supra note 33, para. 25 (“States parties are obligated, regardless of the
level of economic development, to ensure respect for minimum subsistence rights for all.”).
50 See Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 38, para. 9. 
51 Id. para. 5.
52 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 20, at 523; INTER-AM. COMM. H.R., REPORT ON THE
SITUATIONOF HUMAN RIGHTSINTHE REPUBLICOF NICARAGUA 153 (1981), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.53, Doc.
25 (1981) (emphasis added).
53 The principle of progressivity may also be derived directly from articles 1 and 2, which establish
the general obligations to “respect” and to “ensure” Convention rights and to “adopt measures” as
with a view to achieving progressively, by legislation and other appropriate means,
the full realization” of protected rights. While the article 26 progressivity principle
refers literally to the “rights implicit in the economic, social . . . and cultural standards
set forth in the [OAS Charter],” it has been found to apply to all protected rights in
the Convention. Former Inter-American Court Judge Rodolfo E. Piza Escalante, for
example, has stated that the principle of progressivity, contained in article 26, “should
in my judgment be understood to be applicable to any of the ‘civil and political’rights
established in the American Convention.”54 The Commission has likewise affirmed
that “the progressive development of rights is not limited to economic, social and
cultural rights but is applicable to and inherent in all human rights instruments as they
are elaborated and expanded.”55 From a practical perspective, moreover, most CPR,
like most ESCR, can only be achieved progressively.56 The U.N. Committee on ESCR
has stated that, where different means are used to give effect to CPR norms and ESCR
norms, “there should be a compelling justification for this.”57 There is simply no
“compelling justification” for not treating the progressivity principle in article 26 as
applicable to all protected rights in the Convention.58
Judge Piza has explained the structural significance of article 26 in relation to the
similarly worded obligation in article 2. States Parties, under both provisions,
necessary to ensure that those rights have “effect” in the domestic jurisdiction. As discussed above,
the duty to “respect” prohibits public authority from undertaking actions that directly undermine
the enjoyment of protected rights. In other words, article 1(1) prohibits regressiveness in public
policies and measures that affect the enjoyment of rights. At the same time, the article 1(1) duty to
“ensure,” and the correlative article 2 duty to “adopt . . . measures,” constitute a positive mandate
upon States to take steps toward the full realization of protected rights. That is, articles 1 and 2
mandate progressiveness in the realization of all rights protected in the Convention. 
54 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Separate Vote of Judge Rodolfo E. Piza Escalante, Proposed Amendments to
the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of Jan.
19, 1984 (Ser. A) No. 4 (1984), para. 6.
55 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 20, at 523.
56 See, e.g., Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 38, para. 8. Of course, this “does not alter the nature
of the legal obligation of States which requires that certain steps be taken immediately and others
as soon as possible.” Id. 
57 The Domestic Application of the Covenant, General Comment No. 9, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on
Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., 19th Sess., Agenda item 3, para. 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1998/24 (1998)
[hereinafter General Comment No. 9], available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/Master
FrameView/4ceb75c5492497d9802566d500516036?Opendocument>.
58 To the extent the Convention was initially understood to protect so-called “CPR” in Chapter 2 and
“ESCR” in Chapter 3, the inclusion of a special state obligation for ESCR to complement the
general obligations in articles 1 and 2 might have seemed sensible at the time. Modern
understandings of human rights norms, however, recognize the enduring indivisibility and
interdependence of ESCR and CPR, and that one set of rights cannot be ensured without protection
of the other. An evolutionary international human rights law perspective would, thus, suggest
that—in accordance with the view of Judge Piza—the general obligations in articles 1 and 2 apply
to the ESCR protected in article 26 just as the progressivity principle in article 26 applies to the rest
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expressly “undertake to adopt . . . legislative and other measures” for the full
realization of protected rights. The only difference between the two, from an
obligations perspective, is that article 2 requires that such measures “give effect” to
protected rights while article 26 requires that they aim at “achieving progressively”
those rights. As Judge Piza-Escalante has recognized, this distinction recognizes that
some rights are not immediately “requirable in themselves, through a specific ‘action
of restitution,’” and hence cannot be given immediate “domestic legal effect,”
pursuant to article 2, through a specific legislative or other measure.59 The rights to
adequate housing, adequate health care, or to proper nutrition—in their most general
senses—would fall within this category and hence be governed by the obligation in
article 26. By contrast, rights “requirable in themselves,” such as those to strike,
unionization, minimum wage, non-discrimination, free compulsory primary
education, and freedom from illegal forced evictions would be subject to article 2.60
Most rights have aspects that are “directly requirable in themselves” and others that
are “indirectly requirable.” The right to housing is an example. The right to protection
against illegal forced eviction, an essential aspect of the right to housing, is “directly
requirable in itself” and thus governed by article 2. The right of every person to a
guaranteed home is not; a new home cannot be demanded from the State in a court of
law simply because a person does not have one. A homeless individual, or his
representative, could, however, hold the State accountable for failure to take
progressive measures to ensure that the right of everyone to adequate housing is fully
realized in the shortest time frame possible, given available resources. According to
Judge Piza, “whenever it is concluded that a specific basic right is not directly
requirable in itself, one is facing a right that is at least indirectly requirable and that
can be progressively materialized.”61
59 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Separate Vote of Judge Rodolfo E. Piza Escalante, Proposed Amendments to
the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of Jan.
19, 1984 (Ser. A) No. 4 (1984), para. 4.
60 The U.N. Committee on ESCR has identified the following non-exhaustive list of rights that are
“capable of immediate application by judicial and other organs in many national legal systems”:
rights to equality/non-discrimination, fair wages, equal remuneration for equal work, unionization,
special measures of protection for children (particularly in employment situations), free
compulsory primary education, school choice, and creative freedom. See General Comment No. 3,
supra note 47, para. 5; see also General Comment No. 9, supra note 57, para. 10. It has further
recognized that “immediate measures” must be taken to confer legal security of tenure, “which
guarantees legal protection against forced eviction, harassment and other threats,” upon all persons
and households lacking such protection. The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11(1)), General
Comment No. 4, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., 6th Sess., para. 8(a), U.N.
Doc. E/1992/23 (1992), available at  <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/099b725fe87555ec80256
70c004fc803/469f4d91a9378221c12563ed0053547e?OpenDocument#*+Contained+i>. All of
these rights would be subject to the state obligation in article 2 to guarantee that such rights have
domestic legal effects. 
61 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Separate Vote of Judge Rodolfo E. Piza Escalante, Proposed Amendments to
the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of Jan.
19, 1984 (Ser. A) No. 4 (1984), para. 6.
The U.N. Committee on ESCR has explained the significance of the progressiviy
principle in relation to the similarly worded, and heavily interpreted, article 2 of the
ICESCR, which, like Convention article 26, obligates States Parties to “take steps…
with a view to achieving progressively the full realization” of protected ESCR:
The concept of progressive realization constitutes a recognition of the
fact that full realization of all economic, social and cultural rights will
generally not be able to be achieved in a short period of time. In this
sense[,] the obligation differs significantly from that contained in
article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
[ICCPR] [,] which embodies an immediate obligation to respect and
ensure all of the relevant rights. Nevertheless, the fact that realization
over time, or in other words progressively, is foreseen under the
Covenant should not be misinterpreted as depriving the obligation of
all meaningful content. It is on the one hand a necessary flexibility
device, reflecting the realities of the real world and the difficulties
involved for any country in ensuring full realization of economic,
social and cultural rights.  On the other hand, the phrase must be read
in the light of the overall objective, indeed the raison d’être, of the
Covenant[,] which is to establish clear obligations for States parties in
respect of the full realization of the rights in question.  It thus imposes
an obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible
towards that goal. Moreover, any deliberately retrogressive measures
in that regard would require the most careful consideration and would
need to be fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights
provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the
maximum available resources.62
Article 26 thus recognizes the fact that “full realization” of all protected rights “will
generally not be able to be achieved in a short period of time.” Article 26 obligates
States Parties to undertake a national course of action aimed at progressively ensuring
the full effectiveness of all protected rights. The special obligation of progressivity
assumed in article 26 is a “flexibility device” for States, allowing them to engage in
a process of determining the best means—given the particular social, cultural,
ecological, economic, and political landscape of the State—of achieving the full
realization of ESCR. Just as importantly, it is also an express reminder of the
obligation to begin taking steps immediately and to continue taking them consistently,
without any backsliding.63 A State’s “inertia, unreasonable delay in acting, and/or the
62 General Comment No. 3, supra note 47, para. 9.
63 IN T E R- AM. CO M M. H.R., SE C O N D RE P O RT O N T H E SI T U AT I O N O F HU M A N RI G H T S I N PE R U,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, Doc. 59 rev. (2000), ch. VI, para. 11 [hereinafter PERU REPORT 2000] (“[T]he
progressive nature that most international instruments confer on state obligations related to [ESCR]
imposes on states, with immediate effect, the general obligation to constantly seek to attain the
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adoption of measures that constitute setbacks in enforcing [protected] rights are
contrary to the principle of progressiveness.”64 As the Commission has observed: 
While Article 26 does not enumerate specific measures of
implementation, leaving the State to determine the most appropriate
administrative, social, legislative or other steps to pursue, it expresses
a legal obligation on the part of the State to engage in such a process
of determination and to adopt progressive measures in this sphere. The
principle of progressive development establishes that such measures
are to be undertaken in a manner which constantly and consistently
advances toward the full realization of these rights.65
Article 26 should thus be viewed, like article 2 of the ICESCR, as imposing on States
the immediate obligation to (1) make a plan for the progressive realization of
protected rights, (2) implement that plan in good faith, and (3) not take regressive
action that diminishes any of those rights. A State Party, in contentious proceedings,
should be found to have breached article 26 where concrete impairment of an
individual’s protected rights (i.e., as articulated in articles 3–26) results from the
State’s failure, without justification, to undertake any of the above requirements with
respect to a protected Convention right (i.e., that is not “immediately requirable in
itself”).
PRINCIPLE OF PROGRESSIVITY (ART. 26)
1. Duty to make plan of action for the progressive realization of
protected rights for all persons, including appropriate legislative,
administrative, budgetary, judicial and other measures. 
2. Duty to execute plan with due diligence and in good faith.
3. Duty not to engage in backsliding, i.e., take regressive action
that diminishes any right previously afforded in domestic or
international law.
64 See Quito Declaration, supra note 9, para. 29(d). 
65 PERU REPORT 2000, supra note 63, para. 6.
Practice Tip
The general obligation in Convention article 26 is not materially
different from the general obligation in article 2 of the ICESCR.66
There is a legal basis, therefore, for using the U.N. Committee on
ESCR’s expert interpretation of the “progressivity principle” in
interpreting State duties under articles 1 and 26 of the
Convention.67
A. Duty to Make a Plan of Action
While certain obligations are capable of immediate implementation and enforcement,
others will require concerted action over time. The first component of the
“progressivity obligation,” therefore, is the duty to develop a plan for ensuring State
compliance with ESCR obligations. This should involve “the elaboration of clearly
stated and carefully targeted policies, including the establishment of priorities which
reflect [protected rights].” 6 8 Indeed, even where resources are demonstrably
inadequate to attain full realization of protected rights, a procedural requirement
remains for the State to monitor the extent of nonrealization and to devise a detailed
plan of appropriate strategies, programs, and other measures of an administrative,
legislative, financial, educational, and social nature. The U.N. Committee on ESCR
has recognized that an “obligation ‘to work out and adopt a detailed plan of action for
the progressive implementation’ of each of the rights contained in the Covenant is
clearly implied by the obligation in article 2, paragraph 1 ‘to take steps. . . by all
appropriate means . . . .’”69
As article 2(1) of the ICESCR is a general obligation clause that is textually and
structurally similar to Convention articles 2 and 26,70 advocates may argue that an
66 See American Convention, supra note 44, art. 26 (States Parties “undertake to adopt measures . . .
with a view to achieving progressively, by legislation or other appropriate means, the full
realization” of protected rights); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, art. 2(1), G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976 [hereinafter ICESCR]
(Each State Party “undertakes to take steps . . . with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including
particularly the adoption of legislative measures”). 
67 The principle of progressivity enshrined in article 2(1) of the ICESCR has been explained by the
U.N. Committee in General Comments 3 and 9. See General Comment No. 3, supra note 47;
General Comment No. 9, supra note 57. This understanding has been further refined in the
Limburg Principles, the Maastricht Guidelines, and the Quito Declaration, among others.
68 General Comment No. 1, supra note 26.
69 Id. para. 4.
70 See American Convention, supra note 44, art. 2 (“States Parties undertake to adopt . . . such
legislative or other measures as may be necessary . . . .”) (emphasis added); art. 26 (“States Parties
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obligation to adopt a detailed plan of action is also “clearly implied” by articles 2 and
26 of the American Convention. International experts have already come to this
conclusion with regard to the implementation of ESCR in Latin America and the
Caribbean. As the Quito Declaration asserts: “Progressiveness implies that the State
should immediately set strategies and goals to achieve full effectiveness of ESCR,
with a verifiable system of indicators that allow for full supervision from social
sectors.”71
A State’s failure to devise a detailed plan of action does not, in itself, constitute an
adjudicable violation of the Convention. Where injury to a protected right occurs,
however, it is an indication that the State is not undertaking the measures required of
it under articles 1, 2 and 26. This failure can trigger the State’s international
responsibility.
STATE PLANNING AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
The American Convention and Protocol of San Salvador each
obligate States Parties to prepare periodic progress reports on the
realization of ESCR in their jurisdictions. 72 This obligation is similar
to that set forth in article 16 of the ICESCR. The U.N. Committee on
ESCR has stated that these reports are not a procedural matter
designed solely to satisfy each State Party’s formal obligation to
report. Rather, in accordance with the letter and spirit of the treaty,
the process of preparation and submission of reports by States
serves a variety of objectives, including:
• Comprehensive review of domestic laws and practices.
“[T]o ensure that a comprehensive review is undertaken with
respect to national legislation, administrative rules and
procedures, and practices in an effort to ensure the fullest
possible conformity with the Covenant.”
• State monitoring. “[T]o ensure that the State party monitors the
actual situation with respect to each of the rights on a regular
basis and is thus aware of the extent to which the various rights
are, or are not, being enjoyed by all . . . .”
• Plan of action. “‘[T]o work out and adopt a detailed plan of
action for the progressive implementation [of ESCR].” This
71 Quito Declaration, supra note 9, para. 29(d) (emphasis added). 
72 American Convention, supra note 44, art. 42; Additional Protocol to the American Convention on
Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Nov. 17, 1988, art. 19(1)–(5),
O.A.S.T.S. No. 69 (1988), 28 I.L.M. 156 (1989) (entered into force Nov. 16, 1999), available at
<http://www.cidh.oas.org/Básicos/basic5.htm>.
Cont...
should involve “the elaboration of clearly stated and carefully
targeted policies, including the establishment of priorities which
reflect the provisions of the Covenant.”
• Public scrutiny. “[T]o faciliate public scrutiny of government
policies with respect to economic, social and cultural rights and
to encourage the involvement of the various economic, social
and cultural sectors of society in the formulation ,
implementation and review of the relevant policies.”
• Evaluate progress. “[T]o provide a basis on which . . . [to]
effectively evaluate the extent to which progress has been made
toward the realization of the obligations contained in the
Covenant. For this purpose, it may be useful for States to
identify specific benchmarks or goals against which their
performance in a given area can be assessed.”
• Understand problems better and amend policies
accordingly. “[T]o enable the State party itself to develop a
better understanding of the problems and shortcomings
encountered in efforts to realize progressively the full range of
economic, social and cultural rights.” 73
B. Duty to Implement Plan with Due Diligence
Once adopted, a plan must be implemented with due diligence and in good faith. As
affirmed by international ESCR experts, “The fact that the full realization of most
economic, social, and cultural rights can only be achieved progressively, which in fact
also applies to most civil and political rights, does not alter the nature of the legal
obligation of States which requires that certain steps be taken immediately and others
as soon as possible.”74 In implementing a plan of action with respect to protected
rights, States have the obligation “to move as expeditiously as possible toward the full
realization of protected rights” and “to begin immediately to take steps to fulfill their
obligations.”75
Where a State engages in unjustified delay or fails to comply with its own plan for the
progressive realization of protected rights, the State may be held accountable under
international law, having violated the obligation in article 26 to “adopt measures . . .
with a view to achieving progressively . . . the full realization” of protected rights. As
affirmed by the Commission, “The rationale behind the principle of progressive rights
73 General Comment No. 1, supra note 26, paras. 1–8.
74 Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 38, para. 8 (emphasis added). 
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is that governments are under the obligation to ensure conditions that, according to
the state’s material resources, will advance gradually and consistently toward the
fullest achievement of [economic, social and cultural] rights.”76
The Commission has expressly recognized the obligation, under article 26, to
implement, in good faith and in a timely manner, a plan for the achievement of ESCR.
In a 1994 report on El Salvador, for example, the Commission suggested that, in the
context of ensuring the full realization of the right to own property under Convention
article 21, the State had violated article 26 by engaging in unjustified delay in the
implementation of a program of land transfers to demobilized combatants of the civil
war.77 It stressed that, in ensuring the right to property, the land program was an
“essential element in effective implementation of the obligations deriving from
Article 2 and Article 26.”78 By breaching its obligation to implement, in good faith, a
plan of action for the progressive achievement of a protected right, the State violated
the Convention with respect to that right. Had the case been brought in contentious
proceedings, the State could have been found internationally responsible for any
resulting injury to affected individuals. 
The principle of progressivity has also been affirmed in the Argentine courts.
Invoking constitutional and international human rights norms protecting the right to
health, a municipal court ordered the State of Argentina to cease delaying and
promptly comply with a plan to supply a vaccine to all Argentine citizens potentially
affected by a dangerous viral epidemic.79 Because the State had assumed the
obligation to produce the vaccine, the question for the court was “whether the
defendant has promptly fulfilled its obligations or whether, on the contrary, it has
engaged in omissions harmful to the right to health of the population . . . .”80 Finding
that the project had been initiated in 1991 and that, by 1997, the project was
paralyzed, with no investment having taken place in two years, the court ordered the
State to “fulfill the timeline strictly and without delay.”81
76 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 20, at 523 (emphasis added).
77 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1994, at 175–76,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.88, Doc. 9 rev. (1995) (noting land transfer is program that has suffered “the most
delays” under the Peace Agreement, program was “virtually paralyzed” for significant periods, and
government has failed to meet even previous year’s targets).
78 Id.
79 Viceconte, Mariela Cecilia v. State of Argentina—Ministry of Health and Social Action—s/amparo
ley 16.986, Case No. 31.777/96. 
80 Id. para. XII (author’s translation). The right to health is legally cognizable in Argentina through
the status afforded the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (art. XI), the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (art. 25), and the ICESCR (art. 12) in the Argentine
Constitution, as well as through the Constitution’s preamble, which refers to the “general welfare,”
a reference the Argentine Supreme Court has recognized to indisputably include “the preservation
of health.” See id. paras. V–VII. 
81 Id. para. XVII, XVIII (author ’s translation).
This decision follows the reasoning in the Quito Declaration that measures adopted
by the State “should consist of concrete, deliberate actions aimed as clearly as
possible at enforcing all rights as a whole. In all cases, it is the State’s responsibility
to justify its inertia, delay, or deviation in attaining these objectives.”82 The
Maastricht Guidelines similarly affirm that “[t]he burden is on the State to
demonstrate that it is making measurable progress toward the full realization of the
rights in question. The State cannot use the “progressive realization” provisions . . .
as a pretext for non-compliance.”83 When it does, and concrete injury results, it may
be held accountable under international law.
C. Duty Not to Take Regressive Action
(“Backslide”)
Just as a State Party has the obligation to take progressive measures, it has an
obligation not to take regressive measures. Thus, at the most basic level, the duty of
progressivity is a prohibition on regressivity. “Regressive policies” or measures are
understood to be those that “have as their object or effect a decline in the enjoyment
of human rights”; they “constitute setbacks in enforcing [protected] rights.”84 Where
such measures result in concrete injury to specific individuals’ protected rights, they
violate directly the obligations in articles 1(1) and 26, thus triggering state
responsibility on the international plane. The Commission has recognized the duty not
to take regressive action with respect to ESCR, stating that member states “should
take all measures necessary to ensure that the observance of economic, social and
cultural rights does not diminish in any aspect over time.”85
In a 2000 report on Peru, the Commission expressly invoked article 26 in the context
of ESCR backsliding. The Commission suggested that Peru’s elimination of several
major provisions on economic and social rights from its 1993 Constitution violated
Convention article 26. Removing constitutional protection of these rights, said the
Commission, constituted prohibited “backsliding,” even though indicators on
development showed that, in general terms, “Peru has been progressive in respect of
economic, social and cultural rights.”86 This conclusion is significant in that it shows
the Commission is interested in more than overall ESCR “progress.” It is concerned
about any backsliding with respect to protected rights. The Commission concluded
that “a worsening in the effective observance of economic, social, and cultural rights
may constitute a violation, among other provisions, of Article 26 of the American
Convention.”87
82 Quito Declaration, supra note 9, para. 29(b) (emphasis added). 
83 Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 38, para. 8. 
84 Quito Declaration, supra note 9, para. 29(d).
85 INTER-AM. COMM. H.R., THIRD REPORT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN COLOMBIA 70, rec. 2,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, Doc. 9, rev. 1 (1999), available at <http://www.cidh.org/countryrp/Colom99
en/chapter-3.htm> (emphasis added).
86 PERU REPORT 2000, supra note 63, ch. VI, para. 13. 
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Judge Piza-Escalante has also suggested that a draft constitutional amendment in
Costa Rica that reduced the number of ways in which foreigners could be
naturalized—for example, by making it more difficult to gain citizenship through
matrimony—violated the article 26 obligation to develop progressively the right to
nationality (art. 20(1)) and the rights of the family (art. 17), both protected under the
Convention.88 His observation lends further support to the understanding that a State
breaches its obligations under article 26 whenever it takes regressive measures with
respect to any of the rights guaranteed in the Convention, whether CPR or ESCR.
The Commission has explicitly recognized that:
1. unjustified delay in the implementation of a plan for ESCR
provision violates the article 26 progressivity principle; and
2. removing constitutional protection from ESCR constitutes
prohibited “backsliding” under article 26.
Regressive measures are “presumptively invalid.” According to international expert
opinion, such measures are valid only if fully justified under strict scrutiny.89 The
U.N. Committee on ESCR has explained: “[A]ny deliberate retrogressive measures…
would require the most careful consideration and would need to be fully justified by
reference to the totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context
of the full use of the maximum available resources.”90 The Limburg Principles echo
that a State Party violates the Covenant if “it deliberately retards or halts the
progressive realization of a right, unless it is acting within a limitation permitted by
the Covenant or it does so due to a lack of available resources or force majeure.”91 The
Maastricht Guidelines clarify the limits of the exception in this final clause by noting
the importance of distinguishing the inability from the unwillingness of a State to
comply with its treaty obligations.
A State claiming that it is unable to carry out its obligation for reasons
beyond its control has the burden of proving that this is the case. A
temporary closure of an educational institution due to an earthquake,
88 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Separate Vote of Judge Rodolfo E. Piza Escalante, Proposed Amendments
to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of
Jan. 19, 1984 (Ser. A) No. 4 (1984), para. 5.
89 Quito Declaration, supra note 9, para. 29(d).
90 General Comment No. 3, supra note 47, para. 9.
91 Limburg Principles, supra note 33, para. 72 (emphasis added). 
for instance, would be a circumstance beyond the control of the State,
while the elimination of a social security scheme without an adequate
replacement programme could be an example of unwillingness by the
State to fulfill its obligations.92
The text of the American Convention strongly suggests that the “strict scrutiny”
principle regarding regressive state policies already inheres in all protected
Convention rights. Articles 27, 29, and, particularly, 30 and 32(2) govern the scope of
permissible restrictions on the rights guaranteed in the Convention. By virtue of these
provisions, restrictions on the enjoyment and exercise of the Convention’s rights and
freedoms can only be applied under a specified set of extremely limited conditions
and must be fully justified in light of them. Under articles 30 and 32(2), these
conditions include: (a) that the regressive measure is previously established by law;
(b) that the law is strictly tailored to address reasons of general interest, including “the
just demands of the general welfare, in a democratic society”; and (c) that the
regressive measure is applied in strict accordance with those reasons of general
interest (i.e., general interest is not to be used as “pretext” for regressive action).93
These conditions make clear that a State cannot merely use general arguments of
public policy or fiscal discipline or cite offsetting financial or economic gains to
justify regressive measures. Rather, it must concretely show that the “just demands of
the general welfare, in a democratic society” will be favored by the measure.94
Articles 27 and 29 impose further limitations.95 Article 27 governs the suspension of
guarantees in time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the
independence or security of a State Party. Unfortunately, some American States have
adopted the disturbing practice of announcing states of emergency in times of peace
and, under that pretext, adopting regressive measures that often affect ESCR. To
92 Maastricht Guidelines, supra note 38, para. 13 (emphasis added).
93 Compare ICESCR, supra note 66, art. 4 (“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize
that, in the enjoyment of those rights provided by the State in conformity with the present
Covenant, the State may subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law only
in so far as this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of
promoting the general welfare in a democratic society.”) (emphasis added); General Comment No.
3, supra note 47, para. 9 (stating that any regressive measure must be “fully justified by reference
to the totality of rights recognized in the Covenant and in the context of the full utilization of the
maximum available resources.”).
The Limburg Principles emphasize that all limitations on ESCR must conform to the inherent
dignity of the human person, as a minimum standard. They affirm that article 4 of the ICESCR
“was primarily intended to be protective of the rights of individuals rather than permissive of the
imposition of limitations by the State” and that it was “not meant to introduce limitations on rights
affecting the subsistence or survival of the individual or integrity of the person.” Limburg
Principles, supra note 33, paras. 46–47 (emphasis added). 
94 The Limburg Principles affirm that the term “promoting the general welfare” shall be construed to
mean “furthering the well-being of the people as a whole.” Id. para. 52.
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protect against regressive actions in such situations, article 27 prohibits any type of
derogation from eleven of the twenty-four Convention rights in any circumstance .96
For the remaining articles, article 27 provides that measures that derogate from State
obligations under the Convention can be taken only “to the extent and for the period
of time strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such
measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international law and do
not involve discrimination on the ground of race, color, sex, language, religion, or
social origin.”97 Article 27 also imposes a process requirement that States Parties
immediately inform the OAS Secretary-General of the provisions suspended, the
reasons for the suspension, and the date set for the termination of the suspension.98 As
the Court has affirmed, “no right guaranteed in the Convention may be suspended
unless [these] very strict conditions . . . are met.”99
Under the American Convention, a regressive
measure is justified only where:
• it does not diminish any of the rights in articles 3–6, 9, 12,
17–20, 23, 25; 
• it is not inconsistent with the State’s other obligations under
international law and does not involve discrimination on the
ground of race, color, sex, language, religion, or social origin;
• it is duly established by law;
• the law is strictly tailored for reasons of general interest
(including, “the just demands of the general welfare in a
democratic society”); and
• the regressive measure is applied in strict accordance with
those reasons of general welfare. 
96 To “derogate” from a law is to enact something which is contrary to it. The Convention’s non-
derogable provisions include: art. 3 (juridical personality), art. 4 (life), art. 5 (humane treatment),
art. 6 (freedom from slavery), art. 9 (freedom from ex post facto laws), art. 12 (conscience and
religion), art. 17 (rights of the family), art. 18 (right to a name), art. 19 (rights of the child), art. 20
(nationality), art. 23 (participation in government), and art. 25 (judicial guarantees). See American
Convention, supra 44, art. 27(2). 
97 Id. art. 27(1). 
98 Id. art. 27(3). 
99 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2) and 7(6) of the American
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion, OC-8/87 of January 30, 1987 (Ser. A) No. 8,
para. 21 (“Hence, rather than adopting a philosophy that favors the suspension of rights, the
Convention establishes the contrary principle, namely, that all rights are to be guaranteed and
enforced unless very special circumstances justify the suspension of some, and that some rights
may never be suspended, however serious the emergency.”). 
From a procedural standpoint, petitioners have the initial burden of establishing a
prima facie case that a law or policy is regressive. The State then bears the burden of
showing that the regressive measure accords with the limitations set forth above. Of
course, the ultimate burden of proving concrete injury and causation remain with the
petitioner at all times.
ALLOCATION OF BURDENS TO ESTABLISH WHETHER
STATE ACTION WAS REGRESSIVE
Petitioner: Must establish prima facie case that law or policy is
regressive—i.e., demonstrate the regressive character of norm by
showing level of protection offered by new norm constitutes a step
back and has resulted in concrete injury to human persons. 
State Party: Must establish affirmative defense to rebut
presumption—i.e., demonstrate that, despite being regressive, the
norm is justifiable given its protective potential for other rights and
the general welfare. The burden of proof should be high and, in
case of doubt, a finding of invalidity should be preferred.
States Parties regularly undertake actions that have a regressive effect on ESCR. They
often justify this conduct by invoking “national security,” “fiscal discipline,” or “lack
of available resources.” With extremely few exceptions, these justifications do not
stand up to strict scrutiny under international human rights standards. A list of the
most common State justifications for regressive action follows, along with relevant
responses by international authorities.
EXPERT INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO THE MOST
COMMON STATE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR REGRESSIVE ACTS
1. NATIONAL SECURITY
• Limburg Principle 62: “National security may be invoked to
justify measures limiting certain rights only when they are
taken to protect the existence of the nation or its territorial
integrity or political independence against force or threat of
force.”
• Limburg Principle 63: “National security cannot be invoked
as a reason for imposing limitations to prevent merely local or
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• Limburg Principle 64: “National security cannot be used as
a pretext for imposing vague or arbitrary limitations and may
be invoked only when there exist adequate safeguards and
effective remedies against abuse.”
• Limburg Principle 65: “The systematic violation of ESCR
undermines true national security and may jeopardize
international peace and security. A State responsible for such
violation shall not invoke national security as a justification for
measures aimed at suppressing opposition to such violation or
at perpetrating repressive practices against its population.”
2. EC O N O M I C ST R U C T U R A L AD J U S T M E N T/ FI S C A L DI S C I P L I N E/ DE B T
REDUCTION
• Commission: “Economic adjustments should not entail a
decreased observance of human rights. Instead, they can be
used to redress social imbalances and correct the structural
violations that are built into the economic and social structures
of countries in the region.” 100
• C o m m i s s i o n : “When formulating the initial study for
economic structural adjustment programs . . . member states
should avoid programs that exacerbate the conditions of the
poor.”101
• C o m m i s s i o n : “When formulating domestic economic
policies, member states should guarantee an economic
environment that will enable the poor to participate in the
political and economic decision-making processes. As an
example, member states should promote respect for labor
unions, including their rights to organize, bargain collectively
and conduct strikes with the state playing a neutral role.”102
• Commission: “Member states should ensure that socially
disadvantaged groups, particularly minorities, do not suffer
disproportionately from economic adjustment measures.” 103
• Commission: “[E]conomic adjustments must be structured in
such a way that they do not do further injury to the most needy
and most vulnerable sectors, those who have suffered most
as a result of internal violence and recession.”104
3. LACK OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES:
• Commission: “The commitment of states to take steps with
the aim [of] achieving progressively the full realization of
100 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra 20, at 526.
101 Id. at 538, rec. 4. 
102 Id. at 538, rec. 2.
103 Id. at 538, rec. 3.




economic, social and cultural rights requires an effective use
of resources available to guarantee a minimum standard of
living for all . . . . In determining whether adequate measures
have been taken to implement and secure economic, social
and cultural rights, the Commission shall pay close attention
to the equitable and effective use of available resources and
the allocation of public expenditures to social programs that
address the living conditions of the more vulnerable sectors of
society which have been historically excluded from the
political and economic processes.”105
• U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights:
“[E]ven in times of severe resource constraints whether
caused by a process of adjustment, of economic recession, or
by other factors, the vulnerable members of society can and
indeed must be protected by the adoption of relatively low-
cost targeted programmes.”106
• Limburg Principle 23: “The obligation of progressive
achievement exists independently of the increase in
resources; it requires effective use of resources available.” 
• Limburg Principle 25: “States parties are obligated,
regardless of the level of economic development, to ensure
respect for minimum subsistence rights for all.”
• Limburg Principle 26: “Its available resources” refers to both
the resources within a State and those available from the
international community through international cooperation and
assistance. 
• Limburg Principle 27: “In determining whether adequate
measures have been taken for the realization of the rights
recognized in the Covenant attention shall be paid to equitable
and effective use of and access to the available resources.” 
• Limburg Principle 28: “In the use of the available resources
due priority shall be given to the realization of rights
recognized in the Covenant, mindful of the need to assure to
everyone the satisfaction of subsistence requirements as well
as the provision of essential services.” 
• Maastricht Guideline 10: “[R]esource scarcity does not
relieve States of certain minimum obligations in respect of the
implementation of economic, social, and cultural rights.”
105 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 20, at 524, 533.
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State obligations under the Convention for ensuring protected ESCR, as with all
protected rights, can be summarized as follows. 
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS TO GUARANTEE ESCR 
1. Obligation to respect. States Parties must not take direct
actions that restrict or impair ESCR.  
2. Obligation to ensure. States Parties must adopt reasonable
measures to:
• prevent third-party abuse of protected ESCR;
• investigate allegations of ESCR abuse; 
• sanction perpetrators of ESCR violations;
• provide effective remedies to victims of ESCR violations; and
• ensure the minimum core content of protected ESCR.
3. Obligation to “achieve progressively.” States Parties must: 
• make a plan for “achieving progressively . . . the full
realization” of protected ESCR;
• implement that plan in good faith;
• not take regressive action that diminishes ESCR enjoyment.
IV. An Illustrative List: Breaching State 
Obligations Under Articles 1, 2, and 26. 
The Maastricht Guidelines provide a non-exhaustive list of situations in which a
State, through its acts of commission or omission, would be in violation of the
ICESCR. ESCR advocates should argue that, where concrete injury to individuals’
protected rights proximately result, the same situations give rise to international state
responsibility under Convention articles 1, 2, and 26. 
MAASTRICHT GUIDELINES
VIOLATIONS THROUGH ACTS OF COMMISSION (DUTY TO RESPECT)
“Violations of ESCR can occur through the direct action of States or
other entities insufficiently regulated by States. Examples of such
violations include: 
Cont...
a. The formal removal or suspension of legislation necessary for
the continued enjoyment of an ESCR that is currently enjoyed;
b. The active denial of such rights to particular individuals or
groups, whether through legislated or enforced discrimination;
c. The active support for measures adopted by third parties which
are inconsistent with ESCR;
d. The adoption of legislation or policies which are manifestly
incompatible with pre-existing legal obligations relating to these
rights, unless it is done with the purpose and effect of increasing
equality and improving the realization of ESCR for the most
vulnerable groups; 
e. The adoption of any deliberately retrogressive measure that
reduces the extent to which any such right is guaranteed;
f. The calculated obstruction of, or halt to, the progressive
realization of a right protected by the Covenant, unless the State
is acting within a limitation permitted by the Covenant or it does
so due to a lack of available resources or force majeure;
g. The reduction or diversion of specific public expenditure, when
such reduction or diversion results in the non-enjoyment of such
rights and is not accompanied by adequate measures to ensure
minimum subsistence rights for everyone.”107
VIOLATIONS THROUGH ACTS OF OMISSION (DUTY TO ENSURE)
“Violations of ESCR can also occur through the omission or failure
of States to take necessary measures stemming from legal
obligations. Examples of such violations include: 
a. The failure to take appropriate steps as required under the
Covenant;
b. The failure to reform or repeal legislation which is manifestly
inconsistent with an obligation of the Covenant;
c. The failure to enforce legislation or put into effect policies
designed to implement provisions of the Covenant;
d. The failure to regulate activities of individuals or groups so as to
prevent them from violating ESCR;
e. The failure to utilize the maximum of available resources
towards the full realization of the Covenant;
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f. The failure to monitor the realization of ESCR, including the
development and application of criteria and indicators for
assessing compliance;
g. The failure to remove promptly obstacles which it is under a duty
to remove to permit the immediate fulfillment of a right
guaranteed by the Covenant;
h. The failure to implement without delay a right which it is required
by the Covenant to provide immediately;
i. The failure to meet a generally accepted international minimum
standard of achievement, which is within its powers to meet;
j. The failure of a State to take into account its international legal
obligations in the field of ESCR when entering into bilateral or
multilateral agreements with other States, international
organizations or multinational corporations.” 108
All petitions, as a condition of admissibility, must state facts tending to establish three
essential elements: (1) concrete injury to a protected right (arts. 3–26); (2) causation;
and (3) breach of a State obligation (arts. 1, 2, 26). The last element, breach of state
obligations, has been the subject of this chapter. The following three chapters are
devoted to the protected rights in the Convention, i.e., the rights articulated in articles
3–26, and how they may be invoked to protect ESCR under the Convention.
Successfully alleging a violation of one of these rights is essential to the petitioning
process. Indeed, no petition may be processed in the individual petitions process
unless it alleges “a violation of the rights guaranteed by th[e] Convention.”109 It is
critical, therefore, that every petition allege violation of a protected right, as
articulated in articles 3–26, in addition to violation of a state obligation, as articulated
in articles 1, 2 and 26. 
108 Id. para. 15.
109 American Convention, art. 47(b) (“The Commission shall consider inadmissible any petition [that]
. . . does not state facts that tend to establish a violation of the rights guaranteed by this
Convention.”) (emphasis added).
Cont...
ELEMENTS FOR ESTABLISHING AN ESCR VIOLATION
UNDER THE CONVENTION
1. Specific victims suffered concrete impairment of an ESCR
protected in the Convention, i.e., a right—
(a) articulated in articles 3–25, interpreted under the indirect or
integration approaches (discussed in chapters 6 and 7,
respectively); and/or
(b) referred to in article 26, interpreted under the article 26
approach (discussed in chapter 8).
2. The impairment was caused by an act imputable to the
State; and
3. The State breached an international obligation assumed
under Convention articles 1, 2 and 26 with respect to the
alleged victim.
(a)duty to respect (art. 1);
(b)duty to ensure (arts. 1, 2); and/or









USING  PROCEDURAL RIGHTS
TO  PROTECT ESCR
he “indirect approach” uses the Convention’s procedural guarantees to
protect ESCR from substantive impairment. “Procedural rights” refer to
norms that impose process requirements upon States. They do not protect
directly a specific ESC right, such as access to housing, food, health or education, but
rather the right to fair process in the distribution and receipt of all ESC entitlements.
They include the rights to due process (art. 8), to equal protection/non-discrimination
(art. 24), and to judicial protection (art. 25).
The indirect approach is not controversial; it has already been relied upon in concrete
cases by the Commission, the Court, and the European Court of Human Rights to
protect ESCR. Its strength derives from two essential aspects. First, procedural rights
protect process generically; they are not limited to any specific set of substantive
rights. Their application is thus largely immune to traditional ESCR justiciability
critiques. Second, procedural rights have broad application. The Convention’s
procedural guarantees are applicable not only to the rights recognized in the
Convention, but to all rights recognized in the internal legal order of States Parties.
States must guarantee these process requirements in the application of all domestic
laws and regulations, constitutional norms, and ratified international human rights
treaties. 
The Convention’s procedural guarantees require that States
Parties afford due process (art. 8), equal protection (art. 24),
and judicial recourse (art. 25) in the application of all ESCR
protected in the State’s: 
• Constitution;
• ratified international human rights treaties; 
• domestic laws and regulations; and
• other incorporated human rights law.
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The key to the use of these procedural norms is that domestic legislative,
constitutional, or international guarantees already be in place. Judicial bodies may be
reluctant to compel a State to take affirmative steps to implement ESCR. Once a State
has legislatively or otherwise undertaken to do so, however, courts are obligated to
hold government accountable for the manner in which those obligations are
undertaken.1 In essence, States must do so in a way that is non-discriminatory, that
affords due process guarantees when entitlements are diminished, and that, in case of
denial or infringement, offers judicial protection for the reestablishment of protected
rights and compensation for injuries suffered. The following three sections address
each of these requirements in turn. 
I. Right to Non-Discrimination &
Equal Protection of the Law (Arts. 1 & 24) 
Convention articles 1 and 24 enshrine the rights to non-discrimination and equal
protection of the law. Such guarantees, the U.N. Committee on ESCR has affirmed,
“should be interpreted, to the greatest extent possible, in ways which facilitate the full
protection of economic, social and cultural rights.”2 One of the chief causes of ESCR
violations in the Americas is discrimination. Latin America maintains the highest
income inequality of any region in the world.3 Falling largely along racial and ethnic
lines and across urban/rural divides, this inequality contributes to, and perpetuates,
widespread discrimination, particularly in the areas of social-service provision and
public spending for essential services such as health care, education and housing. As
the Commission has recognized, the extremely unequal distribution of resources
within many OAS states is the chief cause of the economic and social problems in
those societies.4 Individual and collective cases of discrimination—whether based on
race, sex, language, group affiliation, socio-economic status, or any other status—
should be directly challenged in the inter-American human right system.
1 See, e.g., Zwaan-de Vries v. The Netherlands, Comm. No. 182/1984, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts.
Comm., 42d Sess., at 160, U.N. Doc. A/42/40 (1987) (“Although Article 26 [of the ICCPR] . . .
does not require, for example, that any State approve legislation to provide social security . . . ,
when that legislation is approved in the exercise of the sovereign power of the State, such
legislation must comply with Article 26 of the Covenant [i.e., right to equal protection of the law
without any discrimination].”).
2 The Domestic Application of the Covenant, General Comment No. 9, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on
Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., 19th Sess., Agenda item 3, para. 15, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1998/24
(1998) [hereinafter General Comment No. 9], available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/
MasterFrameView/4ceb75c5492497d9802566d500516036?Opendocument>.
3 See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1993, at 524,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.85 Doc. 9 rev. (1994) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993]. This situation,
reported by the IMF, World Bank, and UNDP, has been worsening since the 1950s. See id. at
524–25.
4 See, e.g., INTER-AM. COMM. H.R., REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN GUATEMALA
1993, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.83, Doc. 31 (1993), at 409 [hereinafter GUATEMALA REPORT 1993].
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“Discrimination” is defined as “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference
which is based on any ground . . . and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing,
of all rights and freedoms.”5 Articles 24 and 1(1) of the Convention prohibit
discrimination on the basis of any social status.
ARTICLE 1(1): FREEDOM FROM DISCRIMINATION
“The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the
rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons
subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights
and freedoms, without any discrimination for reasons of race, color,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.”
ARTICLE 24: RIGHT TO EQUAL PROTECTION
“All persons are equal before the law. Consequently, they are
entitled, without discrimination, to equal protection of the law.”
The Inter-American Court has not yet discussed article 24 under its contentious
jurisdiction, but has interpreted it in two important advisory opinions. In the first, the
Court clarified the relationship between Convention articles 1(1) and 24. It explained
that article 1(1) prohibits discriminatory treatment “with regard to the exercise of any
of the rights guaranteed under the Convention.”6 Article 24 extends that broad
5 Nondiscrimination, General Comment No. 18, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 37th Sess., Supp.
No. 40, Annex VI, at 174, para. 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 1 (1989), U.N. Doc. A/45/40
(1990), available at < h t t p : / / w w w. u n h c h r. c h / t b s / d o c . n s f / M a s t e r F r a m e Vi e w / 3 8 8 8 b 0 5 4 1 f 8 5 0 1 c 9 c
12563ed004b8d0e?Opendocument> [hereinafter General Comment No. 18]. This definition,
articulated by the U.N. Human Rights Committee, is drawn from article 1 of both the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 220, 5
I.L.M. 352 (1966), entered into force Jan. 4, 1969, and the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 19 I.L.M. 33, entered
into force Sept. 3, 1981.
6 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of
Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of Jan. 19, 1984, Ser. A No. 4 (1984), para. 53 (“Article
1(1) of the Convention, a rule general in scope which applies to all the provisions of the treaty,
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protection to the domestic law of the States Parties: it “prohibits all discriminatory
treatment originating in a legal prescription,” requiring States Parties to “maintain
their laws free of discriminatory regulations.”7 Such discriminatory treatment is per
se incompatible with the Convention. 
The Court clarified in its second opinion that a State may also violate the Convention
through its failure to enact legal prescriptions to ensure equal treatment before the
law.8 Thus, the Court held that a State violates articles 1(1) and 24 where the domestic
legal regime does not provide free legal counsel for indigents or permit waiver of
filing and court fees when necessary for a fair trial: “If a person who is seeking the
protection of the law in order to assert rights which the Convention guarantees finds
that his economic status (in this case, his indigency) prevents him from so doing
because he cannot afford either the necessary legal counsel or the costs of the
proceedings, that person is being discriminated against by reason of his economic
status and, hence, is not receiving equal protection before the law.”9
STATE RESPONSIBILITY UNDER ARTICLE 24
States may be held internationally accountable for all domestic
norms—or their absence—having the purpose or effect of nullifying
or impairing, on the basis of “race, color, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic status,
birth, or any other social condition,” the recognition, enjoyment or
exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and
freedoms.  
imposes on the States Parties the obligation to respect and guarantee the free and full exercise of
the rights and freedoms recognized therein ‘without any discrimination.’In other words, regardless
of its origin or the form it may assume, any treatment that can be considered to be discriminatory
with regard to the exercise of any of the rights guaranteed under the Convention is per se
incompatible with that instrument.”) (emphasis added). 
7 Id. para. 54 (“Although Articles 24 and 1(1) are conceptually not identical[,] . . . Article 24 restates
to a certain degree the principle established in Article 1(1). In recognizing equality before the law,
it prohibits all discriminatory treatment originating in a legal prescription. The prohibition against
discrimination so broadly proclaimed in Article 1(1) with regard to the rights and guarantees
enumerated in the Convention thus extends to the domestic law of the States Parties, permitting the
conclusion that in these provisions the States Parties, by acceding to the Convention, have
undertaken to maintain their laws free of discriminatory regulations.”) (emphasis added). 
8 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Arts. 46(1), 46(2)(a)
and 46(2)(b) of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 of Aug.
10, 1990, Inter-Am. Ct.H.R. (Ser. A) No. 11 (1990).
9 Id. para. 22.
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A. Defining Unlawful Discrimination
under Article 24
The Commission, like the Court, has repeatedly held that the touchstone of
discrimination is unequal treatment.10 In a 1998 Argentine case concerning the
liquidation of a retiree’s compensation fund, the Commission recognized the
following definition of “unequal treatment” under article 24: “Unequal treatment can
be defined as: i. the denial of a right to someone which is accorded to others; ii.
diminishing the right accorded to some, while fully granting it to others; iii. the
imposition of a duty on some which is not imposed on others; or iv. the imposition of
a duty on some which is imposed less strenuously on others.”11
Determining whether “unequal” treatment exists requires a standard of comparison
between the “some” and the “others” in a particular case.12 The two groups must be
similarly situated in law, but treated differently on the basis of an impermissible
ground (e.g., race, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, economic status,
birth, or any other social condition).
The Commission has held, for example, that provisions of the Guatemalan Civil Code
that legally accord men and women different roles in marriage (e.g., responsibilities
to care for children, to administer the conjugal patrimony, or to seek employment out
of the home) constitute a prima facie violation of Convention article 24.13 Though
men and women are similarly situated under law as equal “citizens,” the Code treated
them differently on the basis of sex. The Commission has also recognized that the
discharge of union members for participation in union activities, such as striking, may
violate article 24.1 4 In union discharge cases, the “some” are union-member
10 See, e.g. , Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 8/98, Case 11.671, Carlos García Saccone (Arg.)
Mar. 2, 1998, in ANNUAL REPORT OFTHE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSIONON HUMAN RIGHTS 1997, at
193, para. 40, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, Doc. 7 rev. (1998) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997]
(“[I]t must be emphasized that article 24 of the American Convention establishes a paradigm whose
counterpoint is unequal treatment.”).
11 See id. para. 40 (citing E.W.V IERDAG, THE CONCEPT OF DISCRIMINATIONIN INTERNATIONAL LAW 44
(1973) (non-official translation)). 
12 See id. para. 41 (“It is clear that each form of unequal treatment requires a comparison and,
consequently, a standard of comparison. Accordingly, it is necessary to determine who are the
“some” and who are the “others” in a particular case, that is, what categories must be compared
with others in relation to their respective legal position.”).
13 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 28/98, Case 11.625, María Eugenia Morales de Sierra
(Guate.), Mar. 6, 1998, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 10, at 148. This decision went
only to admissibility.
14 See Report No. 37/97, No. 11.325 (Pan.), Oct. 16, 1997 (unpublished article 50 report; case is
currently before Court); see also IACHR AN N U A L RE P O RT 1997, s u p r a note 10, at 887
(acknowledging that Commission submitted case to Court on Jan. 16, 1998  in which 270 public
sector employees “were arbitrarily dismissed from their jobs because they had participated in a
demonstration for labor claims”). In Case 11.381, the Commission was presented with a similar
situation in which 142 public workers were discharged for participating in a strike. The petitioners,
however, failed to allege an article 24 violation, focusing instead on articles 8, 10, 16, and 25. See
Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 14/97, Case 11.381, Milton García Fajardo, Admissibility
Decision (Nicar.), in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
1996, at 535, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, Doc. 7 rev. (1997) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996].
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employees while the “others” are non-union-member employees; the disparate
treatment is discharge on the basis of “union status.”
The consequences of discriminatory conduct in the area of ESCR was further
considered by the Commission in a Uruguayan case regarding monetary
readjustments in pension and retirement payments. There, the readjustments created
“classes” of beneficiaries, with some receiving less than the Average Wage Index and
some receiving more. Since both classes had identical salaries while employed and
had served the same number of years in employment, this readjustment created
unjustified discrimination among beneficiaries.15 While finding the case formally
inadmissible for not sufficiently exhausting domestic remedies, the Commission
nevertheless felt compelled to express its opinion on the merits in light of the “special
circumstances of the case.”16 It affirmed that readjustment of pension payments to a
level lower than a common index, such as the Average Wage Index, necessarily
“creat[es] discriminations that would violate the principle of equality before the law
as embodied in Article 24 of the Convention.”17
The principle of non-discrimination, as a justiciable procedural right, applies as fully
to ESCR as it does to CPR; this is not open to doubt. The U.N. Human Rights
Committee has expressly affirmed that the ICCPR’s non-discrimination clause
applies to ESCR legislation.18 On this basis, both the Committee and the European
Court of Human Rights have regularly applied non-discrimination principles to ESCR
cases, finding violations of the ICCPR and European Convention for discrimination
in, for example, States’ distribution of unemployment benefits based on gender and
marital status19 and pensions based on nationality.20
15 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 90/90, Case 9893, National Vanguard Movement of Retirees
and Pensioners (Uru.), in ANNUAL REPORT OFTHE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSIONON HUMAN RIGHTS
1990–1991, at 77, 90, para. 25, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.79 rev. 1 Doc. 12 (1991) [hereinafter IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1990–91].
16 Id. para. 23 (“[T]he Commission cannot fail to consider the moral dimensions of the problem in
view of the special circumstances of the case, namely, the equality, social, and economic condition
and number of those affected by a real situation of inequality. This matter deals with a sizable social
group that is particularly sensitive and economically weak to which the society should extend
special protection.”). 
17 Id. para. 25.
18 See Zwaan-de Vries v. The Netherlands, Comm. No. 182/1984, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm.,
42d Sess., at 160, U.N. Doc. A/42/40 (1987).
19 See, e.g., id. (declaring unlawfully discriminatory, and thus invalid, the Dutch Unemployment
Benefits Act, which required married women, but not married men, to prove that they were
“breadwinners” in order to receive unemployment benefits); Broeks v. The Netherlands, Comm.
No. 172/1984, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 42d Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 139, U.N. Doc. A/42/40
(1987) (same); Eur. Ct. H.R., Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, Judgment of Jun. 24, 1993 (Ser. A)
No. 263, reprinted in 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 420 (1993) (declaring invalid legal presumption that
married women with children, but not men and childless women, are not entitled to unemployment
benefits). In the latter case, the European Court of Human Rights found untenable the presumption
that married women give up their jobs when their first child is born, which had been declared by
the Swiss Federal Insurance Court to constitute an “assumption based on experience of everyday
life.”
20 See, e.g., Gueye v. France, Comm. No. 196/1985, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 44th Sess.,
Supp. No. 40, at 189, U.N. Doc. A/44/40 (1989) (declaring invalid provision of lower pensions to
Senegalese soldiers than to French soldiers, both of whom served in the same army at same time). 
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Practice Tip
When bringing an article 24 claim before the Commission or Court,
it is important to make sure that a standard of comparison is clearly
discernible between two groups that are similarly situated yet
treated differently. Petitions must show that: 
1. members of each group are similarly situated under law—
e.g., workers of the same employer, citizens of the same
state/country, residents of the same school district, victims of the
same injury, persons covered by the same law, etc. 
2. members of each group are treated differently
notwithstanding their similar status under law—e.g., fired for
participating in union activities, paid less for equal work, not
eligible for public entitlement programs, provided with public
schools or hospitals that are grossly inadequate compared to
other schools/hospitals in jurisdiction, accorded fewer benefits
under law, etc.
3. the different treatment is based on a prohibited status—
e.g., race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any
other social condition (e.g., union status).
The majority of article 24 complaints filed with the Commission
have been found inadmissible because no such “standard of
comparison” was discernible—i.e., it was not clear that two groups
were, in fact, similarly situated or, in fact, treated differently.21
21 See, e.g. , Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 8/98, Case 11.671, Carlos García Saccone (Arg.),
Mar. 2, 1998, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 10, at 193, para. 43(finding no standard
of comparison in case involving the liquidation of a private company’s compensation fund for
retirees; alleging that judicial authorities discriminatorily rejected their claim, petitioners did not
show that the same judicial authorities had previously decided a factually similar case in a radically
distinct manner); Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 48/98, Case 11.403, Carlos Alberto Marín
Ramírez (Colom.), Sept. 29, 1998, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 1998, at 436, paras. 53–54, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, Doc. 6 rev. (1999) [hereinafter
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998] (finding no standard of comparison where petitioners alleged that
permitting a given remedy for certain kinds of government decisions and not others violated article
24) (“An altogether different situation would arise if the Colombian legal system contemplated a
mechanism to review . . . decisions relating to certain citizens (e.g., rich people, nationals, whites,
etc.) while denying such possibility to other citizens for reasons unrelated to purpose sought. The
petitioner, however, has not produced direct or circumstantial evidence indicating that that has been
the case here.”); Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 39/96, Case 11.673, Santiago Marzioni (Arg.),
in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 14, at 76, para. 43 (finding no article 24 violation
where court ordered workers’ compensation award for one individual that was lower than award
two others had received in different proceedings, because petitioner failed to show he was similarly
situated to other workers) (“In effect, the right to equal protection of the law cannot be assimilated
to the right to equal outcome in judicial proceedings involving the same subject matter.”).
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Not all differences in treatment, however, are discriminatory. To determine whether
unequal treatment is discriminatory, one must look to the more or less objective
criteria of reasonableness, proportionality, and justice.22 According to the Court:
[N]o discrimination exists if the difference in treatment has a
legitimate purpose and if it does not lead to situations which are
contrary to justice, to reason or to the nature of things. It follows that
there would be no discrimination in differences in treatment of
individuals by a state when the classifications selected are based on
substantial factual differences and there exists a re a s o n a b l e
relationship of proportionality between these differences and the aims
of the legal rule under review. These aims may not be unjust or
unreasonable, that is, they may not be arbitrary, capricious, despotic or
in conflict with the essential oneness and dignity of humankind.23
The Commission has likewise affirmed that States “are entitled to treat certain
situations differently” and that they “violate Article 24 of the Convention [only] by
establishing differential treatments without objective or reasonable justification.”24
States may establish reasonable differences in view of different
situations. As a result, they may categorize certain groups of
individuals with a legitimate purpose as long as the classification[]
has a reasonable connection with the purpose of the rule in question.
Thus, by way of example, States are not considered to discriminate
against their citizens by establishing rules on the minimum age for
granting drivers’ licenses. Such differentiation satisfies a legitimate
purpose (traffic safety) and it is related to the object of the rule.25
In an earlier case from Argentina, the Commission also applied the standard of
“objective and reasonable justification” for differential treatment of similarly situated
persons.26 In so doing, it cited the European Court of Human Rights, noting that the
22 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution
of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of Jan. 19, 1984 (Ser. A) No. 4, paras. 53–59. For similar
conclusions reached by the U.N. Human Rights Committee, see, for example, General Comment
No. 18, supra note 5, para. 13 (“[N]ot every differentiation of treatment will constitute
discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is
to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the Convention.”) (emphasis added).
23 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of
Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of Jan. 19, 1984, Ser. A No. 4 (1984), para. 57 (emphasis
added). 
24 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 48/98, Case 11.403, Carlos Alberto Marín Ramírez (Colom.),
Sept. 29, 1998, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 21, at 436, paras. 48.
25 Id. para. 50 (emphasis added).
26 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 39/96, Case 11.673, Santiago Marzioni (Arg.), Oct. 15, 1996,
in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 14, at 76, 79.
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European Commission has held in multiple decisions that “equality of treatment is
violated ‘. . . only where the difference in treatment has no objective and reasonable
justification.’”27
A NORM OR PRACTICE VIOLATES ARTICLE 24
UNDER THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:
(a) Similarly situated individuals are treated differently:
i. a right is denied to one category of persons that is accorded
in full to another;
ii. a right is diminished for one category of persons while
accorded in full to others; 
iii. a duty is imposed on one category of persons that is not
imposed on others; or 
iv. a greater duty is imposed on one category of persons than is
imposed on others; AND
(b)The unequal treatment lacks a legitimate, objective and
reasonable purpose. The government end being pursued is
“illegitimate”:
i. it “lead[s] to situations which are contrary to justice, to reason
or to the nature of things,” 
ii. it is “unjust or unreasonable,” or
iii. it is “arbitrary, capricious, despotic or in conflict with the
essential oneness and dignity of humankind”28; OR
(c) The unequal treatment is not reasonably related to the
legitimate end pursued:
i. there is no “reasonable relationship of proportionality”
between the unequal treatment and the norm’s objectives.29
B. Ensuring Equal Protection: Affirmative Action
Ensuring the right to non-discrimination and equal protection of the law also requires
States Parties to adopt positive measures to redress social inequity. Indeed, where
historic discrimination has become entrenched in the social structure, the mere
passage of non-discrimination legislation and absence of overtly discriminatory
27 Id. para. 42 (citing Eur. Ct. H.R, Judgment of Feb. 9, 1967 (Ser. A) No. 5, para. 38). 
28 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of
Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of Jan. 19, 1984 (Ser. A) No. 4, para. 57.
29 Id.
201
A rt. 24: Equal Pr o t e c t i o n
public conduct is not enough to guarantee equal protection before the law. Affirmative
action is required. 
Where a . . . group has historically been subjected to forms of public
or private discrimination, the existence of legislative prescriptions
may not provide a sufficient mechanism for ensuring the right of all
inhabitants to equality within society. Ensuring the right to equal
protection of and before the law may require the adoption of positive
measures, for example to ensure nondiscriminatory treatment in
education and employment, to remedy and protect against public and
private discrimination.30
In the Americas, poverty presents perhaps the greatest obstacle to guarantees of non-
discrimination and equality before the law; it “inhibits the ability of the individual to
enjoy his or her human rights.”31 As affirmed by the Commission, “[w]hen the most
vulnerable sectors of society are denied access to the basic needs for survival which
would enable them to break out of their condition,” the State “willingly or complicitly
contravene[s]” their right to be free from discrimination.32 The State’s article 1
obligations require it to take steps to address the obstacles presented by poverty.
“These obligations necessarily require the State to ensure conditions whereby the
rights of vulnerable and marginalized groups within its society, such as those
disadvantaged by the effects of poverty, are protected. The broad principles of non-
discrimination and equality reflected in articles 1 and 24 of the Convention require
action to address inequalities in internal distribution and opportunity.”33
The Commission’s understanding of articles 1 and 24 comports with the view of the
U.N. Human Rights Committee, which has stressed that “the principle of equality
sometimes requires States parties to take affirmative action in order to diminish or
eliminate conditions which cause or help to perpetuate discrimination . . . .”34 Such
affirmative action is particularly important in the area of ESCR, where poverty and
social inequality perpetuate widespread discrimination. According to the U.N. Human
Rights Committee: 
30 INTER-AM. COMM. H.R., REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ECUADOR 1996, at vii,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.96 Doc. 10 rev. 1 (1997) [hereinafter ECUADOR REPORT 1996] (emphasis added). 
31 Id. at 24. 
32 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 3, at 522–23.
33 ECUADOR REPORT 1996, supra note 30, at 24–25 (emphasis added); see also GUATEMALA REPORT
1993, supra note 4, at 409 (“[T]he differences in the effective enjoyment of ESCR in Guatemala
[a]re abysmal and constitute real discrimination against major segments of the population . . . . The
unequal distribution of income, essential services and land ownership, and the lack of respect for
the ownership rights of rural persons and Mayans are the worst manifestiations of this problem
area.”) (emphasis added). 
34 General Comment No. 18, supra note 5, para. 10.
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[I]n a State where the general conditions of a certain part of the
population prevent or impair their enjoyment of human rights, the
State should take specific action to correct those conditions. Such
action may involve granting for a time to the part of the population
concerned certain preferential treatment in specific matters as
compared with the rest of the population. However, as long as such
action is needed to correct discrimination in fact, it is a case of
legitimate differentiation under the [ICCPR].35
The Commission has also recognized the requirement of affirmative action in
protecting “cultural” or “group rights.” While the Convention’s express text
guarantees rights to individuals only, the Commission has, under article 29(b), looked
to article 27 of the ICCPR (and the U.N.’s interpretation of it) to extend the
Convention’s individual rights protections to groups.36 Reaffirming the need to
protect ethnic groups in order to bring about true equality among nationals of a state,
the Commission has recognized: “for example, if a child is educated in a language
which is not his native language, this can mean that the child is [not] treated on an
equal basis with other children who are educated in their native language. The
protection of minorities, therefore, requires affirmative action to safeguard the rights
of minorities whenever the people in question (the parents in the case of minors) wish
to maintain their distinction of language and culture.”37
Critics of affirmative action often argue that such policies are discriminatory in
themselves. This view has been universally rejected by international human rights
bodies: Differential treatment is not discriminatory when its purpose is legitimate and
the classifications created are reasonably related to the achievement of that purpose.38
35 Id.
36 See INTER-AM. COMM. H.R., REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS OF A SEGMENT OF THE
NICARAGUAN POPULATIONOF MISKITO ORIGIN 76, para. 1, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.62 doc. 10 rev. 3 (1984).
Article 27 of the ICCPR provides: “In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion,
or to use their own language.”
37 Id. at 76, para. 1 (quoting U.N. Secretary General, The Main Types and Causes of Discrimination,
U.N. Publ. 49.XIV.3, paras. 6–7).
38 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the
Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of Jan. 19, 1984, Ser.A No. 4 (1984), para.
57 (“[N]o discrimination exists if the difference in treatment has a legitimate purpose and if it does
not lead to situations which are contrary to justice, to reason or to the nature of things. It follows
that there would be no discrimination in differences in treatment of individuals by a state when the
classifications selected are based on substantial factual differences and there exists a reasonable
relationship of proportionality between these differences and the aims of the legal rule under
review. These aims may not be unjust or unreasonable, that is, they may not be arbitrary, capricious,
despotic or in conflict with the essential oneness and dignity of humankind.”); Inter-Am. Comm.
H.R., Report No. 39/96, Case 11.673, Santiago Marzioni (Arg.), Oct. 15, 1996, in IACHR ANNUAL
REPORT 1996, supra note 14, at 76, para. 42 (“[E]qual treatment is violated ‘. . . only where the
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Where the purpose of an affirmative action policy is to correct discrimination by
ensuring that all persons may enjoy protected rights on an equal footing,39 and the
classifications created are reasonably related to that end, affirmative action policies
are not only permitted under articles 1 and 24, they are required.
The legal test is fairly straightforward where the State, through concrete acts, treats
similarly situated persons diff e r e n t l y. As described above, the advocate must
demonstrate that: (1) similarly situated individuals were treated differently; and (2)
the unequal treatment lacked a legitimate, objective and reasonable purpose or was
not reasonably related to the legitimate end pursued. 
The legal analysis varies slightly where the discriminatory conduct is based on the
State’s failure to remove barriers that impede equal ESCR enjoyment. Based on the
Court’s reasoning in Advisory Opinion No. 11, advocates should argue that where a
State fails to undertake measures to eliminate obstacles to equal, non-discriminatory
access to public goods (e.g., education, health services, employment, courts), arising
from a prohibited ground, an article 24 violation may be established where two
elements are demonstrated: (1) a public service or good that was accessible to
similarly situated persons was nonetheless inaccessible to petitioners; and (2) the
policy underlying the inaccessibility lacks a legitimate, objective and reasonable
purpose or is not reasonably related to the legitimate end pursued. 
Recommended Argument:
Article 24 is violated by a State’s failure to take
affirmative measures to ensure equal access to
basic public services or goods where:
• An essential service or good (education, health services,
employment, social insurance, courts) accessible to similarly
difference in treatment has no objective and reasonable justification.’”) (citing European Court and
Commission of Human Rights); Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 48/98, Case 11.403, Carlos
Alberto Marín Ramírez (Colom.), Sept. 29, 1998, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 21,
at 436, para. 50 (stating that differential treatment is not discriminatory where there is a legitimate
purpose and the “classification[] has a reasonable connection with the purpose of the rule in
question.”).
39 The U.N. Human Rights Committee defines “discrimination” as used in the ICCPR as “any
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground . . . and which has the
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons,
on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms.” General Comment No. 18, supra note 5, para. 7.
Thus, by inverse logic, a preference that does not have the purpose or effect of nullifying or
impairing—but rather of ensuring—the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of rights by all persons
on an equal footing would not constitute “discrimination” under the ICCPR. 
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situated persons was nonetheless not accessible to petitioner(s)
on the basis of an impermissible ground (e.g., race, indigency,
social status); and either
• The policy underlying the inaccessibility lacks a legitimate,
objective, and reasonable purpose; or
• The inaccessibility is not reasonably related to the legitimate
end pursued.
As the Court made clear in its Advisory Opinion No. 11, where individuals or groups
are denied access to goods or services necessary for the enjoyment of essential rights
on the basis of a prohibited status (e.g., lack of access to judicial protection due to
economic status), States Parties are required to take affirmative measures to ensure
alternative access to those goods or services (e.g., a system of free legal counsel for
the indigent). The same reasoning can be applied to countless ESCR scenarios. An
equal protection challenge might be brought, for example, where a child is prevented
from attending school because her family lacks the resources to pay for transportation
or mandatory school supplies, and no alternate provision is provided by the school
district or State. In such a situation, the aggrieved individual “is being discriminated
against by reason of h[er] economic status and, hence, is not receiving equal
protection before the law.”40
The State may overcome a presumption of unlawful discrimination in the allocation
of public resources, but only by showing that the policy underlying the inaccessibility
has a “legitimate, objective and reasonable purpose” and that the inaccessibility was
“reasonably related to the legitimate end pursued.” “Equal access within available
resources” may be a “legitimate, objective, and reasonable purpose” for a policy that
fails to make “luxury” goods and services available to all on a non-market basis.
“Lack of resources” would not, however, be a legitimate justification for a State’s
failure to ensure that all individuals enjoy the “minimum core content” of protected
rights. That is, a State may legitimately cite resource constraints for failure to
construct modern technology-driven hospitals in every corner of the country, but
could not do so to justify failure to provide emergency or routine health services or
for failure to build enough health centers to ensure reasonable accessibility to all. 
Even where a “legitimate end” is being pursued, an article 24 violation may still be
found where lack of access to public services is not reasonably related to that end.
For example, a State may guarantee free or subsidized university education to all
40 Inter-Am.Ct.H.R., Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Art. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and
46(2)(b) of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 of Aug. 10,
1990 (Ser. A) No. 11, para. 22.
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citizens who pass entrance exams. Poor rural youths who passed the exams might
nonetheless be prevented from attending the university because urban housing costs
were prohibitive and commuting was impracticable. The State might legitimately
argue that, given low demand, resource limitations prevent the construction of public
universities in certain rural areas. That argument would not, however, justify a failure
to provide housing stipends to qualified rural students if they could demonstrate that
urban housing costs prevented them from attending the university. Failure to provide
such stipends would not be “reasonably related” to the objective of providing equal
access to a limited number of universities for all qualified citizens.41 The qualified,
but economically disadvantaged, rural students would have an equal protection
challenge: because of their economic status, they are treated differently than other
persons who similarly passed the exam. 
Advocates should draw upon these equal protection principles to allege a violation of
article 24 in ESCR petitions lodged with the Commission and Court.
II. Right to Judicial Protection (Art. 25)
Article 25 establishes a second procedural right that may be used under the
Convention to protect ESCR. Reinforcing article 1(1), it obligates States Parties to
ensure that everyone enjoys the right to simple, prompt, and effective recourse to a
competent tribunal for all alleged violations of fundamental rights enshrined in the
Convention, their domestic laws, and their constitutions. Article 25 thus requires that
States Parties (1) legislate or judicially recognize domestic causes of action for all
fundamental rights violations; (2) guarantee a serious investigation of all alleged
violations; and (3) ensure that remedies are duly enforced when granted. Where a
State fails to undertake any of these duties, and a victim’s rights are concretely
impaired as a result, the State violates article 25 of the Convention and may be held
internationally responsible in courts of law.
41 See, e.g., Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Nov. 17, 1988, art. 13(3)(c), O.A.S.T.S. No. 69 (1988), 28
I.L.M. 156 (1989), entered into force Nov. 16, 1999, available at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/
Básicos/basic5.htm> [hereinafter Protocol of San Salvador] (“Higher education should be made
equally accessible to all, on the basis of individual capacity, by every appropriate means, and in
particular, by the progressive introduction of free education.”) (emphasis added). This provision is
amenable to the system of individual petitions regulated by articles 44–51 and 61–69 of the
Convention. See id. art. 19(6). 
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ARTICLE 25
1. Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or
any other effective recourse, to a competent court or
tribunal for protection against acts that violate his
fundamental rights recognized by the Constitution or laws
of the state concerned or by this Convention, even though
such violation may have been committed by persons acting in
the course of their official duties.
2. The States Parties undertake:
(a) to ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall have
his rights determined by the competent authority provided
for by the legal system of the state; 
(b) to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; 
(c) to ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such
remedies when granted.
Article 25 is one of the most important provisions in the Convention for the protection
of ESCR. As the President of the Court has observed: “The right to a simple, rapid
and effective remedy before competent national judges or tribunals, consecrated in
article 25 of the Convention, is a fundamental judicial guarantee, much more
important than one might prima facie suppose, and that may never be minimized. It
constitutes, in the final instance, one of the basic pillars not only of the American
Convention, but of the very rule of law in a democratic society.”42
Its strategic potential arises from two sources. First, article 25 “require[s] the direct
application of the American Convention in the internal law of the States Parties.”43
Persons whose rights under the Convention are violated must have direct access to a
competent domestic tribunal capable of effectively redressing the injury. Second, and
perhaps most consequentially for ESCR protection, it requires States to establish a
system of simple and rapid internal remedies, and to apply them effectively, for all
fundamental rights recognized in domestic, constitutional, and (incorporated) treaty
law. This is critical for ESCR protection, since most OAS member states recognize a
wide range of ESCR in their internal laws and/or constitutions, e.g., rights to
education, fair wages, satisfactory labor conditions, housing, social security,
42 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Dissenting Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade, Genie Lacayo Case,
Resolution of Sept. 13, 1997, para. 18; see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Castillo Páez Case, Judgment
of Nov. 3, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 34, para. 82 (“Article 25 constitutes one of the basic pillars not only
of the American Convention, but of the very rule of law in a democratic society.”); Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R., Suárez Rosero Case, Judgment of Nov. 12, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 35, para. 65 (same). 
environmental protection, health care, sanitation, consumer protection, etc.
Historically, States have been reluctant to recognize judicial causes of action for such
rights—treating them as desirable development goals, rather than justiciable rights.44
Article 25 plays an essential role in ESCR protection precisely because it obligates
States Parties to ensure that such norms are treated as justiciable rights in the internal
legal order and that victims have effective recourse to domestic tribunals when they
are violated. 
Article 25’s reference to the “laws of the state concerned” also includes ratified
treaties45 and other international instruments duly incorporated into domestic law.
This is important as most OAS member states have ratified the ICESCR and other
ESCR treaties, such as the ILO Conventions, which plainly set forth justiciable rights.
International declarations (otherwise not legally binding on States) may also be
“made operative as domestic law” by, for example, being given constitutional
hierarchy in the internal legal order. Article 25 requires that all of these incorporated
rights be given effective application in domestic tribunals through the availability of
simple and prompt judicial and administrative remedies. Where such remedies are not
provided and injury results, the State incurs international responsibility under article
25.46
As interpreted by the Commission, the right to effective recourse set forth in article
25 has three elements. It encompasses “the right of every individual to go to a tribunal
43 Id. parr. 21.
44 In reference to the ESCR recognized in the Protocolo de San Salvador, the Commission has
reiterated that “the rights to be guaranteed by means of the additional protocol are attributes of the
human person as such . . . [and] are thus imposed imperatives and not merely desireable
development goals.” ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
1985–1986, at 198, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.68 Doc. 8 rev. 1 (1986).  
45 As a basic principle of international treaty law, “[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.” Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 27, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, T.S. No. 58 (1980), U.N. Doc A/Conf 39/28, 8
I.L.M. 679 (1969), entered into force Jan. 27, 1980, available at <http://www.un.org/law/ilc/
texts/treaties.htm>. The fact that a State has not legislated judicial causes of action for violations
of a ratified treaty, therefore, does not eliminate the State’s international responsibility under article
25 for failure to provide effective remedies. A State may avoid responsibility only where it
specifically deposits, upon ratification, an “understanding” that a treaty’s norms are “non-self-
executing.” As a default rule, rights conferred by treaty are “self-executing” in the internal
jurisdiction—that is, courts may directly enforce such norms without an intermediary act of the
legislature. 
46 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 55/97, Case 11.137, Juan Carlos Abella (Arg.), Nov.
18, 1997, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 10, at 271, 309, para. 163 (finding article
25 violation where State failed to provide effective remedy on the domestic level for alleged
violations of the Geneva Conventions) (“[W]hen the claimed violation is not redressed on the
domestic level and the source of the right is a guarantee set forth in the Geneva Conventions, which
the State Party concerned has made operative as domestic law, a complaint asserting such a
violation, can be lodged with and decided by the Commission under Article 44 of the American
Convention.”).
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when any of his rights have been violated,” the right “to obtain a judicial investigation
conducted by a competent, impartial and independent tribunal that will establish
whether or not a violation has taken place,” and the right to have remedies, including
“adequate compensation,” enforced when granted.47 Each of these elements is
addressed in turn below.
ARTICLE 25 GUARANTEES
• effective access to a competent, impartial and independent
court;
• a justiciable cause of action;
• a judicial investigation that is seriously undertaken;
• a reasoned determination of whether a violation of protected
rights has occurred;
• the possibility of sanction for the violator, if a violation is found;
and
• the possibility of compensation for damage suffered, if a
violation is found.
A. Right of Access to a Tribunal When Human
Rights Have Been Allegedly Violated (Right to
an Effective Remedy)
Article 25 requires that a tribunal be available to all who allege violations of
fundamental rights.48 Such tribunals may be judicial or administrative, as the domestic
47 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 5/96, Case 10.970, Raquel Martín de Mejía (Peru), Mar. 1,
1996, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1995, at 157,
190–91, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91, Doc. 7 rev. (1996) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1995] (“The
Commission considers that the right to a recourse set forth in Article 25, interpreted in conjunction
with Article 8(1), must be understood as the right of every individual to go to a tribunal when any
of his rights have been violated (whether a right protected by the Convention, the constitution or
the domestic laws of the State concerned), to obtain a judicial investigation conducted by a
competent, impartial and independent tribunal that will establish whether or not a violation has
taken place and will set, when appropriate, adequate compensation.”) (emphasis added).
48 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 59/99, Case 11.405, Coutinho Mendes (Braz.), Apr.
13, 1999, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 21, at 399, para. 116 (“The Commission
holds further that the Convention not only requires the State to take measures against proved
violations of human rights but also to react appropriately to complaints of violations without
waiting for them to be formally declared to be such.”). In this regard, the Commission follows the
doctrine of the European Commission in regard to American Convention article 25’s counterpart in
the European Convention, article 13. In the Silver case (1980), the European Commission held that
“Art. 13 requires the High Contracting Parties to provide domestic remedies whenever an
individual complains of a violation of a right or liberty guaranteed by the Convention, so that at
least the substance of the complaint may be determined, and reparation made if it is found to be
true.” Id. para. 116 & n.19 (quoting VAN DIJK, P., THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 381 (1984)).
law provides, but must provide “accessible, affordable, timely, and effective”
remedies. While administrative remedies will be adequate in certain cases, judicial
remedies (either in the first instance or as an ultimate right of appeal) are always
appropriate; they are indispensable whenever a right cannot be made fully effective
without some role for the judiciary.49
Indeed, the key to article 25 is that remedies be effective. As recognized by the Court,
article 25 incorporates the “principle of effectiveness”—the general understanding in
international human rights law that the procedural mechanisms designed to guarantee
rights must be adequate and effective. 50
According to this principle, the absence of an effective remedy to
violations of the rights recognized by the Convention is itself a
violation of the Convention by the State Party in which the remedy is
lacking. In that sense, it should be emphasized that, for such a remedy
to exist, it is not sufficient that it be provided for by the Constitution
or by law or that it be formally recognized, but rather it must be truly
49 According to the U.N. Committee on ESCR: 
The right to an effective remedy need not be interpreted as always requiring a
judicial remedy. Administrative remedies will, in many cases, be adequate and those
living within the jurisdiction of a State party have a legitimate expectation, based on
the principle of good faith, that all administrative authorities will take account of the
requirements of the Covenant in their decisionmaking. Any such administrative
remedies should be accessible, affordable, timely and effective. An ultimate right of
judicial appeal from administrative procedures of this type would also often by
appropriate. By the same token, there are some obligations, such as (but by no means
limited to) those concerning non-discrimination, in relation to which the provision
of some form of judicial remedy would seem indispensable in order to satisfy the
requirements of the Covenant. In other words, whenever a Covenant right cannot be
made fully effective without some role for the judiciary, judicial remedies are
necessary.”
General Comment No. 9, supra note 2, para. 9 (emphasis added).
50 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 y 28 of the
American Convention on Human Rights) , Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of Oct. 6, 1987 (Ser. A) No.
9 (1987), para. 24 (“Article 25(1) incorporates the principle recognized in the international law of
human rights of the effectiveness of the procedural instruments or means designed to guarantee
such rights.”); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez, Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales, and
Godínez Cruz Cases, Preliminary Objections, Judgments of Jun. 26, 1987, paras. 90, 90, 92,
respectively (“States Parties have an obligation to provide effective judicial remedies to victims of
human rights violations (Art. 25), remedies that must be substantiated in accordance with the rules
of due process of law (Art. 8(1)), all in keeping with the general obligation of such States to
guarantee the free and full exercise of the rights recognized by the Convention to all persons
subject to their jurisdictions (Art. 1).”) (emphasis added); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judicial Guarantees
in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 and 28 of the American Convention on Human Rights),
Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of Oct. 6, 1987 (Ser. A) No. 9 (1987), para. 24; see also Inter-Am.
Comm. H.R., Report No. 30/97, Case 10.087, Gustavo Carranza (Arg.), Sept. 1, 1997, in IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 10, at 254, para. 80 (“The right to judicial recourse expressed in
Article 25 of the American Convention is a fundamental tool for the protection of individual rights
in the framework of the American Convention’s object and purpose.”).
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effective in establishing whether there has been a violation of human
rights and in providing redress. A remedy which proves illusory
because of the general conditions prevailing in the country, or even in
the particular circumstances of a given case, cannot be considered
effective. That could be the case, for example, when practice has
shown its ineffectiveness: when the Judicial Power lacks the necessary
independence to render impartial decisions or the means to carry out
its judgments; or in any other situation that constitutes a denial of
justice, as when there is an unjustified delay in the decision; or when,
for any reason, the alleged victim is denied access to a judicial
remedy.51
The Court’s jurisprudence underscores the absolute duty of States, in accordance with
articles 1, 2 and 25 of the Convention, to provide judicial remedies that are
“adequate,” “effective,” and  “accessible, simple, and prompt” in establishing whether
or not a human rights violation has occurred and in providing reparation. According
to the Court, “adequate” judicial remedies are those that are “suitable to address an
infringement of a legal right.”52 If a formal remedy is not adequate to determine,
sanction, and repair an infringement of a legal right in the particular circumstances
of a given case—i.e., “so that, inter alia, those responsible for human rights violations
may be prosecuted and reparations obtained for the damages suffered”—then that
remedy is not “adequate” for the purposes of article 25.53 At the same time, “[a]
remedy must also be effective—that is, capable of producing the result for which it
was designed.”54 Procedural and other requirements can make a given remedy
51 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 y 28 of the
American Convention on Human Rights) , Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of Oct. 6, 1987 (Ser. A) No.
9 (1987), para. 24 (emphasis added); see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Cesti Hurtado Case , Judgment
of Sept. 29, 1999 (Ser. C) No. 56, para. 125. 
5 2 I n t e r-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No.4, para. 64;
I n t e r-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of Jan. 20, 1989 (Ser. C) No.5, para. 67 (same);
I n t e r-Am. Ct. H.R., Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Judgment of Mar. 15, 1989 (Ser. C)
No.6, para. 88 (same); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., C a b a l l e ro Delgado and Santana, Pre l i m i n a ry Objections,
Judgment of Jan. 21, 1994 (Ser. C) No.17, para. 63 (same); see also I n t e r-Am. Ct. H.R., E x c e p t i o n s
to the Exhaustion of Internal Remedies (Art. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) American Convention on
Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 of Aug. 10, 1990 (Ser. A) No.11, para. 36.
53 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Loayza Tamayo Case, Reparations, Judgment of Nov. 27, 1998 (Ser. C)
No. 42, para. 169 (“As the Court has held on repeated occasion, Article 25 in relation to Article 1(1)
of the American Convention obliges the State to guarantee to every individual access to the
administration of justice and, in particular, to simple and prompt recourse, so that, inter alia, those
responsible for human rights violations may be prosecuted and reparations obtained for the
damages suffered.”); see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Internal
Remedies (Art. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory
Opinion OC-11/90 of Aug. 10, 1990 (Ser. A) No.11, para. 36.
54 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No.4, para. 66
(emphasis added); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of Jan. 20, 1989 (Ser. C)
No.5, para. 69 (same); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Judgment of
Mar. 15, 1989 (Ser. C) No.6, para. 91 (same); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Caballero Delgado and Santana,
Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Jan. 21, 1994 (Ser. C) No.17, para. 63 (same); see also, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R., Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Internal Remedies (Art. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b)
American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 of Aug. 10, 1990 (Ser. A)
No.11, para. 36. 
ineffective—for example, if the “remedy” is powerless to compel the authorities; if it
presents a danger to those who invoke it; or if it is not impartially applied.55
An effective remedy requires, in the first instance, a judicially cognizable cause of
action. Courts generally dismiss cases where the legislature has not provided an
explicit cause of action. Where fundamental rights are at stake, however, a court’s
failure to recognize an “implied” cause of action, where the legislature has not created
one expressly, constitutes a violation of article 25. Indeed, a State incurs international
responsibility whenever, “for any reason, the alleged victim is denied access to a
judicial remedy”56—i.e., whether arising from an omission of the legislature (for
failure to legislate a cause of action) or of the courts (for failure to recognize a cause
of action whether or not the legislature has expressly provided one). 
Under article 25, States must ensure that domestic courts recognize a cause of action
for all justiciable rights set forth in the Convention and in domestic, constitutional,
and incorporated treaty law. While the justiciability of CPR is generally taken for
granted, “the contrary assumption is too often made in relation to [ESCR].” This
discrepancy is not warranted.57 As the U.N. Committee on ESCR has made clear,
many ESCR are “capable of immediate implementation” and there is “no right [in the
ICESCR] which could not . . . be considered to possess at least some significant
justiciable dimensions.”58
In its non-exhaustive list of immediately self-executing rights in the ICESCR, the
Committee highlights: gender equality (art. 3); equal salary for equal work (art.
7(a)(i)), right to unionize and to strike (art. 8), protection of children and adolescents
against social and commercial exploitation (art. 10(3)), mandatory primary education,
right of parents to choose child’s education, and freedom to learn (art. 13(2)(a)-(3-4));
and freedom of scientific research and creative activity (art. 15(3)).59 Many ESCR,
55 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No. 4, para. 64,
66.
56 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 y 28 of
the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of Oct. 6, 1987 (Ser. A)
No. 9 (1987), para. 24.
57 See General Comment No. 9, supra note 2, para. 10 (“In relation to civil and political rights, it is
generally taken for granted that judicial remedies for violations are essential. Regrettably, the
contrary assumption is too often made in relation to economic, social and cultural rights. This
discrepancy is not warranted either by the nature of the rights or by the relevant Covenant
provisions . . . . The adoption of a rigid classification of economic, social and cultural rights which
puts them, by definition, beyond the reach of the courts would thus be arbitrary and incompatible
with the principle that the two sets of human rights are indivisible and interdependent. It would also
drastically curtail the capacity of the courts to protect the rights of the most vulnerable and
disadvantaged groups in society.”).
58 Id.
59 See The Nature of States Parties Obligations, General Comment No. 3, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on
Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., 5th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 83, para. 5, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (1990),
available at < h t t p : / / w w w. u n h c h r. c h / t b s / d o c . n s f / ( s y m b o l ) / C E S C R + G e n e r a l + c o m m e n t + 3 . E n ?
OpenDocument>; see also General Comment No. 9, supra note 2, para. 10.
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moreover, have multiple justiciable dimensions. According to the Committee, the
right to adequate housing, for example, has many component elements, each of which
is susceptible to domestic legal remedies:
Depending on the legal system, such areas might include, but are not
limited to: (a) legal appeals aimed at preventing planned evictions or
demolitions through the issuance of court-ordered injunctions; (b)
legal procedures seeking compensation following an illegal eviction;
(c) complaints against illegal actions carried out or supported by
landlords (whether public or private) in relation to rent levels,
dwelling maintenance, and racial or other forms of discrimination; (d)
allegations of any form of discrimination in the allocation and
availability of access to housing; and (e) complaints against landlords
concerning unhealthy or inadequate housing conditions. In some legal
systems it would also be appropriate to explore the possibility of
facilitating class action suits in situations involving significantly
increased levels of homelessness.60
Analyses of other ESC rights demonstrate that they, too, are justiciable in multiple
forms. Where domestic courts do not offer effective judicial protection for such
rights, in all their justiciable elements, States Parties can be found in violation of
Convention article 25. 
Failure to provide a judicial cause of action for fundamental ESCR violations is
justified only where a State can show such remedies are not “necessary to give effect
to those rights.”61 This should be a heavy burden. Consistent with the “principle of
effectiveness,” judicial remedies should be viewed as necessary whenever a protected
ESCR cannot be made fully effective without some role for the judiciary.62 As
Convention article 2 is structurally similar to ICESCR article 2(1), advocates should
urge the Court to adopt the same position espoused by the U.N. Committee on ESCR
regarding the need for judicial remedies for ESCR violations under the ICESCR: 
60 The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11(1)), General Comment No. 4, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on
Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., 6th Sess., para. 17, U.N. Doc. E/1992/23 (1992) [hereinafter General
Comment No. 4], available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/099b725fe87555ec8025670c004
fc803/469f4d91a9378221c12563ed0053547e?OpenDocument#*+Contained+i>.
61 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at
1, art. 2, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23 doc. rev. 2, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970), entered into force July 18, 1978,
available at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/Básicos/basic3.htm> (“[T]he States Parties undertake to
adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the provisions of this Convention, such
legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those rights or freedoms.”)
(emphasis added). 
62 See generally General Comment No. 9, supra note 2, para. 9 (“[W]henever a Covenant
right cannot be made fully effective without some role for the judiciary, judicial remedies
are necessary.”).
[A] State party seeking to justify its failure to provide any domestic
legal remedies for violations of economic, social and cultural rights
would need to show either that such remedies are not “appropriate
means” within the terms of article 2, paragraph 1, of the [ICESCR] or
that, in view of the other means used, they are unnecessary. It will be
difficult to show this and the Committee considers that, in many cases,
the other means used could be rendered ineffective if they are not
reinforced or complemented by judicial remedies.63
The Commission has expressed intolerance for States’claims that protected rights are
non-justiciable. It has been particularly critical of the “political question” doctrine,
noting that the “effect of the . . . doctrine has been to preclude a decision on the merits
of the petitioner’s claims,” in violation of Convention articles 25 (judicial protection)
and 8 (due process).64 In the case of Gustavo Carranza , the Argentine government
invoked the political question doctrine to dismiss a case without considering the
merits. It relied on Baker v. Carr, a U.S. Supreme Court opinion establishing the
contours of the political question doctrine in the United States. The Commission
responded that the Baker decision was hotly contested by judges and scholars, with
many finding the doctrine at odds with constitutional government and the rule of
law.65 As the case at issue fell outside even the broad contours of Baker, the
Commission found the State responsible for violating Convention articles 8 and 25. It
made clear, however, that non-justiciability findings concerning the determination of
fundamental rights is contrary to the object and purpose of the Convention and that
even cases falling within the political question criteria of Baker may not pass muster
under the Convention.66
63 Id. para. 3 (emphasis added). 
64 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 30/97, Case 10.087, Gustavo Carranza (Arg.), Sept. 1, 1997,
in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 10, at 254, para. 45.
65 Id. paras. 48–52. Under Baker, a case should be rejected by the courts as a “political question”
where:
• resolution of the issue is constitutionally committed to a coordinate political department;
• there are no judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the issue;
• it is impossible to decide the issue without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion;
• it is impossible for a court to undertake independent resolution of the issue without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;
• there is an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;
or
• there is a strong potential for embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.
Id. para. 46. 
66 See id. para. 62 (“[I]t must be stressed that a very dangerous precedent would be set by accepting
the application of the political question doctrine as a legitimate mean to justify arbitrary acts
contrary to the Constitution of a State.”). 
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Practice Tip
A violation of article 25 will almost always carry with it a violation of
articles 1 and 2,67 and often article 8,68 because these articles are
mutually reinforcing and interdependent.
B. Right to a Judicial Investigation 
Article 25(2)(b) provides that States Parties undertake “to develop the possibilities of
judicial remedy.” The Commission has made clear that this does not mean States need
only work toward the eventual provision of judicial remedies in the internal
jurisdiction; the obligation to provide effective remedies is immediate. Rather, it
refers to the duty of competent judicial authorities to undertake a “purposeful
investigation” of the facts of every case involving fundamental rights in order to
arrive at a reasoned conclusion. That is, it refers to the State duty, implicit in article
1(1), to undertake a serious investigation of the events allegedly constituting a
violation of protected rights and to act with “due diligence” in processing the claim.
As the Commission has held, absent such conduct on the part of the State, “the right
to obtain effective recourse set forth in Article 25 would be absolutely without
content.”69 The Commission has further explained: 
67 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Dissenting Opinion of Judge A. A. Cançado Trindade,Genie Lacayo
Case, Resolution of Sept. 13, 1997, paras. 21 (“Articles 25 and 1(1) of the Convention are mutually
reinforcing, in the sense of assuring each others’fulfillment in the realm of internal law. Together,
articles 25 and 1(1) require the direct application of the American Convention in the internal law
of the States Parties. In the case of supposed obstacles of internal law, article 2 of the Convention
enters into operation, requiring the harmonization of the internal law of the States Parties with the
Convention, by establishing a system of simple and rapid internal remedies, and by applying them
effectively. If this is not done de facto, due to supposed lagoons [sic] or insufficiencies of internal
law, the States Parties incur in violation of articles 25, 1(1) and 2 of the Convention”).
68 Articles 25 (judicial protection) and 8 (fair trial) of the Convention are closely intertwined. Article
25(2)(a) requires that States Parties ensure that rights are “determined by the competent authority
provided for by the legal system of the state.” Article 8 provides that “[e]very person has the right
to a hearing . . . by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal, previously established by law,
. . . for the determination of his rights and obligations.”
69 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 5/96, Case 10.970, Raquel Martín de Mejía (Peru), Mar. 1,
1996, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1995, supra note 47, at 157, 190 (“The obligation contained in
Article 1(1) is a necessary corollary of the right of every individual to recourse to a tribunal to
obtain judicial protection when he believes he has been a victim of violation of any of his human
rights. If this were not so, the right to obtain effective recourse set forth in Article 25 would be
absolutely without content.”). The Inter-American Court has not yet offered its opinion on the
scope of article 25(2) as distinguished from article 25(1).
Purposeful investigation, in the Commission’s view, implies that the
competent State authority “will develop the possibilities of judicial
remedy,” i.e. that it will undertake the investigation “as a specific
juridical duty and not as a simple matter of management of private
interests that depends on the initiative of the victim or of his family in
bringing suit or on the provision of evidence by private sources,
without the public authority effectively seeking to establish the truth. .
. .” Thus, the obligation to investigate purposefully means in practice
that the State will act with due diligence, i.e. with the existing means
at its disposal, and will endeavor to arrive at a decision . . . .
In this way, within the context of the Convention the term “recourse”
must be understood in a broad sense and not be limited to the meaning
that this word has in the legal terminology of the States’ procedural
legislation.70
In line with this reasoning, the Commission has held that a State’s failure to ensure a
victim’s right to a judicial investigation by an independent and impartial tribunal
violates her right to judicial protection under article 25. The State’s omission made it
impossible for the victim to obtain compensation for the damage she suffered, thus
denying her right to effective recourse to a competent tribunal, in violation of articles
1(1), 8, and 25.71
C. Right to Have Remedies Enforced When
Granted
Finally, under article 25(2)(c) of the Convention, States Parties undertake “to ensure
that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.” A State
Party violates the Convention when it fails to enforce a remedy granted by a court,
administrative tribunal, arbitrator, or other competent authority in relation to a
fundamental right. An article 25(2)(c) violation was alleged in the case of Milton
García Fajardo, a case involving the arbitrary dismissal of 142 customs workers in
Nicaragua for their participation in a labor strike undertaken after failed negotiations
with the Labor Ministry.72 Despite consecutive judicial decrees from domestic courts
declaring the strike legal under the Labor Code and ordering the workers’immediate
reinstatement, the State refused to comply with the judicial orders to reinstate them.
Although ultimately settled, the case presented a plain violation of the State
obligation under article 25(2)(c) to enforce remedies granted by competent authorities
for violation of fundamental rights.
70 Id. at 190–91 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
71 See id.
72 See Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 14/97, Case 11.381, Milton García Fajardo, Admissibility
Decision (Nicar.),  in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 14.
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In sum, States Parties to the Convention violate article 25 whenever they fail to ensure
the right of access to a competent, impartial and independent court, a justiciable cause
of action, a serious judicial investigation, a good faith determination of whether
protected rights have been violated, and the possibility of both sanction for the
violator and reparation for the victim. Where one or more of these elements is lacking
and injury results, the State may incur international responsibility for violation of
Convention article 25.
Article 25 is violated where a State Party:
• fails to provide a cause of action for alleged violation of the
rights recognized in the State’s internal laws, its constitution, the
American Convention, or other domestically incorporated
international human rights instrument. The remedy must provide
for the possibility of sanctions and victim reparation. 
• impedes the provision of an effective remedy through:
1.  lack of a serious investigation;
2.  unjustified delay;
3.  obstruction of justice;
4.  lack of judicial independence; or
5. failure to assist alleged victim impaired by indigence or
generalized fear;
OR
• fails to implement a final decision declared by a competent,
independent and impartial tribunal in respect of those rights.
III. Right to Due Process (Art. 8) 
The third procedural right that may be used to protect ESCR indirectly under the
Convention is the right to a fair trial with due process. Due process requires that no
person be deprived of any property or liberty interest by or through the State unless
procedural guarantees are duly observed. These guarantees are designed to protect
litigants against arbitrariness in the determination of their rights and obligations and
thus “to protect, to ensure or to assert the entitlement to a right or the exercise
thereof.”73 Thus, while article 25 guarantees a remedy, i.e., effective access to judicial
73 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6)),
Advisory Opinion OC-8/87 of Oct. 6, 1987 (Ser. A) No. 9, para. 25 (“Guarantees are designed to
protect, to ensure or to assert the entitlement to a right or the exercise thereof. The States Parties
recourse, article 8 guarantees a p ro c e s s, i.e., a fair hearing with procedural
guarantees.74 Under article 8(2), these guarantees include, among others, a right to
notice, to an opportunity to present evidence and arguments on one’s own behalf, to
exclude illegally obtained evidence, to benefit from competent legal counsel, to a
judicial investigation, and to have one’s case resolved within a reasonable time by an
independent and impartial tribunal.
ARTICLE 8
1. Every person has the right to a hearing, with due
guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent,
independent and impartial tribunal, previously established
by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal
nature made against him or for the determination of his rights
and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature.
The right to legal due process is extremely important for protecting ESCR. Like
articles 24 and 25, article 8 applies to all rights in the Convention75 as well as to all
“rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature” recognized in the
internal jurisdiction.76 When any of these rights are threatened through State action—
not only have the obligation to recognize and to respect the rights and freedoms of all persons, they
also have the obligation to protect and ensure the exercise of such rights and freedoms by means
of the respective guarantees (Art. 1(1)), that is, through suitable measures that will in all
circumstances ensure the effectiveness of these rights and freedoms.”). 
74 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 y 28 of the
American Convention on Human Rights) , Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of Oct. 6, 1987 (Ser. A) No.
9, para. 27 (“Article 8 does not contain a specific judicial remedy, but rather the procedural
requirements that should be observed in order to be able to speak of effective and appropriate
judicial guarantees under the Convention.”); id. para. 28 (“Article 8 recognizes the concept of ‘due
process of law,’ which includes the prerequisites necessary to ensure the adequate protection of
those persons whose rights or obligations are pending judicial determination.”); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
Genie Lacayo Case, Judgment of Jan. 29, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 30, para. 74 (“Article 8, which refers
to judicial guarantees, establishes the contours of the so-called ‘due legal process’or ‘the right to
procedural defense,’ which consist in the right of every person to be heard with due process
guarantees and within a reasonable period by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or
tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature
made against him or for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or
any other nature.”).
75 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 y 28 of
the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of Oct. 6, 1987 (Ser. A)
No. 9, para. 29 (“The concept of due process of law expressed in Article 8 of the Convention should
be understood as applicable, in the main, to all the judicial guarantees referred to in the American
Convention, even during a suspension governed by Article 27 of the Convention.”).
76 American Convention, supra note 61, art. 8(1). 
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e.g., housing eviction, termination of welfare benefits, land confiscation, job
dismissal, etc.—article 8 obligates States Parties to provide a hearing with due
process guarantees to affected persons for the determination of their rights.  
The Court has recently reaffirmed this principle in the context of arbitrary dismissals
of public workers for exercising their protected rights to associate. Noting the grave
socio-economic consequences of the dismissal for the workers and their families, the
Court affirmed that the State should have guaranteed due process protections to the
workers, as contemplated in the Convention, before terminating their jobs.77
Article 8 is especially significant for the protection of welfare benefits, pensions, and
other social assistance entitlements granted by the State to statutorily defined
recipients, generally the poor and elderly. These statutory entitlements create property
interests for qualified recipients in their continued receipt, interests protected by
article 8.  As such, benefits may not be altered or terminated without a hearing before
a competent, independent and impartial tribunal in which the beneficiary receives due
process guarantees. The European Court of Human Rights follows this principle. It
has held that the similarly worded fair trial clause in the European Convention
“appl[ies] in the field of social insurance, including even welfare assistance.” This
protection is necessitated by the fact that “the applicant ‘was claiming an individual,
economic right flowing from specific rules laid down in a federal statute . . . .”78 When
such a right is threatened, a hearing with due process guarantees is required to
determine continued eligibility. The European Court has required due process
protections in the termination of ESCR entitlements conferred both by federal statute
(e.g., public disability insurance79 and pensions for invalids80) and by private
employment contracts (e.g., health insurance allowances8 1 and supplementary
pensions82).
The United States Supreme Court has also extended constitutional due process
protections to welfare benefits, concluding that they are “a matter of statutory
entitlement for persons qualified to receive them.”83 In Goldberg v. Kelly, the
Supreme Court held that while the state has an interest in conserving fiscal and
administrative resources, this interest is outweighed by the interest of the recipient in
uninterrupted receipt of public assistance, which is not mere charity but a means to
77 See I n t e r-Am. Ct. H.R., R i c a rdo Baena et al. Case, Judgment of Feb. 3, 2001 (Ser. C) No. 72, para. 134.
7 8 E u r. Ct. H.R., S c h u l e r-Zraggen v. Switzerland, Judgment of Jun. 24, 1993 (Ser. A) No. 263, para. 46.
79 Eur. Ct. H.R., Salesi v. Italy, Judgment of Feb. 26, 1993 (Ser. A) No. 257-E.
80 Eur. Ct. H.R., Schuler-Zraggen v. Switzerland, Judgment of Jun. 24, 1993 (Ser. A) No. 263.
81 Eur. Ct. H.R., Feldbrugge v. The Netherlands, Judgment of May 29, 1986 (Ser. A) No. 99.
82 E u r. Ct. H.R., Deumeland v. Federal Republic of Germany, Judgment of May 29, 1986 (Ser. A) No. 100.
83 Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970). 
promote the general welfare.8 4 For qualified recipients, the Supreme Court
recognized, “welfare provides the means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing,
and medical care.”85 Termination of benefits before a pre-termination evidentiary
hearing on eligibility may thus “deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by
which to live while he waits.”86 Accordingly, the government interests that prompt the
provision of welfare also prompt its uninterrupted provision to those eligible to
receive it. 
In line with these, and other, rulings, ESCR claimants who have been unjustifiably
removed from public assistance or had their assistance grants substantially reduced
without due process protections should claim violations of Convention article 8(1) in
individual petitions before the Commission and Court. Such a violation would arise
where a State Party did not afford the claimant an “opportunity to be heard” in an
evidentiary hearing with due process guarantees, subjected the claimant to
unreasonably long procedures, or provided a tribunal that lacked independence,
neutrality or jurisdictional competence.
Practice Tip
An important application of the right to due process in the ESCR
field arises with regard to the right to procedural safeguards for
continued receipt of basic entitlements. Welfare benefits, pensions,
and other social-assistance entitlements provided by the State to
the poor are often subject to extreme administrative arbitrariness
and abuse. The due process guarantees of article 8 should be
invoked to hold States accountable for the arbitrary provision of
public assistance. There are precedents for this in regional and
national caselaw.
A. Right to a Hearing 
Article 8 guarantees the right of every person “to be heard” in the determination of
his rights and duties. In other words, no person may be deprived of rights or exposed
84 Id. at 265, 266 (emphasis added). The Court explained: “Welfare, by meeting the basic demands of
subsistence, can help bring within the reach of the poor the same opportunities that are available to
others to participate meaningfully in the life of the community. At the same time, welfare guards
against the societal malaise that may flow from a widespread sense of unjustified frustration and
insecurity.” Id. at 265.
85 Id. at 264. 
86 Id. 
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to excessive obligations without the opportunity to tell her side of the story to a
neutral decisionmaker, i.e., by presenting factual evidence and legal arguments in
support of her case. A State violates article 8 by failing to provide any judicial or
administrative proceeding in which a party may be heard when her rights are
threatened, or by unreasonably restricting the hearing (e.g., not admitting critical
types of evidence), so that a party is prevented from telling her side of the story.
Where subsistence rights are at stake, advocates should argue “due process” requires
that a hearing be provided prior to any deprivation of rights. In other cases, a post-
deprivation hearing will satisfy due process, provided it takes place “within a
reasonable time” and affords the possibility of retroactive benefits or relief. The U.N.
Committee on ESCR has affirmed, for example, that housing evictions should never
take place without a court order and an opportunity for evictees to be heard in pre-
eviction proceedings. Similarly, the U.S. Supreme Court has distinguished between
statutory entitlements that constitute “the very means by which to live,” for which a
pre-deprivation hearing is required,87 and those that are not directly subsistence-
related, for which a post-deprivation hearing meets due process requirements.88
B. “. . . with due guarantees”
The hearing required by article 8(1) is one in which “due guarantees” are provided.
This requires, at a minimum, an adequate investigation, reasonable conduct by State
authorities, and observance of the minimum guarantees enumerated in article 8(2),
supplemented by domestic and international procedural norms. 
The Court begins its due process analysis of judicial proceedings by looking at the
initial investigation. Where State authorities “obstruct or fail to adequately
collaborate in the investigation,” the Court may find a violation of petitioner’s due
process rights.89 This may occur when judicial, police, public ministry, and other
authorities engage in consistent delays or inaction or fail to fulfill orders, or when
petitioners or their relatives are threatened or persecuted and state authorities fail to
take measures to prevent, avoid and punish acts of intimidation.90 Such obstruction is
common in the ESCR context, particularly in response to complaints of labor law
violations, industry regulation noncompliance, environmental contamination,
domestic violence, police abuse of farmworkers, etc.  Where the State does not take
appropriate measures, and a petitioner who has alleged violation of her rights is
87 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
88 See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
89 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Genie Lacayo Case, Judgment of Jan. 29, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 30, paras. 75–76;
see also Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 59/99, Case 11.405, Newton Coutinho Mendes et al.
(Braz.), Apr. 13, 1999, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 21, at 399, para. 109 (applying
methodology used by Court). 
90 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 59/99, Case 11.405, Newton Coutinho Mendes et al. (Braz.),
Apr. 13, 1999, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 21, at 399, para. 113 (Articles 8 and
1(1) together require “the State [to] take administrative and disciplinary as well as judicial
measures to ensure that its police officers and investigative and judicial agents act legally and
effectively to eradicate private crime and violence and to provide the guarantees of security that the
population needs.”). 
hindered in the gathering or presentation of evidence relevant to her case, the State
incurs international responsibility for violating article 8 of the Convention.91
The Court next looks at the judicial proceedings themselves, for which article 8(2)
requires the observance, “with full equality,” of a set of “minimum guarantees.”
Though article 8(2) refers specifically to criminal proceedings, the Court has
recognized that the same “minimum guarantees” apply equally to cases of a civil,
labor, fiscal, or other nature.92
ARTICLE 8(2)
. . . During the proceedings, every person is entitled, with full
equality, to the following minimum guarantees:
(a) The right . . . to be assisted without charge by a translator or
interpreter, if he does not understand or does not speak the
language of the tribunal or court;
(b) prior notification in detail . . .  of the charges against him;
(c) adequate time and means for the preparation of his defense;
(d) the right . . . to defend himself personally or to be assisted by
legal counsel of his own choosing, and to communicate freely
and privately with his counsel;
(e) the inalienable right to be assisted by counsel provided by
the state, paid or not as the domestic law provides, if the
accused does not defend himself personally or engage his own
counsel within the time period established by law;
(f) the right of the defense to examine witnesses present in the
court and to obtain the appearance, as witnesses, of experts or
other persons who may throw light on the facts;
(g) the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself or
to plead guilty;” and
(h) the right to appeal the judgment to a higher court.93
Significantly, “[t]he enumeration contained in [article 8(2)] has been interpreted as a
list of the minimum guarantees, but not an exhaustive list. Hence, there are other
guarantees recognized in the domestic laws of the State that, although not explicitly
included in the text of the Convention, are equally protected under the broad wording
of [article 8(1)] of the Convention.”94 Many domestically-recognized due process
91 Id. para. 115.
92 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Art. 46(1), 46(2)(a)
and 46(2)(b) of the American Convention of Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 of Aug.
10, 1990 (Ser. A) No. 11, para. 28.
93 American Convention, supra note 61, art. 8(2)(a)–(h).
94 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 1/95, Case 11.006, Alan García (Peru), Feb. 17, 1995, in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1994, supra note 94, at 71, sec. VI(B)(2) (emphasis added). 
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guarantees will fit within this provision. The Commission has found, for example,
that the right to inviolability of the home is one of the implicit due process guarantees
in article 8(1): “it functions as an exclusionary rule, one that eliminates illegally
obtained evidence.”95
Practice Tip
Where a State Party provides due process guarantees in domestic
law that are more protective than the “minimum guarantees”
recognized in article 8(2), the State’s failure to provide the more
protective domestic guarantees in ESCR proceedings violates
article 8(1). 
Three article 8(2) “minimum guarantees” deserve special mention: the rights to
notice, to translators free of charge, and to state-provided legal counsel. The right to
notice, necessary to ensure a party “adequate time and means for the preparation” of
her case,96 is essential to guarantee a fair hearing. Indeed, a State-provided “hearing”
does not meet the requirements of article 8(2) if the party whose rights are being
determined has not been given sufficient notice to gather the evidence necessary to
defend or prosecute her case. 
Equally important for ensuring fair process in the determination of one’s rights is the
availability of a translator free of charge for those who don’t speak the language of
the tribunal or court. This right is particularly critical for ensuring due process
protections to indigenous, immigrant, and deaf communities. 
Article 8(2) also protects the “inalienable right” of all persons to legal counsel
provided by the State. The Convention does not specifically require that such
assistance be provided free. The Court has determined, however, that a State’s failure
to do so where an indigent required such assistance to protect his rights would
constitute discrimination on the basis of economic status, in violation of articles 1(1)
and 24.97 Interpreted in light of articles 1, 24, and 25, the Court has therefore
95 Id. (“[It] is more than a guarantee of privacy; it is a guarantee of due process inasmuch as it
establishes what can be seized . . . . When a search of a domicile is conducted without observing
the proper constitutional procedures, that guarantee prevents any evidence thus obtained from
being used to arrive at a subsequent court decision. Thus, in practice it functions as an exclusionary
rule, one that eliminates illegally obtained evidence.”).
96 American Convention, supra note 61, art. 8(2)(b), (c). 
97 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Art. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and
46(2)(b) of the American Convention of Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 of Aug. 10,
concluded that article 8 obligates States Parties to provide free legal assistance to
indigents when necessary for a fair hearing. 98
The Court has gone on to affirm that “[e]ven in those cases in which the accused is
forced to defend himself because he cannot afford legal counsel, a violation of Article
8 of the Convention could be said to exist if it can be proved that the lack of legal
counsel affected the right to a fair hearing to which he is entitled under that Article.”99
Likewise, the Court has held that even if a State were to provide free legal assistance
to the indigent, but did not cover all of the costs necessary to guarantee the full due
process required by article 8, the State would still be in violation of article 8.100 The
Court has emphasized that “the circumstances of a particular case or proceeding—its
significance, its legal character, and its context in a particular legal system—are
among the factors that bear on the determination of whether legal representation is or
is not necessary for a fair hearing.”101
Practice Tip
States Parties to the Convention must provide free legal assistance
and legal costs to indigents when—and to the extent—necessary
for a fair hearing. Failure to do so constitutes a violation of
Convention article 8, read with articles 1(1), 24, and 25, where the
right to a fair hearing is in fact impaired.
C. “. . . within a reasonable period”
Article 8 further requires that judicial and administrative proceedings for the
determination of individual rights be undertaken and completed “within a reasonable
period.” Time is of utmost importance for procedures involving the determination of
ESCR; undue delay may cause irreparable harm. In the 1986 Deumeland case, the
1990 (Ser. A) No. 11, para. 22 (“If a person who is seeking the protection of the law in order to
assert rights which the Convention guarantees finds that his economic status (in this case, his
indigency) prevents him from so doing because he cannot afford either the necessary legal counsel
or the costs of the proceedings, that person is being discriminated against by reason of his economic
status and, hence, is not receiving equal protection before the law.”). 
98 Id. para. 28. The Convention does not require States to provide free legal assistance to indigents in
all circumstances—rather, “only when that is necessary for a fair hearing.” Id. para. 26.
99 Id. para. 27.
100 Id. para. 29.
101 Id. paras. 28–29. 
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European Court of Human Rights considered the reasonability of time for the
determination of entitlement to a widowhood pension.102 While the right to the
pension was ultimately denied, the European Court held that the State had violated
the rights of the petitioners to have their rights determined within a “reasonable
period.” The procedures before the Social Court of the Federal Republic of Germany
had lasted eleven years.
The Inter-American Court has turned to the jurisprudence of the European Court to
interpret the concept of “reasonable period.” It has concluded that three elements
must be considered in light of the particular circumstances of each case to determine
the reasonability of the period in which a judicial procedure develops: (1) the
complexity of the litigation; (2) the procedural activity of the petitioners; and (3) the
conduct of the judicial authorities.103 Upon consideration of these elements, a “global
consideration of the procedure” 104 is undertaken to determine the reasonability of the
period, starting with the filing of the complaint. If the Court finds that there was
substantial delay, which cannot be explained by either complicated evidentiary
requirements or procedural obstruction/gross errors by the petitioner, the Court will
proceed to determine if the judicial authorities were responsible for excessive delay
in various stages of the proceedings. If the Court finds such delay, it will likely rule
that the limits of reasonability have been surpassed, in violation of article 8(1) of the
Convention.
D. “. . . by a competent, independent and
impartial judge or tribunal, previously
established by law”
Due process under article 8 also requires that the determination of rights and
obligations be undertaken “by a competent, independent and impartial judge or
tribunal, previously established by law.” The “c o m p e t e n c e” of a court is a
jurisdictional matter: some courts are courts of “general jurisdiction” while others are
102 Eur. Ct. H.R., Deumeland v. Federal Republic of Germany, Judgment of May 29, 1986 (Ser. A) No.
100. 
103 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Genie Lacayo Case, Judgment of Jan. 29, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 30, para. 77; Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R., Suárez Rosero Case, Judgment of Nov. 12, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 35, para. 72; see also
Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 12/96, Case 11.245, Jorge A. Giménez (Arg.), in IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1995, supra note 47, at 33, para. 111 (“A reasonable length of time for the
proceedings as allowed by Article 8 should be measured according to a series of factors such as the
complexity of the case, the behavior of the accused, and the diligence of the competent authorities
in their conduct of the proceedings.”). For decisions of European Court, see, for example, Eur. Ct.
H.R., Motta, Judgment of Feb. 19, 1991 (Ser. A) No. 195-A, para. 30; Eur. Ct. H.R., Ruiz Mateos
v. Spain, Judgment of Jun. 23, 1993 (Ser. A) No. 262.
104 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Genie Lacayo Case, Judgment of Jan. 29, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 30, para.
81, citing Eur. Ct. H.R., Motta, Judgment of Feb. 19, 1991 (Ser. A) No. 195-A, para. 24; Eur. Ct.
H.R., Vernillo, Judgment of Feb. 20, 1991 (Ser. A) No. 198; Eur. Ct. H.R., Unión Alimentaria
Sanders S.A., Judgment of July 7, 1989 (Ser. A) No. 157.
of “limited or specialized jurisdiction.” Specialized courts may violate a
complainant’s due process rights by hearing a case outside of its jurisdiction. The
Commission has consistently declared, for example, that the exercise of jurisdiction
over civilian matters by military tribunals is per se incompatible with the Convention.
At the same time, courts of “general jurisdiction” may violate parties’ due process
rights by exercising jurisdiction over matters statutorily committed to specialized
courts (e.g., labor courts, land courts, social security boards). In such circumstances,
the generalized court is not technically “competent” to hear the specialized matter,
unless on appeal. 
Judges and tribunals must also be “independent” and “impartial” to satisfy article 8’s
guarantees. The independence of the judiciary, “deriv[ing] from the classic separation
of the three branches of government,”105 is typically a political matter hinging on
whether the legislative or executive branches of government can influence judicial
salaries, tenure, and status. Where judges are dependent on political actors for their
continued employment and earnings, the independence required by due process is not
guaranteed. That is, they do not have “the independence that permits [them] to judge
both the actions of the executive branch and the constitutionality of the laws
enacted.”106 According to the Commission, “in determining whether a court is
independent of the executive, the manner of appointment of its members and the
duration of their terms, [and] the existence of guarantees against outside pressures
must all be considered.”107 “[T]he irremovability of judges . . . must . . . be considered
a necessary corollary of their independence.”108
The “impartiality” of judges, on the other hand, is a more individualized matter. As
the Commission has held, “impartiality implies that the court or judge not have
105 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 1/95, Case 11.006, Alan García (Peru), Feb. 17, 1995, in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1994, supra note 94, at 71, sec. VI(A)(2)(a), quoting INTER-AM. COMM.
H.R., SE V E N T H RE P O RT O N T H E SI T U AT I O N O F HU M A N RI G H T S I N CU B A 51 (1983),
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.61 doc.29 rev. 1 (“The Commission’s repeated position has been that “effective
observance of [judicial] guarantees is based on the independence of the judiciary, which derives
from the classic separation of the three branches of government. This is the logical consequence of
the very concept of human rights. In effect, to protect the rights of individuals against possible
arbitrary actions of the State, it is essential that one of the branches have the independence that
permits it to judge both the actions of the executive branch and the constitutionality of the laws
enacted and even the judgments handed down by its own members. Therefore, the Commission
considers that the independence of the Judiciary is an essential requisite for the practical
observance of human rights in general.”) (emphasis added).
106 Id.
107 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 1/95, Case 11.006, Alan García (Peru), Feb. 17, 1995, in
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1994, at 71, sec.
VI(A)(2)(a), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.88, Doc. 9 rev. (1995) (citing Eur. Ct. H.R., Campbell and Fell,
Judgment of June 28, 1984 (Ser. A) No. 80, para. 78).
108 Id. (citing Campbell and Fell, supra, para. 80; Eur. Comm. H.R., Zand v. Austria, Report No.
12.10.78, App. No. 7360/76, 15 Dec. & Rep. 70, 82, para. 80).
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preconceived opinions about the case sub judice . . .”109 Where a decision-maker
makes up her mind without considering the evidence or is otherwise influenced in her
decision by factors external to the case, due process has been denied. Such partiality
may be triggered by political intimidation, death threats, or judicial bribery. It may
also be triggered by judges’ own pre-programmed views that certain rights are
inherently non-justiciable. In either case, an article 8 violation could be alleged where
the court dismissed an ESCR claim without considering the evidence and arguments
offered by the parties.  
Finally, a court must be “previously established in law .” This provision prevents the
legislature or executive from creating specialized courts in response to a given case.
Such courts, created specifically for a particular end, cannot guarantee the
impartiality and independence required by due process for the determination of
individual rights. 
E. Commission is Not a Court of Fourth Instance
“Due guarantees” under article 8 do not mean a guaranteed favorable result. The
Commission and Court have underscored that the international protection provided by
the supervisory bodies of the American Convention is of a subsidiary nature to that
provided in the internal jurisdiction.110 That means that the inter-American organs
cannot serve as an appellate court or “quasi-judicial fourth instance” to examine
alleged errors of internal law or fact in a case in which due judicial guarantees were
provided. Rather, the jurisdictional competence of the Commission and Court only
extends to violations of the Convention. 
The basic premise of [the so-called “fourth instance formula”] is that
the Commission cannot review the judgments issued by the domestic
courts acting within their competence and with due judicial
g u a r a n t e e s , unless it considers that a possible violation of the
Convention is involved.
The Commission is competent to declare a petition admissible and rule
on its merits when it portrays a claim that a domestic legal decision
109 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 5/96, Case 10.970, Raquel Martín de Mejía (Peru), in IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1995, supra note 47, at 157, 195. The Commission goes on to discuss the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights on the subject.
110 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 55/97, Case 11.137, Juan Carlos Abella (Arg.), Nov. 18, 1997,
in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 10, at 271, paras. 139–40; Inter-Am. Comm. H.R.,
Report No. 46/96, Case 11.206, Juan Milla Bermúdez (Hond.), Oct. 17, 1996, in IACHR ANNUAL
REPORT 1996, supra note 14, at 453, para. 31–32; Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 39/96, Case
11.673, Santiago Marzioni (Arg.), Oct. 15, 1996, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 14,
at 76, para. 48–49; see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Cesti Hurtado Case, Preliminary Objections,
Judgment of Jan. 26, 1999, para. 47 (“In the international jurisdiction, the parties and the material
in controversy are, by definition, distinct from those in the internal jurisdiction.”).
constitutes a disregard of the right to a fair trial, or if it appears to
violate any other right guaranteed by the American Convention.
However, if it contains nothing but the allegation that the decision was
wrong or unjust in itself, the petition must be dismissed under this
formula. The Commission’s task is to ensure the observance of the
obligations undertaken by the States parties to the A m e r i c a n
Convention, but it cannot serve as an appellate court to examine
alleged errors of internal law or fact that may have been committed by
the domestic courts acting within their jurisdiction . Such examination
would be in order only insofar as the mistakes entailed a possible
violation of any of the rights set forth in the American Convention.111
“Fourth instance formula”: The Commission is not competent to
review decisions of the domestic courts unless a violation of the
American Convention is involved. 
The Commission has made absolutely clear that it “has full authority to adjudicate
irregularities of domestic judicial proceedings which result in manifest violations of
due process or of any of the rights protected by the Convention.”112 For example, the
“fourth instance formula” was developed by the Commission in the case of Clifton
Wright, a Jamaican citizen who alleged that judicial error resulted in a death sentence
against him. The domestic system had no process of appeal of judicial error, leaving
Mr. Wright without recourse. While the Commission found that it could “not act as a
quasi-judicial fourth instance and review the holdings of the domestic courts of the
OAS member States,” it found that the evidence on the record clearly showed the
physical impossibility that the petitioner committed the crime. The Commission ruled
that the State had violated article 25 by failing to provide for a mechanism in the
domestic legal process to allow for a correction of judicial error.113
111 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 55/97, Case 11.137, Juan Carlos Abella (Arg.), Nov. 18, 1997,
in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 10, at 271, paras. 141–42 (emphasis added); Inter-Am.
Comm. H.R., Report No. 46/96, Case 11.206, Juan Milla Bermúdez (Hond.), Oct. 17, 1996, in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 14, at 453, paras 33–34; Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report
No. 39/96, Case 11.673, Santiago Marzioni (Arg.), Oct. 15, 1996, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996,
supra note 14, at 76, paras. 50–51; Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 48/98, Case 11.403, Carlos
Alberto Marin Ramirez (Colom.), Nov. 18, 1997, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 21,
at 436, para. 36.  
112 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 39/96, Case 11.673, Santiago Marzioni (Arg.), Oct. 15, 1996,
in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 14, at 76, para. 61 (emphasis added); Inter-Am.
Comm. H.R., Report No. 46/96, Case 11.206, Juan Milla Bermúdez (Hond.), Oct. 17, 1996, in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 14, at 453, para. 44.
113 See Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Res. No. 29/88, Case 9260, Clifton Wright (Jamaica), Sept. 14, 1988,
in INTER-AM. COMM. H.R., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 1987–1988, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.74, Doc. 10 rev. 1.
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In another early case, the Commission ruled that, while it was not competent to decide
whether Argentine domestic law had been applied correctly by the domestic courts, it
could determine, once democratic rule was restored and the Convention was ratified,
whether due process guarantees were afforded a worker detained for political acts by
the previous military regime. The Commission concluded that the State’s refusal to
review the sentence constituted a violation of the petitioner’s rights under articles 8(1)
and 25(1) of the Convention.114
As the Commission has pointed out, “the Wright and López-Aurelli cases constitute
exceptions to the ‘fourth instance’ formula, and they may be used to illustrate the
requisites a petition must meet in order to be reviewed by the Commission.”115
However, the Commission “is not competent to deal with an application alleging that
errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts except where it
considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the rights
and freedoms set out in the Convention.”116 The Commission has further affirmed that
“it is generally for the appellate courts of States parties, and not for the Commission,
to review the facts and the evidence in a particular case. Similarly, it is for the
appellate courts of States parties and not for the Commission to review the judge’s
instructions to the jury or the conduct of the trial, unless it is clear that the judge’s
instructions to the jury were manifestly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice.”117
Under the “fourth instance formula,” the Commission and
Court do not have jurisdiction over:
• errors of law or fact, including errors as to the constitutionality of
legislation, committed by the domestic courts; and
114 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 74/90, Case 9850, López Aurelli (Arg.), Oct. 4, 1990, in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1990–91, supra note 15, at 41, 75, concl. 20 (“[T]he Commission finds
that the Argentine judiciary’s failure to review the trial . . . is inconsistent with the letter and the
spirit of that Convention as regards judicial guarantees and the principle of due process.”). 
115 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 46/96, Case 11.206, Juan Milla Bermúdez (Hond.), Oct. 17,
1996, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 14, at 453, para. 39; Inter-Am. Comm. H.R.,
Report No. 39/96, Case 11.673, Santiago Marzioni (Arg.), Oct. 15, 1996, in IACHR ANNUAL
REPORT 1996, supra note 14, at 76, para. 56.
116 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 48/98, Case 11.403, Carlos Alberto Marin Ramirez (Colom.),
Nov. 18, 1997, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 21, at 436, para. 37.  
117 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 44/99, Case 11.815, Anthony Briggs (Trinidad and Tobago),
Apr. 15, 1999, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 21, para. 59. The European Court of
Human Rights has similarly stated: “The admissibility of evidence is primarily the object of
regulation for national legislation and, as a rule, it corresponds to national courts to evaluate
evidence before it. The function of the Court consists in determining whether the procedures,
considered together, including the manner in which evidence has been obtained, has been just.”
Asch v. Austria, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) para. 26 (Apr. 26, 1991).
Cont...
• admissibility of evidence and jury instructions—unless,
considered as a whole, the procedures have been materially
unjust. 
They do have jurisdiction over:
• “irregularities of domestic judicial proceedings that result in
manifest violations of due process or of any rights protected by
the Convention;” and
• judicial procedures that are “manifestly arbitrary or amount[] to a
denial of justice.”
Practice Tip
Where the line is blurry between “errors of law or fact” and
“irregularities of proceedings” in a petition alleging violations of
Convention articles 8 and 25, petitioners should demonstrate a
clear understanding of the “fourth instance formula” and explain
why the conduct of judicial authorities resulted in “manifest
violations of due process or any rights protected by the
Convention.”
The aforementioned “procedural” rights can be applied to all rights recognized in the
Convention and in the domestic laws and constitutions of States Parties, where formal
ESCR protections are most concretely articulated. The rights in the following section
cannot be so applied. They are, however, amenable to a different strategy for the
protection of ESCR under the Convention.
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Building ESCR into Protected
Convention Rights
Chapter  7
“INTEGRATION  APPROACH”:  BUILDING  ESCR
INTO  PROTECTED  CONVENTION  RIGHTS
he “integration approach” rests on the premise that no right in the Convention
should be treated as exclusively “civil and political” or exclusively
“economic, social, and cultural” in its protective scope. Rather, each right has
essential CPR and ESCR aspects, both of which require effective judicial protection.
This view is consistent with the repeated insistence of the Commission and Court that
CPR and ESCR constitute “an indissoluble whole . . . for which reason both groups
of rights require constant protection and promotion in order to achieve their full
realization.” Under the integration approach, the “protected rights” of the Convention
should thus be read broadly to encompass their ESCR aspects in addition to their
traditional CPR components. 
The integration approach has been expressly advocated under the A m e r i c a n
Convention by former Inter-American Court Judge Rodolfo E. Piza Escalante. Judge
Piza recognized that the formal structural division of CPR from ESCR in the
Convention “follows merely historical reasons and not juridical differences among
them.”1 He further stated that “the standards of the Convention itself may be
understood to be applicable to the so-called ‘economic, social and cultural rights’ to
the degree and in the ways in which they are reasonably requirable in themselves (as
occurs, e.g., with the right to strike).”2 The European Court of Human Rights has also
adopted this “integrationist” view. In regard to the European Convention on Human
Rights, a regional treaty arguably even more narrowly centered on traditional CPR
than its American counterpart, the European Court has held: 
Whilst the Convention sets forth what are essentially civil and political
rights, many of them have implications of a social or economic nature.
1 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Separate Vote of Judge Rodolfo E. Piza Escalante, Proposed Amendments to
the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of Jan.
19, 1984, Ser.A No. 4 (1984), para. 6 (emphasis added).
2 Id. (emphasis added).
233
A rt. 3: Legal Personality
T
The Court therefore considers, like the Commission, that the mere fact
that an interpretation of the Convention may extend into the sphere of
social and economic rights should not be a decisive factor against
such an interpretation; there is no water-tight division separating that
sphere from the field covered by the Convention.3
This chapter considers Convention articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 15, 16, 19, 21, and
22, using the integration approach. While the Court has had significant opportunities
to interpret articles 4 (life), 5 (integrity) and 7 (security) in the “CPR” context of
forced disappearances, extrajudicial executions, and custodial torture, it has not
expressly considered the ESCR aspects of these rights. At the same time, the Court
has not had significant opportunities to interpret either dimension of articles 3 (legal
personality), 6 (involuntary labor), 11 (privacy), 12 (conscience/religion), 13
(thought/expression), 15 (assembly), 16 (association), 19 (rights of child), 21 (right to
property), and 22 (movement/residence). This underscores the opportunity that exists
for orienting the Court’s jurisprudence in the direction of greater ESCR protection.
Perhaps more critically, it also points to the caution that should be exercised in urging
radical new claims that are not clearly grounded in the established jurisprudence of
the Court and Commission. 
Practice Tip
Because Convention rights have traditionally been considered
exclusively in their “civil and political” aspects, petitioners should
rely heavily on article 31 of the Vienna Convention and article 29 of
the Convention to urge the Court to view protected rights
expansively in light of their “ordinary meaning,” the treaty’s “object
and purpose” and in a manner that does not limit or restrict other
rights protected in the internal or international order.
I. Right to Recognition of
Legal Personality (Art. 3)
Article 3 of the Convention protects the right of every person “to recognition as a
person before the law.” To date, this guarantee has been applied only to cases of
f o rced disappearance. Drawing on sources of international law outside the
Convention, the Commission has repeatedly ruled that forced disappearance of
3 Eur. Ct. H.R., Airey v. Ireland, Judgment of Oct. 9, 1979 (Ser. A) No. 32, para. 26, reprinted in 2
Eur. H.R. Rep. 305 (1979) (emphasis added).
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individuals constitutes an express violation of article 3.4 It does so by placing the
victim “outside of and excluded from the juridical and institutional order of the State.
This exclusion ha[s] the effect of denying recognition of the very existence of [the
victim] as a human being entitled to be recognized as such before the law.”5
When a disappearance is carried out, the fundamental protections
established by law are circumvented and the victim is left defenseless.
For the victim, the consequence of an enforced disappearance is, in
essence, to be denied every essential right that—as a matter of law—
is deemed to inhere in the very fact of being human. In this sense, the
act of enforced disappearance violates the right of the individual under
Article 3 of the American Convention “to recognition as a person
before the law.”6
4 See e.g., Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Anetro Castillo et al., Report No. 51/99, Cases 10.471, 10.955,
11.014, 11.066, 11.067, 11.070, 11.163 (Peru), Apr. 13, 1999, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-
AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1998, at 823, para. 117, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, Doc. 6
rev. (1999) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998]; Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 3/98,
Case 11.221, Tarcisio Medina Charry (Colom.), in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1997, at 482, para. 64, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, Doc. 7 rev. (1998)
[hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997]; Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 53/96, Case 8074
(Guate.), para. 24; Report No. 54/96 (Guate.), para. 28, in ANNUAL REPORT OFTHE INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1996, at 382, 394 and 406, 418, respectively, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95,
Doc. 7 rev. (1997) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996]. For example, the Commission has
repeatedly referred to the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearances, G.A. res. 47/133, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 49, at 207, U.N. Doc. A/47/49 (1992),
available at <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/h4dpaped.htm>, which characterizes forced
disappearance as “a violation of the rules of international law guaranteeing, inter alia, the right to
recognition as a person before the law . . . .” Id. art. 1(2) (emphasis added).
5 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 3/98, Case 11.221, Tarcisio Medina Charry (Colom.), in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 4 , at 482, para. 64; see also Inter-Am. Comm. H.R.,
Anetro Castillo et al., Report No. 51/99, Cases 10.471, 10.955, 11.014, 11.066, 11.067, 11.070,
11.163 (Peru), Apr. 13, 1999, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 4, at 823, para. 117
(1998) (“[The victims were] excluded from the legal and institutional framework of the Peruvian
State. In that sense, the forced disappearance of persons constitutes the negation of their very
existence as human beings recognized as persons before the law”); Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report
No. 52/99, Cases 10.544, 10.745, 11.098, Raul Zevallos Loayza et al. (Peru), Apr. 13, 1999, in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 4, at 857, para. 93; Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No.
53/99, Cases 10.551, 10.803, 10.821, 10.906, 11.180, 11.322, David Palomino Morales et al.
(Peru), Apr. 13, 1999, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 4, at 883, para. 119; Inter-Am.
Comm. H.R., Report No. 54/99, Cases 10.807, 10.808, 10.809, 10.810, 10.878, 11.307, William
Leon Laurente et al. (Peru), Apr. 13, 1999, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 4, at 917,
para. 117; Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 55/99, Cases 10.815, 10.905, 10.981, 10.955,
11.042, 11.136, Juan de al Cruz Nunez Santana et al. (Peru), Apr. 13, 1999, in IACHR ANNUAL
REPORT 1998, supra note 4, at 952, para. 111; Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 55/99, Cases
10.827, 11.984, Romer Morales Zegarra et al. (Peru), Apr. 13, 1999, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT
1998, supra note 4, at 1013, para. 77 (same).
6 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 1/97, Case 10.258, Manuel Garcia Franco (Ecuador), Mar. 12,
1997, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 4, at 551, para. 76. 
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While the Court has not expressly pronounced on this provision, the Commission has
established that an article 3 violation arises from all acts constituting “the denial of
[the victim’s] very existence as a human being possessed of legal personality,”7 his or
her placement “squarely outside the reach of the law”8 or “at the margin of the law,”9
or his or her “exclu[sion] from the legal and institutional order of the State.”10 These
formulations are all different ways of describing the same violation.
ARTICLE 3
Every person has the right to recognition as a
person before the law.
Article 3 is violated where an act or omission of
State leaves an individual:
• “outside the reach of the law” or “at the margin of the law;”
• “excluded from the legal and institutional order of the State”;
• “deni[ed] . . . his very existence as a human being possessed of
legal personality”; or
• “denied every essential right that—as a matter of law—is
deemed to inhere in the very fact of being human.”
Forced disappearance is not the only factual situation in which an individual is
“excluded from the legal and institutional order of the State.” The same reasoning
7 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 53/96, Case 8074; Report No. 54/96, Case 8075; Report No.
55/96, Case 8076; Report No. 56/96, Case 9120, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4,
at 382, 394, 406, 418, respectively; see also Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 3/98, Case 11.221,
Tarcisio Medina Charry (Colom.), in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 4, at482, para. 64.
8 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 1/97, Case 10.258, Manuel García Franco (Ecuador), in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 4, at 551, para. 83(f).
9 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 11/98, Case 10.606, Samuel de la Cruz Gómez (Guate.), in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 4, at 619, para. 50.
10 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 51/99, Cases 10.471, 10.955, 11.014, 11.066, 11.067, 11.070,
11.163; Report No. 52/99, Cases 10.544, 10.745, 11.098; Report No. 53/99, Cases 10.551, 10.803,
10.821, 10.906, 11.180, 11.322; Report No. 54/99, Cases 10.807, 10.808, 10.809, 10.810, 10.879,
11.037; Report No. 55/99, Cases 10.815, 10.905, 10.981, 10.995, 11.042, 11.136; Report No. 15/99,
Cases 10.824, 11.044, 11.124, 11.125, 11.175; Report No. 57/99, Cases 10.827, 10.984 (Peru) Apr.
13, 1999, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 4.
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extends to the ESCR context. Indeed, the right to legal personality is particularly
important for social and economic rights as they often implicate basic survival issues. 
Particularly strong article 3 cases might arise in the context of state recognition or
provision of identification documents—e.g., birth certificates, social security
numbers, land-tenure paperwork, marriage or death certificates, personal
identification cards, passports, migrant labor status identification, etc. Where access
to any type of political or social entitlement (e.g., voting, movement, public
assistance, food programs, technical training) is predicated upon possession of
official identification and the State fails to make reasonable efforts to ensure universal
access to that documentation, an article 3 violation may be alleged on behalf of any
person concretely disenfranchised as a result of the State failure. 
In many American countries, for example, decades of civil strife and political
violence have created situations in which large numbers of people have lost their
identification papers or had them destroyed or confiscated.11 Without being able to
prove land tenure, citizenship, and birth, marriage, and death status, individuals may
be effectively excluded from the institutional protection of the state. For poor rural
farming communities, lack of tenure security may be the epitome of
“defenselessness.” The same may be true for the urban poor, who lack birth
certificates or identification cards necessary for access to essential social services.
Where the state obstructs or unreasonably fails to assist individuals in gaining access
to basic identification documents, and a victim, as a result, is denied access to
essential social services or other institutional protection of the State, a violation of
article 3 may be alleged. 
An article 3 violation may also be claimed where access to basic identification
documents is effectively denied poor and marginalized persons due to high processing
costs, long distances to administrative centers, long delays, discriminatory treatment,
unreasonable rules, or other obstacles. Under article 3, read with article 1(1), States
Parties are required to remove such obstacles to access. Where a human person suffers
concrete injury as a result of this failure, an article 3 violation may be asserted. 
F i n a l l y, drawing on the Commission’s discussion of article 3 in the forced
disappearance context, it may be argued that the State violates article 3 by failing to
take reasonable steps to ensure the minimum core content of essential ESCR to
persons living in extreme poverty or social isolation. For the victim, the consequence
of such failure is to be denied an  “essential right that—as a matter of law—is deemed
to inhere in the very fact of being human.”12 In this sense, it violates the right of the
11 See, e.g. , Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Res. 26/89, Case 10.179, Sebastián Gutiérrez et al. (El Sal.),
Sept. 28, 1989, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
1989–1990, at 36, 37, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.77 rev. 1 Doc. 7 (1990) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL
REPORT 1989–90] (documenting that soldiers raided homes and destroyed land titles and personal
identification documents of three campesino leaders of consumers’cooperative). 
12 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report no. 1/97, Case 10.258, Manuel Garcia Franco (Ecuador), Mar. 12,
1997, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 4, at 551, para. 76.
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individual under article 3 “to recognition as a person before the law.” To state a
justiciable claim, however, a petition will likely have to demonstrate that the alleged
victim expressly sought institutional assistance or protection from the State and was
unreasonably excluded from the legal and institutional order, i.e., was denied
recognition as a person before the law by the State’s failure to take any responsive
measure. This argument is untested and may be difficult under the inter-American
organs’ contentious jurisdiction. 
II. Right to Life (Art. 4)
Article 4 enshrines the right to life. Along with articles 5, 7, 11 and 21, it holds
perhaps the greatest potential for using the integration approach to incorporate ESCR
into the legal protections of the Convention. Interpretation of the right to life to
include ESCR protections finds express support in statements by the Commission and
Court, by U.N. expert committees, and by other international expert bodies on ESCR.
The arguments below describe how Convention article 4 may be invoked to protect
rights to health, a healthy environment, access to food and clean water, and workplace
safety.
ARTICLE 4
1. Every person has the right to have his life respected. This
right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the
moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived
of his life.
Article 4 has traditionally been interpreted to prohibit State complicity in extrajudicial
executions and forced disappearance. Such a limited construction, however, relies
exclusively on the provision’s final clause—ignoring the significance of the first two
sentences. Basic tenets of treaty construction prohibit the interpretation of provisions
in such a way as to render any term or phrase irrelevant. The Court, too, has expressly
affirmed the need to interpret article 4 expansively, holding that “[o]wing to the
fundamental nature of the right to life, restrictive approaches to it are inadmissible.”13
The “right to have [one’s] life respected” must be read, therefore, to prohibit not only
“arbitrary deprivation” of life, but also “any impairment” of life that can be attributed
13 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Villagrán Morales et al. Case (the “Street Children” Case), Judgment of Nov.
19, 1999 (Ser. C) No. 63, para. 144.
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to the State under the rules of international law.14 The Court has recently recognized
this explicitly, holding that “the fundamental right to life includes, not only the right
of every human being not to be deprived of his life arbitrarily, but also the right that
he will not be prevented from having access to the conditions that guarantee a
dignified existence.”15 According to the Court, “States have the obligation to
guarantee the creation of the conditions required in order that violations of [the right
to life] do not occur . . . .”16 Judges A.A. Cançado Trindade and Alirio Abreu Burelli
explained: 
The right to life implies not only the negative obligation not to deprive
anyone of life arbitrarily, but also the positive obligation to take all
necessary measures to secure that that basic right is not violated.
We believe that there are distinct ways to deprive a person arbitrarily
of life: when his death is provoked directly by the unlawful act of
homicide, as well as when circumstances are not avoided which
likewise lead to the death of persons. 
14 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No. 4, para.
164 (“Any impairment of [protected Convention rights] which can be attributed under the rules of
international law to the action or omission of any public authority constitutes an act imputable to
the State, which assumes responsibility in the terms provided by the Convention.”) (emphasis
added). This also follows from the Court’s interpretation of every other substantive provision in the
Convention. The right to freedom of expression, enshrined in article 13, for example, is not violated
exclusively by State acts that foreclose entirely the ability to express one’s views, but rather by any
act that effectively “impedes,” “restricts,” “impairs” or “threatens” the free exercise of that ability.
See infra chapter 7 discussing article 13 of Convention. 
15 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Villagrán Morales et al. Case (the “Street Children” Case), Judgment of Nov.
19, 1999 (Ser. C) No. 63, para. 144 (emphasis added).
16 Id. Three judges of the Court have affirmed: 
The right to life and the guarantee and respect thereof by States cannot be
conceived in a restrictive manner. That right does not merely imply that no
person may be arbitrarily deprived of his or her life (negative obligation). It also
demands of the States that they take all appropriate measures to protect and
preserve it (positive obligation). 
The international protection of human rights, as it relates to Article 4(1) of the
American Convention on Human Rights, has a preventive dimension, in which
the obligation to act with due diligence . . . imposes on the States the obligation
to prevent, within reason, those situations which . . . could lead, sometimes even
by omission, to the denial of the inviolability of the right to life.
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Dissenting Opinion of Judges Picado Sotela, Aguiar-Aranguren and Cançado
Trindade, Gangaram Panday Case, Judgment of Jan. 21, 1994 (Ser. C) No. 16, paras. 3–4. This
case concerned the illegal detention of a man who died of asphyxiation in police custody. Autopsies
could not definitively determine whether the cause of death was homicide or suicide. While finding
a violation of Convention article 7 (liberty), the majority opinion dismissed the claims that the State
violated articles 4 (life) and 5 (humane treatment). The three dissenting judges argued that the State
violated article 4(1), read with article 1(1), by failing to act with due diligence and within
reasonable means to prevent the detainee’s death.
The cited quote arose from a dissenting opinion; its non-restrictive view of article 4, however, has
recently been adopted by the full Court. See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Villagrán Morales et al. Case (the
“Street Children” Case), Judgment of Nov. 19, 1999 (Ser. C) No. 63, para. 144.
The arbitrary deprivation of life is not limited, thus, to the illicit act of
homicide; it extends itself likewise to the deprivation of the right to
live with dignity. This outlook conceptualizes the right to life as
belonging, at the same time, to the domain of civil and political rights,
as well as economic, social and cultural rights, thus illustrating the
interrelation and indivisibility of all human rights.17
The Commission has echoed this view, expressly stating that “[t]he right to have one’s
life respected is not . . . limited to protection against arbitrary killing.”18 It has
affirmed that “respect for rights linked to life and integrity should go hand in hand
with improvements in the population’s living standards as regards economic, social
and cultural rights, whose implementation must be a priority in the eyes of the
State.”19 International human rights bodies have also consistently affirmed this
broader interpretation of the right to life. The United Nations Human Rights
Commission’s independent expert Luis Valencia Rodríguez has recognized the role
that guaranteed access to basic subsistence goods plays in the right to life: 
A trend has been observed to consider the right to life as a broader and
more general concept, characterized not only by the fact of being the
legal basis of all the rights, but also by forming an integral part of all
the rights that are essential for guaranteeing access for all human
beings to all goods , including legal possession of same, necessary for
the development of their physical, moral and spiritual existence.
Moreover, deprivation of this legal possession, especially during
armed conflicts, jeopardizes the right to life.20
Likewise, the U.N. Human Rights Committee has directly tied the right to life to State
health and nutrition policies. In its interpretation of article 6 of the ICCPR (materially
identical to Convention article 4), the Committee concluded: 
[T]he Committee has noted that the right to life has been too often
narrowly interpreted. The expression “inherent right to life” cannot
17 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Villagrán Morales et al. Case (the “Street Children” Case), Judgment of Nov.
19, 1999 (Ser. C) No. 63, joint concurring opinion of Antonio Augusto Cançado Trindade and
Alirio Abreu Burelli, paras. 2–4 (first emphasis in original, second emphasis added).
18 INTER-AM. C OMM. H.R., REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ECUADOR 1996, at 88,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.96 Doc. 10 rev. 1 (1997) [hereinafter ECUADOR REPORT 1996].
19 Status of Human Rights in Several Countries: Guatemala, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-
AMERICAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1991, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/III.25 doc.7, at 213
(1992) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1991] (emphasis added).
20 Status of Human Rights in Several Countries: Nicaragua, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-
AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1993, at 465, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.85 Doc. 9 rev. (1994)
[hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993] (citing El derecho de toda persona a la propiedad
individual y colectiva, final report submitted by Luis Valencia Rodríguez, E/CN.4/1993/15,
18.12.92, at 26–27). 
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properly be understood in a restrictive manner, and the protection of
this right requires that States adopt positive measures. In this
connection, the Committee considers that it would be desirable for
States parties to take all possible measures to reduce infant mortality
and to increase life expectancy, especially in adopting measures to
eliminate malnutrition and epidemics.21
Based on these interpretations, the Court should be urged to interpret the right to life
in article 4 broadly to cover State policies and practices that concretely impair
individuals’rights to health, a healthy environment, nutritious food, clean water, and
workplace safety. Petitions should directly propose an expansive definition of the
right to life. 
PROPOSED INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 4
Article 4 is violated whenever a person dies or is put in imminent
risk of death or damage to life or health as a result of an act or
omission by any public authority, including the failure to take
reasonable measures, within all available resources, to prevent
such death, sickness, or injury.
This definition would likely find support in both the Commission and Court. The
Commission’s former president has already recognized that the right to life may be
violated by industrial contamination of potable water sources. In his annual report on
the Commission’s activities to the OAS Permanent Council, former Commission
president Dr. Alvaro Tirado Mejía recognized the increased receipt of petitions
alleging environmental abuses and affirmed:
It may seem anomalous to characterize violations of environmental
law as human rights violations, but Article 4 of the American
Convention requires governments to protect the right to life. That right
is in jeopardy for example when water, without which life cannot be
imagined, is polluted by unregulated industrial processes. When toxic
effluents are poured directly into the drinking water of the population,
the epidemiological consequences are well known—increases in
disease, stillbirths, malformation of fetuses, disease and diminish[ed]
life expectancy.22
21 The Right to Life (Art. 6): General Comment No. 6, 37 U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 16th Sess.,
Supp. No. 40, Annex V, para. 5, U.N. Doc. A/37/40 (1982).
22 Address of the President of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Dr. Alvaro Tirado
Mejía, before the Permanent Council of the OAS, Wash., D.C., Feb. 6, 1995, in ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1995, at 275, 278, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91,
Doc. 7 rev. (1996) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1995]. 
The Commission thus appears to echo the U.N. Human Rights Committee’s
understanding of the right to life, recognizing the legal duty of states under
international law to protect the right to life by taking essential measures to prevent
disease, infant mortality and morbidity, malnutrition, diminished life expectancy, etc. 
The following subsections look at three “types” of acts and omissions giving rise to
State responsibility under article 4. 
• direct acts and omissions by public authority that concretely impair life; 
• failure to take reasonable steps to prevent private third-party abuse of life;
and 
• failure to take preventive and responsive measures in the face of disasters
or extreme poverty, with life-impairing consequences (i.e., failure to ensure
minimum core content).
Such acts, of commission and omission, may give rise to justiciable claims under the
contentious jurisdiction of the Commission and Court where petitioners can show that
(1) an individual died or her life was put in serious risk, (2) as a proximate result of
an unlawful act, (3) that can be imputed to the State under general principles of
international law. As described in chapter 5, an unlawful act may be imputed to a
concerned State where, in relation to the unlawful act, the State breaches its duties to
respect, prevent, investigate, sanction, and remedy.
A. Direct Acts (of Commission and Omission)
by State Agents that Impair Life
The “easiest” article 4 case arises where the State takes direct action that results in
concrete harm to a person’s life, or otherwise fails by omission to take reasonable
steps to prevent such harm with respect to persons under the State’s control. Such acts
occur in countless scenarios, including, for example, where a State or state agent: (a)
destroys food crops or contaminates water supplies; (b) obstructs access to
subsistence goods and services; (c) fails to take reasonable measures to prevent death
or serious illness of persons in state custody; (d) fails to take reasonable measures to
promote workplace safety in public enterprises; or (e) makes substantial financial
cutbacks in essential social assistance programs for the neediest. A petition must
demonstrate concrete injury to specific victims under each of these scenarios. 
1. Direct Deprivation of Food and Water Supplies
Where state agents directly deprive persons of the basic subsistence goods necessary
for life, and concrete injury to life results, an article 4 violation may be alleged. This
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may occur where military or other state agents destroy or confiscate food crops, grain
supplies or livestock of civilian communities or pollute their rivers and drinking
wells. Such tactics have been used pervasively in the Americas over the past two
decades, particularly against rural communities purported to be guerrilla supporters or
coca farmers alleged to be contributing to the drug trade. In Guatemala, for example,
the counterinsurgency strategy included “a scorched earth policy of crop-burning,
confiscation of harvests and slaughter of livestock, calculated not only to deny the
guerrillas food but also to force the [civilian] peasants to near starvation.”23 These
tactics, including pollution of rivers and drinking wells, destruction of community
grain stores, and razing of maize harvests, have been well documented by numerous
sources.24
Such acts, aimed at destroying or harming life through malnutrition, sickness, and
starvation, must be seen as direct violations of article 4, no different from
extrajudicial executions inflicted by gunfire or torture. Indiscriminate aerial spraying
of herbicides in “coca regions,” without regard for subsistence crops, livestock, water
sources, and human life below, may also be viewed as a direct violation of article 4.
It may be challenged in the individual petitions process where it results in actual or
imminent harm to the life of specific individuals.
Acts such as those described above are expressly proscribed under international
humanitarian law. Article 14 of the Second Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, for
example, provides that “[it is prohibited] to attack, destroy, remove or render useless
. . . foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock,
drinking water installations and supplies and irrigation works.”25 The Commission
has repeatedly affirmed, with the Court’s approval, that it is competent to “directly
enforce rules of international humanitarian law or interpret provisions of the
American Convention, using those rules as reference,”26 and has frequently invoked
Geneva Protocol II, pursuant to Convention article 29, to help it interpret Convention
article 4. Petitioners should urge the Commission to do so with regard to the ESCR
aspects of warfare. Although these “specialized” rules were intended to protect
civilian communities in situations of domestic armed conflict, the “object and
purpose” of the Convention compels that they be applied in times of “peace” as well. 
23 HUM. RTS. WATCH/AM., CREATING A DESOLATION AND CALLING IT PEACE (1983). 
24 For a discussion of many of these sources in the Guatemalan context, see TARA MELISH, HUMAN
RIGHTS TO FOOD IN GUATEMALA: FROM RHETORIC TO REALITY 70–80 (1997). 
25 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.
26 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 1/99, Case 10.480, Lucio Parada Cea et al. Case (El Sal.), Jan.
27, 1999, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 4, at 531, para. 66; see also Inter-Am.
Comm. H.R., Report No. 55/97, Case 11.137, Juan Carlos Abella (Arg.), Nov. 18, 1997, in IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 4, at 271, 309, paras. 164–66; Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report
No. 26/97, Case 11.142, Arturo Ribón Avila (Colom.), Sept. 30, 1997, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT
1997, supra note 4, at 444, para. 132.
Significantly, the Commission has identified many of these practices, including
destruction of crops and market produce by soldiers, confiscation of livestock,
plunder of community stores, and destruction of medical centers in impoverished
communities, in its resolutions concerning individual petitions.27 However, the
Commission has never addressed, in the individual petitions process, the serious risk
to (and actual effects upon) life associated with the direct deprivation of subsistence
resources such as food and water. Rather, in explaining article 4 violations, it has
narrowly focused on the extrajudicial executions that have accompanied these life-
impairing acts. This should be challenged in future petitions. While the Commission
and Court have the “power and duty to apply the juridical provisions relevant to a
proceeding, even when the parties do not expressly invoke them,”28 the petitioner has
the primary responsibility to directly argue that such life-impairing acts violate
article 4. In the cases above, in which the Commission restricted its attention to
extrajudicial executions, petitioners failed to urge a more expansive interpretation of
article 4. 
Practice Tip
Where petitioners cannot affirmatively demonstrate that named
victims suffered concrete harm to life—increased incidence of
disease, malnutrition, birth defects, death (e.g., with medical
records and testimony)—as a result of a State’s destruction of
subsistence crops and other basic food and water supplies, they
should allege a violation of article 7 (personal security), which does
not require a showing of concrete physical harm.
2. Direct Obstruction of Access to Subsistence
Goods, Markets, and Services 
Direct obstruction of access to food markets, water sources, and health centers to
individuals who depend upon them for their survival may also implicate article 4. An
27 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 48/97, Case 11.411, “Ejido Morelia” (Mex.), IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 4 , at 655; Report No. 23/93, Case 10.456 (Colom.), Oct. 12,
1993, in IACHR ANNUALREPORT 1993, supra note 20, at 86–87; Res. 22/89, Case 10.124 (Surin.),
Sept. 27, 1989, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
1988–89, at 147, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.76 Doc. 10 (1989) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT
1988–89].
28 As the Court has recognized, this is true “by virtue of a general principle of law, iura novit curia,
on which international jurisprudence has repeatedly relied and under which a court has the power
and the duty to apply the juridical provisions relevant to a proceeding, even when the parties do not
expressly invoke them.” Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988
(Ser. C) No 4, para. 163. 
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article 4 violation might be found, for example, where military or police authorities
prevent impoverished individuals from carrying produce to market or from seeking
access to food markets. 
The Commission heard such a case in 1996. The case involved eighteen members of
a rural Guatemalan community who, pursuant to their constitutional rights, refused to
participate in the Civil Defense Patrols (PAC). The local military commissioner
retaliated by ordering all local corn mills in the area to refuse to grind the maize of
the eighteen community members and their families. The PAC detained María Mejía,
one of the eighteen, when she attempted to leave the locality to buy supplies, forcing
her to return to her residence.29 As the community members were dependent on
ground maize for their subsistence, this obstruction directly implicated article 4. The
military subsequently murdered María Mejía, a community org a n i z e r. T h e
Commission’s case was thus framed narrowly around the homicide; the military
orders to obstruct the victims’ access to basic food supplies—and the life-impairing
effects it had on the affected families—were never addressed on the merits.
An article 4 violation might also be alleged where public health authorities turn
individuals suffering life-impairing injuries or sickness away from health clinics or
hospitals, resulting in an aggravation of the victim’s condition or death. This situation
may arise, for example, where the injured or sick are unable to pay hospital or clinic
fees or where clinics are ordered not to treat persons from particular political, social,
ethnic, racial, or other groups. Public health workers are state agents for purposes of
imputing international responsibility.
3. Death or Serious Illness in State Custody
The State assumes heightened responsibility for the life and health of persons in state
custody. The Court has made clear that, as the institution responsible for custodial
establishments, the State is the direct “guarantor” of the rights to life and to humane
treatment for persons in state custody. It has held, for example, that when a missing
person is last seen in state custody and significant time has passed, the state incurs
responsibility for violation of article 4, even absent any concrete evidence that the
missing individual is dead or died in state custody.30
29 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 32/96, Case 10.553, María Mejía (Guate.), IACHR ANNUAL
REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 465.
30 See e.g., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No 4,
para. 188 (“The context in which the disappearance of Manfredo Velásquez occurred and the lack
of knowledge seven years later about his fate create a reasonable presumption that he was killed.”);
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of Jan. 20, 1989 (Ser. C) No. 5, para. 198 (“The
context in which the disappearance of Saúl Godínez occurred and the lack of knowledge six and a
half years later about his fate create a reasonable presumption that he was killed. Even if there is a
minimal margin of doubt in this repsect, it must be presumed that his fate was decided by
authorities who systematically executed detainees without trial and concealed their bodies in order
to avoid punishment. This, together with the failure to investigate, is a violation by Honduras of a
legal duty under Article 1(1) of the Convention to ensure the rights recognized by Article 4(1).”). 
[E]very person deprived of her or his liberty has the right to live in
detention conditions compatible with her or his personal dignity, and
the State must guarantee to that person the right to life and to humane
treatment. Consequently, since the State is the institution responsible
for detention establishments, it is the guarantor of these rights of the
prisoners.31
The Commission has affirmed that this includes the duty “to guarantee the health” of
persons in state custody, including protection from unhygienic conditions, disease,
malnutrition, and negligent or recklessly indifferent medical care. In the case of Juan
Hernández, the Commission found an article 4 violation where a detainee died in a
Guatemalan state prison of cholera, a common, easily preventable and easily curable
disease. Prison authorities failed to provide the victim with sufficient rehydration
formula and to transfer him to a hospital facility, as was obviously the appropriate
course given the severity of his condition.32 Petitioners alleged the victim’s death was
directly caused by the inhumane treatment of prisoners in the detention facility and
the negligence of prison authorities in treating the victim. They asserted that “the
prison authorities and those in charge of health care in the prison, [we]re directly
responsible for ensuring the physical safety of the inmates and respect for their human
dignity.”33 The Commission agreed, holding that, by not taking the necessary
measures to guarantee the life and health of the detainee nor acting reasonably to
prevent his death, the State:
violated by omission its duty to guarantee the health and life of Mr.
Hernández Lima since the victim was in its custody and had no means
to turn to his relatives and friends, to an attorney or to a private
physician; the State, therefore, had complete control over his life and
personal safety.
. . . [T]he Guatemalan State failed to guarantee Mr. Hernández Lima’s
life and personal safety. More importantly, the Commission has
established that the State has not demonstrated that it acted with the
diligence required to protect the victim’s life and health . . . .34
In coming to this conclusion, the Commission adopted a useful allocation of burdens
of proof. Petitioners were required to establish the standard elements of causation,
injury in fact, and state imputability. That is, they demonstrated that (i) significant
31 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Neira Alegría et al. Case, Judgment of Jan. 19, 1995 (Ser. C) No 20, para. 60
(finding State of Peru in violation of Convention article 4(1) for deaths of prisoners during an
inmate uprising, given the State’s “duty to subdue the uprising” and its failure to take appropriate
steps).
32 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 28/96, Case 11.297, Juan Hernández (Guate.), Oct. 16, 1996,
in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 406, 408, 16–17.
33 Id. para. 18. 
34 Id. paras. 60–61.
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risks to health and life were present in the detention center, i.e., poor health conditions
and negligent prison authorities responsible for administering health remedies; (ii) an
individual died as a direct result of those poor conditions and negligent treatment; and
(iii) the State is “responsible for detention establishments” and thus for guaranteeing
the right to health and life of detainees, who are deprived of their liberty and have no
other recourse to satisfy their health needs. 
The burden was then transferred to the State to affirmatively “claim and adequately
substantiate that it took the measures necessary to guarantee the life and health of [the
victim].”35 As it had not met that burden, the Commission concluded the State
“violated by omission its duty to guarantee the health and life” of the victim.36 The
significance of these cases is that the Commission explicitly recognized that article 4
obligates States “to guarantee the health” of persons in custody. The State is
internationally responsible, under article 4, for all deaths or preventable harm to
health that occur in its custody unless state agents acted with the diligence required to
protect the victim’s life and health. This is a question of fact to be determined by an
external factfinder.
The “custodial” jurisprudence of the Commission and Court has been limited to
detainees in prisons and detention centers. However, the same legal analysis
necessarily applies to other “custodial” institutions, such as psychiatric hospitals,
state-run children’s homes, and public schools. Indeed, article 4 violations may arise
anywhere the State fails to take adequate measures to protect the life or health of
persons under its direct control and actual or imminent injury results.
A State Party to the Convention violates
article 4 by direct omission when: 
1. an individual dies or suffers concrete injury to health;
2. the State had complete control over the victim’s life and safety;
and 
3. the State failed to act with the diligence required to prevent the
injury to life or health.
The questions of “complete control” and “diligence required” are
fact specific and should be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
35 Id. para. 59. To meet its burden, the State must refute the petitioners’ allegations and present
evidence demonstrating that it took reasonable measures to prevent the victim’s death. Id. 
36 Id. para. 60. 
4. Public Workplace Safety
The State is also directly responsible for injuries to life and health suffered in public
workplaces. While a public worker is not in state “custody,” the State is responsible
for employees’ life and safety while acting within the scope of employment.
Following the reasoning of the Court, since the State is the institution responsible for
public workplaces, it is the guarantor, in those workplaces, of the rights to life and
health of public workers. 37
Significant risks to health and life often exist in the workplace. These may include,
among others, exposure to carcinogens or other hazardous chemicals; lack of
adequate protective gear; negligence in removing hazards; or workplace accidents
caused by insufficient protective shields on machinery and extended work hours
leading to exhaustion. As members of the Court have recognized, article 4, read with
article 1(1), “imposes on the States the obligation to prevent” injuries to life or
health.38 This requires regulating and monitoring workplace risks and removing
hazards to life and health. While the State has duties to prevent violations of the right
to life in both public and private employment settings, the duty to remove hazards is
heightened where the State is in immediate control of the dangerous workplace
setting.
In accordance with the Court’s “state custody” jurisprudence, an article 4 violation
should thus be alleged in the individual petitions process where: (i) significant risks
37 The right of workers to work conditions that are compatible with life, health, and dignity is
affirmed in numerous international human rights and labor instruments, all of which can be invoked
under article 29 to assist in interpreting the American Convention. See, e.g., Additional Protocol to
the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Nov. 17, 1988, art. 7, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69 (1988), 28 I.L.M. 156 (1989), entered into force Nov. 16,
1999 [hereinafter Protocol of San Salvador] (“[E]veryone shall enjoy [the right to work] under just,
equitable, and satisfactory conditions, which the States Parties undertake to guarantee in their
internal legislation . . . .”); Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, art. 44(b),
119 U.N.T.S. 3, 2 U.S.T. 2394, entered into force Dec. 13, 1951, amended 721 U.N.T.S. 324,
entered into force Feb. 27, 1990, O.A.S.T.S. Nos. 1–C, 61 (“Work is a right . . . and it should be
performed under conditions, including a system of fair wages, that ensure life, health, and a decent
standard of living for the worker and his family . . . .”); American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, art. XIV, O.A.S. Res. XXX, Int’l Conference of Am. States, 9th
Conference, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/I.4 Rev. XX (1948) (“Every person has the right to work,
under proper conditions . . . [to] assure him a standard of living suitable for himself and his
family.”); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 7,
G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993
U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976 [hereinafter ICESCR] (“The States Parties
. . . recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work
which ensure, in particular: . . . [a] decent living . . . [and] [s]afe and healthy working conditions.”);
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, art. 23, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 67th plen. mtg., art. 5, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (“Everyone has the right to . . . just and
favourable conditions of work . . . [and] to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself
and his family an existence worthy of human dignity . . . .”); see also ILO Conventions.  
38 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Dissenting Opinion of Judges Picado Sotela, Aguiar-Aranguren and Cançado
Trindade, Gangaram Panday Case, Judgment of Jan. 21, 1994 (Ser. C) No. 16, para. 4.
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to life and health are present in the public workplace; (ii) the State fails to take
reasonable steps to protect its employees from those risks; and (iii) a public worker
suffers death or concrete injury as a direct result. Petitions must show that all
domestic remedies—including administrative remedies, such as workers
compensation—were exhausted. 
Petitioners should propose an allocation of burdens, similar to that used in the state
custody cases, for determining state responsibility. Under this allocation, the
petitioner would bear the burden of establishing the elements of concrete injury,
causation, and imputability; the State would then bear the rebuttal burden of showing
it had taken reasonable measures to prevent the given injury. Where the petitioner has
met her burden and the State cannot demonstrate that it took “reasonable steps” to
protect workers from life-impairing health risks in the workplace, an article 4
violation should be established. 
PROPOSED ARTICLE 4 ALLOCATION OF BURDENS
FOR PUBLIC WORKPLACE SAFETY CASES
PETITIONER: Burden of Proof
1. Significant risks to life and health were present in the workplace;
2. Person(s) suffered death or concrete harm to life as a direct
result of that risk; and
3. The State owned or controlled the workplace where the injury or
death occurred.
STATE: Rebuttal Burden
1. The State took reasonable steps necessary to avoid death or
injury to workers as a result of the risk. 
5. Financial Cutbacks in Social Assistance Programs
The termination of entitlements upon which recipients depend for their subsistence
may also violate the right to life. This may occur, for example, where the State makes
substantial financial cutbacks in essential social assistance programs designed to meet
the minimum subsistence needs of the most vulnerable, without making alternative
accommodation. A substantial cutback in such programs may significantly affect the
lives and health of persons who depend on them for their subsistence; it may even
lead directly to death. Where death or other concrete impairment of life results, it
should be argued that the State violates article 4 of the Convention, read with article
1(1), where substantial cutbacks in essential public assistance programs affecting
subsistence rights are made and the State fails to demonstrate it acted diligently to
ensure that alternative provision was available for persons dependent on that aid for
their subsistence. 
The chief juridical difficulty with “budget reduction” cases, from an article 4
perspective, is that it is necessary to show concrete injury proximately resulting from
the financial cutback. Where only hypothetical or speculative injury is alleged, the
case will be found inadmissible. Accordingly, when framing these cases in terms of
the Convention, it is essential to name individual victims specifically and to
demonstrate concrete harm to their lives (e.g., with medical reports, expert testimony,
etc.). Petitions must also state facts demonstrating that the injury was reasonably
attributable to the regressive policy, rather than to any other causal factor. These two
essential elements—concrete injury and causation—make budget reduction cases,
using the integration approach, somewhat difficult; petitioners may have better
success using the indirect approach, i.e., claiming violations of due process, equal
protection or judicial protection. 
Practice Tip
Petitions involving financial cutbacks or other regressive action in
the ESCR field should invoke article 26 (progressive development),
in addition to articles 4, 5 or 7. They must demonstrate concrete
injury to actual persons that is proximately caused by the
regressive action and is imputable to the State. 
B. Failure to Take Reasonable Steps to Prevent
Injury to Life and Health by Private Actors
States Parties to the Convention are obligated not only to refrain from impairing
protected rights through their direct acts, but also to protect individuals from acts and
omissions of private third parties that impair those rights. Where the State fails to
prevent, investigate, sanction and/or remedy injuries to life and health caused by third
parties, States Parties to the Convention may be held responsible under article 4. The
Court and Commission have repeatedly emphasized this foundational principle of the
inter-American human rights system.39
39 See, e.g. , Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988, paras. 166
(“This obligation [to “ensure” the free and full exercise of the rights recognized by the Convention]
implies the duty of the States Parties to organize the governmental apparatus and, in general, all the
structures through which public power is exercised, so that they are capable of juridically ensuring
the free and full enjoyment of human rights. As a consequence of this obligation, the States must
prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the rights recognized by the Convention and,
moreover, if possible attempt to restore the right violated and provide compensation as warranted
for damages resulting from the violation.”) (emphasis added), 176 (“If the State apparatus acts in
such a way that the violation goes unpunished and the victim’s full enjoyment of such rights is not
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An illegal act which violates human rights and which is initially not
directly imputable to a State (for example, because it is the act of a
private person or because the person responsible has not been
identified) can lead to international responsibility of the State, not
because of the act itself, but because of the lack of due diligence to
prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the Convention.
. . . What is decisive is whether a violation of the rights recognized by
the Convention has occurred with the support or the acquiescence of
the government, or whether the State has allowed the act to take place
without taking measures to prevent it or to punish those responsible.40
This principle should be extended to third-party abuse of the right to life in ESCR
contexts. Examples of situations in which the State can be held responsible because
of its failure to regulate include: (a) private industrial contamination of food and water
sources; (b) hazardous use of agricultural chemical sprays; and (c) unreasonable
private workplace hazards. 
1. Industrial Contamination of Food and Water
Sources
The Commission has explicitly recognized the state duty, under article 4, to take
affirmative measures to protect against third-party contamination of food, air, and
water sources that threatens life and health. It has recognized, for example, that oil
exploitation activities in Ecuador have exposed inhabitants of the region “to toxic
byproducts . . . in their drinking and bathing water, in the air they breath[e], and in the
soil they cultivate to produce food.”41 This has posed “considerable risk to human
health and life” through greatly increased risk of serious illness.42 The Commission
directly tied these health risks to article 4: “The realization of the right to life, and to
physical security and integrity[,] is necessarily related to and in some ways dependent
upon one’s physical environment. Accordingly, where environmental contamination
and degradation pose a persistent threat to human life and health, [articles 4, 5 and
7] are implicated.”43
restored as soon as possible, the State has failed to comply with its duty to ensure the free and full
exercise of those rights to the persons within its jurisdiction. The same is true when the State allows
private persons or groups to act freely and with impunity to the detriment of the rights recognized
in the Convention.”) (emphasis added). 
40 Id. paras. 172–73 (enphasis added); see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of
Jan. 20, 1989 (Ser. C) No. 5, paras. 181–82; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Caballero Delgado and Santana
Case, Judgment of Dec. 8, 1995 (Ser. C) No. 22, para. 56.
41 ECUADOR REPORT 1996, supra note 18, at vi, 79. 
42 Id. at 89–90 (recognizing that “[h]uman exposure to oil and oil-related chemicals, through the skin
or ingested in food or water, or through fumes absorbed via the respiratory system, has been widely
documented to cause adverse effects to human health and life” and documenting studies
demonstrating that, “[i]n the instant case, emerging data indicates the considerable risk posed to
human life and health by oil exploitation activities in the Oriente”). 
43 Id. at 88. 
A former Commission President has also linked article 4 with the increased health
risks caused by unregulated industrial contamination of potable water sources. “When
toxic effluents are poured directly into the drinking water of the population, the
epidemiological consequences are well known—increases in disease, stillbirths,
malformation of fetuses, disease and diminish[ed] life expectancy.” These health
consequences, the Commission President concluded, put the right to life, protected by
article 4, in jeopardy.44
The Commission has thus made clear that “[s]evere environmental pollution” that
poses a “persistent threat to human life and health” may give rise to an article 4
violation. It has affirmed that “[c]onditions of severe environmental pollution, which
may cause serious physical illness, impairment and suffering on the part of the local
populace, are inconsistent with the right to be respected as a human being,” the
principle that “underlies the fundamental protections of the right to life and to
preservation of physical well-being.” 45
Private companies were directly responsible for this contamination. The State was
nonetheless found internationally responsible for the resultant injuries because of its
failure to regulate private acts that contravened the fundamental rights of the affected
individuals.46 Indeed, the Court’s article 1(1) jurisprudence makes clear that the State
is responsible for illegal acts by private parties that violate human rights, where the
State fails to act with “due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as
required by the Convention,” i.e., with a serious investigation, punishment of
perpetrators, and compensation for victims.47 Article 4, read with article 1(1), thus
obligates States Parties to adopt appropriate legislation to protect against pollution, to
remedy existing contamination, to compensate injured parties, and to prevent future
recurrence by punishing perpetrators and vigorously enforcing regulatory
legislation.48 An article 4 violation may be alleged where injury to life or health
proximately results from the concerned State’s failure to take one or more of these
essential measures.
44 Address of the President of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Dr. Alvaro Tirado
Mejía, before the Permanent Council of the OAS, Wash., D.C., Feb. 6, 1995, in IACHR ANNUAL
REPORT 1995, supra note 22, at 275, 278 (“Article 4 of the American Convention requires
governments to protect the right to life. That right is in jeopardy for example when water, without
which life cannot be imagined, is polluted by unregulated industrial processes.”). 
45 ECUADOR REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at vi, 92.
46 See id. at 92 (“The State of Ecuador must ensure that measures are in place to prevent and protect
against the occurrence of environmental contamination which threatens the lives of the inhabitants
of development sectors. Where the right to life of Oriente residents has been infringed upon by
environmental contamination, the Government is obliged to respond with appropriate measures of
investigation and redress.”) (emphasis added).
47 See, e.g. , Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case , Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No.
4, para. 172.
48 See, e.g., ECUADOR REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 94 (“[I]t is the obligation of the State to
respect and ensure the rights of the inhabitants . . . and the responsibility of the
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The right to have one’s life respected is not . . . limited to protection
against arbitrary killing. States Parties are required to take positive
measures to safeguard life and physical integrity. S e v e re
environmental pollution may pose a threat to human life and health,
and in the appropriate case give rise to an obligation on the part of a
state to take reasonable measures to prevent such risk, or the necessary
measures to respond when persons have suffered injury.49
Although the Commission’s report was not part of contentious proceedings, the
Commission suggested a finding of state responsibility based on the State’s failure:
(1) to regulate private uses that created actual or imminent damage to the life and
health of affected individuals; (2) to enforce such regulations; and (3) to provide an
effective remedy to victims. This failure constituted a material omission, in violation
of articles 4 and 1. Where concrete injury to the life and health of specific individuals
can be shown, similar cases should be brought under the inter-American organs’
contentious jurisdiction.
2. Hazardous Use of Chemical Sprays and
Pesticides
Article 4 may be implicated, in a similar manner, by the unregulated use of chemical
sprays and pesticides in the private agricultural industry. Many of these sprays pose a
high risk to human health and life and are often applied by persons using no protective
gear. Sometimes they are applied by hand; sometimes they are aerially sprayed over
fields in which humans continue to work. Many of these sprays are outlawed in the
United States, the European Union, and many Latin American states because of their
extreme toxicity to human life and health. 
Advocates may allege an article 4 violation for the unregulated use of chemical sprays
where two conditions are met. First, it must be shown that the use of such chemical
sprays caused actual or imminent injury to human life. Second, it must be shown that
the State failed to take reasonable measures to regulate the use of dangerous
chemicals in the private market. Depending on the chemical, reasonable measures
Government to implement the measures necessary to remedy the current situation and
prevent future oil and oil-related contamination which would threaten the lives and health
of these people . . . . ‘Decontamination is needed to correct mistakes that ought never to
have happened.’ Both the State and the companies conducting oil exploitation activities
are responsible for such anomalies, and both should be responsible for correcting them. It
is the duty of the State to ensure that they are corrected.”), vi (“[T]he adoption of
legislation to strengthen protection against pollution and the pursuit of clean up activities
by private licensee companies, must be fully implemented and complemented by further
action to remedy existing contamination and prevent future recurrences.”), 92 (“Where the
right to life, to health and to live in a healthy environment is already protected by law, the
Convention requires that the law be effectively applied and enforced.”) (emphasis added).
49 Id. at 88 (emphasis added).
might include prohibiting the substance on the domestic market, regulating its use
through the issuance of special permits, specifying the protective gear that must be
worn when applying the substance, or regulating the time periods in which humans
are prohibited from entering sprayed areas without specialized protective gear.
Required measures also include taking reasonable steps to monitor compliance with
regulations, seriously investigating reports of abuse, sanctioning violators, and
ensuring effective remedies to victims of chemical spray poisoning. 
3. Unreasonable Private Workplace Hazards
Finally, a State may be held responsible for violations of the right to life that occur in
private workplaces. While the State itself has the obligation to remove hazards to
worker health and safety in public workplaces, it is obligated to ensure that private
employers remove the same kinds of hazards in privately owned workplaces. This
means legislating safety regulations for private industry, monitoring compliance with
those regulations, seriously investigating allegations of breach of the law and abuse
of rights, punishing perpetrators, and ordering adequate reparation for injuries
suffered as a result of private abuse. The same test would apply in the private
workplace as in the public workplace, although the measures required of the State
differ slightly.
PROPOSED ARTICLE 4 ALLOCATION OF BURDENS FOR
PRIVATE WORKPLACE SAFETY CASES
PETITIONER: Burden of Proof
1. Significant risks to health and/or life were present in the
workplace.
2. Person(s) suffered death or concrete harm to life as a proximate
result of that risk; and
3. State had a duty to regulate private workplace health and safety
risks.
STATE: Rebuttal Burden
1. State took reasonable steps necessary to avoid death or injury
to workers as a result of the risk. 
A Mexican workplace safety case was recently brought to the attention of the
Commission. Petitioners, employees of a private chemical company, were injured by
a chemical explosion in the factory. Despite clearly hazardous and illegal storage
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conditions in the factory, state inspectors had consistently given the company a
positive inspection rating. The victims of the explosion unsuccessfully sought
remedies from the State in Mexico’s legal system. Though the petition was found
inadmissible on procedural grounds, it has strong potential on the merits. By giving
the private company’s risky and illegal conduct official approval, the State ratified the
risk to human life and health, thus incurring international responsibility in the terms
of the Convention. The State also incurred international responsibility by failing to
sanction the factory owners and to ensure compensation to the injured workers. 
C. Failure to Take Appropriate Measures to
Protect the Right to Life in the Face of
Disasters and Extreme Poverty
Article 4 protects the right of all persons to respect for their life. This requires that all
persons have, at the very least, access to the “minimum core content” of this right. In
the ESCR context, this minimum threshold consists of basic subsistence rights
necessary for human survival (food, water, warmth, shelter, basic health care). Most
people in most societies can meet their own needs without direct assistance from the
State; that is, where the State refrains from actively violating rights and creates a legal
framework in which violations by third parties can be vindicated. Under certain
circumstances, however, individuals cannot meet their own subsistence needs without
State assistance. When this happens, article 4 should be viewed as requiring States
Parties to directly provide minimum services necessary to preserve life. As the
Commission has affirmed, “without satisfaction of these basic needs, an individual’s
survival is directly threatened. This obviously diminishes the individual’s rights to life
[art. 4] . . . .”50
State assistance becomes necessary in situations of extreme poverty and where
natural or human disasters hit. The Commission has recognized extreme poverty “as
a condition of life so limited by malnutrition, disease, illiteracy, low life expectancy
and high infant mortality as to be beneath any rational definition of human decency
and dignity.”51 Persons may be unexpectedly thrown into such a condition, moreover,
through the onset of natural disasters, e.g., widely destructive hurricanes, droughts,
floods, tornadoes, or earthquakes—particularly when homes, food supplies, and
medical centers have been destroyed or rendered unusable. The same is true where
50 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 20, at 522–23 (emphasis added). The Commission
further stated: “When the most vulnerable members of society are denied access to the basic needs
for survival which would enable them to break out of their condition, it results in the right to be
free from discrimination [being willfully violated].” Id. 
51 Id. at523; INTER-AM. COMM. H.R., REPORT ONTHE SITUATIONOF HUMAN RIGHTSIN NICARAGUA 153
(1981), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.53, Doc. 25 (citing WORLD BANK, POVERTYAND BASIC NEEDS (1980)). 
human disasters are unleashed, e.g., armed conflict, bombing raids, oil spills, or toxic
environmental contamination.52
Where the State fails to take appropriate preventative or responsive measures to
protect the subsistence rights of individuals in such circumstances, and concrete
injury to life results, an article 4 violation might be asserted. Two legal grounds may
be urged in support. First, the Convention would largely be deprived of its raison
d’etre if it were to be read not to establish a minimum core obligation to ensure a life
that at least meets a rational standard of human dignity. The duty to ensure the
minimum core content of rights has been explicitly recognized by the Commission,53
by U.N. specialized bodies,54 and by other international experts in the field of ESCR.55
Petitioners should urge the Court to incorporate this duty into its own jurisprudence.
The Court will likely be most willing to do so in the context of violations of the right
to life under Convention article 4, although it will likely require significant assistance
in determining the content of the “minimum core” of the right to life in each particular
case.
Second, the “state custody” jurisprudence of the Court and Commission recognizes
that the State has an immediate duty to guarantee the life and health of persons who
52 The Commission has recognized that neither “necessity” nor military error is a defense or
justification for the violation of the right to life and health. Over the objections of the United States,
it found a case admissible in which an insane asylum was bombed by U.S. military aircraft in
Grenada, leaving the surviving residents without shelter, food, medicines, and any other effective
remedy. Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Application No. 9213, Disabled Peoples’ International against
United States, Decision of Commission as to Admissibility, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-
AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1986–1987, at 184, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.71 Doc. 9 rev. 1
(1987) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1986–87].
53 See, e.g., IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 20, at 524 (“[T]he obligation of member states
to observe and defend the human rights of individuals within their jurisdictions, as set forth in both
the American Declaration and the American Convention, obligates them, regardless of the level of
economic development, to guarantee a minimum threshold of these rights.”) (emphasis added).
54 See, e.g., The Nature of States Parties Obligations, General Comment No. 3, U.N. ESCOR, Comm.
on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., 5th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 83, para. 10, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23
(1990), available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(symbol)/CESCR+General+comment+3.
En?OpenDocument> (“[T]he Committee is of the view that a minimum core obligation to ensure
the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent
upon every State party. Thus, for example, a State party in which any significant number of
individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and
housing, or of the most basic forms of education is, prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations
under the Covenant. If the Covenant were to be read in such a way as not to establish such a
minimum core obligation, it would largely be deprived of its raison d’être.”) (emphasis added). 
55 See, e.g., The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan.
26, 1997, para. 9, reprinted in 20 HUM. RTS. Q. 691 (1998) (“Violations of the Covenant occur
when a State fails to satisfy what the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has
referred to as ‘a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum
essential levels of each of the rights . . . .’Such minimum core obligations apply irrespective of the
availability of resources of the country concerned or any other factors and difficulties.”). 
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have no recourse other than the State to ensure their rights.56 As the Commission has
stated, when an individual is in state custody, he has “no means to turn to his relatives
and friends, to an attorney or to a private physician; the State, therefore, ha[s]
complete control over his life and personal safety,”57 thus becoming the immediate
guarantor of his rights to health and life. The operative factor in the Commission’s
reasoning is that the affected individual had no recourse to anyone other than the
State for protection of his right to health and life. Where an individual suffers injury
to life under such circumstances, the State “must claim and adequately substantiate
that it took the measures necessary to guarantee the life and health of the affected
individual.”58
The necessary interpretive jump between state custody and non-state custody settings
is not difficult to make, particularly since the State is the guarantor u n d e r
international law of all of the rights recognized in the Convention for all persons
subject to its jurisdiction—not just those in state custody.59 Thus, the Commission’s
holding in the Hernández Case—that the State violated its “duty to guarantee the
health and life” of a detainee, based on the fact that the victim was “without the
possibility of recourse” to any other outside source—can be interpreted to support the
notion that whenever persons are unable to meet their subsistence needs by
themselves or through social networks (for any reason beyond their control), the state
has a duty under article 4 to take direct responsibility for the protection and
preservation of life and health.60
56 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Neira Alegría et al. Case, Judgment of Jan. 19, 1995 (Ser. C) No 20,
para. 60; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez and progeny; Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report
No. 28/96, Case 11.297, Juan Hernández (Guate.), Oct. 16, 1996, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996,
supra note 4, at 406.
57 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 28/96, Case 11.297, Juan Hernández (Guate.), Oct. 16, 1996,
in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 406, para. 60 (“The Guatemalan State . . .
violated by omission its duty to guarantee the health and life of Mr. Hernández Lima since the
victim was in its custody and had no means to turn to his relatives and friends, to an attorney or to
a private physician; the State, therefore, had complete control over his life and personal safety.”)
(emphasis added).
58 Id. para. 59. 
59 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No. 4, para. 166
(“The second obligation of the States Parties is to ‘ensure’the free and full exercise of the rights
recognized by the Convention to every person subject to its jurisdiction. This obligation implies the
duty of the States Parties to organize the governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures
through which public power is exercised, so that they are capable of juridically ensuring the free
and full enjoyment of human rights.”) (emphasis added).
60 As has been noted in regard to the right to food: 
In extraordinary circumstances , when individuals or groups by themselves, for
various reasons, cannot take care of their own needs (i.e. when respect,
protection, and facilitation of food rights prove insufficient), states have the
obligation to fulfill the right to adequate food—i.e. to be a direct provider. This
obligation generally consists of direct provision of goods and services, such as
food and other humanitarian aid when no other possibility exists. This may be
PROPOSED INTERPRETATION
OF STATE DUTY UNDER ARTICLE 4
As guarantor of the right to life under articles 4 and 1(1), States
Parties must take direct responsibility for the protection and
preservation of the life and health of persons who have no recourse
to alternative assistance beyond the State for ensuring basic
subsistence rights.
Significantly, this state duty was already envisaged in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which provides for “the right to security in the event of
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in
circumstances beyond [one’s] control.”61 The Universal Declaration may be invoked
to assist in interpreting article 4 under article 29(d) of the Convention. A “lack of
livelihood in circumstances beyond [one’s] control” often arises for poor communities
when natural or human-made disasters exacerbate already-desperate conditions, as
well as in situations of extreme poverty. Such circumstances, it should be argued, give
rise to the state duty to ensure the minimum core content of rights to affected persons
who have no other recourse for protection of their rights, and thus are dependent on
the State for protection of their human dignity.
Indeed, in situations of natural or human disasters, affected individuals are very often
“without the possibility of recourse” to any other assistance beyond that of the State
for protection of their health, life, and personal integrity. In effect, then, from a
practical viewpoint, their situation is similar to that of a person under direct state
custody. The State may thus be considered the direct guarantor of their essential
rights, required to act with due diligence to protect affected individuals’rights to life
and health. The same is true of persons living in extreme poverty, who have no
recourse other than the State to assist them with their subsistence needs. 
As in the previous examples, the burden is on the petitioner to demonstrate concrete
injury, causation, and imputability. The State then bears the rebuttal burden of
demonstrating that it took reasonable steps to avoid the injury. Petitioners should be
aware that a finding of imputability will likely require that they demonstrate the State
knew of the individual’s specific condition, yet failed to reasonably respond. 
necessary, for example, to protect workers and their families when extreme
unemployment sets in (such as under recession); to provide special feeding and
health care for needy young children and social security programs for the needy
elderly; to protect populations during sudden situations of natural disasters or
civil conflict; and/or to protect those who are marginalized due to structural
transformations in the economy or production.
MELISH, supra note 24, at 58 (internal citations omitted).
61 Universal Declaration, supra note 37, art. 25(1) (emphasis added). 
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Practice Tip
Where acts imputable to the State, such as those described above,
cause concrete but non-life-impairing harm to health, petitioners
should make the above arguments invoking article 5 (personal
integrity) and/or article 7 (personal security) rather than article 4
(life).
III. Right to Personal Integrity (Art. 5)
Article 5 of the Convention establishes the right of every person to respect for his or
her “physical, mental, and moral integrity” (art. 5(1)) and to be free from “cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment” (art. 5(2)). Direct deprivation, and other indirect
limitations, of basic ESCR—such as minimum health care, food, potable water,
education, adequate housing, safe workplace conditions, a healthy environment, and
social security—plainly affect not only the physical, but also the mental and moral
integrity of human beings for whom such basic subsistence goods are out of reach.
Other affirmative acts by state authorities and private parties, particularly with regard
to workplace safety, housing, and health, may constitute “cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment” in violation of article 5—either alone or in conjunction with articles 4
and/or 7. 
ARTICLE 5
1. Every person has the right to have his physical, mental, and
moral integrity respected.
2. No one shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman, or
degrading . . . treatment. All persons deprived of their
liberty shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity
of the human person.
Both the Court and Commission have affirmed that article 5 should be interpreted
expansively to protect against a wide range of debasing acts. The Commission has
stated, “The right to personal integrity protected under the American Convention and
by other international human rights instruments encompasses far more than a ban on
beatings, physical torture or other forms of treatment that leave traces or visible
marks on the victim.”62 The Court has likewise stated that the violation of the right to
personal integrity encompasses a wide range of acts, each of which must be
considered in its specific context, and cannot be limited to torture or other
immediately physical bodily aggressions. 
The violation of the right to physical and psychological integrity of
persons is a category of violation that has several gradations and
embraces treatment ranging from torture to other types of humiliation
or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment with varying degrees of
physical and psychological effects caused by endogenous and
exogenous factors which must be proven in each specific situation.63
Whether article 5 has been violated, therefore, will depend not only upon the
degrading treatment itself, but also upon the “endogenous” and “exogenous” factors
influencing how the given victim experiences that treatment. This distinction is
important for finding article 5 violations in the ESCR context. “Endogenous factors”
refer to the internally experienced aspects of a victim’s particular situation.
“Exogenous factors” refer to the external conditions that affect the victim’s
experience of abuse. Thus, an article 5 violation might clearly arise for one person in
one set of circumstances, but not for another who experienced the same act in a
d i fferent set of circumstances. A chronically malnourished person from a
marginalized region who has been repeatedly denied health, education and other basic
social services may experience a given act by a state official differently—physically
and psychologically—than will a person who has never suffered hunger nor been
mistreated by state authority. Denials of health care and restricted access to food
markets and clean water supplies, in particular, will affect impoverished persons
much more intensely than people who are not poor.
To support article 5 claims, endogenous and exogenous conditions should be
described clearly in petitions before the Court. The Commission has followed this
practice, for example, in denouncing article 5 violations against indigenous activists
in the Mexican State of Chiapas, citing statistics describing the impoverishment,
historic neglect, and marginality of the population of Mexico’s poorest region.64 The
Court has likewise considered the endogenous and exogenous conditions of at-risk
“street children” in Guatemala, noting the particular gravity of the article 5 violation
given that it occurred “in a context of great violence against children and youths who
lived on the streets.”65
62 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 49/99, Case 11.610, Loren Laroye Riebe Star et al. (Mex.), in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 4, at 724, para. 91 (flatly rejecting State argument that
a medical exam concerning the physical condition of a victim was sufficient to prove the absence
of any act violating article 5) (emphasis added). 
63 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Loayza Tamayo Case, Judgment of Sept. 17, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 33, para. 57
(emphasis added).
64 See Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 49/99, Case 11.610, Loren Laroye Riebe Star et al. (Mex.),
in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 4.
65 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Villagrán Morales et al. Case (the “Street Children” Case), Judgment of Nov.
19, 1999 (Ser. C) No. 63, para. 167; see also id. para. 79 (“In Guatemala, at the time the events
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EXAMPLES: 
Endogenous Factors: Victim’s particular situation of:
• impoverishment;
• health problems, disease, disability, or malnutrition;
• repeated experience of denial of health care, education, or other
basic social services;
• consistent mistreatment by public authorities based on
indigence or social, cultural, ethnic or racial background, etc. 
Exogenous Factors: Community/group/regional history of:
• State neglect;
• impunity for human rights violations;
• notorious corruption in provision of basic social services, etc.;
• racism/group discrimination.
The right to personal integrity has three distinct elements—physical, mental, and
moral—each of which may be the basis for violations of article 5. They are discussed
in turn below.
A. Physical Integrity
Given the region’s recent history of military dictatorship, it is not surprising that inter-
American jurisprudence on the article 5(1) right to physical integrity has been limited
almost exclusively to torture and other severe forms of physical abuse committed in
state custody. This by no means, however, limits the spectrum of situations in which
a violation of article 5, in its “physical” element, can be found. Both the Court and
Commission are open to considering “new” violations of article 5, even where the
underlying acts are not mentioned in the American Convention or Declaration. 
The Commission, for example, has expressly found that rape and other forms of
sexual abuse committed by or with the acquiescence of state agents, while not
explicitly mentioned in the Convention, constitute clear violations of the right to
physical integrity protected by article 5(1).66 The “physical” violation results not only
from the physical injury that accompanies rape, but also from unwanted pregnancy.
occurred, there was a common pattern of illegal acts perpetrated by State security agents against
‘street children’; this practice included threats, arrests, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and
homicides as a measure to counter juvenile delinquency and vagrancy.”). 
66 The Commission further found that rape by state authorities fits the established definition of
“torture,” violating article 5(2) as well as 5(1). See Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 5/96, Case
10.970, Raquel Martín de Mejía (Peru), in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1995, supra note 22, at 195,
200 (using article 29(b) to interpret the American Convention in light of the Inter-American
Convention to Prevent and Sanction Torture).
Such precedents can be drawn upon to allege similar claims in the labor context. The
exposure of agricultural workers to unwanted chemical sprays without the benefit of
protective equipment may, for example, violate the physical element of article 5(1).
Similarly, where maquila or other industrial workers are forced to submit to
sterilization, other birth control methods, or sexual favors as quid pro quo for
retaining employment, article 5(1)’s physical component may be violated. 
The Commission has also found that a State violates a prison inmate’s right to
physical integrity by denying him adequate medical attention.67 The Cesti Hurtado
case occurred in the special context of state custody, where the State assumes direct
responsibility for the life and physical integrity of prisoners.68 As discussed above,
however, this principle can be extended to non-custody situations where an individual
is directly dependent on state care and has no outside recourse for protection. This
would be the case, for example, where an individual seeks emergency medical
attention or is otherwise unable to obtain private health services. A State would also
violate article 5(1), in conjunction with article 24 (nondiscrimination), where it
denied medical attention to individuals based on a prohibited status, such as race,
ethnicity, gender, religion, socio-economic status, birth, etc.
The article 5(1) right to physical integrity protects individuals from all acts, imputable
to the State, that concretely impair physical integrity. Article 5(1) is thus particularly
relevant to the rights to health and to a healthy work and living environment; where
responsibility can be imputed to the State for acts and omissions that cause increased
incidence of malnutrition, sickness, stunting, birth defects, work injuries, disease,
etc.—i.e., health risks affecting physical integrity—an article 5 violation may be
alleged before the Commission or Court. Three key elements must be demonstrated
clearly in all petitions: (1) physical injury to human beings; (2) a causal connection
to the challenged act; and (3) imputability to the State. A short list of potential
examples includes: 
• Denial of health care: A victim is turned away from emergency care at a
public health center or hospital, and, as a result, suffers physical harm. 
• Dangerous work conditions: A worker in the public sector or, where the
state regulates private workplace conditions, in the private sector, suffers
physical injury as a direct result of hazardous work conditions.
67 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Cesti Hurtado Case , Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Jan. 26, 1999 (Ser.
C) No. 49, para. 7(6). While the Court did not reject the Commission’s contention, it found that the
record did not support a finding that the alleged victim had in fact been denied adequate medical
attention. See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Cesti Hurtado Case, Judgment of Sept. 29, 1999 (Ser. C) No. 56,
para. 160.
68 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Neira Alegría et al. Case, Judgment of Jan. 19, 1995 (Ser. C) No 20,
para. 60; Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 28/96, Case 11.297, Juan Hernández (Guate.), Oct.
16, 1996, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 406, 408, para. 60–61.
262
Integration A p p ro a c h
263
A rt. 5: Personal Integrity
• Failure to vaccinate children: Child suffers sickness as a result of the state’s
failure to comply with a national vaccination program.69
• Agro-chemical sprays: A worker suffers physical injury or sickness as a
result of agro-chemical sprays applied without adequate protective gear.
• Destruction of food crops: A family or community suffers physical injury
(sickness; malnutrition) as a result of state-authorized restriction of access
to food markets, destruction of crops, or contamination of water supplies.
The Commission has further established that procedural safeguards must be taken
whenever the State undertakes any type of physical intervention with a human person.
These safeguards include: (1) the prior acquisition of a judicial order; and (2) the
promulgation of guidelines for proper conduct while undertaking the intervention.
This is true even when the procedure at issue is not per se illegal. In the case of Ms.
X, the Commission found the Argentine prison policy of conducting vaginal searches
of women visitors who wanted personal contact with prisoners to violate the article
5(1) right to physical and moral integrity. It resolved: 
The procedure in question is not per se illegal. Nevertheless, when the
state [undertakes] any kind of physical intervention [with] individuals,
it must observe certain conditions in order to ensure that such
treatment does not generate a greater degree of anguish and
humiliation than that which is inevitable. Such a measure should
always be the consequence of a judicial order which assures some
control over the decision as to the necessity of its application and that
the person subjected to it does not feel defenseless before the
authorities. Moreover, the measure should always be performed by
qualified personnel exercising the necessary care to ensure that no
physical harm results from the procedure and conducting the
examination in such manner so as to ensure that those persons
submitted to it do not feel that their mental and moral integrity has
been affected.70
This principle, which applies to “any kind of physical intervention [with]
individuals”—or intervention with individuals’intimate physical space—by the state,
should be equally applicable to state-authorized forced evictions.71 While the eviction
69 See, e.g. , Viceconte v. Argentina, Ministry of Health and Social Action, s/amparo ley 16.986, No.
31.777/96 (1998) (national court finds Argentina responsible for violating right to health of citizens
by failing to provide vaccine, in accordance with national health plan, to area suffering from viral
epidemic). 
70 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 38/96, Case 10.506, Ms. X (Arg.), Oct. 15, 1996, in IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 50, para. 87.
71 The Commission regards “any kind of physical intervention” as a broad category, not limited to
actual physical contact. In the case of Ms. X, for example, the Commission described visual vaginal
exams as “physical interventions” that violate article 5 when undertaken without the requisite
procedural safeguards. “Physical interventions” may, therefore, better be described as state
of squatters or occupiers from public or private property is not per se illegal, it must,
in order to be lawful, be based upon a properly acquired judicial order—granted only
after potential evictees are afforded reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard,
in accordance with Convention article 8—and be undertaken under conditions that do
not subject the evictee(s) to more anguish and humiliation than is inevitable in such
circumstances. For this to occur, states should be required to establish guidelines for
the proper conduct of authorities during evictions. 
Whenever the State undertakes any type of intervention with a
p e r s o n ’s intimate physical space, it must take the following
procedural safeguards: 
• prior acquisition of a judicial order; and
• strict adherence to proper conduct guidelines for authorities
undertaking the intervention. 
B. Mental and Moral Integrity
ESCR violations generally affect a person’s “mental and moral” integrity as much as
their “physical” integrity, particularly for marginalized and impoverished sectors. In
its evolving jurisprudence, the Commission has interpreted the right to “moral” and
“mental” integrity under article 5(1) broadly, finding Convention violations where
acts imputable to States resulted in “emotional trauma,”72 “trauma and anxiety,”73
abandonment of development work and social justice activities,74 flight from one’s
interventions with a person’s intimate physical space. This definition plainly includes forced
evictions, which may not always involve direct physical contact.
72 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 47/96, Case 11.436, Survivors of the “13 de marzo”
(Cuba), in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 132, para. 106 (finding Cuba responsible
for violating personal integrity of 31 survivors in refugee boat fleeing to the United States as a
consequence of the emotional trauma resulting from the shipwreck caused by Cuba). 
73 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 32/96, Case 10.553, María Mejía (Guate.), Oct. 16,
1996, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 370, para. 60 (finding Guatemala
responsible for threats by military officials to community members that “caused trauma and anxiety
to the victims and constrained their ability to lead their lives as they desire”).
74 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 29/96, Case 11.303, Ranferí Gómez (Guate.), Oct. 16, 1996, in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 425, paras. 77–80 (describing “series of events with
a common pattern and intent: the destruction of his personality, so that he would be cowed into
quitting his social work. The periodic threats . . . constitute cruel, inhumane and degrading
treatment and have left a serious psychological scar on [the victim]”) (emphasis added).
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community due to an inability to lead one’s life as one desires,75 “humiliation,”76
“intimidation” and “sowing the seeds of panic,”77 “fear for one’s life, ”78 and “a
serious psychological scar.”79 It has also found that acts affecting an individual’s
“personal self-esteem . . . translate[] into important damage to his moral integrity.”80
Likewise, an act that “affects the normal development of daily life and causes great
tumult and perturbation to him and his family . . . [provoking] constant uncertainty
about his future,” “seriously damages his mental and moral integrity,”81 in violation
of article 5(1).
The Court, moreover, has held that, “even if no other physical or ill treatment
occurred,” the mere fact of being placed in the trunk of a police vehicle “constitutes
an infringement of Article 5 of the Convention relating to humane treatment”; “that
action alone must clearly be considered to contravene the respect due to the inherent
dignity of the human person.”82 The Court has also held that “prolonged isolation and
deprivation of communication are in themselves . . . harmful to the psychological and
75 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 32/96, Case 10.553, María Mejía (Guate.), Oct. 16,
1996, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 370, para. 60 (finding Guatemala
responsible for threats by military officials to community members that “constrained their ability
to lead their lives as they desire,” thereby forcing them to leave their community and reorganize
their lives).
76 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 43/96, Case 11.430, Gallardo Rodríquez (Mex.), Oct. 15, 1996,
in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 485, para. 79 (noting “humiliation of being the
target of attacks by military authorities in the Mexican media . . . seriously damages his mental and
moral integrity”).
77 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 32/96, Case 10.553, María Mejía (Guate.), Oct. 16,
1996, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 370, para. 61 (finding Guatemala
responsible for violating rights to mental and moral integrity through military attacks intended to
“intimidate” and “sow[] the seeds of panic” among community members); Inter-Am. Comm. H.R.,
Report No. 48/97, Case 11.411, Severiano Santiz Gomez et al. (Mex.), Feb. 18, 1998, in IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 4, at 637, para. 59 (finding Mexico responsible for infliction of
mental damage in violation of article 5 through “intimidating” behavior of military officials and
“creating panic” in poor, indigenous community). 
78 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 49/97, Case 11.520, Tomás Porfirio Rondin, “Aguas
Blancas” (Mex.), Feb. 18, 1998, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 4, at 662, paras.
76–77 (“[T]he Commission believes that the fact that these persons . . . experienced, for minutes,
the possibility that they might die as these events unfolded, produces serious mental and moral
damages to their persons . . . in violation of the right to physical mental and moral integrity . . . as
protected in Article 5 of the American Convention.”). 
79 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 29/96, Case 11.303, Carlos Ranferí Gómez (Guate.), Oct. 16,
1996, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 425, para. 77. 
80 Id. para. 81 (“[T]he physical deterioration which [the victim] suffers as a result of his wounds has
affected his self esteem. This effect constitutes significant damage to his moral integrity.”). 
81 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 43/96, Case 11.430, José Francisco Gallardo (Mex.), Oct. 15,
1996, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 485, para. 79.
82 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Castillo Páez Case, Judgment of Nov. 3, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 35, para. 66. 
moral integrity of the person and a violation of the right of any detainee to respect for
his inherent dignity as a human being.”83
While these violations have tended to arise in the CPR context, they are equally
applicable to the ESCR sphere. Indeed, particularly for persons at the social and
economic margin, threats to food supply, employment, basic health necessities,
housing, education, and social security may proximately cause “emotional trauma,”
“anxiety,” and “humiliation,” thus affecting a victim’s “normal development in daily
life” and causing “constant uncertainty about the future.”
Violations of “mental and moral integrity”
(art. 5(1)) may be found where acts imputable





• intimidation and panic;
• fear for one’s life;
• diminished “personal self-esteem” ; or
• derivative psychological effects.
or where they:
• affect a victim’s “normal development in daily life”;
• cause victim and family “great imbalances and disconcerts”;
• cause “constant uncertainty about the future”; or
• are “contrary to respect for the inherent dignity of the human
person” (for detainees).
Illegal evictions, one example of such violations, are often accompanied by physical
violence and destruction of the home and personal possessions. These abuses cause
83 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No. 4, para.
156; see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of Jan. 20, 1989 (Ser. C) No. 5,
para. 164 (same); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Suárez Rosero Case, Judgment of Nov. 12, 1997 (Ser. C) No.
35, para. 90 (“[I]solation from the outside world produces moral and psychological suffering in any
person, places him in a particularly vulnerable position, and increases the risk of aggression and
arbitrary acts in prison.”); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Villagrán Morales et al. Case (the “Street Children”
Case), Judgment of Nov. 19, 1999 (Ser. C) No. 63, para. 163 (“[Victims] experienced extreme
psychological and moral suffering during those hours . . . [in which they] were isolated from the
external world and certainly aware that their lives were in danger.”). 
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severe emotional trauma and anxiety for evictees, who find themselves without a
home and with no place to go for shelter, warmth, and physical protection. Such
evictions cause painful uncertainty about the future, severely affecting victims’
normal development in daily life. Where evictions do take place, they must be
preceded by a judicial order and undertaken according to promulgated guidelines in
which authorities are instructed not to destroy personal belongings and to ensure that
evictees have temporary shelter and assistance finding new housing.84
Damaging, destroying or contaminating food or water supplies of impoverished
households and communities or denying health care to people who are severely sick
or injured also violate the “mental and moral” elements of article 5(1). The constant
insecurity and uncertainty that these acts generate constitute a manifest violation of
the right to mental and moral integrity of the person, in violation of article 5. 
C. Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
Closely related to the right to mental and moral integrity, protected by article 5(1), is
the right to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, enshrined in article
5(2). The term “degrading treatment” has been defined to include any kind of act “that
causes severe mental or physical suffering which, under those particular
circumstances, turns out to be unjustifiable.”85 For its part, the U.N. General
Assembly has declared:
The term “cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment” has
not been defined by the General Assembly, but it should be interpreted
in such a way as to provide the broadest possible protection against
abuse, be it physical or mental.86
Based on these understandings, the Inter-American Commission has held that
situations that lead to “well-founded fear for one’s life and physical integrity” or to a
“state of uncertainty and fear” constitute cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in
violation of the Convention.87 The Court has found that certain acts that put an
84 See, e.g., Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F.Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fl. 1992) (federal court held city’s
routine seizure and destruction of homeless persons’ property constituted “cruel and unusual
punishment” under U.S. Constitution and enjoined city from destroying homeless persons’property
without following established procedures). The parties ultimately entered into a settlement
agreement. See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 76 F.3d 1154 (11th Cir. 1996).
85 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 49/99, Case 11.610, Loren Laroye Riebe Star et al. (Mex.), Apr.
13, 1999, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 4, at 724, para. 87 (citing European Human
Rights Commission expert NIGEL S. RODLEY,THE TREATMENTOF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW 73–74 (1987)). 
86 Cited in id.
87 See id. paras. 89–90 (concluding victims’fear for their lives and physical integrity “was both real
and legitimate” given the improper manner in which they were arrested, the fact they were
transferred blindfolded for several hours, were kept in a “state of uncertainty and fear,” were denied
use of bathroom, and were deprived of rest and sleep).
individual “in a particularly vulnerable position” can be considered cruel and
inhuman treatment, harmful to the psychological and moral integrity of the person, in
violation of article 5 of the Convention.88 The Court has held: 
The European Court of Human Rights has declared that, even in the
absence of physical injuries, psychological and moral suffering,
accompanied by psychic disturbance during questioning, may be
deemed inhuman treatment. The degrading aspect is characterized by
the fear, anxiety and inferiority induced for the purpose of humiliating
and degrading the victim and breaking his physical and moral
resistance. That situation is exacerbated by the vulnerability of the
person . . . . 89
The Court has further held that “being exhibited through the media wearing a
degrading garment” and “solitary confinement in a tiny cell with no natural light”
both “constitute forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in the terms of
Article 5(2).”90 It has stated, “The mere fact that the victim was for 36 days deprived
of any communication with the outside world, in particular with his family, allows the
Court to conclude that [the victim] was subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment.”91 Significantly, this conclusion was reinforced by the fact that the prisoner
was “held in a damp underground cell measuring approximately 15 square meters
with 16 other prisoners, without the necessary hygiene facilities, and that he was
obligated to sleep on newspaper.”92
The daily experience of millions of homeless persons in the Americas mirrors the
degradation suffered by these victims of direct abuse. Where it can be shown that the
State is directly responsible for forcing a person into such conditions of
homelessness,93 advocates may argue that article 5(2) is implicated. The inhuman and
degrading treatment suffered by each victim would have to be specifically pled in
petitions. Such treatment may also take the form of “punishment.” A U.S. federal
court has found, for example, that the destruction of homeless persons’ property,
88 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Suarez Rosero Case, Judgment of Nov. 12, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 35, para. 90,
read with Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case , Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No
4, para. 156 and Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case , Judgment of Jan. 20, 1989 (Ser. C) No.
5, para. 164 (referring to prolonged isolation and deprivation of communication with the exterior
world).
89 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Loayza Tamayo Case, Judgment of Sept. 17, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 33, para. 57
(emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
90 Id. para. 58. 
91 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Suarez Rosero Case, Judgment of Nov. 12, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 35, para. 91. 
92 Id. 
93 This may occur where state authorities forcefully evict or displace individuals from public or
private space without providing alternative accommodation. It may also occur where the State
allows private development to destroy low-income housing without providing alternative housing
options.
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when undertaken in retaliation for engaging in life-sustaining acts in public (eating,
sleeping, bathing, urinating), constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment” under the
U.S. Constitution.94
“Cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment” (art. 5(1))
may be found where acts imputable to States
Parties lead to:
• well-founded fear for one’s life and physical integrity
(Commission);
• a state of uncertainty and fear (Commission); or
• placing a person “in a particularly vulnerable position” (Court).
ESCR violations generally place their victims in “situations of particular
vulnerability,” leading to a state of “uncertainty and fear.” This is especially true
given that most ESCR victims are poor, with few alternatives to secure their
subsistence. When the few means upon which they do depend are denied or restricted,
they are placed in a situation of extreme insecurity leading to “well-founded fear for
their life and physical integrity.” The abusive acts and omissions creating these
situations should be viewed as “cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment,” in violation
of article 5(2). Petitions should always allege violation of article 5(1) and 5(2)
together.
IV. Freedom from Forced Labor (Art. 6)
Article 6 protects the right to be free from all forms of slavery and forced labor.
Though the Court has not yet pronounced on this provision, article 6 has important
implications for the protection of ESCR in the labor field and should be argued in
concrete cases under the Court’s contentious jurisdiction. This is particularly true in
regard to practices and institutions similar to slavery (e.g., debt bondage), oppressive
labor contracts and hazardous work conditions, exploitation of child labor, and traffic
in women. 
94 See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F.Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fl. 1992).
ARTICLE 6
1. No one shall be subject to slavery or to involuntary
servitude, which are prohibited in all their forms, as are the
slave trade and traffic in women.
2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory
labor. . . .
A. Practices and Institutions Similar to Slavery:
Debt Bondage
Various forms of slavery continue to be practiced in the Americas. Many of these
forms, all of which are prohibited under Convention article 6(1), have been
enumerated in the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave
Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery.95 This Convention, to which
twenty-one American States are party,96 can be invoked under Convention article 29
to assist in interpreting article 6(1). The Supplementary Convention expressly
recognizes as “similar to slavery” the institutions and practices of debt bondage,
serfdom, selling women into marriage, and delivering a child to another with a view
to exploiting the child or her labor. The Convention commits States Parties to take all
practicable measures to eradicate these practices. 
SUPPLEMENTARY CONVENTION ON THE ABOLITION
OF SLAVERY, THE SLAVE TRADE, AND INSTITUTIONS
AND PRACTICES SIMILAR TO SLAVERY, ART. 1
SECTION I. INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES SIMILAR TO
SLAVERY
95 226 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force April 30, 1957 [hereinafter Supplementary Convention],
available at <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/f3scas.htm>. Ratification information is
available at <http://www.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final/ts2/newfiles/part_boo/xviiiboo/xviii__1.html>.
96 The American States that have ratified the Supplementary Convention include: Antigua and
Barbuda, Argentina, Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Cuba, Dominica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Saint Lucia, St.
Vincent and the Grenadines, United States, and Uruguay. El Salvador and Peru have signed, but not
ratified, the Supplementary Convention. See <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty4.htm>
(last updated June 11, 2001).
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Article 1. Each of the States Parties to this Convention shall take all
practicable and necessary legislative and other measures
to bring about progressively and as soon as possible the
complete abolition or abandonment of the following
institutions and practices [similar to slavery] . . . .
(a) Debt bondage, that is to say, the status or condition arising from
a pledge by a debtor of his personal services or of those of a
person under his control as security for a debt, if the value of
those services as reasonably assessed is not applied towards
the liquidation of the debt or the length and nature of those
services are not respectively limited and defined;
(b) Serfdom, that is to say, the condition or status of a tenant who
is by law, custom or agreement bound to live and labour on land
belonging to another person and to render some determinate
service to such other person, whether for reward or not, and is
not free to change his status;
(c) [“Sale” of Women.] Any institution or practice whereby:  (i) A
woman, without the right to refuse, is promised or given in
marriage on payment of a consideration in money or in kind to
her parents, guardian, family or any other person or group; or (ii)
The husband of a woman, his family, or his clan, has the right to
transfer her to another person for value received or otherwise;
or (iii) A woman on the death of her husband is liable to be
inherited by another person; 
(d) [Child Exploitation] Any institution or practice whereby a child
or young person under the age of 18 years, is delivered by either
or both of his natural parents or by his guardian to another
person, whether for reward or not, with a view to the exploitation
of the child or young person or of his labour.
The most prevalent form of modern day slavery is debt bondage. Debt bondage
occurs when a person’s labor is demanded as a means of repayment of a loan.
Sometimes people are “sold” into bonded labor as a result of debts previously
incurred by the laborer or her family. More often, young people are enticed into
accepting verbal contracts on the basis of fraudulent promises of well paid work or
other opportunities. They are then taken to distant areas, often other countries, where
they are told that they owe large sums of money for their passage, upkeep, and/or to
pay the “referral service.” Bonded laborers’ debts are generally difficult, if not
impossible, to repay: debts often bear high interest rates and employers often force
the laborer to pay inflated sums for food, rent, and medical bills, which are added to
the original debt. The value of the work done by the laborer is invariably greater than
the original sum of money borrowed or advanced; bonded laborers are often tied to
their debt-holder for life. 
Cont...
Debt bondage, which persists in the Americas, is prohibited under Convention article
6 as well as the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery. It has been
well documented in countries such as Brazil and the Dominican Republic. Petitions
should be brought on behalf of victims of debt bondage in OAS member states, using
Convention article 6(1).
A fact pattern that seemed plainly to present such an article 6 violation was presented
to the Commission in its 1991 study of the situation of Haitian migrant workers in the
sugar plantations of the Dominican Republic.9 7 As the Commission reported,
Dominican “buscones,” paid by the sugar industry, lured thousands of poor Haitians
to the Dominican Republic with false promises of paid work. Once there, the workers
were trapped. Without visas or other identification, they could not leave the plantation
without facing arrest or deportation. They were paid in “tickets,” rather than currency,
redeemable only at the plantation store at a twenty percent discounted value. Food
and supplies had to be bought at the plantation store at inflated prices, adding to the
w o r k e r s ’ debt. The workers were physically abused and forced to live in
overcrowded, unhealthy conditions, with no potable water, latrines or medical facility.
Tuberculosis, diarrhea and malaria were frequently reported. These circumstances
clearly constituted “slavery” within the meaning of article 6. Nevertheless, the
Commission focused on the mass expulsions at the end of the harvest season, rather
than the slave-like conditions on the plantation, and did not mention article 6.98
Where bonded labor is implicated, future petitions should specifically plead the
violation of article 6.
B. Sub-Minimum Labor Conditions and Wages
The Commission has announced an article 6 violation in only one published case. In
Report No. 32/96, the Commission found that attacks and reprisals by the Guatemalan
military against indigenous community members for refusing to participate, without
remuneration, in the counter-insurgency vigilance work of the Civil Self-Defense
Patrols (PACs) violated article 6(2) of the Convention.99 Article 6(2), said the
Commission, “expressly proscribes forced labor, prohibits forced participation in the
PACs and protects the right to refuse such an obligation.”100 It cited the European
Court of Human Rights’ definition of  “forced labor” as “work: 1) executed by the
worker against his will; 2) which is unjust or oppressive in and of itself or which
involves an unjust or oppressive obligation.”101
97 See Special Report on Collective Expulsions of Haitians Working in Dominican Sugar Plantations
During Annual Harvest, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1991, supra note 19, at 278–79.
98 The Commission found the Dominican Republic had violated articles 8 (due process), 17 (rights of
the family), 19 (rights of the child), 20 (right to nationality), 22 (freedom of movement and
residence), and 25 (judicial protection). 
99 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 32/96, Case 10.553, María Mejía (Guate.), Oct. 16, 1996, in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 370, para. 62.
100 Id. 
101 See id. n.27 (citing Eur. Ct. H.R., Iversen v. Norway, App. No. 1468/62, Judgment of Dec. 17, 1963,
in 6 Y.B. EUR. CONVENTION ON H.R. 338). 
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“Forced Labor” is work that is: 
• done by the worker against her will; and
• unjust or oppressive in and of itself or involves an unjust or
oppressive obligation
This definition may be used as a guide, in conjunction with domestic legislation102 and
international law,103 for building arguments for finding article 6 violations in a wide
spectrum of ESCR cases. In particular, article 6(2) may be invoked to challenge sub-
minimum labor conditions and wages.
Most OAS member states have detailed legislation providing minimum standards for
wages and labor conditions for the various industries in their internal jurisdictions.
Most of these States are also party to one or more ILO Conventions and other
international instruments, such as the ICESCR,104 protecting the labor rights of child
and adult workers. The American Convention imposes a legal obligation on States
Parties to enforce the minimum wage and labor standards in force in each State and
to ensure that public and private employers do not fall below these minimum
standards.105 Where these minimum standards are not enforced, or where a State
systematically fails to investigate and sanction complaints of sub-minimum labor
conditions, and concrete injury to workers results, the State may be held accountable
for violating article 6(2).
This conclusion is based on the premise that an individual may not legally waive her
rights under minimum wage and labor laws nor contract around them. If a person is
working below legally based minimum standards, a legal presumption should be
created that she is doing so “against her will,” compulsorily, obliged to do so because
of her poverty, economic powerlessness, or other social or economic condition
(perhaps as a legal variant of “duress”). Accordingly, where minimum labor standards
102 The International Labour Organization provides an excellent bibliographic database to retrieve, by
country, national laws and regulations on labor, social security, and related human rights. See
NATLEX <http://natlex.ilo.org/scripts/natlexcgi.exe?lang=E>.
103 See, e.g., Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, Jun. 28, 1930, art. 2 (ILO No. 29)
(“For the purposes of this Convention the term forced or compulsory labour shall mean all work
or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the
said person has not offered himself voluntarily.”); Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced
Labour, Jun. 25, 1957 (ILO No. 105).
104 See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 37, art. 7. 
105 While this obligation is not explicit with regard to enforcement of minimum labor standards per se,
it expressly falls under the obligations imposed by articles 2 (domestic legal effects) and 25
(judicial protection) to ensure effective remedies for all acts that violate fundamental rights
recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned. 
are expressly prescribed in domestic law, it may be argued that the existence of sub-
minimum labor conditions in private and public workplaces creates a presumption of
an article 6(2) violation—such work being per se “unjust or oppressive” and the
worker “forced” (from a legal standpoint) to participate. Where minimum labor
standards are not expressly, but only generally or implicitly, prescribed in domestic
law, it may be necessary to present specific evidence of the “unjust or oppressive”
nature of the labor in petitions to the Commission and Court. 
Practice Tip
Check concerned State’s internal labor laws for their protective
scope and application, which ILO Conventions have been adopted,
and whether the ICESCR has been ratified.
Given the egregious labor conditions in the American States, an article 6 violation
might be alleged in a number of scenarios. The “maquila sector,” prevalent in many
American States, represents a prominent example of abuse. The sector generally
employs young female workers for excessive hours, in dangerous and unhygienic
conditions, under constant supervision, often at sub-minimum wage levels.1 0 6
Temporary or seasonal farm or plantation work, in which sub-minimum pay,
excessive hours, and inadequate housing and sanitary conditions are, in many areas,
the prevailing norm, is another important example.107 Such situations may give rise to
article 6 violations where affected workers can show that the State knew of, but failed
to take reasonable measures to remedy, the sub-minimum conditions to which they
were subjected. 
C. Exploitation of Children or their Labor
Article 6, pursuant to sections (1) and (2), is also directly implicated where child labor
is employed in exploitative conditions. Forms of child labor similar to slavery, such
106 Appendix B of this Manual presents a model petition alleging Convention violations arising from
the treatment of workers in such a factory.
107 See, e.g. , ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1994, at 188,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.88, Doc. 9 rev. (1995) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1994] (“[L]abor laws
[in Guatemala], particularly those with respect to unionization, wages, and working conditions, are
not observed in a large number of farming sectors. The Ministry of Labor itself was quoted in the
press in 1993 as saying that most coffee plantations do not pay the minimum wage. Working
conditions are even worse for hundreds of thousands of . . . temporary workers who come to the
coast with their families during harvest season. The [Commission] received information from
international experts to the effect that conditions in some zones, particularly the cotton fincas, are
worse than in any other OAS member country.”). 
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as the sale and trafficking of children, debt bondage, and serfdom,108 are expressly
prohibited under article 6(1). Significantly, the Supplementary Convention on the
Abolition of Slavery proscribes all institutions and practices “whereby a child or
young person under the age of 18 years, is delivered [by his guardian] to another
person . . . with a view to the exploitation of the child or young person or of his
labour.”109 If the delivery of a child into exploitative labor conditions is prohibited as
a “practice similar to slavery,” the exploitative labor itself must also be prohibited. It
may thus be argued that employment of a child in exploitative conditions is per se
prohibited under Convention article 6(1), read in light of the Supplementary
Convention and article 29’s interpretive mandate. Where a State fails to take
reasonable steps to prevent the employment of exploitative child labor, it may be held
responsible, under article 6(1), for any resulting injury to a child.
Article 6(2), which prohibits “forced” or “compulsory labor,” should also be viewed
as prohibiting the employment of children in exploitative conditions. Because a child
can not legally consent to exploitative employment, such labor should, as a matter of
law, be considered “done by the [child] against her will” and  “unjust or oppressive.”
As discussed above, the Commission has recognized that these two conditions define
“forced labor” under article 6(2).110
The key to finding an article 6 violation, under sections (1) and (2), is that the
challenged labor be shown to be “exploitative,” “unjust and oppressive,” or involving
“an unjust or oppressive obligation.” To show that a particular kind of work meets
these criteria, advocates should look first to domestic labor legislation, which often
provides highly specific protections for working children. They should also look to
international human rights instruments that provide special protection to child
workers, particularly the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on
the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor, the ICESCR, and the Protocol of
San Salvador.
Forms of child labor prohibited under domestic legislation or ratified treaty law
should be considered per se incompatible with Convention article 6, read in light of
article 29’s interpretive mandate. Where it can be shown, for example, that a State
Party, aware that children below a minimum age (established by domestic law) were
being employed within its jurisdiction, failed to take reasonable steps to prevent the
use of such child labor, the State should be found in violation of article 6.111 An article
108 See Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst
Forms of Child Labour (ILO No. 182), Jun. 17, 1999, art. 3, not yet in force, available at
<http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/scripts/convde.pl?C182> (enumerating “practices similar to slavery”);
Supplementary Convention, supra note 95, art. 1 (same).
109 Supplementary Convention, supra note 95, art. 1(d) (emphasis added). 
110 See text accompanying supra note 101.
111 See, e.g. , ICESCR, supra note 37, art. 10(3) (“States should set age limits below which the paid
employment of child labour should be prohibited and punishable by law.”). 
6 violation should also be found where the State failed to take reasonable action in the
face of knowledge that children were performing “any work that is likely to be
hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education, or to be harmful to the child’s
health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development.”112 Whether
particular work “interferes” with a child’s education or is “harmful” to a child’s health
or development should be determined by a judicial factfinder (unless the concerned
State’s domestic law specifies the types of work that meet these criteria). 
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR CHILD LABOR
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), art. 32:
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to be protected
from economic exploitation and from performing any work that is
likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education,
or to be harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental,
spiritual, moral or social development.
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, art. 10:
3. . . . Children and young persons should be protected from
economic and social exploitation. Their employment in work
harmful to their morals or health or dangerous to life or likely to
hamper their normal development should be punishable by law.
States should set age limits below which the paid employment
of child labour should be prohibited and punishable by law.
Protocol of San Salvador, art. 7:
7. . . . States Parties undertake to guarantee in their internal
legislation . . . 
. . .
(f) The prohibition of night work or unhealthy or dangerous
conditions and, in general, of all work which jeopardizes health,
safety, or morals, for persons under 18 years of age. As regards
minors under the age of 16, the work day shall be subordinated
to the provisions regarding compulsory education and in no
case shall work constitute an impediment to school attendance
or a limitation on benefiting from education received.
Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action
for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (ILO
No. 182), arts. 1, 3: 
1. Each Member which ratifies this Convention shall take
immediate and effective measures to secure the prohibition and
112 Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 32(1), G.A. res. 44/25, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 49) at 167, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force Sept. 2, 1990. 
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elimination of the worst forms of child labour as a matter of
urgency . . . . 
. . .
3.  For the purposes of this Convention, the term the worst forms of
child labour comprises: (a) all forms of slavery or practices
similar to slavery, such as the sale and trafficking of children,
debt bondage and serfdom and forced or compulsory labour,
including forced or compulsory recruitment of children for use in
armed conflict; (b) the use, procuring or offering of a child for
prostitution, for the production of pornography or for
pornographic performances; (c) the use, procuring or offering of
a child for illicit activities, in particular for the production and
trafficking of drugs as defined in the relevant international
treaties; (d) work which, by its nature or the circumstances in
which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or
morals of children.
Practice Tip
Every petition alleging that a child’s rights, as protected under
domestic or international law, have been violated should invoke
Convention article 19 (rights of the child). 
D. Traffic in Women and Other Forms of Human
“Trading”
In addition to slavery and involuntary servitude “in all their forms,” article 6(1)
expressly prohibits “traffic in women” and the “trade” in persons for purposes of
submitting them to slavery-like practices. A State that knowingly permits or fails to
reasonably act to prevent such traffic within its borders is per se in violation of article
6(1). This applies to traffic in women and other persons for prostitution, marriage,
menial labor, or any other “forced” service. The United States government estimates
that 50,000 people, mainly women and children, are smuggled into that country alone
each year for forced labor and the sex trade.113 Comparable levels of trafficking likely
occur in many other American countries. Advocates may challenge this practice in the
individual petitions process where a victim of trafficking can demonstrate that the
State failed to take reasonable measures to protect him or her from the practice—for
example, where the State directly participates in the trade or fails to investigate
allegations of the practice, prosecute conspirators, or provide reparation to victims. 
113 See Matthew Yi, U.S. to Aid Human-Trafficking Victims, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2001, at A2 (citing
U.S. State Department figures).
Cont...
ARTICLE 6 ESCR ARGUMENTS
A State Party violates article 6 where concrete injury to
specific victims results from the State’s failure to—
• Take reasonable steps to prevent debt bondage and other
institutions and practices similar to slavery; 
• Enforce minimum wage laws and other minimum labor
standards recognized domestically by the State Party;
• Prevent child labor from being used in conditions likely to be
hazardous to the child, to interfere with the child’s education, or
to be harmful to the child’s health or development; 
• Act diligently to prevent traffic in women and other persons
within its borders.
V. Right to Personal Liberty & Security (Art. 7)
Article 7 enshrines the right to personal liberty and security. While the Court’s
jurisprudence on article 7 has been dominated by cases of state-sponsored forced
disappearance and arbitrary detention, the provision should be invoked to protect
against broader threats to human liberty and security. As the Commission has
recognized, “The freedom of a person is not only violated if he is attacked physically
or morally, but also when he is deprived of the means to live in dignity and denied the
material requisites that are indispensable for a normal life.”114
ARTICLE 7
1. Every person has the right to personal liberty and security.
2. No one shall be deprived of his physical liberty except for
the reasons and under the conditions established
beforehand by the constitution of the State Party
concerned or by a law established pursuant thereto.
114 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 20, at 465–66 (citing United Nations, El derecho de toda
persona a la propiedad individual y colectiva, final report submitted by Luis Valencia Rodríguez,
E/CN.4/1993/15, 18.12.92, pp. 26–27) (emphasis added). 
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A. Personal Liberty
The right to personal liberty is most frequently associated with deprivation of
physical liberty. Under article 7(2), no one may be deprived of his physical liberty
except for the reasons and under the conditions established beforehand by the
constitution or a law enacted pursuant to the constitution.115 The Commission has
regularly found a person’s right to personal liberty violated when she is physically
disappeared, kidnapped, arbitrarily arrested (e.g., without a warrant), or wrongfully
detained by or with the acquiescence of state authorities. 
Deprivation of physical liberty may occur just as frequently, however, in private
encounters, such as in employment and domestic settings. A worker’s liberty may be
unlawfully deprived, for example, by being involuntarily locked in a factory
overnight to meet work quotas. Deprivations of physical liberty may also be suffered
in situations of debt bondage and other forms of exploitative labor relationships,
where workers’ physical movements are severely restricted or restrained. Where a
person is concretely deprived of physical liberty—in any manner not previously
established by law—by or with the acquiescence of the State, an article 7 violation
may be alleged.
The right to personal liberty must, however, be viewed as broader than the right not
to be deprived of physical liberty. Indeed, if the intent of the Convention’s framers
had been to equate “the right to personal liberty and security” with “depriv[ations] of
. . . physical liberty,” they would not have created separate provisions in article 7(1)
and (2). Interpreting “personal liberty” in a way that takes into account its “ordinary
meaning,” its context in the treaty, and the treaty’s object and purpose, article 7(1)
should be viewed—like article 5 (personal integrity)—as having mental, moral, and
physical components. 
Viewed in this light, a State might violate an individual’s right to liberty of person by
taking measures that prevent the individual from pursuing her educational or
occupational goals. In the case of Loayza Tamayo, the Court observed that the State,
through its acts, “prevented [the victim] from achieving her goals for personal and
professional growth, goals that would have been feasible under normal
circumstances.”116 The Court explained the significance of State-sponsored disruption
of a person’s “life plan” in terms of a person’s right to liberty:
115 The Commission has explained, “Under the terms of Article 7, the legality or arbitrariness of an
arrest must be analyzed on the basis of whether or not there was observance of the constitution
and/or domestic laws enacted pursuant thereto that prescribe the reasons why an individual can be
deprived of his or her freedom and establish the procedures that must be carried out in arresting an
individual.” Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 1/95, Case 11.006, Alan García (Peru), in IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1994, supra note 107, at 71, 100.
116 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Loayza Tamayo Case, Reparations (art. 63(1)), Judgment of Nov. 27, 1998
(Ser. C) No. 42, para. 152. It must be stressed that this conclusion was reached at the reparations
stage of the case; it was stated in the context of describing the consequences, rather than the
substance, of an article 7 violation.
[T]he options that an individual may have for leading his life and
achieving the goals that he sets for himself . . . are the manifestation
and guarantee of freedom. An individual can hardly be described as
truly free if he does not have options to pursue in life and to carry that
life to its natural conclusion. Those options, in themselves, have an
important existential value. Hence, their elimination or curtailment
objectively abridges freedom and constitutes the loss of a valuable
asset, a loss that this Court cannot disregard.117
From a mental and moral perspective, concrete impediments to a person’s “life plan”
abridge a person’s liberty just as fully as arbitrary arrest deprives a person of physical
liberty.
B. Personal Security
Article 7 also protects the right to “personal security.” The Commission, in its annual
reports, has suggested a broad interpretation of the right to security of person. This
approach is supported by internationally recognized rules of treaty interpretation.
Under these rules, article 7 must be interpreted in a way that takes into account the
ordinary meaning of its terms, their context in the treaty, the treaty’s object and
purpose, and the interpretive guidance of other human rights norms, such as those
protecting the “right to social security.” 
The ordinary meaning of “personal security” is the assurance of the human person’s
safety or the absence of harm or risk of harm. This meaning covers all threats to
human safety—those caused by nutritional deprivation and housing destruction as
fully as those caused by military gunmen and torture. The Commission has
recognized, for example, that the right to “personal security” encompasses the right
not to be deprived of or denied access to subsistence rights and basic needs: “The
freedom of a person is not only violated if he is attacked physically or morally, but
also when he is deprived of the means to live in dignity and denied the material
requisites that are indispensable for a normal life.”118 According to the Commission,
“without satisfaction of these basic needs, an individual’s survival is directly
threatened. This obviously diminishes the individual’s . . . personal security. . . .”119
The Commission has further explained
117 Id. para. 148.
118 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 20, at 465–66 (citing United Nations, El derecho de toda
persona a la propiedad individual y colectiva, final report submitted by Luis Valencia Rodríguez,
E/CN.4/1993/15, 18.12.92, pp. 26–27). 
119 Id. at 522–23.
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[T]he essential element of the legal obligation assumed by each
government in these [ESCR] matters is to procure the realization of the
social and economic aspirations of its people, following an order that
g i v e s priority to the basic necessities of health, nutrition and
education. The priority of “survival rights” and “basic necessities,”
the Commission explained, are a natural consequence of the right to
personal security.120
Drawing on these statements, petitioners may argue that article 7 should be
interpreted to protect against concrete impairments of, and threats to, the ability of
individuals and communities to obtain “the material requisites that are indispensable
for a normal life,” i.e., minimum subsistence needs or the resources necessary to
obtain them. This may occur in numerous scenarios, including where individuals’
food sources are damaged or destroyed by acts imputable to the State, where
minimum wage laws are flouted, or where social security schemes are administered
in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner. Such acts directly threaten an individual’s
personal security.
Practice Tip
Advocates should argue that a person’s right to “personal security”
is violated where an act imputable to the State concretely impairs
or threatens her ability to obtain minimum subsistence needs—e.g.,
essential foodstuffs, clean water, essential primary health care,
basic shelter and housing, the most basic forms of education—for
herself and her family or the resources necessary to obtain them. 
1. Threats to Subsistence 
Where State agents destroy food crops, contaminate rivers and other water supplies,
or block access to essential food markets, they directly impair the “personal security”
of individuals who depend on those resources for their subsistence. Significantly, the
Commission has identified many of these practices in concrete cases under its
contentious jurisdiction. These have included destruction of crops and market
produce by soldiers, confiscation of livestock, plunder of community stores, and
120 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1989–90, supra note 11, at 195 (reiterating its statements concerning the
legal importance of ESCR in earlier reports, such as ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1980–1981, at 126, OEA.Ser.L/V/II.54 doc.9 rev. 1 (1981))
(emphasis added). 
destruction of medical centers in impoverished communities.121 In the case of Maria
Mejía, a local Guatemalan military commissioner ordered all corn mills in the area to
refuse to grind the maize of a group of people who had refused to engage in forced
military service.122 As the victims were dependent on maize for their subsistence, the
commander’s retaliatory action must be viewed as a direct violation of article 7,
intended to deprive them and their families of essential food resources indispensable
for human security.
The State may also violate article 7 by permitting private entities to damage the
resource base from which individuals and communities secure their subsistence. This
may occur, for example, by providing permits to private business to engage in
logging, drilling, polluting or other activities on lands traditionally reserved for
subsistence activities. Such a situation was recently reported in Mexico, where
privately owned sugar refineries were allowed to dump sewage, highly polluted with
o rganic and chemical waste, into the river Santana, thereby threatening the
subsistence of the 600 families who live along the river and depend on fishing to
secure their income and food supply.123 As monitoring missions confirmed, the
sewage emissions caused the spread of parasites and disease, which ravaged the fish
population and created serious risks to human health. State authorities were
repeatedly warned of these threats to livelihood, yet failed to take measures to protect
the food and income security of those who depend on fishing to secure their
livelihood. Under article 7, read with article 1, this omission should incur the State’s
international responsibility for the private business’ acts and all resulting injuries to
persons whose income and food base was compromised by the river’s willful
contamination. 
In the context of physical liberty, the Commission has specifically found that threats
of arbitrary and unjustified detention, even where no physical restriction on liberty
was effected, can infringe the right to security of person protected by article 7.124 The
same reasoning may be applied in the context of ESCR.  Thus, threats of deprivation
of basic subsistence needs, even where no actual deprivation occurs, can violate
article 7. This might occur, for example, where state agents threaten to destroy a
121 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 48/97, Case 11.411, “Ejido Morelia” (Mex.), IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 4 , at 655; Report No. 23/93, Case 10.456 (Colom.), Oct. 12,
1993, in IACHR ANNUALREPORT 1993, supra note 20, at 86–87; Res. 22/89, Case 10.124 (Surin.),
Sept. 27, 1989, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
1988–89, at 147, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.76 Doc. 10 (1989) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT
1988–89].
122 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 32/96, Case 10.553, María Mejía (Guate.), IACHR ANNUAL
REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 465.
123 This account comes from FIAN Intervention 0118: México: Sugar plant sewage threatens the
subsistence of people along the river Santana, Tabasco, available at  <http://www.fian.org/english-
version/e-0118.htm>.
124 See Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 1/95, Case 11.006, Alan García (Peru), in IACHR ANNUAL
REPORT 1994, supra note 107, at 71, 100. 
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community’s crops or to forcefully evict a family in the middle of the night, or where
contaminants are disposed of on a community’s property and, while having no
immediate impact, threaten serious harm to local health or food and water supplies in
the future. Such threats necessarily cause affected individuals mental anguish and
insecurity, thus implicating article 7.
2. Minimum Wage
The ability of individuals to lead a “secure” life, in which they can obtain the material
requisites for life, is also unlawfully restricted where the State fails to ensure that
workers are paid at least the minimum wage fixed by law. It may also be infringed
where the legal minimum wage is insufficient to allow workers to meet the
subsistence needs of themselves and their families. The Commission has stressed
these obligations in its recommendations to States Parties, urging Peru, for example,
to “take the steps needed to guarantee enforcement of the minimum wage laws, and
[to ensure] the minimum wage [is] sufficient to cover the cost of the basic family
market basket.”125
The Commission has noted, in this regard, the special importance and relevance of the
right to work. Observing that the right to work is the first of the rights referred to in
the Protocol of San Salvador, it stressed that the Protocol requires States to
“guarantee, in their legislations, in particular, ‘remuneration which guarantees, as a
minimum, to all workers dignified and decent living conditions for them and their
families . . . .’”126 Where a State fails to guarantee a minimum wage that, at the very
least, allows workers to secure the essential requisites of decent living, it should be
found to be in violation of article 7.  
3. Social Security
Where individuals, for any reason, are unable to work, minimum wage guarantees
provide no protection for a person’s “security.” Read with Convention article 29, the
article 7 right to personal security should thus be viewed as encompassing the “right
to social security.” Enshrined in numerous international conventions, the right to
social security is designed to protect the economic, health, and nutritional security of
individuals in event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or
other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond one’s control. States often provide
such security in the form of welfare benefits, unemployment insurance, sickness
benefits, health insurance, pensions (and other retirement benefits), financial
125 IN T E R- AM. CO M M. H.R., SE C O N D RE P O RT O N T H E SI T U AT I O N O F HU M A N RI G H T S I N PE R U,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, Doc. 59 rev. (2000), ch. VI, para. 31(3) [hereinafter 2000 PERU REPORT].
126 Id. ch. VI, para. 26.
assistance for work-related injuries (e.g., workers’compensation), disability benefits,
survivors’benefits for widows and orphans, paid maternity leave, disaster relief, and
basic food subsidies or food stamps. Such “safety net” programs are intended to
protect individuals from harm, and risks of harm, to their ability to meet the essential
subsistence needs of themselves and their families. As such, they form an essential
component of the right to “personal security.”  
While the right to social security has not been considered on the merits in the
individual petitions process, the Commission has noted with concern the receipt of
complaints with respect to violations of the right to social security. In a 2000 report
on country conditions in Peru, for example, the Commission noted the precarious
situation in which several groups of pensioners were living. It lamented Peru’s failure
to recognize in practice the constitutional principle of “equalization of pensions” and
Peru’s decision to repudiate retroactively the rights of thousands of pensioners subject
to the Peruvian pension regime.127 It affirmed that “the situation of Peruvian
pensioners is an extremely important aspect to which the Peruvian State should give
careful consideration” in light of the “very important rights” to social security
established in the American Declaration and Protocol of San Salvador.128 These
instruments may be drawn upon, pursuant to the interpretive mandate of Convention
article 29, to assist in interpreting the right to personal security enshrined in article 7. 
RIGHT TO SOCIAL SECURITY
San Salvador Protocol, art. 9
9.1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right
of everyone to social security, including social insurance.
9.2. In the case of persons who are employed, the right to social
security shall cover at least medical care and an allowance or
retirement benefit in the case of work accidents or
occupational disease and, in the case of women, paid
maternity leave before and after childbirth
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, art. 9
9.   The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right
of everyone to social security, including social insurance.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 22, 25
22. Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social
security and is entitled to realization . . . of the economic, social
127 2000 PERU REPORT, supra note 125, ch. VI, para. 27. 
128 Id. paras. 28–29. 
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and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free
development of his personality.
. . . . 
25. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including
food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social
services, and the right to security in the event of
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or
other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man, art. XVI
XVI Every person has the right to social security which will protect
him from the consequences of unemployment, old age, and
any disabilities arising from causes beyond his control that
make it physically or mentally impossible for him to earn a
living.
The exact shape and scope of social security programs are to be decided, in the first
instance, by political authorities. Once established, however, social security programs
may not be applied discriminatorily or arbitrarily. Furthermore, rights to pension
benefits and other entitlements may vest; once they do, they may not be repudiated
retroactively. To ensure “security of person,” social security schemes must also
guarantee that benefits are set at a level that is objectively sufficient to ensure a
person’s security in the face of lack of livelihood.
An article 7 violation may be alleged where individuals who meet the State’s
eligibility requirements for participation in social security schemes are nevertheless
denied participation, or participation on equal terms, in those schemes. Such a
situation was presented to the Commission in the Uruguayan National Vanguard
Movement of Retirees and Pensioners case.129 There, the State readjusted pension and
retirement payments for certain beneficiaries within the same income category so that
some were receiving more than the Average Wage Index and others receiving less.
Although the case was formally found inadmissible, the Commission felt compelled
to affirm that readjustment of pension payments to a level lower than a common index
necessarily violates Convention article 24.130 If the merits had been considered, the
Commission might also have found that the unequal payment of benefits violated the
right to personal security, protected under article 7.
129 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 90/90, Case 9893, National Vanguard Movement of Retirees
and Pensioners (Uru.), in ANNUAL REPORT OFTHE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSIONON HUMAN RIGHTS




A State might also violate article 7 where its eligibility criteria for participation in
social security programs are themselves discriminatory. This might occur where, for
example, legislation excludes from participation in social security schemes foreign
and migrant workers, street venders, and other workers who do not have full-time
jobs. 
A third type of violation might occur where vested rights to a certain level of pension
benefits are repudiated retroactively or where the level of any social security benefit
fell below an objective minimum. Indeed, the Commission has explicitly affirmed the
importance of vested rights to pension benefits and the need to ensure that social
security benefits are objectively sufficient to cover basic subsistence needs. In the
context of making recommendations to improve human rights enjoyment in Peru, the
Commission has thus affirmed that the State should “take steps to guarantee respect
for acquired rights in the context of pension plans, and that the amount of the
pensions set be sufficient to cover at least the cost of the basic family market
basket.”131 Where pension or other social security benefits are insufficient to ensure a
person’s physical and mental security in the face of lack of livelihood, an article 7
violation should be alleged. 
Courts have demonstrated that they are capable of determining when benefits are
objectively insufficient to ensure personal security. A Canadian federal court, for
example, has held that a provincial government cannot deduct from one welfare check
amounts that it may have overpaid in error on previous welfare checks; such
deductions would bring the recipient below a level at which he or she could hope to
make ends meet for the month.132 The plaintiff in the case was a chronic epileptic who
relied entirely on the welfare system for support. The judges were unanimous in their
belief that they were both justified in and capable of determining a level of benefits
below which a decrease in benefits could not be tolerated.133
SITUATIONS THAT MAY VIOLATE
THE RIGHT TO SOCIAL SECURITY
• Discriminatory eligibility criteria are used in social security
regime; 
• Individuals who meet eligibility requirements are nonetheless
denied full benefits;
131 2000 Peru Report, supra note 125, para. 31(4). 
132 See Finlay v. Minister of Fin. of Can., 57 D.L.R.4t , 211, 227, 229 (Fed.Ct. Trial Div. 1980), aff’d
[1990] 2 F.C. 790 (Fed.Ct.App.).
133 See Scott & Macklem, Constitutional Ropes of Sand or Justiciable Guarantees? Social Rights in a
New South African Constitution, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 78 (1992) (describing case). 
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• Vested right to receipt of certain level of benefits is repudiated
retroactively;  
• Level of social security benefits distributed is objectively
insufficient to allow a family to meet its basic subsistence needs
(e.g., below cost of basic market basket).
VI. Right to Privacy (Art. 11)—Inviolability of Home
Article 11 enshrines the right to privacy and to freedom from arbitrary interference
with the home. It “guarantees a sphere that nobody can invade, an area of activity that
belongs entirely to each individual.”134 The provision is of critical importance for the
future protection of ESCR in the inter-American system, particularly with regard to
many aspects of the right to housing—such as the right to legal protection against
forced evictions, mass displacements, and perhaps even arbitrary rent hikes. It may
also be used to protect against environmental contamination in residential areas.
ARTICLE 11
1. Everyone has the right to have his honor respected and his
dignity recognized.
2. No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive
interference with his private life, his family, his home, or his
correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor or
reputation.
3. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against
such interference or attacks.
The Court has not yet invoked article 11 under its contentious jurisdiction. The
Commission, however, has found several article 11 violations in the individual
petitions process. These have fallen under three general categories: (1) affronts to
honor and dignity; (2) adverse publicity (attacks on reputation); and (3) interference
134 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 38/96, Case 10.506, Ms. X (Arg.), Oct. 15, 1996, in IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 52, para. 91 (“The object of Article 11, like the total premise
of the Convention, is essentially the protection of the individual against arbitrary interference by
public functionaries.”).
Cont...
with home and correspondence.  With regard to “dignity,” the Commission has found
that torture, rape, and other sexual abuse implicate “a deliberate attack on dignity,”
which is included in the broader concept of “private life.”135 It has also found that a
state policy of vaginal searches of female penitentiary visitors who want personal
contact with prisoners violates the article 11 right to privacy.136
With regard to publicity, the Commission has frequently found article 11 violations
for state-sponsored defamation campaigns. This has most frequently occurred against
religious and human rights workers for their activities aimed at improving the living
conditions of the poor137 and members of military forces who expose corruption,
criminality, or abuse in military ranks.138 The Commission has described such
campaigns as “an attack against the dignity and honor” of the victims that directly
injures their fame and reputation.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly for ESCR purposes, the Commission has found
that the State violates article 11 through “arbitrary or abusive” interference with the
home and private correspondence.  In Report No. 1/95, the Commission found that
article 11 “explicitly protect[s] the home.” The guarantee of inviolability of the
domicile and of private papers may only give way “when there is a well-substantiated
search warrant issued by a competent judicial authority, spelling out the reasons for
the measure being adopted and specifying the place to be searched and the objects that
will be seized.”139 The warrant requirement for entry into the home is well established
in the inter-American system; it is of critical importance for the right to housing and
to freedom from illegal forced evictions.
The Commission has further explained the legal significance of the protection against
“arbitrary and abusive interference” with the right to privacy, which the State has a
special obligation to prevent. “The idea of ‘arbitrary interference’ refers to elements
135 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 5/96, Case 10.970, Raquel Martín de Mejía (Perú), in IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1995, supra note 22, at 168, 200–201; see also Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report
No. 31/96, Case 10.526, Diana Ortíz (Guate.), in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at
425, para. 116.
136 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 38/96, Case 10.506, Ms. X (Arg.), Oct. 15, 1996, in IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 52. 
137 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 31/96, Case 10.526, Diana Ortíz (Guate.), in IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 425, paras. 116–17 (“These declarations constituted a grave
affront to the honor and reputation of Sister Ortiz, based in large measure on her work as a catholic
nun oriented to improving the living conditions of the poor indigenous groups in Guatemala.”);
Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 49/99, Case 11.610, Loren Laroye Riebe Star et al. (Mex.), in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 4, at 724, para. 95; 
138 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 43/96, Case 11.430, José Francisco Gallardo (Mex.),
in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 585, paras. 73–76; Inter-Am. Comm. H.R.,
Report No. 20/99, Case 11.317, Rodolfo Robles (Peru), in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra
note 4, at 815, 842–43, paras. 140–43.
139 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 1/95, Case 11.006, Alan García (Peru), in IACHR ANNUAL
REPORT 1994, supra note 107, at 71, 102–03.
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of injustice, impossibility to predict, and lack of reasonability.”140 Accordingly, where
State action interferes with a right protected by the Convention—such as the right to
inviolability of the home—it will be deemed “arbitrary or abusive” unless it is (1)
prescribed by law; (2) necessary (in a democratic society for the security of all); and
(3) proportionate and reasonable (i.e., strictly tailored to achieve those objectives).141
In applying these standards to the case of vaginal searches of female visitors to an
Argentine penitentiary, the Commission found that, to be lawful in each particular
case, the search must meet a four-part test: 1) it must be absolutely necessary to
achieve the security objective in the particular case; 2) there must be no less intrusive
alternative; 3) it must be judicially authorized; and 4) it must be carried out by an
appropriate health professional.142
This test may be applied to housing evictions (see box below).
A State may not enter a domicile or evict persons
from their home unless: 
1. it is absolutely necessary to achieve a stated democratic
objective in the particular case ;
2. there is no less intrusive alternative; 
3. a judicial order authorizes the act; and
4. it is carried out by persons trained in protecting individuals’
property and dignity and in advising evictees of available
alternative housing options. 
It is important to underscore the importance of pleading article 11 in housing rights
cases before the Commission. While a number of published cases detail factual
scenarios in which state authorities break into, plunder, and systematically destroy
homes of poor farming communities,143 the Commission has never independently
asserted an article 11 violation. Petitioners must do so expressly. An illustrative set of
ESCR violations implicating article 11 are described below: (a) illegal forced
evictions; (b) arbitrary rent hikes; and (c) environmental contamination of residential
areas.
140 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 38/96, Case 10.506, Ms. X (Arg.), Oct. 15, 1996, in IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 52, para. 92.
141 Id. para. 60. 
142 Id. para. 72. 
143 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 43/96, Case 11.411, Severiano Santíz Gómez and
others (Mex.), in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 576.
A. Illegal Forced Evictions & Mass Displacements
Forced evictions and mass displacements, particularly of squatters or homeless who
lack alternate housing, is a serious problem in the American States. Where undertaken
without following appropriate procedures and guidelines, such evictions may
constitute an express violation of article 11’s prohibition on “arbitrary or abusive
interference with . . . [the] home.”  
While no legal precedent exists in the inter-American system, precedents from the
European Commission of Human Rights and the U.N. Committee on ESCR may be
referred to in seeking to extend the protection of article 11 to illegal evictions.  Like
the American Convention, the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights lacks an explicit provision on the right to housing.  Nevertheless, issues related
to housing have been dealt with under article 8 of the European Convention (right to
privacy), which closely resembles the American Convention’s article 11.144 In the
inter-state complaint case of Cyprus v. Turkey, the European Commission ruled that
forced evictions of individuals from houses and homes violated article 8(1). 
The evictions of Greek Cypriots from houses, including their own
homes, which are imputable to Turkey under the Convention, amount
to an interference with rights guaranteed under article 8(1) of the
Convention, namely the right of these persons to respect for their
home, and/or their right to respect for private life.145
The U.N. Committee on ESCR has also consistently declared that governments
tolerating or encouraging forced evictions have violated the housing rights clauses of
the ICESCR, namely article 11(1).146 At its fifth session, the Committee denounced
the Government of the Dominican Republic for violating article 11(1) by carrying out
massive forced evictions in the capital city, Santo Domingo.147 The Committee has
made similar statements with reference to government practices in Panama (1992),
Kenya (1993), Nicaragua (1993) and the Philippines (1993), among others.148
The Committee has established a set of procedural protections that States Parties to
the ICESCR should apply when undertaking evictions (see box below).149 Failure to
144 Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides: “Everyone has the right to
respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” (emphasis added).
145 Application 6780/74 and 6950/75, Cyprus v. Turkey, report of the Commission, paras. 208–10,
European H.R. Reports Vol. 4 (1981), at 482.
146 Article 11 of the ICESCR affirms:  “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right
of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate . . .
housing.” (emphasis added).
147 U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1990/8, para. 249.
148 See U.N. Docs. E/1992/23 (6th Sess.); E/1993/22 (7th Sess.); E/1994/23 (8th–9th Sess.).
149 See The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11.1): Forced Evictions, General Comment No. 7, U.N.
ESCOR, Comm. on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., 16th Sess, paras. 15–16, U.N. Doc. E/1998/22,
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follow these guidelines may amount to a violation of article 11(1) of the ICESCR
where concrete injury results. Advocates should argue that the same procedural
protections are required under article 11 of the American Convention. 
PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS STATES SHOULD APPLY WHEN
UNDERTAKING FORCED EVICTIONS:
“The [U.N. ESCR] Committee considers that the procedural
protections which should be applied in relation to forced evictions
include:
(a) an opportunity for genuine consultation with those affected; 
(b) adequate and reasonable notice for all affected persons prior to
the scheduled date of eviction;
(c) information on the proposed evictions, and, where applicable,
on the alternative purpose for which the land or housing is to be
used, to be made available in reasonable time to all those
affected; 
(d) especially where groups of people are involved, government
o fficials or their representatives to be present during an
eviction; 
(e) all persons carrying out the eviction to be properly identified;
(f) evictions not to take place in particularly bad weather or at night
unless the affected persons consent otherwise;
(g) provision of legal remedies; and
(h) provision, where possible, of legal aid to persons who are in
need of it to seek redress from the courts.”150
“Evictions should not result in individuals being rendered homeless
or vulnerable to the violation of other human rights. Where those
affected are unable to provide for themselves, the State party must
take all appropriate measures, to the maximum of its available
resources, to ensure that adequate alternative housing,
resettlement or access to productive land, as the case may be, is
available.”151
annex IV (1997) [hereinafter General Comment No. 7], available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/
doc.nsf/MasterFrameView/959f71e476284596802564c3005d8d50?Opendocument>.
150 Id. para. 15. 
151 Id. para. 16. 
B. Arbitrary Rent Hikes
A State may also violate article 11 by failing to regulate rental rates on the housing
market. As the Commission has recognized, the “state has a special obligation to
prevent ‘arbitrary or abusive’ interferences” in the private sphere of the individual,152
which necessarily includes the home. This obligation extends beyond interference by
public authorities, to include interference by private actors, such as landlords.
Landlords can interfere with the right to the inviolability of the home by arbitrarily or
disproportionately raising rent requirements, e.g., to levels that bear no reasonable
relation to market value. While landlords, as property owners, have rights over their
property (and hence have broad discretion over the rents they charge), they may not
exercise those rights in a way that unduly infringes upon the protected rights of
others. States Parties to the Convention have an obligation to regulate this tension
between rights and duties. As article 32(2) of the Convention reads: “The rights of
each person are limited by the rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just
demands of the general welfare, in a democratic society.”
In this regard, the European Court of Human Rights has held unfounded the argument
that state-legislated rent caps violate the right to property.153 As that Court has stated:
“[M]odern societies consider housing a primordial necessity, whose regulation cannot
be left completely to the free play of the market.”154 An article 11 violation might be
alleged, therefore, where a person’s right to inviolability of the home is impaired (e.g.,
through necessity of vacating home) by an abusive rent increase or a landlord’s
disregard for a state-legislated rent cap, and the State fails to provide an
administrative remedy or judicial cause of action to the injured party. It might even
be argued that, in the housing context, article 11, read with article 2, requires the
legislation of targeted rent caps to protect individuals from arbitrary interference with
the home. Abusive rents are sometimes imposed as an indirect means of forcing low-
income residents or residents of a particular racial or ethnic group to vacate their
homes, thereby clearing the way for the building of luxury, exclusive, or commercial
units. Article 11 provides a limited means of challenging such acts, and the State’s
corresponding omissions, in the inter-American human rights system. 
C. Environmental Contamination of Residential
Areas
Article 11 may further be invoked to protect against environmental contamination of
residential areas. An important precedent to this effect was recently established by the
152 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 38/96, Case 10.506, X and Y (Arg.), in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT
1996, supra note 4, at 52, paras. 91–92. 
153 See Eur. Ct. H.R., Mellacher et al., v. Austria, Judgment of Dec. 19, 1989 (Ser. A) No. 169 (finding
that States have a wide margin of discretion in legislating social and economic policies, such as
protections on the right to housing).
154 See Eur. Ct. H.R., James et al. v. United Kingdom, Judgment of Feb. 21, 1986 (Ser. A) No. 98
(rejecting argument that right to property prohibited legislation granting house renters right to
forced cession of property after 21 years). 
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European Court of Human Rights. In López Ostra v. Spain, the Court held Spain
responsible for violating article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights by failing to adopt measures to avoid the efflux of sulfur-hydroxide
from a water and residue purification station. This omission on the part of the State
created a health risk for the inhabitants of the neighboring houses and constituted a
grave crime against the environment.155 The strong similarities between article 11 of
the American Convention and article 8 of its European counterpart—both protecting
the inviolability of the home—point to the potential for bringing cases based on the
right to health and the right to a healthy environment when individual domiciles or
entire residential areas are affected by environmental contamination and the State
fails to take reasonable measures of prevention. 
Practice Tip
Petitions for violation of housing rights may jointly invoke 
• Article 11. Right to Privacy/Freedom from Arbitrary Interference 
with the Home
• Article 21. Right to Property
• Article 22. Right to Residence
• Article 26. Progressivity in Realization of ESCR implicit in OAS 
Charter
VII. Freedom of Conscience and Religion (Art. 12)
The right to freedom of conscience and religion, protected by article 12 of the
Convention, embodies the close inter-connection between CPR and ESCR. A large
portion of the CPR violations in the American continent are directed against
individuals because their beliefs differ from those of their persecutors. Many such
victims have been union, student, campesino, and religious activists and organizers,
who, compelled by their beliefs and conscience, chose to engage in activities to
protect the most vulnerable sectors of society, often in regard to ESCR issues.
ARTICLE 12
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience and
religion. This right includes freedom to maintain or to
change one’s religion or beliefs, and freedom to profess or
disseminate one’s religion or beliefs, either individually or
together with others, in public or in private.
155 See Eur. Ct. H.R., López Ostra v. Spain, Judgment of Dec. 9, 1994 (Ser. A) No. 303(C).
Article 12 may thus be used to promote ESCR by protecting the ability of those who,
compelled by their conscience, religion, or other strongly held beliefs, work with
communities around ESCR issues. Indeed, the Commission has affirmed that the
Convention protects the manner in which persons choose to profess and disseminate
their religion and beliefs.156 Though the Court has not had the opportunity to comment
directly on the merits of article 12, the Commission has stated:  
Article 12 . . . protects the right to freedom of conscience and religion,
which includes the right of every person to uphold their religion or
beliefs and the freedom to practice and preach them both public[ly]
and privately. To that end, no one can be subjected to restrictive
measures that affect such liberty, “subject only to the limitations
prescribed by law that are necessary to protect public safety, order,
health, or morals, or the rights or freedoms of others” [art. 12(3)].157
The Commission has found article 12 violations in at least two contentious cases
where religious persons were persecuted by State authorities for their human rights,
religious, and humanitarian work with the poor. In the first, the Commission found
that Guatemalan government agents violated article 12 by subjecting a U.S.
Maryknoll nun to surveillance, threats, clandestine detention, torture and rape: such
attacks were “intended to punish and suppress her religious activities as a Church
missionary and her work with the indigenous people of Huehuetenango.”158 Because
fear prevented the nun from returning to Guatemala, the Commission found “she has
been denied her right to exercise her right to freedom of conscience and religion by
working as a foreign missionary in Guatemala for the Catholic Church.”159
In the second case, the Commission concluded that three foreign priests had been
“punished for their religious activity,” i.e., their work in defense of the people of
Chiapas, in violation of article 12. To find an article 12 violation, the Commission
requires that a link be established between an individual’s choice of belief/religion
and state retaliatory action. Significantly, while evidence was presented that a
campaign of persecution existed against the Catholic Church in Chiapas,160 the
156 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 49/99, Case 11.610, Loren Laroye Riebe Star (Mex.), in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 4, at 724, para. 101 (“The manner in which they chose
to profess and disseminate their religion and beliefs is protected by the American Convention.”).
157 Id. para. 98. 
158 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 31/96, Case 10.526, Diana Ortíz (Guate.), in IACHR ANNUAL
REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 425, para. 119. 
159 Id.
160 Such persecution included the closing of churches and the prohibition of religious meetings by
local authorities; the expulsion from Mexico of various foreign priests; the lack of government
protection of priests and nuns against assassination attempts, rapes, attacks, and threats; the failure
to investigate those incidents and to prosecute the perpetrators of those crimes; the illegal arrest of
ecclesiastic workers; church raids; and false and defamatory attacks in the press stating that priests
in Chiapas provided arms to the EZLN, fomented violent uprisings, land seizures, and other illegal
activities. 
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Commission was persuaded that an article 12 violation had occurred by the sole fact
that the three priests, after being arrested and transported by state agents to the airport
in Mexico City, were interrogated by migration authorities about the social doctrine
of the Catholic Church.161 That tie between “religious preference and the treatment
they received” was sufficient to find an article 12 violation.162
While these cases involved the Catholic Church, article 12 protects any religious or
strongly held belief that reflects the exercise of a person’s conscience. This includes
any indigenous religion or set of beliefs and any “nonreligious” world view such as
non-violence (e.g., conscientious objectors). It should also include such
“nonreligious” beliefs as a commitment to “poverty alleviation” or “economic
equality.” Thus, a person who faced state-sponsored reprisals for his refusal, based on
a strong belief of nonviolence, to join the military or local defense patrols could claim
a violation of article 12. The same may be true of a person who disseminated her
beliefs about ESCR based on her strong anti-poverty and social justice convictions. 
Practice Tip 
• An article 12 violation is established where petitioners
demonstrate a link between an individual’s choice of
belief/religion and state retaliatory action.
• Article 12 (freedom of conscience and religion) is often alleged
in conjunction with article 16 (freedom of association).163
VIII. Freedom of Thought and Expression (Art. 13)
Article 13, which protects the right to “seek, receive, and impart information and
ideas,” may be used to protect individuals and groups from restrictions and reprisals
for criticizing government, expressing views about ESCR, and conducting human
rights documentation. It may also be used to protect the right of access to government
information on ESCR progress and certain aspects of the right to basic literacy and
education.
161 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 49/99, Case 11.610, Loren Laroye Riebe Star et al. (Mex.), in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 4, at 724, paras. 102–03. 
162 Id. para. 102. 
163 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 31/96, Case 10.526, Diana Ortíz (Guate.), in IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 425, para. 119 (finding Guatemalan state in violation of both
articles 12 and 16 for persecution of missionary, preventing her from continuing her religious and
humanitarian work with indigenous communities and local popular organization). 
ARTICLE 13
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and
expression. This right includes freedom to seek, receive,
and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of
frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or
through any other medium of one’s choice. 
2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing
paragraph shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall
be subject to subsequent imposition of liability, which shall be
expressly established by law [and be necessary to ensure]:164
(a) respect for the rights or reputations of others; or (b) the
protection of national security, public order, or public health or
morals.165
3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect
methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private
controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or
equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any
other means tending to impede the communication and
circulation of ideas and opinions .166
Both the Commission and Court have pronounced rather extensively on the legal
protections afforded by article 13. The Court has recognized that the right to freedom
164 The English version of the text reads: “which shall be expressly established by law to the extent
necessary to ensure. . .” (emphasis added). In an important advisory opinion on article 13(2),
however, the Court affirmed that “The English text of this provision constitutes an erroneous
translation of the original Spanish text. The here relevant phrase should read ‘and be necessary to
ensure . . . .’” Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law
for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 of the American Convention on Human Rights),
Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of Nov. 13, 1985 (Ser. A) No. 5, para. 29. 
165 In an important advisory opinion on article 13(2), the Court explained that a State may validly
impose liability for abuse of freedom of expression only where four requirements are met: the
grounds of liability must (a) be previously established in law (not retroactive); (b) expressly and
precisely defined by law (not vague); (c) pursue legitimate ends (in a democratic society); and (d)
be “necessary to ensure” those ends (strictly tailored). See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Compulsory
Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29
of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of Nov. 13, 1985 (Ser.
A) No. 5, paras. 30–50. It emphatically concluded that “the guarantees contained in the American
Convention regarding freedom of expression were designed . . . to reduce to a bare minimum
restrictions impeding the free circulation of ideas.” Id. para. 50 (emphasis added). 
166 Paragraphs 4 and 5 of article 13 provide, respectively, that: “(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of
paragraph 2 above, public entertainments may be subject by law to prior censorship for the sole
purpose of regulating access to them for the moral protection of childhood and adolescence” and
“(5) Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that
constitute incitements to lawless violence or to any other similar illegal action against any person
or group of persons on the grounds including those of race, color, religion, language, or national
origin shall be considered as offenses punishable by law.”
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of expression has two distinct dimensions, both of which must be guaranteed
simultaneously. The first is an individual’s right to “express and impart” information
and ideas.  The second dimension, no less important, is the right of all others to “seek
and receive” them.  “Hence, when an individual’s freedom of expression is
unlawfully restricted, it is not only the right of that individual that is being violated,
but also the right of all others to ‘receive’information and ideas.”167 According to the
Court, by impairing the right of every person to be well informed, the violation
“affects one of the fundamental prerequisites of a democratic society.”168
The right protected by Article 13 . . . has a special scope and character,
which are evidenced by the dual aspect of freedom of expression. It
requires, on the one hand, that no one be arbitrarily limited or impeded
in expressing his own thoughts. In that sense, it is a right that belongs
to each individual. Its second aspect, on the other hand, implies a
collective right to receive any information whatsoever and to have
access to the thoughts expressed by others.
. . . . 
The two dimensions mentioned of the right to freedom of expression
must be guaranteed simultaneously.169
The Court has also recognized that the right to freedom of expression, as protected by
article 13, can be violated in three distinct ways: by direct government action; by
indirect government action; and where no government action exists at all. Direct
government action, the most extreme violation of the right to freedom of expression,
“occurs when governmental power is used for the express purpose of impeding the
free circulation of information, ideas, opinions or news.”170 Examples of this type of
violation, explains the Court, include “prior censorship, the seizing or barring of
publications and, generally, any procedure that subjects the expression or
dissemination of information to governmental control.”171
Indirect government action can also violate article 13. “In effect, any governmental
action that involves a restriction of the right to seek, receive and impart information
and ideas to a greater extent or by means other than those authorized by the
Convention, would also be contrary to it. This is true whether or not such restrictions
benefit the government.”172 This might occur, for example, where the government
167 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice
of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion
OC-5/85 of Nov. 13, 1985 (Ser. A) No. 5, para. 30. 
168 Id. para. 54. 
169 Id. paras. 30, 33 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
170 Id. para. 54. 
171 Id.
172 Id. para. 55. 
imposes abusive tax or fine structures on particular media outlets or conducts a
blacklisting campaign to dissuade advertisers from certain media. 
The Court has further recognized that, given the broad scope of the language of the
Convention, a State may even violate article 13 by taking no action at all. “This might
be the case, for example, when due to the existence of monopolies or oligopolies in
the ownership of communications media, there are established in practice ‘means
tending to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.’”173 An
article 13 violation may thus be found whenever “means tending to impede the
communication and circulation of ideas and opinions” are established in practice, and
the State fails to take responsive measures. 
The following methodology may be used to address article 13 violations, which may
be suffered by individuals who are impaired in their ability to express ideas and
information as well as those who are impaired in their ability to receive them.
States Parties violate article 13 where an individual’s
(1) expression of ideas and information or (2)
receipt of ideas and information is concretely
impaired by—
• Direct State Action: prior censorship; seizing or banning of
publications; persecution.
• Indirect State Action: use of incentives and disincentives, or
other indirect restriction, to regulate content of expressive
conduct aired by media outlets.
• State Omission: State’s failure to take reasonable steps to
remove any condition or status “tending to impede” the
expression, circulation or receipt of ideas and opinions.
The above criteria suggest four important types of rights closely related to ESCR that
are protected by article 13: (a) the right to criticize government and to express and
disseminate views about ESCR; (b) the right to conduct human rights documentation
regarding ESCR abuse; (c) the right of access to government information on ESCR
progress and the concomitant right to disseminate “shadow reports” on government
conduct; and (d) the right to basic literacy and education. 
173 Id. para. 56.
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A. Right to Criticize Government and to
Express and Disseminate Political Views 
The right to publicly criticize government policies that have a negative impact on
ESCR is one of the ESCR advocate’s most potent tools.  The Court has recognized
that such expressive freedom is “a cornerstone upon which the very existence of a
democratic society rests.”174 In the words of the Court: 
[T]he concept of public order in a democratic society requires the
guarantee of the widest possible circulation of news, ideas and
opinions as well as the widest access to information by society as a
whole.  Freedom of expression constitutes the primary and basic
element of the public order of a democratic society, which is not
conceivable without free debate and the possibility that dissenting
voices be fully heard. . . . It is also in the interest of the democratic
public order inherent in the American Convention that the right of each
individual to express himself freely and that of society as a whole to
receive information be scrupulously respected.175
Accordingly, the Commission has been scrupulous in scrutinizing petitions alleging
violation of the right to free expression and has often found article 13 violations
where individuals were restricted or impeded in, or punished for, criticizing or
expressing their views about government policies. These cases have tended to fall into
four categories: (1) government banning of books (“prior restraint”); (2) direct
punishment of government critics; (3) reprisals for carrying political literature; and
(4) failure to sanction private acts that have a “chilling” effect on free speech. 
“Prior restraint” refers to the banning of expression before publication or circulation.
It “is always incompatible” with article 13.176 The Commission has found, for
example, that a State ban on the publication, distribution, and circulation of a book
exposing government corruption constituted an express violation of article 13. In so
doing, it summarily rejected the government’s argument that the article 11 right to
“honor and dignity” of businessmen named in the book trumped the right to free
expression protected by article 13.177 The Commission similarly found an article 13
violation where a State Party confiscated and prohibited imported books from a
certain publisher. The Commission found that “[t]he right of the petitioners to
174 Id. para. 70.
175 Id. para. 69.
176 Id. para. 78 (“Article 13(2) . . . stipulates, in the first place, that prior censorship is always
incompatible with the full enjoyment of the rights listed in Article 13 . . . .”). 
177 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 11/96, Case 11.230, Francisco Martorell (Chile), in IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 241. 
transport books to Grenada, and the right to receive them in Grenada are protected by
Article 13 of the Convention.”178
The Commission has also been adamant in protecting against direct state attacks on
government critics. The Commission has found that public contempt (desacato) laws,
which provide public officials with a private cause of action to prosecute their critics,
violate both articles 13 and 2 of the Convention.179 The Commission has also found
a violation of the right to free expression where a State prohibited a radio station from
airing broadcasts critical of the government, driving it to the brink of bankruptcy in
the process.180
The right to carry, distribute, and read political literature that is contrary to the views
of the government is also protected by article 13. The Commission has found an
article 13 violation where a university student was detained and disappeared after
police, in a university-wide document-inspection operation, found copies of a
communist newspaper in his backpack. The Commission affirmed that “[i]n carrying
a Communist newspaper for distribution or personal consumption, Mr. Medina was
exercising his right to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas.”181 The
Commission held that reprisals for the exercise of that right, which “are necessarily
seen as an attempt to chill or halt the exercise of protected rights,” constitute an
express violation of article 13(1).182
The Commission has further emphasized the duty of States Parties under article 13 to
investigate and sanction all acts that have the effect of “chilling” free speech. Both the
Commission and Court have affirmed that particular attention must be given to
protecting journalists and their occupation,183 although the same protection must be
178 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 2/96, Case 10.325, Steve Clark (Gren.), in IACHR ANNUAL
REPORT 1995, supra note 22, at 122, 133.
179 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 22/94, Case 11.012, Horacio Verbitsky (Arg.), in IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1994, supra note 107, at 40. 
180 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 14/87, Case 9642, Humberto Rubín (Para.), Mar. 28, 1987, in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1986–87, supra note 52, at 111. Among the tactics employed, state
authorities threatened to expel the radio announcer from the country unless he changed his editorial
position; required identification and explanations from all persons wishing to visit the radio station;
refused to provide police protection following repeated death threats against radio staff; sent “radio
interference” affecting ninety percent of broadcasts; and pressured local merchants to withdraw
commercial support for the station by airing on an official government television program the
names of those merchants who did not comply. As Paraguay was not yet party to the Convention,
the Commission found a violation of article IV of the Declaration.
181 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 3/98, Case 11.221, Tarcisio Medina Charry (Colom.), in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 4, para. 76.
182 Id. para. 77 (“[T]he Commission has made clear that, ‘the exercise of the rights protected in the
American Convention can never justify attacks or reprisals by State agents.’ Reprisals are
necessarily seen as an attempt to chill or halt the exercise of the protected rights. Where State
agents . . . carry out reprisals for the exercise of a right, a violation of that right occurs.”). 
183 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the
Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory
Opinion OC-5/85 of Nov. 13, 1985 (Ser. A) No. 5 (1985) (finding that journalism, because it is “the
primary and principal manifestation of freedom of expression,” deserves special scrutiny).
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afforded “any person engaged in the activity of public expression of information or
ideas.”184 In the case of Héctor Félix Miranda, a Mexican newspaper columnist who
was assassinated in the course of his work, the Commission found insufficient proof
to establish direct state responsibility for the killing. Nonetheless, the Commission
found that article 13 had been violated by the State’s failure to investigate the
assassination and to criminally prosecute the intellectual authors of the crime. As the
Commission stated, “A State’s refusal to conduct a full investigation of the murder of
a journalist is particularly serious because of its impact on society . . . , [as it]
constitutes an incentive for all violators of human rights[,] . . . [and] has a ‘chilling
effect,’ . . . . instill[ing] the fear of denouncing any and all kinds of offenses, abuses
or illegal acts.”185 The Commission concluded that the State’s failure to take swift
action to punish all perpetrators of the crime led to the State’s international
responsibility for violating the journalists’“right to freedom of expression and that of
the citizens in general to receive information freely and to learn the truth about the
events that took place.”186
B. Right to Conduct Human Rights
Documentation and to Denounce Human
Rights Abuses
Article 13 also encompasses the right to engage in human rights documentation and
to denounce human rights abuse. In fact, when the expression at issue “deals with
alleged violations of human rights,” the protection afforded by article 13 becomes
even broader. “In such a case, not only is a person’s individual right to transmit or
disseminate information being violated, the right of the entire community to receive
[that] information is also being undermined.”187
184 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 5/99, Case 11.739, Héctor Félix Miranda (Mex.), Apr. 13,
1999, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 4, at 783, 798–200, para. 52.
185 Id.
186 Id. para. 56; see also id. para. 52 (“The [] State must send a strong message to society that there
will be no tolerance for those who engage in such a grave violation of the right to freedom of
expression.”).
187 In the words of the Commission: 
In the Commission’s view, the exercise of the right of freedom of thought and
expression within a democratic society includes the right to not be prosecuted or
harassed for one’s opinions or for one’s allegations about or criticisms of public
officials . . . . The right of free expression also includes the right to analyze
critically and to oppose. This protection is broader, however, when the statements
made by a person deal with alleged violations of human rights. In such a case,
not only is a person’s individual right to transmit or disseminate information
being violated, the right of the entire community to receive information is also
being undermined. 
Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 20/99, Case 11.317, Rodolfo Robles Espinoza and Sons (Peru),
in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 4, at 815, 845, paras. 148 (emphasis added). 
Thus, in the case of Rodolfo Robles, the Commission found an article 13 violation
where a State Party engaged in retaliatory harassment of a former army general for
statements made about military corruption, human rights abuse, and “death squad”
activity organized by State intelligence. The Commission concluded that the principle
objective of the government attacks was to impede the general from expressing his
opinions and denunciations concerning grave human rights violations by the Army.188
The Commission has likewise affirmed that article 13 protects the right of individuals
to engage in human rights research and documentation. In the case of Carlos Ranferí
Gómez, a Guatemalan union activist created a documentary on living conditions in the
“Communities of Population in Resistance” (CPRs), filming, photographing, and
collecting testimonies and denunciations related to army harassment. Upon his return
from this documentation mission, his bus was stopped by masked soldiers who shot
Gómez in the chest, confiscated his materials, and left him for dead. The local police
refused to transport Gómez to the hospital and warned others not to assist. The
Commission concluded that the assassination attempt constituted an express violation
of article 13, as the clear intent of the government agents was to confiscate the camera
equipment, photographs, and testimonies to prevent their diffusion.189
C. Right of Access to Periodic Government
Reports on ESCR 
ESCR advocates might also invoke article 13 as a tool to promote widespread access
to the periodic reports State Parties are required to prepare on the measures adopted
and progress made in achieving observance of ESCR. Such reporting requirements
are laid out in the American Convention, the Protocol of San Salvador, and the
ICESCR, among others. The U.N. Committee on ESCR has identified a variety of
objectives that these reports serve, including “to facilitate public scrutiny of
government policies with respect to [ESCR] and to encourage the involvement of the
various economic, social and cultural sectors of society in the formulation,
implementation and review of the relevant policies.”190 The mandatory State
reporting requirement thus directly implicates the right of individuals “to receive”
information under article 13. 
188 Id. paras. 150–51.
189 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 29/96, Case 11.303, Carlos Ranferí Gómez (Guate.), in IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 522, para. 92. 
190 Reporting by States Parties, General Comment No. 1, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and
Cultural Rts., 3rd Sess., para. 5, U.N. Doc. E/1989/22 (1989), available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/
tbs/doc.nsf/MasterFrameView/38e23a6ddd6c0f4dc12563ed0051cde7?Opendocument>.
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STATE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS ON ESCR REALIZATION
AMERICAN CONVENTION, art. 42.
“The States Parties shall transmit to the Commission a copy of
each of the reports and studies that they submit annually . . . so that
the Commission may watch over the promotion of the rights implicit
in the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural
standards set forth in the [OAS Charter].”
PROTOCOL OF SAN SALVADOR, art. 19.
“[T]he States Parties to this Protocol undertake to submit [to the
Secretary General of the OAS] periodic reports on the progressive
measures they have taken to ensure due respect for the rights set
forth in this Protocol.”
IN T E R N AT I O N A L CO V E N A N T O N EC O N O M I C, SO C I A L, A N D CU LT U R A L
RIGHTS, art. 16.
“The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to submit [to
the Secretary General of the United Nations] in conformity with this
part of the Covenant reports on the measures which they have
adopted and the progress made in achieving the observance of the
rights recognized herein.” [See also articles 17-21]
Nevertheless, it is widely recognized that the state reporting system has been
inadequate and ineffective in the Americas.191 Such reports, even when prepared,
often lack appropriate analysis and are rarely publicized; indeed, there is little public
awareness of governments’ reporting obligations.  A strong argument can be made,
therefore, that when a State fails to comply with its reporting requirements as
mandated under international law, it violates the article 13 right of individuals to
“seek [and] receive” that information.  
This conclusion is supported by Commission statements on the scope of article 13 and
the Convention’s “object and purpose.” Under article 42 of the Convention, States
Parties are required to prepare reports on their activities in promoting the ESCR
implicit in the OAS Charter. The Commission has affirmed that, in a democratic
society, “the information available about the activities of public officials should be as
transparent as possible and accessible to all social groups.”192 Part of the reporting
requirement, therefore, must be seen as making monitored information known to the
191 See, e.g., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1985–1986, at
200, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.68 Doc. 8 rev. 1 (1986) (finding the ESCR reporting system regulated under
article 42 of the Convention “established an inadequate system of protection and therefore has not
been applicable” since the Convention came into force). 
192 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 20/99, Case 11.317, Rodolfo Robles Espinoza and Sons (Peru),
in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 4, at 815, para. 153 (emphasis added).
public.  By failing to prepare reports or by failing to make them accessible to all social
groups, a State violates the right of individuals to receive crucial information that
affects their lives. As the Commission has affirmed, undertaking tactics “to curtail
freedom of information and the free dissemination of ideas and opinions, particularly
in cases involving human rights violations and, consequently, punishable acts, is
unquestionably a serious violation . . . of society’s right to receive information and to
control the exercise of public power.”193
The “object and purpose” of the Convention—i.e., the effective protection of human
rights—supports the conclusion that article 13 should be read to require States Parties
to make their progress reports available to the public. Indeed, the very purpose of the
reporting requirement is to promote transparency in government human rights policy
and to create opportunities for citizens to challenge government assertions regarding
human rights achievement. Only in this way can citizens engage government for the
effective protection of human rights. As the old adage goes, “What is measured,
improves.” 
In sum, while individuals might not have standing to allege an article 42 violation on
their own, article 13 may provide a mechanism by which individuals can enforce the
reporting obligations of States Parties.  This argument, it should be stressed, is
untested and should be advanced with caution. Advocates may want to seek the
Court’s opinion, under its advisory jurisdiction, on the question of article 13’s effect
on State reporting obligations under the Convention and other applicable ESCR
treaties.
Practice Tip
A potential strategy for making States’ reporting obligations under
the Convention effective is to allege an article 13 violation where a
State Party has either (i) directly or indirectly impeded access to
State reports it has prepared in conformity with article 42; or (ii)
failed to prepare a report as required under article 42 or other
international law. (Note: article 29(b) may be invoked in relation to
reporting requirements in other international human rights treaties.)
193 Id. (emphasis added); see also Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Resolution No. 14/87, Case 9642, Humberto
Rubín (Para.), Mar. 28, 1987, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1986–87, supra note 52, at 111, 113–14
(“In the view of the Commission, freedom of the expression and dissemination of ideas is one of
the most solid guarantees of modern democracy . . . [and] entitles every person to acquire
information without interference of any kind .”) (emphasis added). 
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D. Right to Basic Literacy and Education
Finally, article 13 may be read to require States Parties to ensure the right to basic
literacy and fundamental education.  Under article 13, read with article 1, States
Parties are responsible for not only respecting, but ensuring, the right of all persons
within their jurisdiction to freedom of expression. “This right includes freedom to
seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds . . . either orally [or] in
writing . . . .”194 Clearly, a person who is illiterate or who lacks basic literacy skills
cannot “seek, receive, and impart information and ideas . . . in writing,” and may have
difficulty doing so orally. The ability of the illiterate or poorly educated to express
ideas and receive information, a right protected by article 13,195 is plainly limited in
practice. 
Significantly, in interpreting article 13, the Court has made clear that the Convention
obligates States Parties not only to refrain from engaging in “direct” and “indirect”
acts that restrict free expression, but also to take direct action when “means tending
to impede” free expression are established in practice.196 Lack of schools, poor
curricula, indirect school fees for impoverished students, and child labor are all
“means tending to impede” free expression in practice. Just as States have a direct
obligation under article 13 to remove private monopolies and oligopolies that tend to
restrict the free circulation of ideas,197 so too must the State be seen as having the
obligation to ensure the availability and accessibility of basic literacy and education
programs for the population. Indeed, it is today unassailable that the ability to read
and write is essential for free expression and that widespread illiteracy is largely
caused by the inaccessibility of quality schools.
Reading article 13 in light of other international human rights instruments—as
required by article 29(b) and (d)—further supports an interpretation that it imposes an
obligation upon States Parties to ensure access to basic literacy and education
programs. The ICESCR, the American Declaration, and the Protocol of San Salvador
each expressly obligates States Parties to provide “free” and “compulsory” primary
education accessible to all.198 States Parties agree that the purpose of education is to
“enable everyone to participate effectively in a democratic and pluralistic society,”199
194 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at
1, art. 13(1), OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23 doc. rev. 2, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970), entered into force July 18, 1978.
195 “The right protected by Article 13 . . . implies a collective right to receive any information
whatsoever and to have access to the thoughts expressed by others.” Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts.
13 and 29 of the American Convention on Human Rights) , Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of Nov. 13,
1985 (Ser. A) No. 5 (1985), para. 30.
196 Id. paras. 54–56. 
197 Id. para. 56.
198 See ICESCR, supra note 37, art. 13(2)(a); American Declaration, supra note 37, art. XII; Protocol
of San Salvador, supra note 37, art. 13(2)(a).
199 Id. art. 13(2). The same language appears in article 13 of the ICESCR (“agree that education shall
enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society . . . .”). 
that is, by being able to form opinions and express them to others. Indeed, the U.N.
Human Rights Committee has emphasized that States have an obligation “to adopt
every possible measure . . . to provide [children] with a level of education that will
enable them to enjoy the rights recognized in the Covenant, particularly the right to
freedom of opinion and expression.”200 The connection between basic education, the
ability to participate in decisionmaking and public expression, and democratic
institutions is a common and recurring theme in the inter-American system.201
Below, four aspects of the right to basic literacy that might be protected through
article 13 are considered: (1) physical accessibility of schools and basic literacy
programs; (2) quality literacy training; (3) removal of indirect fees for the poor; and
(4) strict limitations on child labor.
1. Physical Accessibility of Schools and Basic
Literacy Programs
Lack of physical access to literacy classes or schooling is the most direct impediment
to gaining the basic literacy skills necessary to express oneself freely.  It may thus be
argued that a State violates its obligations under article 13 to “ensure” the right to free
expression whenever individuals remain illiterate as a result of their inability to attend
primary schools or basic adult literacy programs. Such inaccessibility may be due to
the unreasonable distance of a program from one’s home or the physical condition of
the facilities. States Parties have an obligation to ensure that accessible schools, open
to all, are located within a reasonable distance of all communities. Where individuals
do not have access to basic literacy programs, States should be required under the
200 Rights of the Child (art. 24), General Comment 17, 44 U.N. GAOR, H.R. Comm., 35th Sess., Supp.
No. 40, annex VI, para. 3, U.N. Doc. A/44/40 (1989). 
201 The Court has explained: 
Freedom of expression is a cornerstone upon which the very existence of a
democratic society rests. It is indispensable for the formation of public opinion.
It is also a conditio sine qua non for the development of political parties, trade
unions, scientific and cultural societies and, in general, those who wish to
influence the public. It represents, in short, the means that enable the community,
when exercising its options, to be sufficiently informed. Consequently, it can be
said that a society that is not well informed is not a society that is truly free.
. . . .
In its social dimension, freedom of expression is a means for the interchange of
ideas and information among human beings and for mass communication. It
includes the right of each person to seek to communicate his own views to others,
as well as the right to receive opinions and news from others. For the average
citizen it is just as important to know the opinions of others or to have access to
information generally as is the very right to impart his own opinions.
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice
of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion
OC-5/85 of Nov. 13, 1985 (Ser. A) No. 5 (1985), paras. 70, 32 (emphasis added).
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Convention to build a new school or to provide travel support such that the aggrieved
individual can reach the nearest literacy training center.
This right to basic education and literacy is guaranteed not only in international
treaties, but in the domestic laws and political constitutions of most American States.
These legal protections guarantee, at a minimum, that primary education be
compulsory and accessible to all without cost. Some of the provisions of international
instruments are listed below.
RIGHT TO EDUCATION
Protocol of San Salvador, art. 13
1. Everyone has the right to education.
. . . .
3. The States Parties to this Protocol recognize that in order to
achieve the full exercise of the right to education: 
(a) Primary education should be compulsory and accessible
to all without cost ;
(b) Secondary education in its different forms, including
technical and vocational secondary education, should be
made available and accessible to all by every appropriate
means, and in particular, by the progressive introduction of
free education;
. . . .
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, art. 13
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that . . . 
(a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available free
to all;
(b) Secondary education in its different forms, including
technical and vocational secondary education, shall be
made generally available and accessible to all by every
appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive
introduction of free education. 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. XII
Every person has the right to an education . . . . Every person has
the right to receive, free, at least a primary education.
Charter of the OAS, art. 48
The Member States will exert the greatest efforts, in accordance
with their constitutional processes, to ensure the effective exercise
of the right to education, on the following bases: 
(a) Elementary education, compulsory for children of school age,
shall also be offered to all others who can benefit from it. When
provided by the State it shall be without charge;
(b) Middle-level education shall be extended progressively . . . .
Charter of OAS, art. 49
The Member States will give special attention to the eradication of
illiteracy . . . .
2. Quality Literacy Training
Sometimes the problem is not lack of physical access to primary schools, but the fact
that schools do not provide a minimally adequate education at all. This may be due to
underfunding, overcrowding, and/or lack of standards for the quality of teaching.
Whatever the cause, article 13 may be invoked to hold States Parties responsible for
failing to provide a minimal “primary education” for students enrolled in public
schools. Such inadequacy of training may leave students without the basic literacy
skills necessary to be able to freely express and impart their views in society, in
violation of article 13. Lack of basic literacy training in publicly financed schools is
a particularly egregious problem in many rural areas of the Americas.
Advocates might look to the United States, where a movement has emerged to
recognize, under state constitutions, a judicially enforceable right to a “minimally
adequate education” for all school children. At least seven states have ruled that their
state constitutions guarantee such a right.202 By doing so, they have awarded plaintiffs
relief in the form of judicially ordered and supervised plans to remedy substandard
educational conditions in public schools, bringing them up to a minimal standard of
educational adequacy. The legislatures have responded by legislating minimum
standards by which schools may be evaluated in the future. The U.N. Committee on
ESCR has called for similar steps under article 13 of the ICESCR, affirming that
“States Parties are obliged to establish ‘minimum educational standards’to which all
educational institutions . . . are required to conform” and to “maintain a transparent
and effective system to monitor such standards.”203
3. Removal of Indirect Fees for Basic Literacy
Programs and Primary Education
The basic literacy necessary for free expression may also be impeded by direct and
indirect fees for primary education. While direct fees are per se prohibited under
numerous treaties applicable to the American states (see box above), “[i]ndirect costs,
such as compulsory levies on parents (sometimes portrayed as being voluntary, when
202 These states include: Kentucky, Idaho, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, Maryland, and
North Carolina. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ. Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky 1989); Idaho Schs.
for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 850 P.2d 724 (Idaho 1993); Claremont
Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375 (N.H. 1993); McDuffy v. Secretary of the Executive Office
of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1993); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661
(N.Y. 1995); Montgomery County, Md. v. Bradford, 691 A.2d 1281 (Md. 1997); Leandro v. State,
488 S.E.2d 249 (N.C. 1997). See generally David L. Kirp, New Hope for Failing Schools: State
Courts Are Remedying the Shame of Inadequate Education Funding, NATION, June 1, 1998, at 20
(describing trend of state courts finding their state constitutions guarantee enforceable right to a
minimally adequate education).
203 The Right to Education (Art. 13): General Comment No. 13, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Econ., Soc.,
and Cultural Rts., 21st Sess, para. 54, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (1999).
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in fact they are not), or the obligation to wear a relatively expensive school uniform,
can also fall into the same category.”204 Though mandatory uniform requirements are
not per se incompatible with ensuring basic literacy education in public schools, they
directly impede basic education for the poor where students are required to purchase
uniforms privately and where such policies do not provide alternative options for
students who cannot afford them. 
The same is true of school policies requiring students to purchase their own books and
materials. Such requirements may constitute an insurmountable obstacle for poor
students. Where school fees prevent a poor student from attending primary school,
particularly where the concerned State is party to an international instrument
requiring that primary education be compulsory and free, a violation of article 13
should be alleged. The imposition of fees in such circumstances is also likely to
violate the right to non-discrimination and equality before the law, protected by
articles 1(1) and 24. 
4. Strict Limits on Child Labor
Child labor can be another major impediment to basic literacy. Extreme household
poverty often forces parents to choose between sending their children to work or to
school. While the State does not bear direct responsibility for this situation, it is
obligated to ensure, through the imposition of laws and their enforcement, that any
work performed by children does not interfere with the child’s attainment of the basic
literacy skills necessary for free expression.  This conclusion is reached by reading
article 13 together with article 7 of the Protocol of San Salvador, under which States
Parties undertake to guarantee that: 
As regards minors under the age of 16, the work day shall be
subordinated to the provisions regarding compulsory education and in
no case shall work constitute an impediment to school attendance or a
limitation on benefiting from education received.
This provision is deemed so important in the inter-American system that it is one of
only two rights in the Protocol that is explicitly subject to the individual petition
process of the Commission and Court. Article 19(6) of the Protocol provides that the
rights established in articles 8(1)(a) (union rights) and 13 (right to education) may
give rise to individual petitions before the Commission and Court. While the above-
quoted provision is enshrined in article 7 (just, equitable, and satisfactory conditions
of work), it directly concerns the effective exercise of sections (1) and (3) of article
13, which establish that “[e]veryone has the right to education” and that “[p]rimary
204 Plans of Action for Primary Education (Art. 14): General Comment No. 11, U.N. ESCOR, Comm.
on Econ., Soc., and Cultural Rts., 20th Sess, para. 7, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/4 (1999).
education should be compulsory and accessible to all without cost.” Accordingly, its
violation should give rise to the individual petitions process under the terms of article
19(6). Advocates may also argue that this guarantee is implicit in Convention article
13’s protection of the right to free expression, read with article 29(b). 
SUBORDINATION OF CHILD’S WORK DAY
TO COMPULSORY EDUCATION
Protocol of San Salvador, art. 7
. . . States Parties undertake to guarantee in their internal
legislation . . . 
(f) . . . As regards minors under the age of 16, the work day shall
be subordinated to the provisions regarding compulsory
education and in no case shall work constitute an impediment
to school attendance or a limitation on benefiting from
education received.
Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 32
1. States Parties recognize the right of the child to be protected
from economic exploitation and from performing any work that
is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s
education, or to be harmful to the child’s health or physical,
mental, spiritual, moral or social development.
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, art. 10
3. . . . Children and young persons should be protected from
economic and social exploitation. Their employment in work
harmful to their morals or health or dangerous to life or likely to
hamper their normal development should be punishable by law.
States should set age limits below which the paid employment
of child labour should be prohibited and punishable by law.
IX. Right of Assembly (Art. 15)
Article 15 of the Convention protects the right of peaceful assembly. Traditionally
considered a civil and political right, the right of assembly is of critical importance
for the protection of ESCR. In particular, article 15 may be used to protect individuals
from limitations on, or reprisals for, their participation in political, social, or
economic demonstrations, picketing, gatherings, or organizing meetings. 
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ARTICLE 15
“The right of peaceful assembly, without arms, is recognized.
No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right
other than those imposed in conformity with the law and necessary
in a democratic society in the interest of national security, public
safety or public order, or to protect public health or morals or the
rights or freedoms of others.”
The right of assembly is essential for effectively protecting ESCR. Individuals often
peacefully assemble to demonstrate against political abuse, corruption, or
environmental contamination. They march in parades to call attention to government
neglect of marginal areas and growing impoverishment and picket businesses that
engage in unjust labor practices. They participate in community workshops about
human rights, group discussions to identify community development needs, and
meetings to organize social or political action. Effective protection of human rights
would not be possible without the exercise of all these forms of assembly. As the
Commission has recognized, the right of assembly is instrumental; it supports the
exercise of all other fundamental rights, permitting groups to achieve ends not
expressly prohibited by law.205
Article 15 is violated wherever public authority interferes with, restricts, limits or
punishes the exercise of peaceful assembly. Where a group of people seeks to
peacefully assemble, state agents may not engage in acts to prevent the assembly,
disrupt it, or subsequently punish participants for exercising their rights. Indeed, it is
well established that the exercise of the rights protected in the Convention can never
justify attacks, reprisals or sanctions against those who exercise them. Restrictions on
the right of assembly might occur, for example, where the State banned certain forms
of assemblies; imposed mandatory licensing (e.g., requiring state approval for
assemblies of more than three persons); required the payment of fees; or imposed
restricted time, place and content requirements. Unlawful punishment may occur
where persons are fined, criminally prosecuted, persecuted, or fired or demoted from
their jobs as a result of their participation in peaceful assembly.
Article 15 has been considered in only one published opinion in the inter-American
system.206 In the Ricardo Baena case, the Court considered whether the State of
Panama, by firing 270 public workers following their participation in a street
demonstration organized to call attention to unjust labor conditions, had violated the
205 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Ricardo Baena et al. Case, Judgment of Feb. 3, 2001 (Ser. C) No. 72, para.
144(a) (stating Commission’s arguments). 
206 See id. paras. 144-50.
workers’right of assembly. The Court found no evidence that the State had restricted
the workers’ right to assemble peacefully in the streets, and thus no article 15
violation. It based its conclusion on several facts: the State had not in any way
interrupted or restricted the street demonstration, the dismissal notices made no
reference to the demonstration (only to the related call for a labor strike), and state
security officers had, in fact, accompanied the parade to ensure it proceeded without
incident.207 Most of the fired workers were union leaders; the Court thus did find that
the workers’ right of association (art. 16) had been violated (see below). Given,
however, that the demonstration was union-organized, the dismissals occurred
immediately following the demonstration, and the indissoluble link between the
demonstration and the call for a strike, the Court’s failure to find a violation of article
15, in conjunction with article 16, is somewhat puzzling. Future petitions should
stress the close interrelation between articles 15 and 16: an association cannot achieve
the ends for which it was formed if it cannot peacefully assemble without fear of
retaliation. 
Some restrictions on the right to assembly may be imposed legitimately under the
Convention. Legitimate restrictions must, however, meet two threshold requirements.
They must be (1) previously established in law; and (2) “necessary in a democratic
society in the interest of national security, public safety or public order, or to protect
public health or morals or the rights or freedoms of others.” These are extremely high
thresholds, and the burden lies on the State to prove that restrictions on protected
rights are indeed legitimate.
Right of assembly may be violated where persons
engaged, or seeking to engage, in assembly—i.e.
demonstrations, strikes, parades, picketing, community
workshops, group discussions, organizing meetings, or
other gatherings—are restricted, impeded, or
punished by way of:
• bans; 
• mandatory licensing; 
• required payment of fees;
• limited time and place requirements;
• exclusionary content limitations;
• civil fines or other penalties;
• criminal prosecution;
• persecution; or
• dismissal or demotion in employment, etc.
Such restrictions are legitimate only when they are (1) previously
established in law, and (2) “necessary in a democratic society in the
interest of national security, public safety or public order, or to
protect public health or morals or the rights or freedoms of others.” 
207 See id. paras. 148–50. 
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X. Freedom of Association
(Art. 16)—Labor Union Rights
The right to freedom of association for “political, economic, labor, social, [and]
cultural” purposes is protected by article 16 of the Convention. While important for a
wide range of ESCR, it is particularly relevant to the protection of labor union rights,
including the right to strike and the right to form trade unions. Indeed, the exceptional
importance of freedom of association, in the labor union context, for the defense of
workers’ legitimate interests has been expressly recognized by the Court.208 At least
two cases have been brought in the inter-American system alleging violations of
article 16 for the retaliatory firing of workers for participating in a union, strike, or
labor demonstration.209
ARTICLE 16
1. Everyone has the right to associate freely for ideological,
religious, political, economic, labor, social, cultural, sports,
or other purposes.
2. The exercise of this right shall be subject only to such
restrictions established by law as may be necessary in a
democratic society, in the interest of national security, public
safety or public order, or to protect public health or morals or the
rights and freedoms of others.
The “right to associate freely for . . . labor . . . purposes” may be violated where
membership in labor unions is restricted or obstructed or where union members are
punished for their participation in union activities—e.g., through civil or criminal
208 See id. para. 158 (affirming its place in the corpus juris of human rights). The justiciability of labor
union rights in the inter-American system is underscored by article 19 of the Protocol of San
Salvador. That provision expressly provides that violations of the “right of workers to organize
trade unions and to join the union of their choice for the purpose of protecting and promoting their
interests” may, where they are directly attributable to a State Party, give rise to application of the
system of individual petitions before the Commission and Court. See Protocol of San Salvador,
supra note 37, art. 19(6) (Means of Protection).
209 See Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 14/97, Case 11.381, Milton García Fajardo (Nicar.), Mar.
12, 1997, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 535, paras. 34, 71–72 (finding case
admissible, but stating that it should be pursued through the friendly settlement procedure rather
than the individual petitions process); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Ricardo Baena et al. Case, Judgment of
Feb. 3, 2001 (Ser. C) No. 72, paras. 151-73.
sanctions or through dismissal or demotion. The latter scenario has arisen in two
recent inter-American cases. In the Milton García Fajardo case, 142 customs workers
in Nicaragua were fired after participating in a labor strike demanding job security
and the indexation of wages to devaluation. Despite judicial decrees that the strike
was lawful and that the workers must be rehired, the State refused to reinstate them
to their posts. Similarly, in the Ricardo Baena case, 270 unionized workers in
Panama’s public sector were arbitrarily fired from their jobs after a strike and labor
demonstration to protest labor conditions was announced. The State attempted to
justify the dismissals by accusing the workers of complicity in a military uprising and
retroactively applying a hastily passed law. The Court, like the Commission, found
the State had violated article 16 with respect to the fired workers, the majority of
whom were union leaders.210
The Court based its holding on several critical facts, noting in particular that the law
authorizing the dismissals was enacted just fifteen days after the strike was called, the
state had disregarded proper procedure in firing the union members, state agents had
ransacked the union offices and interfered with their bank accounts, and the majority
of the fired workers were union leaders.211 The Court held that these facts
demonstrated that the intent of the new law was to separate union leaders from public-
sector workers. The Court found that this necessarily interfered with union activity in
the public sector.212 The right to associate, said the Court, is the fundamental right to
join together to achieve a common, lawful end without pressure or interference that
can alter or undermine that end.213 Freedom of association, as it relates to labor
unions, consists of the ability to form labor organizations and to develop their internal
structure, activities and programs of action, without intervention from public
authorities that limits or restricts the exercise of that right.214
Advocates may further invoke article 16 to protect collective bargaining with respect
to labor conditions and minimum wages.  The Commission has expressly recognized
that “the right to work and to the conditions under which it must be exercised [i.e.
under “proper conditions” and with “appropriate remuneration”] is directly connected
with the right of association.”215
Article 16 may also be used outside the labor context. Noting that article 16
“establishes the right of every person to associate freely for a n y [ l a w f u l ]
210 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Ricardo Baena et al. Case, Judgment of Feb. 3, 2001 (Ser. C) No. 72, para.
173. The Court also found violations of articles 8, 9, and 25, and breaches of articles 1 and 2. 
211 Id. para. 171. 
212 Id. para. 160.
213 Id. para. 156. 
214 See id. para. 156. The Court noted that freedom of association, in the union context, is comprised
of “both a right and a freedom.” In addition to the right to form associations without restriction, it
includes the freedom not to be compelled or obliged to join an association. Id. paras. 156, 159.
215 Status of Human Rights in Several Countries: Cuba, IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1994, supra note
107, at 142 (emphasis added).
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purpose…”216 the Commission has consistently found violations of article 16 where
state agents have persecuted human rights, religious, and union workers for their
activities working with poor and marginalized communities, often around ESCR
issues. In each of these cases, the Commission has found that the retaliatory state
action (e.g., rape, expulsion, assassination attempts) was specifically designed to
punish, undermine, and disrupt the ties of association between the victims and the
communities with which they worked.217 Such action violated the article 16 rights not
only of the immediate victims, but also of the communities and organizations with
which they worked.218
XI. Rights of the Child (Art. 19)
Convention article 19 enshrines the rights of the child. It is an extremely important
provision in the Convention for ESCR purposes; it has been read to expressly
encompass a wide range of ESCR protections for the child. Article 19 does not define
what is meant by a “child.” The Court has thus interpreted the provision in light of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, which considers every human being who has
not attained 18 years of age to be a child, “unless under the law applicable to the child,
majority is attained earlier.”219 Articulating the right of all such children to special
216 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 29/96, Case 11.303, Carlos Ranferí Gómez (Guate.), in IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 522, para. 93. 
217 See Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 31/96, Case 10.526, Diana Ortíz (Guate.), in IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 425, para. 119 (finding attacks by state authorities on
Maryknoll nun “were intended to punish and suppress her . . . work with the indigenous people of
Huehuetenango, as well as her association with members of GAM” and thus violated “her right to
associate with the people of Huehuetenango, the Church of Guatemala and the GAM”); Inter-Am.
Comm. H.R., Report No.49/99, Case 11.610, Loren Laroye Riebe Star et al. (Mex.), in IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 4, at 724, paras. 104–05 (“[The priests’] projects provide direct
economic and social benefits to many of the indigenous Mayan people of the region, and it is
therefore considered that the expulsion of the priests was designed ‘to intimidate the indigenous
people, depriving them of their leaders, and undermining the success of self-help organizations.’ .
. . [T]he decision to summarily expel them was also a violation of the right to associate freely for
religious purposes, since it radically and definitively cut them off from contact with their
parishioners in Chiapas.”); Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 29/96, Case 11.303, Carlos Ranferí
Gómez (Guate.), in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 522, paras. 93–95 (finding
union activist’s right to associate freely with members of Communities of Population in Resistance
for purposes of human rights documentation was violated).
218 In Report No. 49/99, the Commission found that, by expelling foreign missionaries for their human
rights work with local communities, the State violated the article 16 rights not only of the priests,
but of two residences for indigenous children, the town medical clinic, a seamstresses’cooperative,
a consumers cooperative, and a local library who whom they worked. See Inter-Am. Comm. H.R.,
Report No.49/99, Case 11.610, Loren Laroye Riebe Star et al. (Mex.), in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT
1998, supra note 4, at 724, para. 104.
219 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Villagrán Morales et al. (the “Street Children” Case), Judgment of Nov. 19,
1999 (Ser. C) No. 63, para. 188.
measures of protection by his family, society and the State, article 19 should be
invoked in every petition involving human rights abuses against a child.  
ARTICLE 19
Every minor child has the right to the measures of protection
required by his condition as a minor on the part of his family,
society, and the state. 
According to the Commission, “the reason for Article 19 of the Convention arose
from the vulnerability of children and their incapacity to personally ensure the respect
of their rights.” Article 19 thus establishes the right of every child to “the measures of
protection required by his [or her] condition as a minor.” These special measures of
protection, which are owed by the child’s family, society, and the State, are to be
defined by reference to the Convention itself and to other international instruments
that protect children’s rights, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The
Court has affirmed, “Both the American Convention and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child form part of a very comprehensive international corpus juris for
the protection of the child that should help this Court establish the content and scope
of the general provision established in Article 19 of the American Convention.”220 The
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) expressly incorporates ESCR
protections for the child; it should be invoked in every petition involving a child
victim to assist in interpreting the “measures of protection” required under article 19.
In the Court’s words: 
These provisions [in the CRC] allow us to define the scope of the
‘measures of protection’ referred to in Article 19 of the American
Convention, from different angles. Among them, we should emphasize
those that refer to non-discrimination, special assistance for children
deprived of their family environment, the guarantee of survival and
development of the child, the right to an adequate standard of living,
and the social rehabilitation of all children who are abandoned or
exploited.221
The Court has considered only one contentious case in which article 19 has been
invoked. In the “Street Children” case, the Court considered whether the State of
220 Id. para. 194. 
221 Id. para. 196 (emphasis added). 
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Guatemala was responsible for the abduction, torture, and murder of three child
victims who lived on the streets of Guatemala in extremely precarious socio-
economic conditions. The Court found the State responsible for a systematic practice,
carried out by members of the State security forces, of aggression against “street
children” in the country and linked the death of the three child victims to the State
practice. The Court stated: 
When States violate the rights of at-risk children, such as “street
children,” in this way, it makes them victims of a double aggression.
First, such States do not prevent them from living in misery, thus
depriving them of the minimum conditions for a dignified life and
preventing them from the “full and harmonious development of their
personality,” even though every child has the right to harbor a project
of life that should be tended and encouraged by the public authorities
so that it may develop this project for its personal benefit and that of
society to which it belongs. Second, they violate their physical, mental
and moral integrity and even their lives.222
The Court has repeatedly noted the special obligations States Parties to the
Convention have to children, especially at-risk children. Noting, for example, that one
of the child victims in the “Street Children” case had a criminal record, it concluded
that this fact, together with knowledge that the child lived on the street, created a
special obligation on the part of the State apparatus to rehabilitate the child in order
to prevent further criminal activity and to allow the child to “play a constructive and
productive role in society.”223 The State also assumes special obligations with respect
to children deprived of their family environment or who are abandoned or exploited.
Where any protected right is violated with respect to a child victim, a violation of
article 19 should be alleged.  
Practice Tip 
• An article 19 violation should be alleged in every petition
involving a child victim.
• Article 19 should be viewed as an umbrella provision that
incorporates into the Convention the rights of the child
enshrined in other international human rights instruments and
domestic laws. Practitioners should rely heavily on the
Convention on the Rights of the Child to assist in interpreting the
“measures of protection” required under article 19 (see box
below). 
222 Id. para. 191 (emphasis added). 
223 Id. para. 197. 
CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
Art. 6.  (1) States Parties recognize that every child has the
inherent right to life; (2) States Parties shall ensure to
the maximum extent possible the survival and
development of the child.
Art. 19. (1) States Parties shall take all appropriate legislative,
administrative, social and educational measures to
protect the child from all forms of physical or
mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or
negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation,
including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s),
legal guardian(s) or any other person who has the
care of the child . . . . 
Art. 20. A child temporarily or permanently deprived of his or
her family environment, or in whose own best interests
cannot be allowed to remain in that environment, shall
be entitled to special protection and assistance
provided by the State.
Art. 24. (1) States Parties recognize the right of the child to the
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
health and to facilities for the treatment of illness
and rehabilitation of health. States Parties shall
strive to ensure that no child is deprived of his or her
right of access to such health care services; (2)
States Parties shall pursue full implementation of this
right and, in particular, shall take appropriate
measures: (a) To diminish infant and child
m o r t a l i t y; To ensure the provision of necessary
medical assistance and health care to all children
with emphasis on the development of primary health
care; (c) To combat disease and malnutrition,
including within the framework of primary health care,
through, inter alia, the application of readily available
technology and through the provision of adequate
nutritious foods and clean drinking-water, taking
into consideration the dangers and risks of
environmental pollution; (d) To ensure appropriate pre-
natal and post-natal health care for mothers; (e) To
ensure that all segments of society, in particular
parents and children, are informed, have access to
education and are supported in the use of basic
knowledge of child health and nutrition, the
advantages of breastfeeding, hygiene and
environmental sanitation and the prevention of
accidents. . . . 
Art. 26. (1) States Parties shall recognize for every child the right
to benefit from social security, including social
insurance, and shall take the necessary measures to
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achieve the full realization of this right in accordance
with their national law.
Art. 27. (1) States Parties recognize the right of every child to a
standard of living adequate for the child’s physical,
mental, spiritual, moral and social development . . . .
(3) States Parties, in accordance with national
conditions and within their means, shall take
appropriate measures to assist parents and others
responsible for the child to implement this right and
shall in case of need provide material assistance and
support programmes, particularly with regard to
nutrition, clothing and housing .
Art. 28. (1) States Parties recognize the right of the child to
education, and with a view to achieving this right
progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity,
they shall, in particular: (a) Make primary education
compulsory and available free to all; (b) Encourage
the development of different forms of secondary
education, including general and vocational education,
make them available and accessible to every child,
and take appropriate measures such as the
introduction of free education and offering financial
assistance in case of need; Make higher education
accessible to all on the basis of capacity by every
appropriate means . . . . 
Art. 32. (1) States Parties recognize the right of the child to be
protected from economic exploitation and from
performing any work that is likely to be hazardous
or to interfere with the child’s education, or to be
harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental,
spiritual, moral or social development; (2) States
Parties shall take legislative, administrative, social and
educational measures to ensure the implementation of
the present article. To this end, and having regard to
the relevant provisions of other international
instruments, States Parties shall in particular: (a)
Provide for a minimum age or minimum ages for
admission to employment; (3) Provide for appropriate
regulation of the hours and conditions of
employment; (4) Provide for appropriate penalties or
other sanctions to ensure the effective enforcement of
the present article. 
Art. 36. States Parties shall protect the child against all other
forms of exploitation prejudicial to any aspects of the
child’s welfare.
Cont...
XII. Right to Property (Art. 21)—Right to Housing,
Land, and Social Assistance
The right to property is enshrined in article 21 of the Convention.  “[F]eaturing among
the fundamental rights of man,”224 the right is of critical importance for ESCR
protection. In particular, it can be used to protect certain aspects of the right to
housing, the right to land, the right to legal protection against the destruction of crops,
livestock, and other belongings, and the right to basic welfare entitlements provided
under domestic law.
ARTICLE 21
1. Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his
property. The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment
in the interest of society.
2. No one shall be deprived of his property except upon
payment of just compensation, for reasons of public utility
or social interest, and in the cases and according to the
forms established by law.
3. Usury and any other form of exploitation of man by man
shall be prohibited by law.
A violation of article 21 occurs where a person demonstrates he has been “damaged
in or dispossessed by the State of the use, enjoyment or interest in an object or thing
to which he had acquired legal rights under domestic law.”225 As a person may acquire
legal rights in housing, statutory welfare entitlements, and other personal or
communal property, article 21 may be invoked to protect these items from state
encroachment.
The right to property is an “inalienable right, concerning which no State, group or
person may undertake or carry out activities designed to suppress [it].”226 It is not
224 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 20, at 465. 
225 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 39/96, Case 11.673, Santiago Marzioni (Arg.), in IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, para. 29 (emphasis added). An individual would not have a
claim under article 21 where he claimed eligibility for a given entitlement notwithstanding a
judicial or administrative determination that he was not. The Commission has specifically found
that the concept of property does not include “a potential award” or “the mere possibility of
obtaining a favorable decision.” Id. (finding no violation of article 21 for claim that court awarded
petitioner an inadequate workers compensation award).
226 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 20, at 467.
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sacrosanct, however. The State may expropriate property in which others have legal
rights if three conditions are met: (1) just compensation is paid; (2) the expropriation
is justified by reasons of public utility or social interest; and (3) the expropriation is
e ffected in accordance with pre-established law.2 2 7 If property is confiscated,
destroyed, or otherwise diminished in its use-value, with the knowledge,
acquiescence or participation of the State, and the victim is not fairly compensated for
her loss,228 a violation of article 21 may be alleged.
An article 21 violation occurs when a person has been damaged
in or dispossessed by the State of the use, enjoyment or interest in
an object or thing to which he has acquired legal rights under
domestic law.
A State may acquire the property of another only if three
conditions are met:
(1)   Payment of just compensation;
(2)   Reasons of public utility or social interest; and
(3)   Observance of the forms established by law.
Various components of the right to property are discussed below.
A. Housing Rights
The Commission has explicitly recognized that the right to adequate housing is
closely intertwined with the right to individual property.229 Although the right to
227 Id. at 466 (“[N]o State—especially if it is a party to a binding instrument—may expropriate
property without payment of just compensation, while such expropriation must further be justified
by reasons of public utility or social interest and be effected in accordance with the forms
established by law.”). 
228 “[I]nternational law recognizes, as a general principle of the right to private property[,] that the
State must in all cases compensate nationals or foreigners when it expropriates their property.”
United Nations, El derecho de toda persona a la propiedad individual y colectiva, Final Report
submitted by Independent Expert Luis Valencia Rodríguez, E/CN.4/1993/15, 18.12.92, at 26–27
(cited in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 20, at 466–67).
229 According to the Commission, “While all human rights are clearly indivisible and interdependent,
the right to shelter is the right most closely connected with the right to individual property. Since
the right to an adequate dwelling can be an integral and important part of the right to property
ownership, lack of it can be considered an abridgment of other fundamental rights such as the right
to freedom and personal security.” IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 20, at 465–66 (citing
United Nations, El derecho de toda persona a la propiedad individual y colectiva, Final Report
submitted by Independent Expert Luis Valencia Rodríguez, E/CN.4/1993/15, 18.12.92, at 26–27)
(emphasis added).
housing encompasses a wide range of rights,230 the claims with the greatest likelihood
of success under article 21 involve protection from: (a) arbitrary destruction of
housing and personal property; (b) illegal forced evictions; (c) arbitrary rent hikes;
and (d) environmental contamination of residential property.
1. Protection against Destruction
of Housing-Related Property
Article 21 plainly protects against arbitrary destruction of housing and personal
property.  Forceful removal of squatter communities or homeless persons from public
or private areas often involves the bulldozing, burning or confiscation of temporary
shelters and the personal possessions inside them.  While private property owners
have the right to seek a court order for the removal of unwanted persons on their land,
they do not have the right to destroy the property of those persons. Where the State
destroys or confiscates such property, or allows private actors to do so, it violates
article 21. Just compensation must be paid and alternate housing accommodations
provided.   
Destruction of housing and related property by state agents is particularly egregious
during civil conflicts. This may occur as a direct tactic of war231 or in an attempt to
remove civilian communities from the line of fire. In respect to the latter, the
Commission issued a country report in 1984 finding Nicaragua in violation of article
21 for the systematic “destruction of the homes, crops, livestock and other
belongings” of the Miskito Indians in the course of a compulsory relocation to new
s e t t l e m e n t s .2 3 2 The Commission stated that Nicaragua should “authorize just
compensation for the destruction of their property to those concerned.”233
230 The U.N. Committee on ESCR, for example, affirms that the concept of a right to “adequate
housing” includes at least the following: (a) legal security of tenure; (b) availability of services,
materials, facilities and infrastructure; (c) affordability; (d) habitability; (e) accessibility; (f)
location; and (g) cultural adequacy. See The Right to Adequate Housing (Art. 11(1)), General
Comment No. 4, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rts., 6th Sess., para. 8, U.N.
Doc. E/1992/23 (1992), available at < h t t p : / / w w w. u n h c h r. c h / t b s / d o c . n s f / 0 9 9 b 7 2 5 f e 8 7 5 5 5 e c
8 0 2 5 6 7 0 c 0 0 4 f c 8 0 3 / 4 6 9 f 4 d 9 1 a 9 3 7 8 2 2 1 c 1 2 5 6 3 e d 0 0 5 3 5 4 7 e ? O p e n D o c u m e n t # * + C o n t a i n e d + i >
[hereinafter General Comment No. 4]. 
231 War-time destruction of civilian homes and residential property is an express offense under
international humanitarian law and the laws of war. See, e.g., Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 Annex
I, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, entered into forceDec. 7, 1978; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609, entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.
232 INTER-AM. COMM. H.R., REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS OF A SEGMENT OF THE




Integration A p p ro a c h
323
A rt. 21: Right to Pr o p e rt y
Despite this important precedent, neither the Commission nor Court has yet found a
housing-related article 21 violation under its contentious jurisdiction. This is
surprising given the substantial number of contentious cases before these bodies in
which the homes and housing-related property of victims of torture, disappearance or
extrajudicial execution have been destroyed, ransacked, burned, and/or pillaged by
State agents.234 Unfortunately, however, the parties failed to allege article 21
violations in the pleadings, and the Court and Commission failed to do so sua sponte
(on their own).235
2. Protection against Forced Evictions/Displacement
& the Right to Minimally Adequate Housing
Article 21 may also be invoked where persons are forcefully evicted from their homes
without a court order or other due process protections: such evictions deprive evictees
of “the right to the use and enjoyment of [their] property.” To be successful, evictees
must show that (1) they were not afforded due process protections (i.e., the eviction
was illegal); and (2) they “had acquired legal rights under domestic law” to that
property. The latter requirement is easily demonstrated where the evictee has legal
title to the property in question. It may also be demonstrated, however, where the
evictee has a rental contract or agreement concerning the property (is a lawful
“tenant”) or where the evictee has gained legal rights to the property through some
form of adverse possession, if recognized in the domestic law.
Article 21 may even protect against forceful displacement of persons, such as
squatters and homeless persons, who have no formal legal claim to the specific land
or space they occupy but have no other place to reside. States Parties are obligated to
ensure such persons alternate accommodation, space, or resources through which
minimally adequate housing may be accessed. This conclusion is supported by article
1 of the Convention, which obligates States Parties to ensure the right to property for
all persons. It is also supported by reading article 21 in light of article 29(d), which
prohibits the interpretation of article 21 so as to exclude or limit the effect of the
American Declaration. Under article 23 of the Declaration, “Every person has the
right to own such private property as meets the essential needs of decent living and
helps to maintain the dignity of the individual and of the home.” 
234 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 61/99, Case 11.519, José Alexis Fuentes Guerrero et
al. (Colom.), Apr. 13, 1999, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 4, at 467; Inter-Am.
Comm. H.R., Report No. 48/97, Case 11.411, “Ejido Morelia” (Mex.), in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT
1997, supra note 4, at 655; Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 43/96, Case 11.411, Severiano
Santíz Gómez et al. (Mex.), in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 576; Inter-Am.
Comm. H.R., Res. 26/89, Case 10.179, Sebastián Gutiérez et al. (El Sal.), in IACHR ANNUAL
REPORT 1989–90, supra note 11, at 38; Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Res. 22/89, Case 10.124 (Surin.),
Sept. 27, 1989, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1988–89, supra note 27, at 143.
235 It is a general principle of international law (jura novit cura) that “international agencies have the
power, and indeed the duty, to apply all relevant legal provisions, even if they have not been
invoked by the parties.” Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 60/99, Case 11.516, Ovelário Tames
(Braz.), Apr. 13, 1999, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 4, at 449, para. 40.
The “essential needs of decent living” necessarily include minimally adequate
housing. Article 21 may thus be read to obligate States Parties to provide homeless
persons with entitlements sufficient to secure minimally adequate housing when they
cannot do so on their own. Such entitlements may include legal rights to build
temporary shelters on public or private lands, direct provision of accessible shelter
services, public housing subsidies, or financial resources for securing private housing
or similar rental accommodation. 
Petitioners should be aware that, where failure to ensure the minimum core content of
housing rights is alleged, it is extremely unlikely the Commission or Court will order
an immediate individual remedy of permanent housing under article 21.  They may,
however, order the concerned State to devise, fund, implement, and supervise
measures to provide relief to homeless persons in the jurisdiction on a priority basis,
perhaps indicating the minimum core content of temporary shelter to be provided
petitioners in the interim. The South African Constitutional Court ordered such a
remedy in a recent opinion, in which it determined the rights of 390 adults and 510
children who were rendered homeless as a result of their eviction from informal
homes situated on private land earmarked for formal low-cost housing.236 The
squatters’ take-over of the land resulted from the appalling conditions in their
previous settlement, along with their frustration at being on a waiting list for
subsidized low-cost housing for as long as seven years without response. The Court
ordering the State to: 
devise and implement within its available resources a comprehensive
and coordinated programme progressively to realise the right of access
to adequate housing. The programme must include reasonable
measures . . . to provide relief for people who have no access to land,
no roof over their heads, and who are living in intolerable conditions
or crisis situations.237
Article 21 may be invoked to protect against
forceful evictions/displacement where: 
1. Due process and other procedural protections are not afforded
evictee;238 and
236 See Government of the Republic of South Africa v. Grootboom, 2000, CCT 11/00, paras 3-8. The
Constitutional Court did not attempt to define the minimum core content of the “right to have
access to adequate housing,” on the ground that the “core content” will vary with context and the
Court had insufficient information before it to allow it to make such a determination in that case.
Id. para. 33. It did not say that a court is not capable of making this determination if properly
presented with sufficient information.  
237 See id. para. 99. 
238 The U.N. Committee on ESCR considers that States should apply the following due process and
procedural protections in relation to forced evictions: “(a) an opportunity for genuine consultation
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2. Evictees had legal right under domestic law to property—e.g.,
(a) possessed legal title to property; 
(b) were tenants under rental contract;
(c) possessed legal rights through adverse possession; or
(d) lacked resources to secure alternative accommodation
(minimum core content).
3. Protection against Arbitrary Rent Hikes
Article 21 might also be invoked to protect against arbitrary rent hikes by private or
public property owners. Where not justified by reasonable cost-of-living increases
(hence not “arbitrary”), such rent hikes “damage[] . . . [a renter’s] use, enjoyment or
interest in [housing] to which he had acquired legal rights under domestic law.” This
is particularly true where renters are forced to abandon their housing contracts due to
arbitrary rent increases or to forgo other essential living necessities such as food or
heat. Where concrete damage to a legal interest in housing can be shown to have
resulted from an arbitrary rent hike, which can be imputed to the State, aggrieved
renters might bring a claim under article 21. 
It may be argued, in fact, that by failing to legislate and enforce protections against
arbitrary rent hikes, States violate their article 1 and 2 obligations to ensure the right
to property under article 21. The argument that rental housing owners’ right to
property is violated by state-legislated rent caps has been roundly rejected by the
European Court of Human Rights, which has found that States have a wide margin of
discretion in legislating policies to protect the right to housing.239 It has affirmed that
“modern societies consider housing a primordial necessity, whose regulation cannot
be left completely to the free play of the market.”240 The U.N. Committee on ESCR
has also stressed the importance of “affordability” to the right to adequate housing,
a ffirming that “tenants should be protected by appropriate means against
unreasonable rent levels or rent increases.”241 This jurisprudence should be drawn
with those affected; (b) adequate and reasonable notice for all affected persons prior to the
scheduled date of eviction; (c) information on the proposed evictions and where applicable, on the
alternative purpose for which the land or housing is to be used, to be made available in reasonable
time to all those affected; (d) especially where groups of people are involved, government officials
or their representatives to be present during an eviction; (e) all persons carrying out the eviction to
be properly identified; (f) evictions not to take place in particularly bad weather or at night unless
the affected persons consent otherwise; (g) provision of legal remedies; and (h) provision, where
possible, of legal aid to persons who are in need of it to seek redress from the courts.” General
Comment No. 7, supra note 149, para. 16.
239 See Eur. Ct. H.R., Mellacher et al., v. Austria, Judgment of Dec. 19, 1989 (Ser.A) No. 169.
240 Eur. Ct. H.R., James et al. v. United Kingdom, Judgment of Feb. 21, 1986 (Ser.A) No. 98. 
241 General Comment No. 4, supra note 230, para. 8(c). In terms of “affordability,” the Committee
states in full: “Personal or household financial costs associated with housing should be at such a
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upon in arguing for rent cap protections for low-income housing in the inter-
American system. 
4. Protection Against Environmental
Threats to Residential Property
Finally, article 21 may be invoked where a person’s “use, enjoyment or interest” in
her property is diminished by environmental contamination or other preventable
environmental threats, and the State fails to take adequate preventative and protective
measures. Such threats not only directly diminish economic property value, but also
effect one’s use and enjoyment of one’s property. The European Court of Human
Rights, for example, has found a State in violation of the European Convention by
failing to adopt measures to avoid the efflux of sulfur-hydroxide from a water and
residue purification station. The effect of the State’s omission was to put the
inhabitants of the neighboring houses in substantial health risk. Though the Court
found a violation of the “right to privacy/inviolability of the home,” the situation also
violated the right to property, as the inhabitants’ use and enjoyment of their own
neighboring houses and property was substantially diminished. 
The recent catastrophe in El Salvador, where hundreds of homes were crushed
beneath a deadly landslide, might also implicate article 21. Rather than enforce
protective zoning measures to restrict development on the precarious hillside perched
over the city, the State overturned those restrictions to permit construction of luxury
housing, ignoring rigorous public dissent and expert warnings of environmental
danger to the houses below. Such action, imputable to the State, proximately resulted
in concrete injury to the housing rights of thousands of people, thus implicating the
State’s obligations under articles 1 and 21. 242
Advocates may strengthen their housing-related property rights arguments under
article 21 of the Convention by drawing upon other housing rights protections in
domestic and international law. These norms may be used to assist in the
interpretation of article 21 through the medium of article 29. 
level that the attainment and satisfaction of other basic needs are not threatened or compromised.
Steps should be taken by States parties to ensure that the percentage of housing-related costs is, in
general, commensurate with income levels. States parties should establish housing subsidies for
those unable to obtain affordable housing, as well as forms and levels of housing finance which
adequately reflect housing needs. In accordance with the principle of affordability, tenants should
be protected by appropriate means against unreasonable rent levels or rent increases. In societies
where natural materials constitute the chief sources of building materials for housing, steps should
be taken by State parties to ensure the availability of such materials.” Id.
242 In a lawsuit brought by developers, the Supreme Court of El Salvador overturned the protective
zoning restrictions, finding they illegally cancelled the existing zoning easements of developers.
Given the danger to the underlying houses, the correct course under article 21 was arguably to have
upheld the zoning laws for “reasons of public utility,” while reasonably compensating the
developers for the easements. 
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National Constitutions protecting Housing Rights: Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic,
E c u a d o r, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru.
OTHER INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
PROTECTING HOUSING RIGHTS
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 25(1)
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including . . .
housing . . . .
International Covenant on ESCR, art. 11(1)
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right
of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his
family, including adequate . . . housing . . . .
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, art. 5(e)(iii)
States Parties undertake to . . . guarantee the right of everyone,
without distinction . . . , to equality before the law, notably in the
enjoyment of the following rights: . . . (e) . . . (iii) The right to
housing . . . .
Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 27(3)
States Parties, in accordance with national conditions and within
their means, shall take appropriate measures to assist parents
and others responsible for the child to implement this right and
shall in case of need provide material assistance and support
programmes, particularly with regard to nutrition, clothing and
housing.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, art. 14(2)(h)
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women in rural areas in order to ensure,
on a basis of equality of men and women, that they participate
in and benefit from rural development and, in particular, shall
ensure to such women the right: . . . (h) To enjoy adequate living
conditions, particularly in relation to housing . . . .
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 21
As regards housing, the Contracting States, in so far as the
matter is regulated by laws or regulations or is subject to the
control of public authorities, shall accord to refugees lawfully
Cont...
staying in their territory treatment as favourable as possible and,
in any event, not less favourable than that accorded to aliens
generally in the same circumstances.
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, art. 43(1)(d)
Migrant workers shall enjoy equality of treatment with nationals
of the State of employment in relation to: . . . (d) Access to
housing, including social housing schemes, and protection
against exploitation in respect of rents.
ILO Recommendation No. 115 on Workers’ Housing
B. Right to Land and Tenure Security
Article 21 also protects the right to land, an important aspect of property. States
Parties are obligated not only to refrain from directly interfering with an individual’s
enjoyment of her land, but to protect against infringement of property rights by
private third parties. As the Commission has recognized, “[t]he common legal
meaning of the word property denotes ‘the right to dispose of something in every
legal way, to possess it, use it, and to exclude everyone else from interfering with
i t . ’ ”2 4 3 State-sponsored forced displacements/resettlements from individually or
communally owned lands thus directly implicate article 21. Such displacements are
lawful only where the State meets its burden of proving they were undertaken (1) after
providing displaced communities with just compensation and/or comparable
alternative lands; (2) for reasons of public utility; and (3) in conformity with the forms
established by law.
States Parties also have an obligation to protect property rights from infringement by
private third parties. Legal security of tenure is an essential element of this
protection;244 it may be conferred by providing land titles, maintaining up-to-date land
registries, and seriously investigating and sanctioning violations of land rights. A
243 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 39/96, Case 11.673, Santiago Marzioni (Arg.), in IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 76, 81, para. 26 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (1968)). 
244 As the U.N. Committee on ESCR has stated: “[Legal security of tenure] takes a variety of forms,
including rental (public and private) accommodation, cooperative housing, lease, owner-
occupation, emergency housing and informal settlements, including occupation of land or property.
Notwithstanding the type of tenure, all persons should possess a degree of security of tenure which
guarantees legal protection against forced eviction, harassment and other threats. State parties
should consequently take immediate measures aimed at conferring legal security of tenure upon
those persons and households currently lacking such protection, in genuine consultation with
affected persons and groups.” General Comment No. 4, supra note 230, para. 8(a) (emphasis
added).
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recent petition filed with the Court on behalf of the Awas Tingni community of
Nicaragua raises the issue of land tenure security as a direct Convention violation.
The petition alleges that Nicaragua violated article 21 by failing to demarcate and
officially recognize the tribe’s territory, and thus failing to protect the tribe’s
communal lands from encroachment by private lumber companies. 
As a function of the State obligation to ensure protected rights, article 21 may also
confer certain land ownership rights to the landless, particularly in regions where
communities depend on the land for subsistence. The Commission has suggested that,
in such situations, article 21—read with articles 2 and 26—obligates the State to take
progressive measures, including legislative action, to transfer land to the landless.245
States Parties are thus required not only to respect and protect current land ownership
systems under article 21, but to engage in land reform where necessary to ensure
“structural implementation of the guarantee of the right to own land, in the broadest
sense.”246
C. Basic Welfare Entitlements/Social Assistance
Article 21 may also be invoked to protect continued receipt of basic welfare
entitlements, such as unemployment benefits, health insurance, disability payments,
or social security. In this respect, state obligations may be viewed as both “negative”
and “positive.” 
Advocates may argue that article 21 (read with articles 8 and 1) imposes a “negative”
obligation on States Parties to refrain from arbitrarily depriving qualified individuals
of property-based entitlements without due process of law. Many states provide social
assistance and other basic welfare entitlements to persons meeting a set of
legislatively or administratively determined eligibility requirements. While the State
enjoys broad discretion in setting eligibility standards for such assistance, once those
standards have been determined in law, all persons who meet the required criteria may
be said to possess “property rights” in continued receipt of the corresponding
entitlement. This “property right” exists until the person no longer meets the
determined eligibility criteria or the criteria are changed through the formal legal
process. Where a State deprives an individual of social assistance without due process
245 Status of Human Rights in Several Countries: El Salvador, IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1994, supra
note 107, at 175 (finding that, regarding the right to own property, the Salvadoran peace
agreement’s program for transfer of land to demobilized combatants “is an essential element in
effective implementation of the obligations deriving from Article 2 and Article 26 of the American
Convention”). 
246 Status of Human Rights in Several Countries: Nicaragua, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra
note 20, at 466; see also id . at 465 (recognizing growing significance and importance of property
ownership). 
of law—e.g., adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard—the State may be said
to violate article 21 in conjunction with articles 8 and 1.247
Advocates may also argue that article 21 (read with articles 2 and 26) imposes a
“positive” obligation on States Parties to legislate such need-based entitlements as
necessary to ensure that all persons within their jurisdictions have sufficient property
to “meet the essential needs of decent living.” Indeed, article 23 of the American
Declaration, which can be invoked through article 29(d) to help interpret article 21,
specifically states: “Every person has the right to own such private property as meets
the essential needs of decent living and helps to maintain the dignity of the individual
and of the home.” In the context of discussing the right to property under article 21
of the Convention, the Commission has invoked Declaration article 23,
acknowledging that although the Declaration is not legally binding, it establishes
“universal and regional rules which have become rules of international customary law
and, as such, are considered obligatory in the doctrine and practice of international
law.”248 The Commission has stressed the growing importance and significance of
property ownership and has cited approvingly to U.N. reports that interpret the right
to property broadly to include guaranteed access to goods necessary for human
development and dignity. National constitutions often provide similar property-based
protections and can also be invoked through article 29(b).249
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 17
1. Everyone has the right to property individually and commonly
owned.
2. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of his property.
American Declaration, art. 23
Every person has the right to own such private property as meets
the essential needs of decent living and helps to maintain the
dignity of the individual and of the home.
Constitution of Nicaragua, art. 44
Nicaraguans have the right to personal property that will guarantee
them the goods necessary and essential for their integral
development.
247 Though the petition was declared inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, the
Commission was presented with a related claim in Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Resolution No. 90/90,
Case 9893, National Vanguard Movement of Retirees and Pensioners (Uru.), in ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1990–1991, at 77, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.79 rev. 1
Doc. 12 (1991). Petitioners alleged that, by using indices lower than the Average Salary Index to
readjust payments to certain retirees and pensioners, the State violated their right to property as
established in the American Declaration. 
248 Status of Human Rights in Several Countries: Nicaragua, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra
note 20, at 465.
249 See, e.g. , NIC. CONSTITUTION, art. 44 (“Nicaraguans have the right to personal property that will
guarantee them the goods necessary and essential for their integral development.”). 
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XIII.Freedom of Movement and Residence
(Art. 22)
Article 22 of the Convention protects the right of movement and residence. It
guarantees that “[e]very person has the right to freely move about and reside in the
territory of a State party, subject to the law, without interference by the State or
private third parties.”  Article 22 may be used to protect against a wide variety of
intrusions on one’s domicile.  In particular, like article 11 (inviolability of the home),
article 22 may be used to protect against forced evictions and involuntary
resettlements. It may also be used to protect homeless persons from certain vagrancy
statutes or other laws that criminalize being on the street during the day or night.
ARTICLE 22
1. Every person lawfully in the territory of a State Party has
the right to move about in it, and to reside in it subject to
the provisions of the law.
. . . .
3. The exercise of the foregoing rights may be restricted only
pursuant to a law to the extent necessary in a democratic
society to prevent crimes which protect national security, public
safety, public order, public morals, public health, or the rights
and freedoms of others. 
The Commission has found States Parties in violation of article 22 on various
occasions where individuals or communities have been forced to flee their homes or
countries due to military reprisals or threats.250 According to the Commission, such
“forced displacements” constitute a direct violation of article 22(1). The Commission
has also recognized that incidents serving to detain persons in their travels impede the
“right to circulate freely” and that incidents serving to intimidate displaced persons
not to return to their communities imply a violation of the “right to elect their place
of residence.”251 Petitions challenging such displacements should specifically
250 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 32/96, Case 10.553, María Mejía (Guate.), in IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 370; Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 29/96, Case
11.303, Carlos Ranferí Gómez (Guate.), in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 4, at 425;
Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 49/99, Case 11.610, Loren Laroye Riebe Star et al. (Mex.), in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 4, at 724.
251 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 32/96, Case 10.553, María Mejía (Guate.), in IACHR ANNUAL
REPORT 1996, supra note 4, para. 482.
request, as forms of reparation, the right to return to the previous residence or
community without future intimidation or, in circumstances where new communities
have taken over the land, full restitution and/or compensation for their lost property.
Although untested, the right to free movement and residence may also be used to
protect homeless persons from certain vagrancy and criminal loitering laws. Where
such statutes are used to arrest homeless persons or force them outside the city limits
for the simple “crime” of having no place to go, a violation of article 22 should be
alleged.  Though subsections (3) and (4) of article 22 will likely be invoked as
justification for such laws, the State should bear a heavy burden of proving an
exception applies. The effect of such laws is to criminalize homelessness, which
raises serious problems under other Convention provisions, such as the right to equal
treatment under the law.
The Commission’s express recognition that a State violates article 22 by obstructing
the “right to elect [one’s] place of residence,”252 opens up other possibilities for using
article 22 to protect ESCR. In particular, such obstruction might occur as a result of
discriminatory housing policies or residential requirements. It might also occur where
residential areas are rendered unfit due to toxic contamination of air, soil, or water
supplies and the State failed to take reasonable preventative and protective measures. 
An article 22 violation may be found where an individual or group
is prevented from, obstructed in, or prohibited from, freely electing
her place of residence. This may be due to, inter alia:
(a) intimidation or reprisals causing fear for personal safety; 
(b) laws or police practices punishing homeless persons for
residing in the street;
(c) discriminatory housing policies; or 
(d) toxic contamination of air, soil or water supplies, caused by a
S t a t e ’s negligent omissions, that make residential areas
unsafe or unfit for living.
252 Id.
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Chapter 8
“Article 26 Approach”:
Invoking the ESCR Implicit in the
OAS Charter
Chapter  8
“ARTICLE  26  APPROACH”:  INVOKING  THE
ESCR  IMPLICIT IN  THE  OAS  CHARTER
he third “approach” for bringing ESCR petitions in the inter-American
system relies on article 26. Article 26, the only Convention provision under
the heading “economic, social, and cultural rights,” expressly recognizes the
“rights implicit in the economic, social . . . and cultural standards set forth in the
[OAS Charter].” These implied rights include those to education, food, nutrition,
health, sanitation, adequate housing, social security, unionization, strike, fair wages,
just labor conditions, participation in development decisionmaking, and equal
opportunity. While article 26 does not itself enumerate protected ESCR, it should be
viewed as an umbrella provision that expressly incorporates into the Convention, as
protected rights, the rights implied in the OAS Charter. It creates an express cause of
action under the Convention to hold States accountable for respecting, ensuring, and
progressively achieving a wide range of essential ESCR. As such, it is a critical
provision for ESCR protection in the inter-American system. 
ARTICLE 26
The States Parties undertake to adopt measures, both
internally and through international cooperation, especially
those of an economic and technical nature, with a view to
achieving progressively, by legislation or other appropriate
means, the full realization of the rights implicit in the
economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural
standards set forth in the [OAS Charter].
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The article 26 approach has not yet been recognized by the Commission or Court nor
has it been used in the individual petitions process. This is most likely due to the fact
that, unlike most other Convention provisions, article 26 encompasses both a general
obligation, “the obligation of progressive achievement,” and a set of rights, “the
rights implicit in the [ESC] standards of the [OAS Charter].” Commentators on article
26, including the Commission and Court, have tended to focus their analyses on the
general obligation; they have not discussed the rights, which are the immediate
concern of the article 26 approach. To avoid conflating these two distinct aspects of
article 26, it is useful, at the outset, to divide article 26 conceptually into its
constituent parts. 
ARTICLE 26
Protected Rights: Every person shall enjoy the “rights implicit in
the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards
set forth in the [OAS Charter].”
General Obligation: “The States Parties undertake to adopt
measures, both internally and through international cooperation,
especially those of an economic and technical nature, with a view
to achieving progressively, by legislation or other appropriate
means, the full realization of the rights implicit in the economic,
social, educational, scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the
[OAS Charter].”
The “rights” and “obligations” components of article 26 are fully severable and need
not be read together. Indeed, as recognized by former Inter-American Court Judge
Piza-Escalante, the article 26 duty of progressivity—like the obligations set forth in
articles 1 and 2—is a general obligation that attaches to all rights guaranteed in the
Convention, regardless of whether the right is characterized as an ESCR or CPR. The
decisive criterion is whether the right in question is “reasonably requirable in itself,”
not whether it is a “right implicit in the OAS Charter.” In Judge Piza’s words:  
[T]he principles of “progressive development” contained in Article 26
of the Convention, although they refer literally to the economic, social,
educational, scientific, and cultural standards contained in the [OAS
Charter], should in my judgment be understood to be applicable to any
of the “civil and political” rights established in the A m e r i c a n
Convention, to the extent and in the ways in which they are not
reasonably requirable in themselves, and vice versa, that the standards
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of the Convention itself may be understood to be applicable to the so-
called “economic, social and cultural rights,” to the degree and in the
ways in which they are reasonably requirable in themselves (as occurs,
e.g., with the right to strike).1
The progressivity obligation, enshrined in article 26, thus, has no necessary
connection to the rights articulated in article 26, as distinct from any other protected
right in the Convention. As Judge Piza has observed, the fact that the progressivity
obligation resides in article 26, rather than alongside articles 1 and 2, “follows merely
historical reasons and not juridical differences” among the protected rights.2
Because the progressivity obligation contained in article 26 can be severed from, and
applied to rights other than, the “rights implicit in the economic, social . . . and
cultural standards set forth in the [OAS Charter],” the rights articulated in article 26
must, of necessity, be viewed as standing on their own as “protected rights” under the
Convention. The structure of the Convention firmly supports this view—that is, that
article 26 was intended not only to articulate the obligation of progressivity, but also
to establish a set of fully protected “economic, social, and cultural rights.” Indeed,
just as articles 3–25, widely acknowledged to articulate “protected rights,” are
grouped under the chapter heading “Civil and Political Rights,” article 26 resides in
the chapter entitled “Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights.” These two chapters,
together, must be viewed as setting forth the Convention’s “protected rights,” the
basis upon which petitions may be submitted under the contentious jurisdiction of the
Commission and, ultimately, the Court.  
That the Convention’s framers intended article 26 to establish “protected rights”
under the Convention is further supported by longstanding rules of treaty
interpretation, which require that treaty terms be read “in their context.”3 Indeed, to
read article 26 as articulating an obligation only, without establishing a separate set of
independently protected rights, would ignore the fact that article 26 is expressly
positioned in the Convention under a chapter articulating “Rights.” There would have
been little reason, as a practical matter, to include in the Convention a separate
chapter on “economic, social, and cultural rights” if article 26 were not intended to
articulate protected rights, distinct from the progressivity obligation. Article 26 was,
thus, clearly intended to establish a set of protected rights under the Convention. 
In sum, article 26 establishes, as protected Convention rights, the “rights implicit in
the economic, social . . . and cultural standards set forth in the [OAS Charter].” These
1 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Separate Vote of Judge Rodolfo E. Piza Escalante, Proposed Amendments to
the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of Jan.
19, 1984 (Ser. A) No. 4 (1984), para. 6 (emphasis added).
2 Id.
3 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 31(2), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, T.S. No.
58 (1980), U.N. Doc A/Conf 39/28, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969), entered into force Jan. 27, 1980, available
at <http://www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm>.
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rights, once given substantive content, may, when threatened with concrete
impairment, be directly invoked in the individual petitions process, just as any of the
rights articulated in articles 3–25 may be invoked. By recognizing these implied
rights as protected rights under the Convention, article 26 creates an express cause of
action to hold States accountable for violating a wide range of critical ESCR. It is thus
an exceptional tool for ESCR protection efforts in the inter-American system.
I. Defining the Protected Rights Articulated in
Article 26
The “rights implicit” in the OAS Charter, each of which is protected under
Convention article 26, include a wide range of important ESCR (see box below).
Although vaguely worded, these implied rights have been given specific content in
other regional human rights instruments enacted subsequent to the OAS Charter—
most notably, the American Declaration and the Protocol of San Salvador. Indeed, the
Court has expressly recognized that the American Declaration “contains and defines
the fundamental human rights referred to in the Charter.”4 The Court has stated, “For
the member states of the Organization, the Declaration is the text that defines the
human rights referred to in the Charter”5; thus, the OAS Charter “cannot be
interpreted and applied as far as human rights are concerned without relating its
norms . . . to the corresponding provisions of the Declaration .”6
Because article 26 must be interpreted and applied with reference to the OAS Charter,
it must also be interpreted and applied with reference to the Declaration. For States
Parties to the Convention, therefore, article 26 provides an indirect means for
enforcing, in the individual petitions process, the rights guaranteed in the
Declaration.7 The Declaration protects, in more concrete and specific terms than the
Charter, the rights to health, education, social security, work, fair wages, rest and
leisure, property, inviolability of the home, special protection for mothers, children
and the family, and the benefits of culture. 
Petitioners may also refer to the Protocol of San Salvador in helping to decipher the
substantive content of the “rights implied in the economic, social . . . and cultural
standards set forth in the [OAS Charter].” As recognized in its preamble, the Protocol
4 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
Within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory
Opinion OC-10/89 of July 14, 1989 (Ser. A) No. 10, para. 43 (emphasis added).
5 Id. para. 45 (emphasis added).
6 Id. para. 43 (emphasis added). 
7 See generally id. para. 46 (“[G]iven the provisions of Article 29(d), these States cannot escape the
obligations they have as members of the OAS under the Declaration, notwithstanding the fact that
the Convention is the governing instrument for the States Parties thereto.”) (emphasis added).
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aims to “reaffirm[], develop[], perfect[] and protect[]” the fundamental economic,
social and cultural rights that have been recognized in earlier regional instruments,
e.g., the OAS Charter and the Declaration. The Protocol, therefore, may be viewed as
the most current and specific articulation of the ESCR implicit in the OAS Charter.
All three of these regional instruments—the OAS Charter, the Declaration, and the
Protocol—should be invoked when interpreting the protected rights articulated in
article 26.
RIGHTS REFERRED TO IN ARTICLE 26
RIGHT TO EDUCATION
• Charter, art. 34(h). “Rapid eradication of illiteracy and expansion
of educational opportunities for all.”
• Charter, art. 49. “[G]reatest efforts . . . to ensure the effective
exercise of the right to education . . . .”
• Charter, art. 50.  “[S]pecial attention to the eradication of
illiteracy . . . .”
• Declaration, art. XII. “Every person has the right to an education
. . . . Likewise every person has the right to an education that will
prepare him to attain a decent life, to raise his standard of living,
and to be a useful member of society. The right to an education
includes the right to equality of opportunity in every case, in
accordance with natural talents, merit and the desire to utilize
the resources that the state or the community is in a position to
provide. Every person has the right to receive, free, at least a
primary education.”
• Protocol, art. 13. “(1) Everyone has the right to education. . . .
(3) The States Parties to this Protocol recognize that in order to
achieve the full exercise of the right to education: a. Primary
education should be compulsory and accessible to all without
cost; b. Secondary education in its different forms, including
technical and vocational secondary education, should be made
generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate
means, and in particular, by the progressive introduction of free
education; c. Higher education should be made equally
accessible to all, on the basis of individual capacity, by every
appropriate means, and in particular, by the progressive
introduction of free education; d. Basic education should be
encouraged or intensified as far as possible for those persons
who have not received or completed the whole cycle of primary
instruction; e. Programs of special education should be
established for the handicapped, so as to provide special
instruction and training to persons with physical disabilities or
mental deficiencies. . . .”
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RIGHT TO FOOD & NUTRITION
• Charter, art. 34(j). “Proper nutrition, especially through . . .
efforts to increase the production and availability of food”
• Charter, art. 34(d). “Modernization of rural life and reforms
leading to equitable and efficient land-tenure systems,
increased agricultural productivity, expanded use of land,
diversification of production and improved processing and
marketing systems for agricultural products; and the
strengthening and expansion of the means to attain these ends.”
• Declaration, art. XI. “Every person has the right to the
preservation of his health through sanitary and social measures
relating to food . . . .”
• Protocol, art. 12. “(1) Everyone has the right to adequate
nutrition which guarantees the possibility of enjoying the highest
level of physical, emotional and intellectual development. (2) In
order to promote the exercise of this right and eradicate
malnutrition, the States Parties undertake to improve methods
of production, supply and distribution of food, and to this end,
agree to promote greater international cooperation in support of
the relevant national policies.”
RIGHT TO ADEQUATE HOUSING:
• Charter, art. 34(k). “Adequate housing for all sectors of the
population.”
• Declaration, art. IX. Every person has the right to the inviolability
of his home.
• Declaration, art. XI. Every person has the right to the
preservation of his health through sanitary and social measures
relating to . . . housing . . . .”
• Declaration, art. XXIII. “Every person has a right to own such
private property as meets the essential needs of decent living
and helps to maintain the dignity of the individual and of the
home.”
RIGHT TO SOCIAL SECURITY
• Charter, art. 34(f). “Stability of domestic price levels . . . .” 
• Charter, art. 45(a). “[R]ight to material well-being . . . .”
• Charter, art. 45(b). “Work is a right . . . and should be performed
under conditions . . . that ensure life, health, and a decent
standard of living for the worker and his family, both during his
working years and in his old age, or when any circumstance
deprives him of the possibility of working”
• Charter, art. 45(h). “Development of an efficient social security
policy.”
• Declaration, art. XVI. Every person has the right to social
security which will protect him from the consequences of
unemployment, old age, and any disabilities arising from causes
beyond his control that make it physically or mentally impossible
for him to earn a living.
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• Protocol, art. 9. “(1) Everyone shall have the right to social
security protecting him from the consequences of old age and of
disability which prevents him, physically or mentally, from
securing the means for a dignified and decent existence. In the
event of the death of a beneficiary, social security benefits shall
be applied to his dependents. (2) In the case of persons who are
employed, the right to social security shall cover at least medical
care and an allowance or retirement benefit in the case of work
accidents or occupational disease and, in the case of women,
paid maternity leave before and after childbirth.”
RIGHT TO UNIONIZE AND STRIKE
• Charter, art. 45(c). “Employers and workers, both rural and
urban, have the right to associate themselves freely for the
defense and promotion of their interests, including the right to
collective bargaining and the workers’ right to strike, and
recognition of the juridical personality of associations and the
protection of their freedom and independence . . . .”
• Charter, art. 45(d). “Fair and efficient systems and procedures
for consultation and collaboration among the sectors of
production . . . .”
• Declaration, art. XXII. Every person has the right to associate
with others to promote, exercise and protect his legitimate
interests of a . . . labor union or other nature.
• Protocol, art. 8. “(1) The States Parties shall ensure: a. The right
of workers to organize trade unions and to join the union of their
choice for the purpose of protecting and promoting their
interests. As an extension of that right, the States Parties shall
permit trade unions to establish national federations or
confederations, or to affiliate with those that already exist, as
well as to form international trade union organizations and to
affiliate with that of their choice. The States Parties shall also
permit trade unions, federations and confederations to function
freely; b. The right to strike. . . .”
RIGHT TO ADEQUATE LABOR CONDITIONS & FAIR WAGES
• Charter, art. 34(g). “Fair wages, employment opportunities, and
acceptable working conditions for all”
• Charter, art. 45(b). “Work . . . should be performed under
conditions, including a system of fair wages, that ensure life,
health, and a decent standard of living for the worker and his
family . . . .”
• Declaration, art. XIV. “Every person has the right to work, under
proper conditions . . . . Every person who works has the right to
receive such remuneration as will, in proportion to his capacity
and skill, assure him a standard of living suitable for himself and
for his family.”
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• Protocol, art . 7. “The States Parties to this Protocol recognize
that the right to work to which the foregoing article refers
presupposes that everyone shall enjoy that right under just,
equitable, and satisfactory conditions, which the States Parties
undertake to guarantee in their internal legislation, particularly
with respect to: a. Remuneration which guarantees, as a
minimum, to all workers dignified and decent living conditions for
them and their families and fair and equal wages for equal work,
without distinction; b. The right of every worker to follow his
vocation and to devote himself to the activity that best fulfills his
expectations and to change employment in accordance with the
pertinent national regulations; c. The right of every worker to
promotion or upward mobility in his employment, for which
purpose account shall be taken of his qualifications,
competence, integrity and seniority; d. Stability of employment,
subject to the nature of each industry and occupation and the
causes for just separation. In cases of unjustified dismissal, the
worker shall have the right to indemnity or to reinstatement on
the job or any other benefits provided by domestic legislation; e.
Safety and hygiene at work; f. The prohibition of night work or
unhealthy or dangerous working conditions and, in general, of
all work which jeopardizes health, safety, or morals, for persons
under 18 years of age. As regards minors under the age of 16,
the work day shall be subordinated to the provisions regarding
compulsory education and in no case shall work constitute an
impediment to school attendance or a limitation on benefiting
from education received; g. A reasonable limitation of working
hours, both daily and weekly. The days shall be shorter in the
case of dangerous or unhealthy work or of night work; h. Rest,
leisure and paid vacations as well as remuneration for national
holidays.
RIGHT TO HEALTH & SANITATION
• Charter, art. 34(i). “Protection of man’s potential through the
extension and application of modern medical science”
• Charter, art. 34(l). “Urban conditions that offer the opportunity for
a healthful, productive, and full life.”
• Declaration, art. XI. “Every person has the right to the
preservation of his health through sanitary and social measures
relating to food, clothing, housing and medical care, to the
extent permitted by public and community resources.”
• Declaration, art. VII. “All women, during pregnancy and the
nursing period, and all children have the right to special
protection, care and aid.”
• Protocol, art. 10. “(1) Everyone shall have the right to health,
understood to mean the enjoyment of the highest level of
physical, mental and social well-being. (2) In order to ensure the
exercise of the right to health, the States Parties agree to
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recognize health as a public good and, particularly, to adopt the
following measures to ensure that right: a. Primary health care,
that is, essential health care made available to all individuals
and families in the community; b. Extension of the benefits of
health services to all individuals subject to the State’s
jurisdiction; c. Universal immunization against the principal
infectious diseases; d. Prevention and treatment of endemic,
occupational and other diseases; e. Education of the population
on the prevention and treatment of health problems, and f.
Satisfaction of the health needs of the highest risk groups and
of those whose poverty makes them the most vulnerable.”
• Protocol, art. 11. “(1) Everyone shall have the right to live in a
healthy environment and to have access to basic public
services. (2) The States Parties shall promote the protection,
preservation, and improvement of the environment.”
RIGHT TO PARTICIPATE IN DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES
• C h a r t e r, art. 45(f). “The incorporation and increasing
participation of the marginal sectors of the population, in both
rural and urban areas, in the economic, social, civic, cultural,
and political life of the nation . . . .”
• Charter, art. 45(g). “Recognition of the importance of the
contribution of organizations such as labor unions,
cooperatives, and cultural, professional, business,
neighborhood, and community associations to the life of the
society and to the development process.”
• Declaration, art. XX. “Every person having legal capacity is
entitled to participate in the government of his country, directly
or through his representatives, and to take part in popular
elections, which shall be by secret ballot, and shall be honest,
periodic and free.”
• Declaration, art. XXIV. “Every person has the right to submit
respectful petitions to any competent authority, for reasons of
either general or private interest, and the right to obtain a prompt
decision thereon.”
RIGHT TO EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY
• Charter, art. 45(a). “All human beings, without distinction as to
race, sex, nationality, creed, or social condition, have a right to
material well-being . . . under circumstances of liberty, dignity,
equality of opportunity, and economic security.”
• Charter, art. 34(b). “Equitable distribution of national income.”
• Declaration, art. II. “All persons are equal before the law and
have the rights and duties established in this Declaration,
without distinction as to race, sex, language, creed or any other
factor.”
• Declaration, art. XII. “Every person has the right to an education
. . . [which] includes the right to equality of opportunity in every
case, in accordance with natural talents, merit and the desire to
utilize the resources that the state or the community is in a
position to provide.”
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II. Elements for Establishing a Violation of an
Article 26 Right
As with all petitions lodged with the Commission, petitions alleging an article 26
violation must demonstrate that (1) specific victims suffered concrete impairment of
a right guaranteed in article 26, (2) the impairment was caused by an act imputable
to the concerned State, and (3) the State breached an international obligation
assumed under the Convention with respect to the alleged victim. All three elements
must be separately proved in every petition. That requirement does not change even
when article 26 is implicated as a protected right and as a state obligation—that is, for
elements (1) and (3). 
ELEMENTS FOR ESTABLISHING AN ARTICLE 26 VIOLATION
1. Specific victims suffered concrete impairment of an article
26 right, i.e., rights to education, food, nutrition, health,
sanitation, adequate housing, social security, unionization,
strike, fair wages, just labor conditions, participation in
development decisionmaking, or equal opportunity.
2. The impairment was caused by an act imputable to the
State; and
3. The State breached an international obligation assumed
under Convention articles 1, 2 and 26 with respect to the
alleged victim. 
(a)  duty to respect (art. 1);
(b)  duty to ensure (arts. 1, 2); and/or
(c)  duty of progressivity (arts. 1, 26).
A. Concrete Impairment of a
Right Protected in Article 26
To establish a violation of article 26, a petition must demonstrate that the alleged
victim suffered concrete impairment of a “right implicit in the economic, social . . .
and cultural standards set forth in the [OAS Charter]”—that is, of the rights to
education, food, nutrition, health, sanitation, adequate housing, social security,
unionization, strike, fair wages, just labor conditions, participation in development
decisionmaking, or equal opportunity. Such impairment may be “actual” or
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“imminent,” but it must be “concrete”; it may not be speculative or hypothetical.
Concrete impairment of an article 26 right, like impairment of the rights articulated
in articles 3–25, may be proved through a variety of forms of evidence, including
medical reports, photos, videos, witness testimony, expert testimony, police reports,
employment records, etc. 
Regressive policies or laws that affect article 26 rights, for example, may be
challenged in the individual petitions process only where they result in concrete
injury to the protected rights of specific individuals. In a 2000 report on Peru, the
Commission suggested that Peru breached its obligation of progressivity under article
26 by eliminating from its 1993 Constitution several major provisions on economic
and social rights. One of the ESCR provisions that lost constitutional rank was the
right of women to maternity leave, a right expressly protected in the Declaration and
Protocol—both of which define and contain the “rights implied in the [ESC]
standards set forth in the [OAS Charter].” A challenge to that regressive policy could
have been mounted, in the individual petitions process, by a working woman or class
of working women who could demonstrate that, as a result of the policy, they were
fired (actual injury) or had to abandon concrete plans to have a child (imminent
injury). Such women would have been concretely injured by the State’s regressive act
and thus would have had standing to challenge the State’s backsliding under the
contentious jurisdiction of the Commission and Court.  
B. Impairment Caused by an
Act Imputable to the State
To state a claim under the Convention, the alleged concrete impairment of a protected
right must have been caused by an act imputable to the State. In the above example,
for instance, a pregnant woman fired from her job because of disciplinary problems—
i.e., not because the right to maternity leave had lost constitutional rank—would not
likely have a claim that could be adjudicated in the individual petitions process. 
C. Breach of an International
Obligation (Arts. 1, 2, 26)
Finally, to impute responsibility to the State for concrete impairment of a right,
petitioners must show that the State breached an obligation it assumed under the
Convention for respecting, ensuring, and/or progressively achieving that right. As
discussed in chapter 5, these obligations are enshrined in articles 1, 2, and 26. Thus,
a State Party may violate article 26 where it fails to respect an article 26 right, where
it fails to ensure an article 26 right, or where it fails to “achieve progressively” an
article 26 right.
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OBLIGATIONS TO “RESPECT” AND “ENSURE” RIGHTS
PROTECTED IN ARTICLE 26
1. Obligation to respect (art. 1). States Parties must not take
direct actions that restrict or impair the ESCR implied in the OAS
Charter.
2. Obligation to ensure (arts. 1, 2). States Parties must adopt
reasonable measures to:
• prevent third party abuse of the ESCR implicit in the OAS
Charter;
• investigate allegations of ESCR abuse; 
• sanction perpetrators of ESCR violations;
• provide effective remedies to victims of ESCR violations; and
• ensure the minimum core content of the ESCR implicit in the
OAS Charter.
3. Obligation to “achieve progressively” (arts. 1, 26). States
Parties must: 
• make a plan for “achieving progressively . . . the full
realization” of protected ESCR;
• implement that plan in good faith; and
• not take regressive action that diminishes ESCR enjoyment.
III. The “Article 26 Approach” Versus
the “Integration Approach”
As a practical matter, virtually identical results can generally be achieved using the
“article 26 approach” and the “integration approach.” Indeed, given the interpretive
mandate of article 29—which prohibits the interpretation of any Convention
provision so as to restrict the enjoyment of any right recognized by virtue of the OAS
Charter—all of the “rights implicit in the OAS Charter” can, in most cases, be
protected through articles 3–25 (using the integration approach). A violation of the
right to health, for example, might be alleged just as easily under Convention article
5 (personal integrity) as it could be under Convention article 26 (“rights implicit in
OAS Charter”). The two approaches are thus, in many ways, substitutes for one
another.
While the “article 26 approach” is far more direct than the “integration approach,” it
is also far less tested. Both the Court and Commission have a great deal of experience
finding violations of articles 3–25 and have already employed the integration and
indirect approaches under their contentious jurisdiction. They will thus be much more
comfortable with petitions using the latter approaches. Neither the Commission nor
346
A rticle 26 A p p ro a c h
Court has, moreover, ever even suggested that article 26, in itself, articulates
protected rights. The article 26 approach therefore remains quite uncertain. As such,
the strategic advocate will avoid relying on the article 26 approach by itself; she will
rely, whenever possible, on both the “integration” and “article 26” strategies, argued
in the alternative. That is, advocates should allege a violation of articles 3–25 using
the “indirect” or “integration” approaches and then make an independent article 26
argument based on the same set of facts.
Practice Tip
Judges on the Court may be wary of holding a State responsible for
violating the Convention based on article 26 alone. Unless the goal
of the litigation is to push the Court into expressly recognizing that
article 26 may be invoked on its own, it will usually be preferable to
allege a violation of another protected right in conjunction with
article 26. Using the “indirect” and “integration” approaches, this
should not be difficult.
If a strong, independent article 26 argument can be made without
reference to any other provision, the strategic advocate is advised
to make both an “integration approach” argument and an “article 26
approach” argument, argued in the alternative.
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“COMPLEX  VIOLATIONS”  APPROACH
fourth strategy for bringing ESCR claims before the Court is to argue that a
specific act, although not enumerated in the Convention’s text, is part of a
state-sponsored or state-tolerated policy or practice that implicates a number
of enumerated rights, and thus constitutes a “complex violation” of the Convention.
This strategy is drawn directly from the Court’s celebrated Velásquez Rodríguez
decision.
In Velásquez Rodriguez, the Court was confronted with a pervasive and systematic
state practice of forced disappearance of persons. Although the practice implicated
many provisions of the Convention (e.g., rights to life, integrity, security), it was not
directly proscribed by the Convention nor any other treaty in force applicable to the
concerned States. 1 In an effort to send a strong message that the practice of forced
disappearance was itself a direct violation of the Convention, the Court declared the
phenomenon to be “a complex form of human rights violation,” one that constituted a
“radical breach of the treaty” in itself.2 It defined a “complex violation” as one that,
despite not being expressly recognized in the Convention’s text, nevertheless “must
be understood and confronted in an integral fashion” and that “shows a crass
abandonment of the values which emanate from the concept of human dignity and the
most basic principles of the inter-American system and the Convention.”3
The Velásquez Rodríguez judgment effectively inscribed the prohibition of forced
disappearances into the American Convention. Today, it is common understanding
that “forced disappearance” constitutes a per se violation of the Convention. The
same argument may be made with certain ESCR violations that, while not specifically
enumerated in the Convention’s text, nevertheless meet the Velásquez Rodriguez
standard for constituting a “complex violation.” 
1 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No 4, para. 153.
2 Id. paras. 150, 158.
3 Id.
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IN  PREPARING  A CASE
dditional considerations to keep in mind in preparing a case include
evidentiary rules and burdens of proof, precautionary and provisional
measures, opportunities for resolving the petition before judgment, remedies
and their enforcement, class actions, requests for interpretation of previous rulings,
and requests for advisory opinions. Each of these aspects of the inter-American
system is considered below.
In complying with the procedural rules governing these concerns, advocates should
bear in mind the Court’s repeated affirmation that procedural rules are a “means of
attaining justice” and thus “mere formalities” should not stand in the way of the
primary goal of protecting human rights.1 “Keeping within certain timely and
reasonable limits,” therefore, “some omissions or delays in complying with procedure
may be excused, provided that a suitable balance between justice and legal certainty
is preserved.”2 In preserving this balance, what is essential is, first, that no party
suffers actual prejudice to his or her procedural rights and, second, that the objectives
of the various procedures are met.3 Where these conditions are satisfied, formal
defects do not “justify according to the purely literal meaning of a regulatory norm
preference over the superior interest of the realization of justice in the application of
the American Convention.”4
1 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Castillo Páez Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Jan. 30, 1996 (Ser.
C) No. 24, para. 34; see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Loayza Tamayo Case, Preliminary Objections,
Judgment of Jan. 31, 1996 (Ser. C) No. 25, para. 33; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Paniaguas Morales et al.
Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Jan. 25, 1996 (Ser. C) No. 23, para. 38; Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R., Cayara Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Feb. 3, 1993 (Ser. C) No. 14, para. 42;
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Baena Ricardo Case, Judgment of Feb. 3, 2001 (Ser. C) No. 72, para. 76. 
2 See supra. Each of these cases involved the late filing of required papers with the Court. 
3 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987
(Ser. C) No. 1, para. 33; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Preliminary
Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987 (Ser. C) No. 2, para. 38; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godinez Cruz
Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987 (Ser. C) No. 3, para. 36; Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R., Paniaguas Morales et al. Case , Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Jan. 25, 1996 (Ser. C)
No. 23, para. 42.
4 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Paniaguas Morales et al. Case , Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Jan. 25,
1996 (Ser. C) No. 23, para. 42.
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I. Supporting the Petition: Evidentiary
Considerations
The allegations in a petition must be supported by probative evidence. Petitioners
should thus be familiar with the rules and practices of the Court and Commission
regarding the admission of evidence, the weighing of direct and circumstantial
evidence, the consideration of witness testimony, burdens of proof, and various
presumptions of truth and state responsibility. The evidentiary rules used by the Court
are described in articles 43–51 of the Court’s Rules of Procedure. The Commission,
by contrast, has not promulgated specific evidentiary rules, preferring less formal
standards of proof. Petitioners in Commission proceedings interested in the
submission of their cases to the Court should nevertheless present all “the
documentary, testimonial, and expert evidence available.”5 Such evidence should be
“capable of establishing the truth of the allegations in a convincing manner.”6 Indeed,
one of the factors used by the Commission in deciding whether to submit a case to the
Court is “the quality of the evidence available.”7
A. Admissibility of Evidence
While the Commission will tend to admit all evidence offered by the parties at any
stage of the proceedings, the Court will admit evidence only where two conditions are
met. First, the Court must have prior notification of what items of evidence are to be
offered. The Court will admit only such evidence as is indicated in documents filed
prior to the oral proceedings—that is, “in the application and answer and in the
document setting out the preliminary objections and the answers to them.”8 Such
documents must stipulate the forms of evidence the parties propose to employ,
“indicating and identifying the witnesses and experts; the place and circumstances of
any inspections; the purpose of the expert evidence and any other information
necessary for the gathering of evidence.”9 Where prior notification is not provided,
5 See Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, art. 43(3)(d),
approved during the Commission’s 109th extraordinary period of sessions, Dec. 4–8, 2000, effective
May 1, 2001 [hereinafter Commission Rules of Procedure], available at <http://www.oas.org/
OASpage/gifs_oasnews/oas_news_gif1.htm> (“When the petitioner is interested in the submission
of the case [to the Court], he or she should present . . . the documentary, testimonial, and expert
evidence available.”). 
6 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No 4, para. 129. 
7 Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 5, art. 44(2)(e). 
8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Order of the Court Regarding the Admission of Evidence During the
Proceedings of the Cases, Feb. 2, 1996, para. 1, dec. para. 1; see also Rules of Procedure of the
Inter-American Court on Human Rights, art. 43, effective Jan. 1, 1997 [hereinafter Court Rules of
Procedure], available at <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/rule 1-97.htm>. 
9 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Order of the Court Regarding the Admission of Evidence During the
Proceedings of the Cases, Feb. 2, 1996, para. 1.
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the Court may admit a particular piece of evidence only where the party offering it
alleges force majeure, serious impediment, or the emergence of supervening events as
grounds for producing an item of evidence, provided the opposing party is guaranteed
the right of defense.10
Second, the evidence must be “relevant” or “helpful” to the Court’s decision.11 Like
the Commission, the Court employs broad admissibility criteria, admitting all
evidence that helps it understand the objective facts of the controversy.12 The Court
will thus admit evidence that would not otherwise be admissible in domestic
proceedings.13 The Court may request the production of additional evidence at any
stage of the proceedings.14
ARTICLE 44 OF COURT’S RULES OF PROCEDURE
Procedure for Taking Evidence. The Court may, at any stage of
the proceedings:
1. Obtain, on its own motion, any evidence it considers helpful. In
particular, it may hear as a witness, expert witness, or in any
other capacity, any person whose evidence, statement or
opinion it deems to be relevant.
2. Invite the parties to provide any evidence at their disposal or any
explanation or statement that, in its opinion, may be useful. 
3. Request any entity, office, organ or authority of its choice to
obtain information, express an opinion, or deliver a report or
pronouncement on any given point. The documents may not be
published without the authorization of the Court.
4. Commission one or more of its members to conduct an inquiry,
undertake an in situ investigation or obtain evidence in some
other manner.
10 Id. dec. para. 1; Court Rules of Procedure, supra note 8, art. 43.
11 Id. art. 44. 
12 See I n t e r-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No 4, para. 141. 
13 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Baena Ricardo Case, Judgment of Feb. 3, 2001 (Ser. C) No. 72, paras.
74–77 (admitting unauthenticated evidence). 
14 Court Rules of Procedure, supra note 8, art. 44. 
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B. Direct & Circumstantial Evidence
The Court will admit both “direct” and “circumstantial” evidence. Direct evidence is
evidence that conclusively establishes a fact without the factfinder having to draw an
inference or presumption. An example would be the testimony of a witness who
actually saw, heard or touched the subject of questioning. Circumstantial evidence, by
contrast, is evidence that provides the factfinder with information from which the
facts sought to be proved may be logically or reasonably inferred. Examples include
doctor’s reports, press clippings, expert testimony, and institutional reports on the
general situation of human rights in a country.
While direct evidence is always the preferred form of proving a case, circumstantial
evidence is often the only way for victims and their representatives to prove human
rights abuse (i.e., direct evidence is often in the exclusive control of the State). The
Court has responded to this reality by adopting a very generous stance on the
admissibility of circumstantial evidence.15 It has held that when ascertaining and
weighing the evidence necessary to decide the cases before it, “[c]ircumstantial
evidence, indicia, and presumptions may be considered, so long as they lead to
conclusions consistent with the facts.”16
Such indirect evidence becomes particularly persuasive “when the respondent State
has assumed an uncooperative stance in its dealings with the Court.”17 Under such
circumstances, circumstantial evidence and inference acquire a “highly presumptive
value” as a basis for finding state responsibility.18 As the Court has held, in human
rights proceedings (in contrast to domestic criminal law), “the State cannot rely on the
defense that the complainant has failed to present evidence when it cannot be obtained
without the State’s cooperation.”19
15 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No 4, paras.
128 (“The standards of proof are less formal in an international legal proceeding than in a domestic
one. The latter recognize different burdens of proof, depending upon the nature, character and
seriousness of the case.”); see also id. paras. 127, 129–132.
16 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No 4, para. 130;
see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Villagrán Morales Case (the “Street Children” Case), Judgment of
Nov. 19, 1999 (Ser. C) No. 63, para. 69 (“The Court . . . may base its judgments on indirect
evidence—such as circumstantial evidence, indicia and presumptions—when they are coherent,
confirm each other and lead to solid conclusions that are consistent with the facts under
examination.”); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Gangaram Panday Case , Judgment of Jan. 21, 1994 (Ser. C)
No. 16, para. 49 (“[T]he Court may, in certain circumstances, make use of both circumstantial
evidence and indications or presumptions on which to base its pronouncements when they lead to
consistent conclusions as regards the facts of the case, particularly when the respondent State has
assumed an uncooperative stance in its dealings with the Court.”); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Suárez
Rosero Case, Judgment of Nov. 12, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 35, para. 33 (same).  
17 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Gangaram Panday Case, Judgment of Jan. 21, 1994 (Ser. C) No. 16, para. 49.
18 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Suárez Rosero Case, Judgment of Nov. 12, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 35, para. 33.
19 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No 4, para. 135.
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of Jan. 20, 1989 (Ser. C) No 5, para. 141.
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Practice Tip
Circumstantial evidence is admissible when it leads to
conclusions consistent with the facts of the case. It may be
used alone to prove state responsibility when the respondent State
has assumed an uncooperative stance in its dealings with the Court
and evidence cannot be obtained without the State’s cooperation. 
The Court will consider a wide variety of evidence in different circumstances. For
example, it has admitted and given varying degrees of probative weight to media
clippings, human rights reports, witness testimony, doctors’ reports, photos, tape
recordings, videos, written statements by state officials, police reports, copies of
official documents, facts found in domestic court proceedings, and Commission
country reports, among others. 
TYPES OF EVIDENCE ADMITTED
• Doctors’reports, photos, tape recordings, videos, which are
probative in the absence of valid objections.
• Press clippings , which may be relied upon to prove public or
notorious acts or statements of high officials, or to corroborate
facts in other documents or testimony.20
• Written statements made by state officials to the
Commission, which are binding upon States in proceedings
before the Court.21
• Facts determined by a competent court in prior domestic
proceedings, which may serve to reinforce other evidence.22
• The Commission’s human rights country reports, other
international human rights reports, expert testimony, which
are relevant to the question of whether a given violation took
place in the context of a widespread practice of violations by the
State.23
20 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Baena Ricardo Case, Judgment of Feb. 3, 2001 (Ser. C) No. 72, para. 78. 
21 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Neira Alegria et al. Case, Judgment of Jan. 19, 1995 (Ser. C) No. 20, para.
67 (citing Legal Status of Eastern Greenland Case , 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53, at 71).
22 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Castillo Páez Case, Judgment of Nov. 3, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 34, para. 61.
23 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Castillo Páez Case , Judgment of Nov. 3, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 34, para. 42;
but see Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Gangaram Panday Case , Judgment of Jan. 21, 1994 (Ser. C) No. 16,
paras. 64–65 (affirming in principle that a “single case of violation of human rights by the
authorities of a State is not in itself sufficient ground to presume or infer the existence in that State
of widespread, large-scale practices to the detriment of the rights of other citizens.”).
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• Witness testimony, which is probative when supported by
other witness testimony and consistent with the facts. See
below.
C. Testimony of Lay and Expert Witnesses
Witnesses may be called before the Commission and Court to give testimony.24 Such
witnesses may include the direct victims, their family members, eye-witnesses to
disputed events, or expert witnesses that can testify generally to the governing law,
the existence of a given fact or condition, or a country’s human rights situation. The
Court evaluates witness testimony with great latitude, relying heavily on logic and
experience.25 It considers witness testimony probative where it is (1) definite and (2)
supported by the testimony of others.26 The Court, however, has the power to
determine which witnesses will be heard, when they will be heard, and the subject
matter to which they will be limited.27
Objections to the qualifications of any witness, whether lay or expert, may be raised
before the witness testifies.28 The Court may nevertheless disregard valid objections
and “hear, for purposes of information, a person who is not qualified to be heard as a
witness.”29 Two commonly raised objections are bias (i.e., the witness has a direct
interest in the outcome of the case) and prior convictions. The Court has made clear
24 A hearing before the Commission is not standard. It must be specifically requested by a party in
writing at least 40 days prior to the beginning of the relevant Commission session and must have
as its purpose the receipt of oral or written presentations by the parties relative to new facts and
information additional to that which has been produced during the proceeding. See Commission
Rules of Procedure, supra note 5, art. 62. 
25 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Loayza Tamayo Case, Judgment of Sept. 17, 1997 (Ser. C), No. 33, para.
42 (holding that, since the Court was not a criminal tribunal, it had greater latitude to use logic and
experience in evaluating oral testimony); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Castillo Páez Case, Judgment of Nov.
3, 1997 (Ser. C). No. 34, para. 39 (holding that the admissibility of witness testimony may be
evaluated with greater latitude, in accordance with the rules of logic and on the basis of
experience); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Villagrán Morales Case (the “Street Children” Case), Judgment
of Nov. 19, 1999 (Ser. C) No. 63, para. 72.
26 See, e.g. , Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Caballero Delgado and Santana Case, Judgment of Dec. 8, 1995
(Ser. C) No. 22, para. 53(a), (b) (finding facts that were derived from specific testimony repeated
by several witnesses to be proven true in case where little documentary or other types of evidence
other than testimony were provided).
27 See Court Rules of Procedure, supra note 10, art. 46. 
28 See id. arts. 48(1), 49. Objections to expert witnesses must be presented within 15 days of
notification of their appointment. Id. art. 49(2).
29 Id. art. 48. 
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that neither objection, by itself, is sufficient to disqualify a witness.30 Rather, it has
held that the testimony of a witness with a direct interest in the case (e.g., the victim,
an implicated state agent, family members) should be evaluated in the context of the
evidence as a whole.31 For example, the Court has held that where police are
implicated in a human rights violation, police reports regarding the incident are
insufficient by themselves to refute contrary testimony by eye-witnesses.32 The Court
has explained that since it has the discretion to weigh evidence, it will decide what
weight to give testimony of witnesses that may not be objective.33
Expert witnesses may be called by either the parties or the Court. Expert witnesses
differ from lay witnesses in that they may testify only generally to a defined matter
in issue—that is, without reference to the particular case. The opinion of an expert
witness on the law, for example, would be admissible only as it related to the current
state of national or comparative law, not to the law’s application to the specific case
at bar.34 Proposed expert witnesses may be disqualified where the opposing party
makes a timely objection that (i) the witness or the witness’s family members have a
direct interest in the case, or (ii) the witness has previously participated in matters
concerning the case in a national or international court or investigatory committee.35
While parties may always cross-examine each other’s witnesses, they may not always
examine witnesses called directly by the Court.36
Witnesses may be impeached where they give inconsistent or incredible testimony.
Impeachment is not warranted, however, where imprecision in witness testimony was
“not substantial, but merely concerned some details” and can be explained “by the
circumstances surrounding the events, the condition of the witnesses, and the time
that had elapsed since the events.”37 The Court has squarely placed the burden of
refuting questioned testimony on the challenging party.38 Where the witness’s
30 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Suárez Rosero Case, Judgment of Nov. 12, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 35, para.
32 (“It is the well-settled jurisprudence of this Court that any interest which a witness may have in
the outcome of a case, is not enough, per se , to disqualify such witness.”); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No. 4, para. 145 (“Neither is it
sustainable that having a criminal record or charges pending is sufficient in and of itself to find that
a witness is not competent to testify in Court.”); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Loayza Tamayo Case,
Judgment of Sept. 17, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 33, para. 43 (same). 
31 See I n t e r-Am. Ct. H.R., Loayza Tamayo Case, Judgment of Sept. 17, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 33, p a r a s .
42–43; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., S u á rez Rosero Case, Judgment of Nov. 12, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 35, para. 33.
32 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Castillo Páez Case, Judgment of Nov. 3, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 34, para. 60. 
33 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Judgment of Mar. 15, 1989 (Ser.
C) No. 6, para. 139(c).
3 4 S e e I n t e r-Am. Ct. H.R., Loayza Tamayo Case, Judgment of Sept. 17, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 33, para. 43.
35 Court Rules of Procedure, supra note 10, art. 49(1).
36 S e e I n t e r-Am. Ct. H.R., Gangaram Panday Case, Judgment of Jan. 21, 1994 (Ser. C) No. 16, para. 31.
37 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Castillo Páez Case, Judgment of Nov. 3, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 34, para. 54.
38 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of Jan. 20, 1989 (Ser. C) No. 5, para. 147(f);
see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Judgment of Mar. 15, 1989
(Ser. C) No. 6, para. 139(f). 
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testimony is consistent with the evidence, the Court has insisted that the challenging
party must do more than just make general allegations of incompetency or lack of
impartiality; such general allegations are insufficient to rebut testimony that is
fundamentally consistent with other evidence.39
Practice Tip
Witness testimony is probative where it is definite and supported by
the testimony of others .
D. Burdens of Proof
Cases often rise and fall on who bears the burden of proof—that is, the responsibility
of producing sufficient evidence in support of a fact or issue and favorably persuading
the Commission or Court with respect to that fact or issue. Accordingly, advocates
should be familiar with how the Court structures burdens of proof and how to use
these burdens to their advantage. 
As a general rule, the party seeking a given action by the Court or Commission bears
the burden of proof on the underlying matter. Thus, in seeking dismissal of a petition
for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, the State bears the burden of proving that
effective alternative remedies exist that were not exhausted. The State must specify
what those remedies are, demonstrate their effectiveness, and show that they were not
exhausted by the petitioner,40 unless it is clearly evident from the background
information contained in the petition.41
By contrast, the petitioning party bears the ultimate burden of proving state
responsibility for human rights abuse.42 There are two circumstances in which the
burden may fully or partially shift to the State. First, when necessary evidence is in
39 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of Jan. 20, 1989 (Ser. C) No. 5, para. 149;
see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Judgment of Mar. 15, 1989
(Ser. C) No. 6, para. 141.
40 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Castillo Páez Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Jan. 30, 1996
(Ser. C) No. 24, para. 40; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Loayza Tamayo Case, Preliminary Objections,
Judgment of Jan. 31, 1996 (Ser. C) No. 25, paras. 40, 51; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez
Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Jun. 26, 1987 (Ser. C) No. 1, para. 88.
41 Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 5, art. 31(3). 
42 See, e.g. , Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case , Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No.
4, para. 123.
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the State’s exclusive control and the State refuses to cooperate with the Court, a
presumption of state responsibility may be created, with the burden shifting to the
State to prove that it was not responsible for the alleged human rights abuse.43 Second,
in certain instances (such as those involving discriminatory or regressive state action),
once a petitioner produces sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of state
responsibility, the burden arguably shifts to the State to present a legitimate
affirmative defense. Only once that burden is met will the burden shift back to the
petitioner to demonstrate the State’s proffered defense was “pretext” for unlawful
conduct.44
The Court also employs burdens of proof for determining entitlement to damage
awards; it has allocated different burdens, for example, to successors and dependents
of human rights victims. Where a victim or her successors (i.e., children, spouse,
parents) claim damages, the party challenging the award bears the burden of proving
the victim/successors have suffered no compensable loss. By contrast, non-successor
dependents bear the burden of proving claimed damages exist.45
E. Presumptions of Truth
The Court and Commission follow a common practice of presuming the facts alleged
in a petition to be true if the government fails to respond to them within prescribed
time limits, “as long as other evidence does not lead to a different conclusion.”46 In
the Court’s words, this presumption is based on “the principle that the silence of the
accused or the elusive or ambiguous answers on its part may be interpreted as an
acknowledgment of the truth of the allegations, so long as the contrary is not indicated
by the record or is not compelled as a matter of law.”47
43 S e e I n t e r-Am. Ct. H.R., Neira Alegria et. al Case, Judgment of Jan. 19, 1995 (Ser. C) No. 20, para. 65.
44 See relevant discussions in Chapter 7, supra.
45 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Aloeboetoe et al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 10, 1993 (Ser. C)
No. 15, para. 54. 
46 See Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 5, art. 39 (“The facts alleged in the petition, the
pertinent parts of which have been transmitted to the State in question, shall be presumed to be true
if the State has not provided responsive information during the maximum period set by the
Commission under the provisions of Article 38 of these Rules of Procedure, as long as other
evidence does not lead to a different conclusion.”). 
47 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No. 4, para.
138; see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Villagrán Morales Case (the “Street Children” Case), Judgment
of Nov. 19, 1999 (Ser. C) No. 63, para. 68; Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 28/96, Case 11.297,
Hernández Lima (Guate.), Oct. 16, 1996, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1996, at 406, para. 45, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, Doc. 7 rev. (1997) [hereinafter
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996]; Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Raquel Martí de Mejía v. Perú, Report No.
5/96, Case 10.970, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
1995, at 157, para. 54, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91, Doc. 7 rev. (1996) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT
1995].
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This presumption is also based on the mandates of procedural fairness. Because
petitioners are disadvantaged by a State’s failure to appear and to produce requested
information, they cannot be “forced to meet a standard of evidence equivalent or
similar to the one they initially would have had to meet if the Government had
appeared” or produced requested information.48 To do so would reward the State for
breaching its international obligations to furnish the Commission with information in
connection with the individual case being processed.49 Facts in an unanswered
allegation will be presumed true, however, only where they meet the minimum
elements of “consistency, specificity, and credibility”50 and “other evidence does not
lead to a different conclusion.”  
PRESUMPTIONS OF TRUTH
• Allegations in a petition that are “consistent, specific and
credible” will be presumed true in the absence of any
government response.51
48 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 13/96, Case 10.948, Comadres (El Sal.), Mar. 1, 1996, in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1995, supra note 47, at 101, para. 21. 
49 See id.; Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 28/96, Case 11.297, Hernández Lima (Guate.), Oct. 16,
1996, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 47, at 406, paras. 40 (“The Convention [art.
48(1)] . . . obliges states to furnish information requested by the Commission in the course of
developing an individual case.”), 42 (“[The State] must comply with the obligation to furnish the
Commission with information in connection with the individual case being processed. Otherwise,
[it] would be violating the Convention and prejudicing its own defense in the case.”), 44 (States
“cannot defend themselves by refusing to provide the evidence needed for the Commission to do a
proper analysis of the case.”).
50 See Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Raquel Martí de Mejía v. Perú, Report No. 5/96, Case 10.970, in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 47, at 157, sec. V(B)(1) (1996) (“[A] simple failure to
appear on the part of a State or failure by it to supply information do not in and of themselves
transform the facts into truth. Rather, they need to be analyzed in light of certain criteria that make
it possible to establish whether, in terms of article 42 of the Commission’s Regulations, there is
“other evidence” that might lead to “a different conclusion” from that presented by the petitioner.
These evaluation criteria are consistency, credibility and specificity.”); Inter-Am. Comm. H.R.,
Report No. 28/96, Case 11.297, Hernández Lima (Guate), Oct. 16, 1996, in IACHR ANNUAL
REPORT 1996, supra note 47, at 406, para. 46 (“The Commission’s view is that the facts are not
presumed to be true merely because the Guatemalan Government’s answers in the instant case were
ambiguous or elusive; instead, the facts as alleged must be analyzed in light of the criteria
established here. The petitioners must, therefore, meet the admissibility requirements . . . and the
minimum elements of consistency, specificity and credibility in the version of the facts presented in
order for those facts to be presumed as true.”) (emphasis added); Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report
No. 13/96, Case 10.948, Comadres (El Sal.), Mar. 1, 1996, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1995, supra
note 47, at 101, paras. 19–22 & n.12 (discussing consistency, credibility, and specificity).
51 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Cayara Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Feb. 3, 1993 (Ser. C)
No. 14, paras. 18–19; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment
of June 26, 1987 (Ser. C) No. 3, para. 17(3); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales
Case, Preliminary Objections , Judgment of June 26, 1987, Ser. No. 2, para. 17(3); Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987 (Ser. C) No.
1, para. 17(3); see also Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 5, art. 39. 
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P re c a u t i o n a ry Remedies
• When the State fails to object to or contest an issue, it will be
presumed true.52
• The validity of documents will be presumed when no objections
to their authenticity or veracity is raised.53
• Facts certified in multiple official documents and not contested
by the State are presumed proven.54
• Silence or elusive or ambiguous answers may be interpreted as
an acknowledgment of the truth of the matter.55
F. Presumptions of State Responsibility
Where the State is in exclusive control of the evidence and fails to cooperate with the
Commission on a given issue, the Court will go even further and give legal effect to
a presumption of state responsibility for a given act.56 A State’s failure to cooperate
with respect to one issue does not, however, infect the State’s entire case; the above
presumption cannot be used to impose liability for other alleged acts in a petition for
which evidence is not in the exclusive control of the State.57
II. Precautionary and Provisional Remedies
Persons associated with cases pending in international human rights proceedings
sometimes come under serious threat at home, either from state agents or with their
52 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Suárez Rosero Case, Judgment of Nov. 12, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 35, para. 30
(holding that State’s failure to object to witness testimony and expert reports was sufficient to prove
facts thereby alleged).
53 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of Jan. 20, 1989 (Ser. C) No. 5, para. 146. 
54 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Neira Alegria et al. Case, Judgment of Jan. 19, 1995 (Ser. C) No. 20, paras.
66–70.
55 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of Jan. 20, 1989 (Ser. C) No. 5, para. 144.
56 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Gangaram Panday Case, Judgment of Jan. 21, 1994 (Ser. C) No. 16,
paras. 49–51 (finding Suriname responsible for illegal detention based on inference created by
State’s failure to produce, as required by Court, official texts of Constitution and substantive and
criminal procedure laws governing cases of detention in its territory); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1999 (Ser. C) No. 4, paras. 135–36 (“In contrast
to domestic criminal law, in proceedings to determine human rights violations the State cannot rely
on the defense that the complainant has failed to present evidence when it cannot be obtained
without the State’s cooperation. The State controls the means to verify acts occurring within its
territory. Although the Commission has investigatory powers, it cannot exercise them within a
State’s jurisdiction unless it has the cooperation of that State.”).
57 See I n t e r-Am. Ct. H.R., Gangaram Panday Case, Judgment of Jan. 21, 1994 (Ser. C) No. 16, para. 62. 
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acquiescence. Both the Commission and Court have the power to order member states
to take measures to prevent serious and irreparable harm to such persons. The
Commission is empowered to order “p re c a u t i o n a ry measure s” whenever the
available information urgently indicates the possibility of irreparable harm to persons.
Such measures, which are intended to be precautionary only, do not constitute a
prejudgment of the merits of a case.58
For its part, the Court may adopt “provisional measures” to prevent irreparable
damage to endangered persons in cases of extreme gravity and urgency. Such
measures may be ordered at any stage of the proceedings, either at the request of a
party or on the Court’s own motion.59 In a case not yet submitted to the Court, the
Court may order such measures at the request of the Commission.60 While provisional
measures may take whatever form the Court deems appropriate, the Court generally
orders that the Government of the relevant State be enjoined “to adopt without delay
whatever measures are necessary to protect the life and personal safety” of the victims
and/or witnesses to a particular incident, and to periodically report to the Court on the
urgent measures taken.61 In ordering provisional measures, the Court will generally
ensure that the following requirements are satisfied: (1) a situation of urgency exists,
(2) that will potentially result in irreparable harm to the physical integrity or life of a
person, and (3) the allegations appear truthful.
To date, precautionary and provisional measures have been ordered only to prevent
physical violence to individuals. There is nothing in the organs’ rules of procedure,
however, that prevents such measures from being ordered to prevent other forms of
irreparable harm—such as environmental contamination, cut-off of state funding or
essential social services benefits, or destruction of essential food items. Precautionary
or provisional measures should be sought to enjoin any action that urgently threatens
irreparable harm to individuals’ fundamental human rights. 
III. Resolving the Petition Before Judgment
There are three ways in which a petition may be resolved before a decision on the
merits is reached: (1) voluntary withdrawal by the petitioning party; (2) state
declaration of responsibility; and (3) friendly settlement. The Court and Commission
58 Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 5, art. 25(1) (“In serious and urgent cases, and
whenever necessary according to the information available, the Commission may, on its own
initiative or at the request of a party, request that the State concerned adopt precautionary measures
to prevent irreparable harm to persons.”), (4) (“The granting of such measures and their adoption
by the State shall not constitute a prejudgment on the merits of a case.”). 
59 Court Rules of Procedure, supra note 10, art. 25. 
60 Convention, art. 63(2). 
61 See, e.g. , Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Bustios-Rojas Case, Provisional Measures, Order of Aug. 8, 1990,
para. 4(1). 
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may, however, continue consideration of a case in the interests of protecting human
rights, even where the parties seek voluntary dismissal.62
A. Voluntary Withdrawal of Case
A petitioning party in Commission proceedings may at any time desist from his or her
petition or case by stating so in writing to the Commission. Upon consideration of the
request, the Commission may either archive the petition or continue to process the
case in the interest of protecting a particular right.63
Once a case has been submitted to the Court, the Commission may likewise seek to
voluntarily withdraw the case from the Court’s docket. To do so, it must notify the
Court of its intention not to proceed with the case.64 It is then up to the Court to decide
whether to discontinue the hearing or not. The Court will base its decision on “the
opinions of the other parties . . . and the representatives of their victims or next of
kin,”65 “its responsibility to protect human rights,”66 and its responsibility to “preserve
a fair balance between the protection of human rights, which is the ultimate purpose
of the system, and the legal certainty and procedural equity that will ensure the
stability and reliability of the international protection mechanism.”67
B. State Declaration of Responsibility
A case may also be dismissed before judgment on the merits where the respondent
State accepts international responsibility for the alleged violations (thus avoiding a
potential adverse judgment in international proceedings). Once a State accepts such
62 See Court Rules of Procedure, supra note 10, art. 54; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Cayara Case, Preliminary
Objections, Judgment of Feb. 3, 1993 (Ser. C) No. 14, para. 50. 
63 Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 5, art. 35 (“The petitioner may at any time desist from
his or her petition or case, to which effect he or she must so state in writing to the Commission.
The statement by the petitioner shall be analyzed by the Commission, which may archive the
petition or case if it deems this appropriate, or continue to process it in the interest of protecting a
particular right.”). 
64 See Court Rules of Procedure, supra note 10, art. 52(1) (“When the party that has brought the case
notifies the Court of its intention not to proceed with it, the Court shall, after hearing the opinions
of the other parties thereton and the representatives of the victims or their next of kin, decide
whether to discontinue the hearing and, consequently, to strike the case from its list.”).
65 Id.
66 Id. art. 54 (“[T]he Court may, bearing in mind its responsibility to protect human rights, decide to
continue the consideration of a case.”). 
67 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Cayara Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Feb. 3, 1993 (Ser. C) No.
14, para. 63 (dismissing petition from Court’s docket at Commission’s request where time period
available for submitting case under Convention article 51 had long since expired). 
responsibility, the controversy as to the facts that originated the case ceases.68
Provided the Court finds the acceptance and its juridical effects acceptable, the only
remaining contentious proceeding is the determination of reparations, compensation,
court costs and attorneys’fees.69 The Court typically grants a period of six months for
this determination to be made by mutual agreement between the respondent State and
the Commission, taking into account the victims’ best interests. The Court generally
reserves authority, however, to examine and approve that agreement and, in the event
the parties do not agree, to continue Court proceedings on reparation, compensation,
and costs.70
ARTICLE 52(2) OF COURT’S RULES OF PROCEDURE
“If the respondent informs the Court of its acquiescence in the
claims of the party that has brought the case, the Court shall
decide, after hearing the opinions of the latter and the
representatives of the victims or their next of kin, whether such
acquiescence and its juridical effects are acceptable. In that event,
the Court shall determine the appropriate reparations and
indemnities.” 
C. Friendly Settlement 
Finally, the parties may mutually seek to withdraw a case from the Court’s
jurisdiction after reaching a friendly settlement. Under article 48(1)(f) of the
Convention, “[t]he Commission shall place itself at the disposal of the parties
concerned with a view to reaching a friendly settlement of the matter on the basis of
respect for the rights recognized in this Convention.”71 The Commission may do so at
any stage of the examination of a petition, on its own initiative or at the request of any
of the parties.72
68 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., El Amparo Case, Judgment of Jan. 18, 1995 (Ser. C) No. 19, para. 20; Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R., Garrido and Baigorria Case, Judgment of Feb. 2, 1996 (Ser. C) No. 26, para. 27;
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Aloeboetoe et al. Case , Judgment of Dec. 4, 1991 (Ser. C) No. 11, para. 23. 
69 See supra.
70 El Amparo Case, supra, para. 21(3), (4); Garrido and Baigorria Case, supra, para. 31(3), (4); see
also Aloeboetoe et al. Case, supra, para. 23(2) (deciding to retain case on docket to fix reparations
and costs). 
71 See also Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 5, art. 41(1).  
72 See id. Prior to making its decision on the merits of the case, moreover, the Commission will set a
time period for the parties to express whether they have an interest in initiating the friendly
settlment procedure. Id. art. 38(2). 
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While recognizing that, “[t]aken literally, the wording of Article 48(1)(f) . . . would
seem to establish a compulsory procedure,” the Court has affirmed that “the
Commission should attempt such friendly settlement only when the circumstances of
the controversy make that option suitable or necessary, at the Commission’s sole
discretion.”73 The Commission determines whether pursuit of a friendly settlement is
“suitable or necessary” based on the requirement that friendly settlement be reached
“on the basis of respect for the human rights recognized in th[e] Convention.”74 The
Commission has reaffirmed this principle in its new Rules of Procedure, which
provide that “[t]he Commission may terminate its intervention in the friendly
settlement procedure if it finds the matter is not susceptible to such a resolution or if
any of the parties does not consent to its application, decides not to continue it, or
does not display the willingness to reach a friendly settlement based on respect for
human rights.”75
Friendly settlement may also be pursued while a case is pending before the Court.
Pursuant to article 53 of the Court’s Rules of Procedure, “When the parties to a case
before the Court inform it of the existence of a friendly settlement, compromise, or
any other occurrence likely to lead to a settlement of the dispute, the Court may, in
that case and after hearing the representatives of the victims or their next of kin,
decide to discontinue the hearing and strike the case from its list.” 
In order to do so, however, the Court must determine that the friendly settlement is
“based on respect for the human rights recognized in the Convention.”76 This
principle, read with article 63(1), means the friendly settlement must contemplate full
reparation for the harm caused, including restoration of the right violated,
compensation for actual damages, rehabilitation, measures of satisfaction, and
guarantees of non-repetition (see infra). The consent of the aggrieved is thus not
enough: “What is sought with a friendly settlement of the matter based on respect for
human rights is to modify the denounced situation in such a way as to provide
restitution of the rights that have been violated to the affected.”77
73 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987
(Ser. C) No. 1, para. 44; see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case,
Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987 (Ser. C) No. 2, para. 49; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
Godínez Cruz Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987 (Ser. C) No. 3, para. 47.
74 American Convention, art. 48(1)(f); see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case,
Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987 (Ser. C) No. 1, para. 45 (“[T]he Commission
enjoys discretionary, but by no means arbitrary, powers to decide in each case whether the friendly
settlement procedure would be a suitable or appropriate way of resolving the dispute while
promoting respect for human rights.”) (emphasis added); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Fairén Garbi and
Solís Corrales Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26, 1987 (Ser. C) No. 2, para. 50
(same); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of June 26,
1987 (Ser. C) No. 3, para. 48 (same).
75 Commission Rules of Procedure, supra note 5, art. 41(4).
76 American Convention, art. 48(1)(f). 
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(1993) (unofficial translation).
An illustrative example is the case of Horacio Verbitsky, an Argentine journalist
convicted and sentenced under a public contempt (desacato) law for allegedly
dafaming a public figure.  The friendly settlement approved by the Commission
included commitments from the State to repeal the section of the criminal code
establishing the crime of desacato, to vacate Verbitsky’s sentence and cancel all of its
effects, to provide fair compensation for the damages and injury Verbitsky suffered
because of the judicial action, and to request inclusion in the Commission’s report of
a discussion on the compatibility of the desacato law with the American Convention
and the duty of States Parties to harmonize domestic legislation with the Convention
under article 2.78 In return, Verbitsky expressly waived compensation for moral
damages and his attorneys waived any claim for honoraria. The parties requested that
the Commission supervise and monitor compliance with the settlement.
In the Maqueda case, the Court similarly approved discontinuance of proceedings
after finding that the proposed friendly settlement did “not violate the letter and spirit
of the American Convention.” However, “mindful of its responsibility to protect
human rights,” it reserved “the power to reopen and proceed with consideration of the
case, should at any future time a change occur in the circumstances that gave rise to
the agreement.”79
IV. Remedies Stage (art. 63)
Perhaps the most important procedural stage in proceedings before the Commission
and Court concerns the granting of remedies. As the Court has affirmed, “It is a
principle of international law, which jurisprudence has considered ‘even a general
concept of law,’ that every violation of an international obligation which results in
harm creates a duty to make adequate reparation.”80 The Commission has echoed:
“Reparation is . . . obligatory following a State’s failure to enforce an international
convention or commitment.”81 Accordingly, under Convention article 63(1), “If the
Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by this
Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his
right or freedom that was violated . . . [and], if appropriate, that the consequences of
the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be
78 See Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 22/94, Case 11.012, Verbitsky (Friendly Settlement) (Arg.),
Sept. 20,1994, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1994,
at 42, paras. 9, 14, 20 pt. ii, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.88, Doc. 9 rev. (1995). 
79 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Maqueda Case, Resolution of Jan. 17, 1995 (Ser. C). No. 18, para. 27. 
80 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Compensatory Damages, Judgment of July 21,
1989 (Ser. C) No. 7, para. 25; see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Aloeboetoe et al. Case, Reparations,
Judgment of Sept. 10, 1993 (Ser. C) No. 15, para. 43 (same).
81 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 20/99, Case 11.317, Rodolfo Robles Espinoza (Peru), in
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1998, at 787, para. 161,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, Doc. 6 rev. (1999) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998]. 
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remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party.” Unlike other stages
of Court proceedings, “[a]t the reparations stage, the representatives of the victims or
of their next of kin may independently submit their own arguments and evidence” to
the Court.82
“[T]he obligation to make reparation is governed by international law in all of its
aspects, such as its scope, characteristics, beneficiaries, etc.” 83 As such, provisions of
domestic law may not be invoked to modify or suspend the international obligation to
make reparation.84 Under international law, reparation of harm brought about by the
violation of an international obligation includes five distinct elements: (1) restoration
of the legal condition enjoyed before the violation (restitutio in integrum); (2) fair
compensation, including material and moral damages; (3) rehabilitation; (4)
satisfaction; and (5) guarantees of non-repetition.85 These five elements are intended
to meet the main object of reparations: “to repair the violated legal condition of the
human victim or his family members.”86 Although the Court and Commission tend to
refer directly to only three categories of reparation—restoration of the right violated,
fair compensation, and remediation of the consequences of the breach87—the five
82 Court Rules of Procedure, supra note 8, art. 23 (emphasis added). 
83 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., El Amparo Case , Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 14, 1996 (Ser. C) No. 28,
para. 15; see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Aloeboetoe et al. Case , Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 10,
1993 (Ser. C) No. 15, para. 44 (same); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Loayza Tamayo Case, Reparations,
Judgment of Nov. 27, 1998 (Ser. C) No. 42, para. 86 (same); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Neira Alegría et
al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 19, 1996 (Ser. C) No. 29, para. 37 (same).
84 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Neira Alegría et al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 19, 1996 (Ser.
C) No. 29, para. 37 (“[The obligation to make reparation] may not be subject to modification or
suspension by the respondent State through invocation of provisions of its own domestic law.”); see
also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodriguez Case, Compensatory Damages, Judgment of July 21,
1989 (Ser. C) No. 7, para. 30 (holding that duty of reparation under international law functions
independently of national law, “so it is not limited by the defects, imperfections or deficiencies of
national law”).
85 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Loayza Tamayo Case, Reparations, Judgment of Nov. 27, 1998 (Ser. C)
No. 42, para. 85 (recognizing these five distinct elements of reparation under international law); id.
Joint Concurring Vote of Judges A.A. Cançado Trindade and A. Abreu Burelli, para. 5 (same); Inter-
Am. H.R. , El Amparo Case, Dissenting Opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade, Judgment on
Reparations of Sept. 14, 1996, para. 6 (“Full reparation . . . includes, besides the restitutio in
integrum (restoration of the previous situation of the victim, whenever possible) and the
indemnities (in the light of the general principle of the neminem laedere), the rehabilitation, the
satisfaction and—significantly—the guarantee of non-repetition of the acts in violation of human
rights (the duty of prevention).”). 
86 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 49/97, Case 11.520, Tomas Porfirio Rondin (Mex.), in ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1997, at 662, para. 98,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, Doc. 7 rev. (1998).
87 See, e.g. , Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Compensatory Damages , Judgment of
July 21, 1989 (Ser. C) No. 7, para. 26 (“Reparation of harm brought about by the violation of an
international obligation consists in full restitution (restitutio in integrum), which includes the
restoration of the prior situation, the reparation of the consequences of the violation, and
indemnification for patrimonial and non-patrimonial damages, including emotional harm.”); see
also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case, Compensatory Damages, Judgment of July 21, 1989
(Ser. C) No. 8, para. 24 (same).
internationally recognized elements are incorporated within these categories and will
be addressed separately below.
A. Restoration of the Previous Situation
(Restitutio in integrum)
The first obligation in repairing the effects of a human rights violation is to ensure the
restoration of the right that was violated, that is, to return the victim to the legal
condition she was in prior to the violation. This is not always possible. Where a
violation causes irreversible damage (e.g., death, permanent disability), the victim’s
previous condition cannot be fully restored and reparation must take alternative
forms.88 In all other circumstances, however, restitution is the principle form of
reparation for the direct victim, who must be ensured the enjoyment of his right or
freedom that was violated.
A violation of the right to liberty (art. 7), for example, automatically gives rise to the
state’s obligation to release the victim from custody.89 Likewise, a violation of the
right to housing (art. 11) requires the State to ensure the victim access to her former
housing under conditions equal to those enjoyed before the violation or, if that is not
possible, to housing of equivalent size, quality, and location.  In a situation where a
State was found responsible for a violation of the right to life (art. 4) by destroying a
community’s food crops or other means of subsistence, the State would similarly be
required to ensure the victims’ right to food—that is, by providing for the victims’
immediate nutritional needs in the short-term and ensuring access to resources for
sustained long-term food access. 
The Court has made clear, however, that restitution is not limited to restoring the
immediate right that was violated. Rather, it extends to restoring the legal condition
of the victim before the violation occurred. In the case of Loayza Tamayo, the victim
was a school teacher arrested on charges of subversion and unlawfully held
incommunicado.  Rather than merely order her release from prison, the Court
unanimously ordered “as measures of restitutition” (1) the reinstatement of Loayza
88 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., El Amparo Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 14, 1996 (Ser. C)
No. 28, para. 16 (“Inasmuch as the rule of ‘restitutio in integrum’ cannot be enforced in cases in
which the right to life has been violated, reparation to the victims’next of kin and dependents must
take alternative forms, such as pecuniary compensation.”); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Aloeboetoe et al.
Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 10, 1993 (Ser. C) No. 15, paras. 47, 49 (same); Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R., Caballero Delgado and Santana Case, Reparations, Judgment of Jan. 29, 1997 (Ser. C) No.
31, para. 17 (holding that when restitutio in integrum is impossible (e.g., right to life violated),
pecuniary compensation, both material and moral, must be sought for victims’ relatives and
dependents). 
89 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Loayza Tamayo Case, Judgment of Sept. 17, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 33,
para. 83. 
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Tamayo to the teaching service in public institutions (2) at a remuneration level equal
to the pay she was receiving for her teaching services at the time of her detention,
appreciated to reflect its value as of the date of judgment, and (3) with a guarantee of
full retirement benefits, including time accrued during her detention.90 This was
necessary to restore her to the situation she was in prior to the violation of her
Convention rights. Similar arguments should be made in other cases brought before
the Court where a particular violation has caused the loss of a job, benefits, or other
legal entitlement or status. 
B. Fair Compensation
Given their irreparable character, most human rights violations cannot be remedied
merely by restoring the right in question. In such cases, the State is obligated to
provide “fair compensation.” Such compensation refers primarily to actual damages
suffered, which “comprise both material and moral damages.”91 It does not include
punitive damages, which the Court has recognized are “not applicable in international
law at this time.”92
1. Material Damages
Material damages encompass any direct losses experienced by the victim or the
victim’s family as a result of the violation. They include, but are not limited to, loss
of earnings, costs incurred by the victims or their families during the proceedings
(e.g., costs of transportation, legal assistance, telephone calls, etc.), and expenses
incurred in dealing with the immediate consequences of violation (e.g., trying to
locate victims). In ordering compensation for material damages, the Court will not
apply rigid criteria, but will base its determination on “a prudent estimate of the
damages” after looking at the particular circumstances of each case, as pled by the
parties.93 Each potential recipient of material damages must affirmatively plead and
prove entitlement to such damages. This may be done by submitting at trial
90 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Loayza Tamayo Case, Reparations, Judgment of Nov. 27, 1998 (Ser. C) No.
42, dec. paras. 1, 2. 
91 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., El Amparo Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 14, 1996 (Ser. C)
No. 28, para. 16; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Aloeboetoe et al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 10,
1993 (Ser. C) No. 15, paras. 47, 49.
92 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodriguez Case, Compensatory Damages, Judgment of July 21,
1989 (Ser. C) No. 7, para. 38 (finding expression “fair compensation” used in article 63 of the
Convention is “compensatory and not punitive”); see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case,
Compensatory Damages, Judgment of July 21, 1989 (Ser. C) No. 8, para. 36 (same). 
93 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Compensatory Damages, Judgment of July 21,
1989 (Ser. C) No. 7, para. 48; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Aloeboetoe et al. Case , Reparations, Judgment
of Sept. 10, 1993 (Ser. C) No. 15, para. 87.
reasonable estimates and proof of lost earnings, costs, and expenses, such as past pay
stubs, receipts, and documentation of activities. The Court will not award material
damages to any claimant in the absence of a supporting pleading.94
Practice Tip
An estimate or proof of monetary loss or expenses incurred as a
result of a given violation must be submitted to the Court for each
intended recipient of material damages. The Court will not award
material damages where there is no pleading to support the
request. 
a. Lost Earnings/Monetary Loss
The most significant form of material damage is generally loss of earnings. The State
is required to compensate victims and their dependents for any lost income caused by
the violation.  Such loss may result from death, disabling condition, property
deprivation, incarceration, or other restriction affecting earning power.
The Court has established a set of criteria for calculating the amount payable in
compensation for lost income. The calculation of lost earnings is based upon the
income the victim would have received but for the violation—that is, from the time
of violation to the time he or she reasonably could be expected to return to gainful
employment or, in the case of permanent disability or death, until the victim would
have reached the age of average life expectancy in the country at issue (income plus
pension benefits).95 The calculation of lost earnings should be based upon (1) actual
income at the time of the violation or, if not available, (2) the minimum monthly wage
effective in the country or cost of the basic food basket, whichever is higher.96 Where
the victim is a minor, lost income will be calculated from the date of his or her
94 See, e.g. , Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Compensatory Damages, Judgment of
July 21, 1989 (Ser. C) No. 7, para. 42.
95 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., El Amparo Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 14, 1996 (Ser. C) No. 28,
para. 28; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Loayza Tamayo Case, Reparations, Judgment of Nov. 27, 1998 (Ser.
C) No. 42, para. 128–29; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Compensatory Damages,
Judgment of July 21, 1989 (Ser. C) No. 7, para. 46.
96 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Neira Alegría et al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 19, 1996 (Ser.
C) No. 29, para. 49; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., El Amparo Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 14, 1996
(Ser. C) No. 28, para. 28 (using in Court’s calculations of victims’base monthly salary “an amount
not less than the cost of the basic food basket, which is higher than the minimum rural wage at the
time of the events”). 
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eighteenth birthday. Where the victim remains incapacitated beyond the obligatory
retirement age, lost income is determined based on monthly salary up to retirement
and expected pension benefits up to expected natural death.97
The Court has made clear, however, that lost income is not simply a multiple of the
victim’s monthly wage and the number of months he or she is unable to draw
income.98 The correct calculation aims to determine the present value of future
income. This sum is calculated by determining what amount, invested at normal
interest rates, would produce the amount of the monthly income the victim would
have received but for the violation.99 As a lump sum, this figure will necessarily be
less than the simple sum of monthly earnings. 
States are obligated, moreover, to ensure that the real value of compensation
payments does not diminish over time.100 Thus, interest accrued from the date of the
violation must be added to the award,101 no current or future tax may be assessed on
indemnities paid,102 and compensation must be maintained “under the most favorable
conditions permitted by [national] banking practice.”103 The Court has interpreted the
expression “under the most favorable conditions” as referring to the fact that “any act
or measure by the trustee must ensure that the amount assigned maintains its
purchasing power and generates sufficient earnings or dividends to increase it.”104
This is necessary to ensure that the beneficiaries obtain the best returns for their
reparation sums.105 If the State does not fulfill its obligation to pay compensation
within the times fixed by the Court, moreover, it must compensate the victims for any
97 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodriguez Case, Compensatory Damages, Judgment of July 21,
1989 (Ser. C) No. 7, para. 46.
98 Such a calculation would be equivalent to advance payment of future income.
99 Id. para. 46. A professional actuary is generally needed to make this calculation.
100 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case , Interpretation of the Compensatory Damages
Judgment, Judgment of Aug. 17, 1990 (Ser. C), paras. 29–30.
101 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., El Amparo Case , Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 14, 1996 (Ser. C) No. 28,
para. 28.
102 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Compensatory Damages, Judgment of July 21,
1989 (Ser. C) No. 7, para. 57; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., El Amparo Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept.
14, 1996 (Ser. C) No. 28, para. 48; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Neira Alegría et al. Case, Reparations,
Judgment of Sept. 19, 1996 (Ser. C) No. 29, para. 67.
103 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Compensatory Damages, Judgment of July 21,
1989 (Ser. C) No. 7, para. 58; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Aloeboetoe et al. Case , Reparations, Judgment
of Sept. 10, 1993 (Ser. C) No. 15, para. 100 (holding that trust funds will be set up in dollars “under
the most favorable conditions consistent with banking practice.”).
104 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case , Interpretation of the Compensatory Damages
Judgment, Judgment of Aug. 17, 1990 (Ser. C), para. 31; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case,
Interpretation of the Compensatory Damages Judgment, Judgment of Aug. 17, 1990 (Ser. C), para.
31.
105 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Aloeboetoe et al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 10, 1993 (Ser. C) No.
15, para. 103.
losses that result from the delay, including interest on the withheld payments and
compensation for losses due to currency devaluation.106
GENERAL PRINCIPLES THE COURT HAS FOLLOWED IN
CALCULATING DAMAGES FOR LOST INCOME:
• Compensation should be estimated based on the particular
circumstances of each case, as pled by the parties, not
according to rigid criteria.
• Compensatory damages for lost income should be calculated
based on (1) the length of time the victim is unable to draw
income as a result of the violation and (2) the victim’s actual
income or, absent such information, the minimum monthly wage
or the cost of the basic food basket in the country at issue,
whichever is higher.
• The compensation rate due is not simply a multiple of monthly
gross income at the time of the violation; rather, petitioners must
determine what amount, invested at normal interest rates, would
produce the amount of monthly income the victim would have
received but for the violation, i.e., during period of temporary
incapacitation or, in case of death or permanent disability, for
remainder of victim’s expected lifetime in given country.
• Compensation payments must maintain their real value over
time. 
A slightly different set of criteria apply where, due to the victim’s death, the
beneficiaries of the compensation are family members. Successors and dependents
are entitled to what they would have received from the deceased, had he or she not
been killed.107 In making this determination, the Court starts with the sum the
106 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case , Interpretation of the Compensatory Damages
Judgment, Judgment of Aug. 17, 1990 (Ser. C), paras. 39–42; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz
Case, Interpretation of the Compensatory Damages Judgment, Judgment of Aug. 17, 1990 (Ser. C),
paras. 39–42; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., El Amparo Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 14, 1996 (Ser.
C) No. 28, para. 49; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Neira Alegría et al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept.
19, 1996 (Ser. C) No. 29, para. 68.
107 The determination of lost earnings must not take into account that a deceased victim, had he lived,
might have been imprisoned (and thus not able to work) for any number of years; the right to be
presumed innocent precludes this argument. See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Neira Alegría et al. Case,
Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 19, 1996 (Ser. C) No. 29, paras. 44–45.
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deceased would have earned during the remainder of his or her life, when invested at
a nominal interest rate. It then deducts one-quarter for personal expenses,108 with the
remainder available for distribution among successors and non-successor dependents
according to the Court’s apportionment.
In undertaking these calculations, the Court will factor in the age and employability
of successors and dependents. It considers that “children . . . should be guaranteed an
education until they reach a certain age [e.g., 25], [but] will be able to work
thereafter.”109 The same is true of other family members, who “have an actual or
future possibility of working and receiving income of their own.”110 Taking these
factors into consideration, the Court will arrive at a prudent estimate of the damages
for each successor/dependent claimant. 
The Court places maximum emphasis on ensuring that the children and minor
dependents of deceased human rights victims receive a full education and adequate
health services. Significantly, where enjoyment of these services cannot be achieved
merely by granting compensatory damages, the Court will order the construction of
schools and dispensaries where children can receive adequate education and basic
medical attention. In the Aloeboetoe case, for example, the school and medical
dispensary in the locality where most of the children of the victims lived had been
shut down. As a result, the Court ordered that “as part of the compensation due,
Suriname is under the obligation to reopen the school at Gujaba and staff it with
teaching and administrative personnel to enable it to function on a permanent basis as
of 1994 . . . and to make the medical dispensary already in place in the locality
operational during that same year.”111 This award was ordered in addition to the
monetary compensation the children were entitled to receive.112
In assessing damages, the Commission relies heavily on the criteria set out in the
1923 arbitral decision of Lusitania, listed in the following box. 
108 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., El Amparo Case , Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 14, 1996 (Ser. C) No. 28,
para. 28. 
109 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Aloeboetoe et al. Case , Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 10, 1993 (Ser. C) No.
15, para. 85.
110 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Compensatory Damages, Judgment of July 21,
1989 (Ser. C) No. 7, para. 48.
111 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Aloeboetoe et al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 10, 1993 (Ser. C) No.
15, paras. 96, 116(5).
112 Id. paras. 98–108. The Court ordered that the children’s compensatory awards be set up in trust
funds, established in dollars, to be administered by a non-profit foundation under the most
favorable conditions consistent with banking practice.
To determine the amount due a claimant following a victim’s
death, the following sums should be added, reduced to the
present cash value thereof: 
1. Estimated amount deceased, had he not been killed, would
have contributed to the claimant;
2. Pecuniary value the personal services of the deceased
represented for that claimant in terms of the care, education or
supervision he provided for her; and
3. Reasonable compensation for the mental trauma plus the
suffering, if any, caused by the violent severance of family ties
which the plaintiff may have experienced due to that death.113
The Court distinguishes between “successors” and “non-successor dependents” in
assessing entitlement to damages for loss of life. The law assumes that a victim’s
death causes actual and moral damages to her successors, which include her children,
her spouse (and/or life-companion114), and, where these do not exist, her parents.115
Successors are thus presumptively entitled to damages payable for causing loss of
life, and the burden of proof is on the State Party to show that such damages do not
exist. While successors must, as a general rule, prove their identity by means of
relevant documentation (e.g., birth certificates, marriage licenses), the Court has
recognized that proof of succession is not required where the State fails to make the
means for documenting relationships and identity available to all of its inhabitants.116
In such cases, the Court will look to the credibility of the evidence to determine
whether it is admissible.117
The Court may also order reparation for persons who, though not successors, have
suffered some consequence of the unlawful act by being a “dependent” of the
victim.118 Unlike successors, “non-successor dependents” bear the burden of proving
113 See Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 49/97, Case 11.520, Tomas Porfirio Rondin (Mex.), supra
note 86, para. 103.
114 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Neira Alegría et al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 19, 1996 (Ser.
C) No. 29, para. 60; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., El Amparo Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 14, 1996
(Ser. C) No. 28, paras. 40–41. 
115 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Aloeboetoe et al. Case , Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 10, 1993 (Ser. C) No.
15, para. 62; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., El Amparo Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 14, 1996, para.
40.
116 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Aloeboetoe et al. Case , Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 10, 1993 (Ser. C) No.
15, para. 64 (noting that Suriname has failed to provide sufficient registry offices in the region such
that the victims’families could obtain proof of succession). 
117 Id.
118 Id. para. 67. 
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their right to damages.119 To do so, they must provide specific proof that (1) the victim
made regular, periodic payments either in cash, in kind, or in services to them (i.e. not
sporadic contributions); (2) the relationship between the victim and claimant was
such as to provide some basis for the assumption that the payments would have
continued had the victim not been killed; and (3) the victim met a financial need
experienced by the claimant that would not otherwise have been met.120
Successors: “children”/“spouse” or “ascendants”121
• Successors are assumed to have suffered actual and moral
damages. The burden of proof is on the State Party to show that
such damages do not exist.
• Non-successor dependents and third party claimants must
provide specific proof justifying their right to damages. The
burden of proof is on the claimant (i.e., acting independently and
through the Commission).122
Non-successor dependents must meet the following
requirements to receive compensation: 
1. Payment or support by the victim (in cash, in kind or in services)
must have been regular and periodic (not sporadic);
2. Relationship between victim and claimant must allow
assumption that such payments would have continued; and
3. Claimant must have experienced financial need that was met by
the victim.123
b. Costs and Expenses
“Fair compensation” also includes reimbursement for all costs and expenses
reasonably incurred as a result of the violation. This includes all legal costs incurred
by victims and their families in domestic judicial and administrative proceedings, in
119 Id. para. 71. 
120 Id. para. 68. 
121 The Court will interpret such terms according to local law, taking local custom into account, to the
extent that it does not contradict the American Convention (e.g., no distinction will be made
between male and female inheritance rights). See id. para. 62. 
122 Id. paras. 54, 71. 
123 Id. para. 68. 
their dealings with state authorities, and in proceedings before the Commission and
the Court (e.g., attorneys’ fees, court costs, investigation expenses, processing fees).
The Court, however, will reimburse only out-of-pocket costs incurred by victims and
their families. It has consistently refused to reimburse expenses incurred on behalf of
victims by the Commission; such expenses are to be financed out of the OAS
operating budget.124
Compensable material damages also include expenses incurred by victims and their
families in responding to human rights violations. For example, all medical expenses
incurred as a result of a violation must be reimbursed. Similarly, where a victim was
forcefully evicted from her home, expenses incurred in looking for and procuring
alternative shelter (e.g., travel, rent) and personal belongings (e.g., destroyed or
confiscated clothing, cooking items, etc.) should be reimbursed. In disappearance
cases, the Court has repeatedly held that expenses incurred by a victim’s family in
searching for the disappeared are compensable as “fair compensation.” The same is
true of costs incurred by family members in visiting victims in detention centers and
in providing for the health and educational needs of victims’children and dependents
while the victims are incapacitated.125
Practice Tip
Claimants should itemize all costs and expenses for which
they seek reimbursement. In the Velasquez Rodriguez case, the
Court declined to award compensation for expenses incurred by
the family in investigating the whereabouts of the disappeared,
because those expenses were “not pleaded or proven opportunely”
during trial through the submission of an estimate or proof of
expenses.126 Similarly, in the reparations stage of the Aloeboetoe
case, the Court declined to award compensation for assets and
belongings stripped from the victims at the time of their detention
because such losses were not specifically pled at trial.127
124 Id. paras. 112–14; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., El Amparo Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 14, 1996
(Ser. C) No. 28, para. 63; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Neira Alegría et al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of
Sept. 19, 1996 (Ser. C) No. 29, para. 70.
125 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Loayza Tamayo Case, Reparations, Judgment of Nov. 27, 1998 (Ser. C) No.
42, para. 125, 129–30, 133. Health and educational expenses of children and dependents are
compensable only to the extent they would otherwise have been covered exclusively by the victim. 
126 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodriguez Case, Compensatory Damages, Judgment of July 21,
1989 (Ser. C) No. 7, para. 42.
127 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Aloeboetoe et al. Case , Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 10, 1993 (Ser. C) No.
15, para. 80.
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Victims and their families are also entitled to compensation for “moral damages.”
Such damages result from the harmful psychological and emotional impact that
human rights violations cause. Indemnification for moral damages, unlike material
damages, must be based upon “principles of equity.”128
The Court will generally take it as given that a victim of human rights abuse has
suffered moral damages.129 The Court also assumes without specific proof that the
victim’s immediate family (i.e., children, spouse/companion, parents, siblings) have
suffered moral damages; it places the burden of proof on the State to show that such
damages do not exist.130 Other claimants must provide specific proof justifying their
right to moral damages. Moral damages may be demonstrated by expert documentary
evidence and testimony from a psychiatrist who, for example, has examined the
claimants and can attest to the psychological effects the violation has had on them.131
Such testimony may be rebutted by the State with affirmative proof that psychological
harm was not suffered. 
Petitioners have at times sought moral damages for an entire community. The Court
has generally rejected such claims, holding that the obligation to pay moral damages
does not extend beyond the immediate family to larger communities. It has, however,
recognized an exception where a community as a whole suffers direct damages or
where a status-motivated violation is committed against particular members of that
status group (i.e., a racially-motivated crime against a tribal community).132
128 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodriguez Case, Compensatory Damages, Judgment of July 21,
1989 (Ser. C) No. 7, para. 27; see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case, Compensatory
Damages, Judgment of July 21, 1989 (Ser. C) No. 8, para. 25; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Aloeboetoe et
al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 10, 1993 (Ser. C) No. 15, paras. 86–87.
129 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Aloeboetoe et al. Case , Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 10, 1993 (Ser. C)
No. 15, paras. 51–52 (“It is clear that the victims suffered moral damages, for it is characteristic of
human nature that anybody subjected to the aggression and abuse described above will experience
moral suffering. The Court considers that no evidence is required to arrive at this conclusion.”);
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., El Amparo Case , Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 14, 1996 (Ser. C) No. 28,
para. 36 (same); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Neira Alegría et al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 19,
1996 (Ser. C) No. 29, para. 57 (same); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Loayza Tamayo Case, Reparations,
Judgment of Nov. 27, 1998 (Ser. C) No. 42, para. 138 (same). 
130 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Loayza Tamayo Case, Reparations, Judgment of Nov. 27, 1998 (Ser. C)
No. 42, paras. 140–43 (children, parents, siblings); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Aloeboetoe et al. Case,
Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 10, 1993 (Ser. C) No. 15, para. 54 (“With respect to [successors],
it is assumed that the death of the victim has caused them actual and moral damages and the burden
of proof is on the other party to show that such damages do not exist. Claimants who are not
successors, however, must provide specific proof justifying their right to damages.”); id. paras.
76–77 (parents, even where not declared as successors, may still be entitled to moral damages
without affirmative proof).
131 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodriguez Case, Compensatory Damages, Judgment of July 21,
1989 (Ser. C) No. 7, para. 51 (expert testimony regarding immediate family members’symptoms
of fright, anguish, depression and withdrawal resulting from disappearance of head of family). 
132 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Aloeboetoe et al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 10, 1993 (Ser. C) No.
15, paras. 82–83. 
Practice Tip
A v i c t i m ’s immediate family (i.e., children, parents, siblings,
spouse/companion) is generally presumed to have suffered moral
damages, and the burden is on the State to show that they have
not.
C. Rehabilitation 
The third essential element of reparation is rehabilitation: the provision of proper
medical care, including psychological and psychiatric services, to ensure that victims
and their families are restored, to the extent possible, to their full physical and mental
well-being. As the Commission has observed, the provision of proper medical care to
victims of human rights abuse “constitutes one of the State’s inherent juridical
duties.”133 The Court will require the State to provide compensation for future costs
of rehabilitation for victims and their families.134
D. Satisfaction
A victim’s right to effective reparation does not, however, stop at restoration of her
immediately prior individual condition (through restitution, compensation and
rehabilitation). Victims also have a right to reparative measures of a general or
collective nature that aim to vindicate the authority of the law, acknowledge
responsibility, establish the truth, and restore the honor and dignity of victims and
their families.  Satisfaction refers to reparation of a moral or collective nature that can
be granted through symbolic or other non-pecuniary remedial measures.135
The State can implement a wide variety of measures to achieve satisfaction.
According to the two U.N. draft sets of principles on reparation and impunity, these
133 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 49/97, Case 11.520, Tomas Porfirio Rondin (Mex.), supra note
86, para. 105.
134 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Loayza Tamayo Case, Reparations, Judgment of Nov. 27, 1998 (Ser.
C) No. 42, para. 129(d).
135 See generally Dinah Shelton, Reparations in the Inter-American System, in THE INTER-AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 151, 169-70 (1998) (“[I]n some cases applicants may be more
concerned to know the truth, such as the whereabouts of the disappeared victim, than they will be
about receiving monetary compensation. In addition, an award of financial compensation without
requiring general remedial action may signal to a government that it is permitted to violate human
rights provided it has sufficient tax revenues to pay for the resulting damages. Non-pecuniary
measures serve to reinforce the validity of the obligation breached, forcing the responsible state to
acknowledge responsibility. They also provide a measure of satisfaction to persons injured by the
state and serve to send a message to society that the violations will not be tolerated or repeated.”). 
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may include, inter alia , means of cessation of continuing violations; verification of
the facts and full public disclosure of the truth; official declaration or a judicial
decision affirming or restoring the dignity, reputation, and legal rights of the victim;
a p o l o g y, including public acknowledgment of the facts and acceptance of
responsibility; judicial or administrative sanctions against persons responsible for
violations; commemorations and tributes to the victims; and inclusion in training and
in history books of an accurate account of the wrongs committed.136
Although the Commission often asks the Court for the full panoply of such measures,
the Court has tended to reject them in favor of a much more limited set of standard
non-pecuniary reparations. As measures of satisfaction, the Court typically orders that
the State investigate the circumstances underlying the violation, identify the persons
responsible, and sanction them in accordance with the law.137 Where a violation
results in death or disappearance, it will also order the State to do all in its power to
locate and identify the remains of the victims and deliver them to their next of kin.138
Other than that, the Court tends to find that the Court’s own judgment on the merits
constitutes adequate satisfaction.139
136 See Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/17 (1996), Comm’n on Hum. Rts, 48th
sess. Item 10 (annex), para. 15, available at < h t t p : / / w w w. u n h c h r. c h / h t m l / m e n u 4 / s u b r e p /
9617.htm>; Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to
Combat Impunity, Final report prepared by Mr. Joinet pursuant to Sub-Comm’n decision 1996/119,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20, June 26, 1997, Comm’n on Hum. Rts, 49th Sess., Item 9,
principle 44.  
137 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., El Amparo Case , Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 14, 1996 (Ser. C) No. 28,
para. 63; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Neira Alegría et al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 19, 1996
(Ser. C) No. 29, para. 61; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodriguez Case, Compensatory Damages,
Judgment of July 21, 1989 (Ser. C) No. 7, paras. 32–35.
138 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Neira Alegría et al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 19, 1996 (Ser.
C) No. 29, para. 69; see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Aloeboetoe et al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of
Sept. 10, 1993 (Ser. C) No. 15, para. 109; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodriguéz Case, Judgment
of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No. 4, para. 181; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of
Jan. 20, 1989 (Ser. C) No. 5, para. 191. 
139 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodriguez Case, Compensatory Damages, Judgment of July 21,
1989 (Ser. C) No. 7, para. 36; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., El Amparo Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept.
14, 1996 (Ser. C) No. 28, para. 62; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Loayza Tamayo Case, Reparations,
Judgment of Nov. 27, 1998 (Ser. C) No. 42, para. 158.
The Commission, for its part, has consistently rejected States’ arguments that publication of the
Commission’s report declaring a State responsible for committing human rights violations is
sufficient satisfaction to discharge the State’s reparatory obligations under international law. See,
e.g., Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report Nº 61/99, Case 11.519, Jose Alexis Fuentes Guerrero et al.
(Colom.), in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 81, at 446, para. 65; see also Inter-Am.
Comm. H.R., Report No. 5/98, Case 11.019, Alvaro Moreno Moreno (Colom.), in ANNUAL REPORT
O F T H E IN T E R- AM E R I C A N CO M M I S S I O N O N HU M A N RI G H T S 1997, at 416, para. 138,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, Doc. 7 rev. (1998).
The Court’s limited approach to satisfaction is not juridically required and is
increasingly viewed as inadequate under international law.140 It should continue to be
challenged in individual petitions.  
E. Guarantees of Non-Repetition 
The fifth element of reparation under international law includes guarantees of non-
repetition. Such guarantees are preventative: They aim to ensure that victims cannot
be revictimized by similar abuses. Their purpose is to eliminate the circumstances that
led to violations, replacing them with reformed institutions, policies, and laws that are
capable of effectively protecting human rights. Guarantees of non-repetition are thus
closely tied to Convention article 2, under which States commit to adopt all necessary
legislative or other measures to give effect to the rights or freedoms recognized in the
Convention. 
Unfortunately, the Court has adopted a somewhat constrictive view of this element of
reparation.  It will order a State to bring its domestic laws and regulations into
conformity with the Convention only with respect to norms affirmatively applied in
the case at issue,141 even where other “non-enforced” norms created the framework in
which the violation was permitted to occur. Thus, in the case of El Amparo, the Court
declined to order the State to reform the Code of Military Justice and other military
regulations and instructions that were plainly incompatible with the Convention, on
the ground that the impugned regulations had not in fact been enforced, but were a
mere backdrop to the violation. The Court reasoned that pronouncing on the abstract
compatibility of the domestic norms with the Convention would run afoul of its
dictum in its 1994 Advisory Opinion that the Court lacks power under its contentious
jurisdiction to determine “whether a law that has not yet affected the guaranteed rights
and freedoms of specific individuals is in violation of the Convention.”142
In strong dissent, Judge Antonio Cançado Trindade argued that “the very existence of
a legal provision may per se create a situation which directly affects the rights
protected by the American Convention.”143 In his view, the decisive criterion for
distinguishing between examining a legal provision purely in abstracto (reserved for
the Court’s advisory jurisdiction) and doing so in the context of a concrete case
(reserved for the Court’s contentious jurisdiction) is the existence of victims.144 The
140 See generally Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Loayza Tamayo Case, Reparations, Joint Concurring Opinion of
Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade and A. Abreu Burelli, Judgment of Nov. 27, 1998 (Ser. C) No. 42. 
141 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Loayza Tamayo Case, Reparations, Judgment of Nov. 27, 1998 (Ser. C)
No. 42, paras. 162–64 (ordering State to to amend internal laws found incompatible with American
Convention pursuant to article 2).
142 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., El Amparo Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 14, 1996 (Ser. C) No. 28,
paras. 58–60. 
143 Id. Dissenting Opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade, para. 2.
144 Id. para. 8. 
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existence of victims thus renders “juridically inconsequential” the fact that a
particular law—one that plainly affects the guaranteed rights and freedoms of specific
individuals—has not actually been affirmatively applied in a concrete case.145
The weight of logic is on the side of Judge Cançado, and his view should continue to
be urged in petitions filed with the Commission and Court. 
V. Enforcement of Remedies
The Court takes remedies and their enforcement very seriously. Under the
Convention, States Parties “undertake to comply with the judgment of the Court in
any case to which they are parties,”146 and the Court’s Rules of Procedure affirm that
its judgments and decisions “may not be contested in any way.”147 As such, the Court
has a practice of retaining jurisdiction over cases to supervise compliance with its
judgments. Only when the judgment has been fully executed (e.g., compensatory
damages fully paid) will the case be considered closed.148 Even when a case has been
closed, however, the Court may reserve the power to reopen it if warranted by the
circumstances, such as where the underlying judgment establishes obligations of a
permanent nature.149
VI. Class Actions
Class actions are powerful tools for vindicating the rights of unrelated victims who
have suffered the same generalized abusive treatment. While class actions are not
explicitly provided for in the governing instruments of the inter-American human
rights system, there are several provisions that would appear to authorize them.
Article 29(1)(d) of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure, for example, provide that
“if two or more petitions address similar facts, involve the same persons, or reveal the
same pattern of conduct, they may be joined or processed together.” Likewise, article
28 of the Court’s Rules of Procedure provide that “[t]he Court may, at any stage of
145 Id.
146 American Convention, art. 68.
147 Court Rules of Procedure, supra note 10, art. 29(3). 
148 See, e.g., Inter-Am. H.R., El Amparo Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 14, 1996 (Ser. C) No.
28, para. 6 of final order (unanimously deciding that Court “shall supervise compliance with this
Judgment and that only when it has been executed will the case be considered closed”); Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R., Aloeboetoe et al. Case, Reparations, Judgment of Sept. 10, 1993 (Ser. C) No. 15, para.
116(6) (same); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Interpretation of the Compensatory
Damages Judgment, Judgment of Aug. 17, 1990 (Ser. C) No. 7, para. 44(2), (4) (reaffirming power
of supervision of compliance with payment of fixed damages until made).
149 See  Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Aloeboetoe et al. Case, Resolution of Feb. 5, 1997, res. pt. 1; cf. Court
Rules of Procedure, supra note 10, art. 54 (“[Notwithstanding early termination of proceedings by
discontinuance or friendly settlement], the Court may, bearing in mind its responsibility to protect
human rights, decide to continue the consideration of a case.”).
the proceedings, order the joinder of interrelated cases” and “may direct that the
proceedings in two or more cases be conducted simultaneously.”
The Commission, as well, has given clear indications that class actions are
permissible. In the admissibility ruling for Case 11.227, it stated: “[T]he Commission
possesses and has exercised the competence to consider numerous individual claims
in a single case so long as the claims are adequately connected. There exists no
provision in the Convention, in the Statute . . . or in the Regulations of the
Commission which limits the number of individual claims or victims which may be
considered in this manner.”150 In defining “adequately connected,” the Commission
stated that it “may process as a single case the claims of various victims alleging
violations arising out of the application of legislation or a pattern or practice to each
of the victims, without regard to the time and place in which the victims received this
similar treatment.”151 Thus, the alleged violations do not have to coincide in “time and
place” to be joined as long as they stem from similar treatment.152
Class action petitions must, however, individualize the members of the class to the
extent possible. Article 28(e) of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure states that, as
a condition of admissibility, petitions addressed to the Commission must include, “if
possible, the name of the victim . . . .” A petition filed on behalf of “unnamed,
unnumbered” victims would not likely be found admissible; it could, however, be
supplemented at a later time with a list of named persons who suffered concrete
injury.153 While petitioners, in cases of emergency, should not hesitate to file
150 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 5/97, Case 11.227, José Bernardo Díaz et. al (Colom.), in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 47, at 99, 110, para. 48 (emphasis added). The
Commission distinguished an earlier Colombian case in which it had declined to process as a single
case a series of individual claims for grave human rights violations of Colombian labor activists,
by noting that, given the particular circumstances of the labor cases, the Commission considered
that the protection of the human rights guaranteed in the Convention would be better served by
publishing its observations on the cases in a special Second Report on the Situation of Human
Rights in Colombia (1993), rather than processing the cases through the individual petitions
system. The Commission emphasized that the decision did not constitute a precedent that impedes
the processing of “collective” actions in the individual petition system. Id. paras. 46–50.
151 Id. para. 41 (emphasis added). 
152 See id. para. 40. In so holding, the Commission explicitly rejected a plain-language interpretation
of its regulations as requiring that the events and victims strictly coincide “in time and place” for
them to be processed as a single case. Article 40(1) of its prior Regulations provided: “Any petition
that states different facts that concern more than one person, and that could constitute various
violations that are unrelated in time and place shall be separated and processed as separate cases .
. . .” Article 29(c) of its new regulations, effective May 1, 2001, is similarly worded: “if the petition
sets forth distinct facts, or if it refers to more than one person or to alleged violations not
interconnected in time and place, the claims may be divided and processed separately . . . .”
153 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Application No. 9213, Disabled Peoples’International against
United States, Decision of Commission as to Admissibility, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-
AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1986–1987, at 184, para. 48, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.71 Doc.
9 rev. 1 (1987) (finding petition admissible after complaint filed on behalf of “unnamed,
unnumbered residents, both living and dead, of the Richmon Hill Insane Asylum Grenada, West
Indies” was corrected by provision of list of 22 named persons who were killed or injured); Inter-
Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 5/97, Case 11.227, José Bernardo Díaz et. al (Colom.), in IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 47, at 99, 109, para. 42 (finding list of victims presented by
petitioners adequate to satisfy the technical requirements of article 32(b)).
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incomplete petitions, they must be sure that all required information, including a list
of victims’ names, can eventually be filed with the Commission. 
CLASS ACTIONS
Petitions may be brought on behalf of an entire class of similarly
situated persons where all have suffered the same pattern of
conduct, and facts are alleged to characterize the violations
suffered by each as part of a presumed scheme or practice or
common application of legal norms .154
Class members should, however, be individually named to the
extent possible.
VII. Requests for Interpretation
Where the parties disagree as to the meaning or scope of the Court’s final judgment,
any party may file a request for interpretation with the Court’s Secretariat, provided
the request is made within ninety days of the date of notification of the judgment.155
The request must state with precision the issues of meaning or scope for which the
interpretation is requested.156 In this regard, the request must be more than a mere
contention of non-performance; it must involve defining the text or specifying the
scope, meaning or purpose of the judgment.157
VIII. Advisory Opinions
The Court possesses advisory powers in addition to its contentious function. Any
OAS member state or OAS organ may request an advisory opinion from the Court
154 See Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 5/97, Case 11.227, José Bernardo Díaz et. al (Colom.), in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 47, at 99, 109, para. 42 (permitting joinder of claims in
a single case where petitioners presented facts to characterize the violations suffered by several
hundred victims as part of a presumed scheme or practice of political persecution against members
of a leftist political party).
155 American Convention, art. 67; Court Rules of Procedure, supra note 10, art. 58. 
156 Id.
157 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Interpretation of the Compensatory Damages
Judgment, Judgment of Aug. 17, 1990 (Ser. C) No. 9, para. 26; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz
Case, Interpretation of the Compensatory Damages Judgment, Judgment of Aug. 17, 1990 (Ser. C)
No. 10, para. 26.
regarding the interpretation of the Convention, other treaties concerning the
protection of human rights in the American states, or the compatibility of any
domestic laws (or draft legislation158) with the aforesaid international instruments.159
As the Court has recognized, “the purpose of its advisory jurisdiction is to ‘assist
states and organs to comply with and to apply human rights treaties without
subjecting them to the formalism and the sanctions associated with the contentious
judicial process.’”160 The Court’s advisory jurisdiction is thus “an alternative judicial
method” for the protection of internationally recognized human rights.161 It results in
authoritative statements of the law that, although arising from abstract questions
rather than concrete cases, bind the future conduct of States Parties and OAS organs
alike. 
Requests for advisory opinions must meet the formal prerequisites of article 59 of the
Court’s Rules of Procedure. They must “state the specific questions with precision,
identify the provisions to be interpreted, indicate the considerations giving rise to the
request, and furnish the name and address of the Agent.”162 Where the advisory
opinion is sought by an OAS organ other than the Commission, the request must also
specify how the question relates to the organ’s sphere of competence.163 The Court’s
advisory jurisdiction is, however, “permissive in character”: The court retains
discretion to reject any request for an advisory opinion notwithstanding satisfaction
of the above conditions.164
158 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of
the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of Jan. 19, 1984 (Ser. A) No. 4, para.
26.
159 American Convention, art. 64. 
160 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Compatibility of Draft Legislation with Article 8(2)(h) of the American
Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-12/91 of Dec. 6, 1991 (Ser. A) No.12, para.
20; see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the
Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of Jan. 19, 1984 (Ser. A) No. 4, para. 19
(same); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-3/83 of Sept. 8, 1983 (Ser. A) No. 3, para.
43 (same).
161 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25, and 8 of the
American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of Oct. 6, 1987 (Ser. A) No.
9, para. 16; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Restrictions to the Death Penalty, Advisory Opinion OC-3/83 of
Sept. 8, 1983 (Ser. A) No. 3, para. 43.
162 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Certain Attributes of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (Arts.
41, 42, 44, 46, 47, 50 and 51 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion
OC-13/93 of July 16, 1993 (Ser. A) No.13, para. 14; Court Rules of Procedure, supra note 10, art.
59.
163 Court Rules of Procedure, supra note 10, art. 59(3). 
164 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Certain Attributes of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
Advisory Opinion OC-13/93 of July 16, 1993 (Ser. A) No.13, para. 15; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., “Other
Treaties” Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 of the American Convention
on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-1/82 of Sept. 24, 1982 (Ser. A) No.1, para. 28.
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The Court will exercise its advisory jurisdiction only where the request serves the
purposes of the Convention. That is, where it “assist[s] the American States in
fulfilling their international human rights obligations and . . . assist[s] the different
organs of the inter-American system to carry out the functions assigned to them in this
field.”165 The Court has expressly recognized two situations in which it will not
exercise its advisory jurisdiction: (1) where the request “is likely to undermine the
Court’s contentious jurisdiction;”166 and (2) where the request involves a matter “of
purely academic speculation, without a foreseeable application to concrete situations
justifying the need for an advisory opinion.”167
The Court vigorously guards the boundary between its contentious and advisory
jurisdictions, a boundary it considers essential for the protection of victims’ rights
under the Convention.  It will thus scrutinize advisory opinion requests—particularly
from State Parties against whom related cases are pending—to ensure that the
requests are not merely an attempt to “produce, under the guise of an advisory
opinion, a determination of contentious matters not yet referred to the Court.”168 Such
requests threaten to distort the Convention system by denying victims the opportunity
to participate in contentious proceedings, where matters can be discussed and
confronted in a much more direct way than in advisory proceedings.169 As the Court
has recognized, “Whereas the interests of individuals in contentious proceedings are
represented by the Commission, the latter may have different interests to uphold in
advisory proceedings.”170 In such cases, the Court will “invoke its power to refuse to
render an advisory opinion, lest it risk undermining the contentious jurisdiction in a
165 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., “Other Treaties” Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court,
Advisory Opinion OC-1/82 of Sept. 24, 1982 (Ser. A) No.1, para. 25; see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
Certain Attributes of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-
13/93 of July 16, 1993 (Ser. A) No.13, para. 15 (same). 
166 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Certain Attributes of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
Advisory Opinion OC-13/93 of July 16, 1993 (Ser. A) No.13, para. 15; see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
“Other Treaties” Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court, Advisory Opinion OC-1/82
of Sept. 24, 1982 (Ser. A) No.1, para. 31 (same); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Compatibility of Draft
Legislation with Article 8(2)(h) of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion
OC-12/91 of Dec. 6, 1991 (Ser. A) No.12, para. 30 (same). 
167 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency, Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of
Oct. 6, 1987 (Ser. A) No. 9, para. 16; see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Certain Attributes of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-13/93 of July 16, 1993 (Ser. A)
No.13, para. 17 (same). 
168 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Certain Attributes of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
Advisory Opinion OC-13/93 of July 16, 1993 (Ser. A) No.13, para. 18 (finding request admissible);
see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Compatibility of Draft Legislation with Article 8(2)(h) of the American
Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-12/91 of Dec. 6, 1991 (Ser. A) No.12, para.
28 (finding request inadmissible). 
169 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Compatibility of Draft Legislation with Article 8(2)(h) of the American
Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-12/91 of Dec. 6, 1991 (Ser. A) No.12, para.
28.
170 Id.
manner that might impair the human rights of the claimants in the cases pending
before the Commission.”171
The Court will also decline to exercise its advisory powers where the request “does
not refer, specifically or concretely, to any particular fact situation” or involves a
juridical question “of purely academic speculation, without a foreseeable application
to concrete situations justifying the need for an advisory opinion.”172 By contrast, the
Court will tend to render an opinion where the request relates to “a specific juridical,
historical and political context” that emerges as a critical problem in the Americas
(e.g., states of exception or emergency, essential judicial guarantees, etc.)173 or where
the request for an advisory opinion cites concrete cases in which the Commission has
applied the standards in question.174 In such cases, the Court recognizes that its
opinion “could be useful within a reality in which the basic principles of the system
have often been questioned.”175
WHAT A REQUEST FOR AN
ADVISORY OPINION MUST CONTAIN176
Interpretation of the Convention—requests shall indicate: 
• precisely the specific questions on which the opinion of the
Court is being sought;
• provisions to be interpreted;
• considerations giving rise to the request; 
• names and addresses of the Agent or Delegates; and
• how request relates to organ’s sphere of competence (if OAS
organ other than Commission is making the request).
Interpretation of Other Treaties—requests shall indicate: 
• name of, and parties to, the treaty;
• specific questions on which the opinion of the Court is being
sought;
• considerations giving rise to the request; and
• how request relates to organ’s sphere of competence (if OAS
organ other than Commission is making the request).
171 Id. para. 30. 
172 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency, Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of
Oct. 6, 1987 (Ser. A) No. 9, para. 16.
173 Id. para. 17.
174 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Certain Attributes of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
Advisory Opinion OC-13/93 of July 16, 1993 (Ser. A) No.13, para. 17.
175 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency, Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of
Oct. 6, 1987 (Ser. A) No. 9, para. 17.
176 See Court Rules of Procedure, supra note 10, arts. 59–61.
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Interpretation of Domestic Laws (by OAS member state only)—
requests shall indicate:
• provisions of domestic law and the Convention or other treaties
concerning the protection of human right to which the request
relates (copies of the domestic laws referred to in the question
must accompany the application);
• specific questions on which the opinion of the Court is being
sought; and
• name and address of the applicant’s Agent.
While individuals and NGOs cannot request advisory opinions directly from the
Court on ESCR-related questions, they can play a critical role by lobbying the
Commission or other OAS organ to make such a request. The Court has itself
expressed, in the context of its advisory jurisdiction, that “it may have an important
role to play in the promotion and protection of economic, social and cultural
rights.”177 ESCR advocates should take advantage of the Court’s willingness to
consider ESCR questions. They can do this by framing the relevant questions for the
Court’s consideration, preparing background material and amicus briefs, and working
closely with the Commission and other OAS organs to ensure that the requests
ultimately submitted meet the Court’s standards for acceptance.
177 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 1986, at 44–45, para. 14,
OEA/Ser.L/III.15 Doc. 13 (1986) (emphasis added).
Cont...
Under Velásquez Rodríguez, a “complex violation”
of the Convention is a practice that:
1. “must be understood and confronted in an integral fashion”
(¶150);
2. has led to “general censure and repudiation of the practice” in
the international community (demonstrated through statements
and resolutions of international bodies, commissions, sub-
commissions, special rapporteurs, special envoys, etc.) (¶151);
3. “is a multiple and continuous violation of many rights under the
Convention that the States Parties are obligated to respect and
guarantee” (¶155);
4. “constitutes a radical breach of the treaty in that it shows a crass
abandonment of the values which emanate from the concept of
human dignity and of the most basic principles of the inter-
American system and the Convention” (¶158); and
5. “evinces a disregard of the duty to organize the State in such a
manner as to guarantee the rights recognized in the
Convention.” (¶158)
Many ESCR violations directly implicate a wide variety of enumerated Convention
rights, while not being expressly enumerated themselves. The Commission has
recognized, for example, that obstructed access to basic subsistence goods by the
most vulnerable members of society directly implicates the Convention rights to non-
discrimination and equal opportunity (arts. 1, 24), to life (art. 4), to personal security
(art. 7), and to participate in the political and economic processes (art. 23).4
It is important to emphasize, however, that the “complex violation” approach will not
be successful with most ESCR violations, even those implicating a number of
Convention rights. Rather, it should be reserved for those violations that have been
internationally repudiated as distinct, identifiable state policies or practices .
Examples might include the practice of “forced evictions and mass displacements,”
4 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1993, at 522–23,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.85 Doc. 9 rev. (1994) (“When the most vulnerable members of society are denied
access to the basic needs for survival . . . , it results in the right to be free from discrimination; the
right to the consequent principles of equality of access [art. 1 & 24], equity and distribution; and
the general commitment to protect the vulnerable elements in society [art. 1] being willingly or
complicity contravened. Moreover, without satisfaction of these basic needs, an individual’s
survival is directly threatened. This obviously diminishes the individual’s rights to life [art. 4],
personal security [art. 7], and . . . the right to participate in the political and economic processes
[art. 23].”).
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the institution of debt bondage, the practice of exploiting child labor, or the state
practice of destroying communities’ food and/or water supplies in times of civil
conflict.  Each of these violations has been the subject of extensive international
repudiation and implicates several provisions of the American Convention. 
It must also be emphasized that the “complex violation” approach should always be
argued in addition to discussing how each applicable Convention right is violated by
a given State practice. In Velásquez Rodríguez, for example, the Commission
submitted independent evidence to prove that the forced disappearance of the victim
violated articles 4, 5, and 7. Likewise, petitioners pursuing the “complex violation”
approach must show injury in fact, causation, imputability to the State, and breach of
an international obligation with respect to every alleged violation of the Convention
that stems from the challenged policy or practice. 
The “complex violation” approach is thus not a “separate” approach; it must be used
in conjunction with the indirect, integration, and article 26 approaches. Nor does it
make it “easier” to prove a case, at least initially. It is, however, an important
supplementary strategy for enhancing the quality of ESCR precedents in the inter-
American system, serving to effectively inscribe prohibitions on egregious ESCR
abuses into the Convention. This not only sends a strong statement to the region that
certain ESCR abuses are per se incompatible with the Convention, but also helps to
overcome the historic presumption that the Convention is a civil and political rights
document. Use of the strategy should help pave the way for future petitions as well as
for more vigorous ESCR enforcement at the domestic level. 
ESCR STRATEGY
A supplementary strategy for arguing ESCR cases in the inter-
American system involves the concept of “complex violations.” This
concept has been used effectively by the Court to declare that a
specific State-tolerated policy or practice constitutes a “radical
treaty breach” even though the policy is not specifically enumerated
in the Convention’s text. The key is that the policy be pervasive and
internationally repudiated, that it implicate several enumerated
Convention rights, and that it require an integrated, coordinated
response. 
The state-tolerated policy of “forced evictions” is an excellent candidate for the
“complex violation” approach.  While the concept of “forced eviction” and “forced
displacement” of persons from their homes and lands is not currently articulated in
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the American Convention, nor in any other treaty in force applicable to the States
Parties to the Convention, ESCR advocates may use the Velásquez Rodríguez
precedent to urge the Commission and Court to declare this practice to be a “complex
violation” of the Convention and, as such, per se prohibited by it. Each of the five
Velásquez criteria are met: forced evictions (1) constitute “multiple and continuous
violation of many rights under the Convention”; (2) “must be understood and
confronted in an integral fashion”; (3) have been the subject of “general censure and
repudiation” in the international community; (4) show “a crass abandonment of the
values which emanate from the concept of human dignity and of the most basic
principles of the Inter-American system and the Convention;” and (5) evince “a
disregard of the duty to organize the State in such a manner as to guarantee the rights
recognized in the Convention.”
WHAT ARE FORCED EVICTIONS?
“The practice of forced evictions involves the involuntary removal of
persons from their homes or land, directly or indirectly attributable
to the State. It entails the effective elimination of the possibility of
an individual or group living in a particular house, residence or
place, and the assisted (in the case of resettlement) or unassisted
(without resettlement) movement of evicted persons or groups to
other areas.
“The causes of forced evictions are very diverse. The practice can
be carried out in connection with development and infrastructure
projects, in particular dams and other energy projects, land
acquisition or expropriation, housing or land reclamation measures,
prestigious international events (Olympic games, World Fairs, etc.),
unrestrained land or housing speculation, housing renovation,
urban redevelopment or city beautification initiatives, and mass
relocation or resettlement programmes.”5
Forced evictions and displacements constitute a “multiple and continuous violation of
many rights under the Convention.” The U.N. Human Rights Commission has
affirmed that, “by its very nature, displacement is a disruptive and painful process…
creat[ing] a high risk of impoverishment” in terms of “landlessness, joblessness,
5 U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, F o rced Evictions and Human Rights: Fact Sheet No. 25, May 1996, at 6.
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homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, morbidity and social disarticulation.”6
Forced evictions implicate a long list of rights under the Convention—including
articles 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 11, 17, 21, 22, 25, and 26, all in conjunction with articles 1 and 2. 
The practice of illegal forced evictions may violate articles 4, 5, and 7. Direct
governmental killings, beatings, harassment, and arrests of community leaders
opposing forced evictions are commonplace, violating the rights to life, personal
integrity, and personal security. The right to personal security, protected under article
7, is particularly at risk. Indeed, this right means little in practical terms when
individuals and their families are forcibly evicted from their homes with violence,
bulldozers and intimidation or when they are threatened with such eviction. The U.N.
Human Rights Commission has observed: 
Evicted people not only lose their homes and neighborhoods, in which
they have often invested a considerable proportion of their incomes
over the years, but are also often forced to relinquish their personal
possessions, since usually no warning is given before bulldozers or
demolition squads destroy their settlements. Evictees also lose the
often complex reciprocal relationships which provide a safety net or
survival network of protection against the costs of ill health, income
decline or the loss of a job, and which allow many tasks to be shared.
They often lose one or more sources of livelihood as they are forced to
move away from the area where they had jobs or sources of income.7
All of these consequences directly implicate the right to personal security under
article 7. 
Forced evictions also directly breach the right to inviolability of the home (art. 11)
and to freely choose one’s place of residence (art. 22). The right to property, protected
under article 21, is likewise implicated, particularly where forced evictions are
6 Id. The U.N. Commission explained:
The human costs of forced evictions are indeed substantial and can involve a
wide range of additional negative impacts on the lives and livelihood of those
affected, including homelessness and the growth of new slums; physical,
psychological and emotional trauma; insecurity for the future; medical hardship
and the onset of disease; substantially higher transportation costs; loss of
livelihood and traditional lands; worsened housing conditions; physical injury or
death resulting from arbitrary violence; the removal of children from school;
arrest or imprisonment of those opposing an eviction; loss of faith by victims in
the legal and political system; reduction of low-income housing stock; racial
segregation; loss of culturally significant sites; the confiscation of personal goods
and property; substantially higher housing costs; absence of choice of alternative
accommodation; criminalizing self-help housing options; increased social
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accompanied by destruction of the home and other personal property. Article 3, too,
is implicated where forced evictions deprive evictees of a legal address and essential
identity papers that are closely associated with legal personality. Without such legal
identification, displaced persons may be effectively excluded from the institutional
protection of the State.  The right to family life (art. 17) may also be infringed when
families and communities are torn apart by eviction. At the same time, due process
demands that a court order be secured and that evictees be granted the opportunity to
be heard in pre-eviction proceedings. Where this does not occur, an article 8 violation
may be alleged. Similarly, where judicial remedies for illegal forced evictions are not
available, a State may violate article 25. 
Finally, where the State fails to take adequate measures of protection, illegal forced
evictions directly implicate the rights protected under article 26, including those to
progressive achievement of adequate housing, education, work, and health. For
example, unless alternative housing resources are made available, the practice of
illegal forced evictions violates the right to adequate housing. The right to education
is likewise sacrificed when children are unable to attend school due to a forced
eviction, and the right to work is breached when evictees lose their source of
employment as a result of a state-sponsored act. When psychological and physical
health are damaged by the constant threat of eviction, moreover, issues of the right to
health are raised.
Given the breadth of its negative impact, the practice of illegal forced evictions, like
the problem of forced disappearance, “must be understood and confronted in an
integral fashion.”
A global consensus on the unacceptability of illegal forced evictions is, moreover,
increasingly emergent. In Velásquez Rodríguez, the Court demonstrated the “general
censure and repudiation” of the practice of forced disappearance in the international
community by referring to the establishment of a U.N. Working Group on the issue;
multiple resolutions of the U.N. and OAS General Assemblies, commissions, and
subcommissions; and reports of special U.N. rapporteurs, special envoys, and the
Inter-American Commission.8 A similar degree of “general censure and repudiation”
is emerging regarding the practice of forced evictions. U.N. human rights bodies have
declared illegal forced evictions to be “gross violations of human rights” and have
called upon Governments to eradicate them.9 A U.N. special rapporteur on the topic
has observed: “[T]he issue of forced removals and forced evictions has in recent years
reached the international human rights agenda because it is considered a practice that
does grave and disastrous harm to the basic civil, political, economic, social and
8 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No 4, paras.
151–53.
9 See, e.g., U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, Forced Evictions and Human Rights: Fact Sheet No. 25, May
1996, at 7.
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cultural rights of large numbers of people , both individual persons and
collectivities.”10 At the same time, the U.N. Committee on ESCR has affirmed that
“instances of forced eviction are prima facie incompatible with the requirements of
the [ICESCR].”11
Finally, as “forced evictions can always be attributed directly to specific decisions,
legislation or policies of States or to the failure of States to intervene to halt forced
evictions by third parties,”12 the continuing practice of illegal forced evictions
“evinces a disregard of the duty to organize the State in such a manner as to guarantee
the rights recognized in the Convention.” Indeed, as the U.N. Human Rights
Commission has affirmed: “State responsibility for most forms of involuntary
movement of people is virtually always evident. In cases of forced eviction,
Governments are often actively involved in the actual movement of people from their
homes.”13
The complex violations approach has never been used in the ESCR context. If it is to
be used, institutions and practices such as forced eviction and displacement of
persons, debt bondage, and child labor exploitation will likely be the issues with the
greatest chance of success under this strategy. Petitioners should remember, however,
that the approach does not exempt them from proving each of the underlying
Convention violations individually, e.g., using the indirect, integration, and article 26
approaches. Injury in fact, causation, imputability, and breach of an international
obligation must be shown for every constituent violation.
Practice Tip
1. “Complex violation” approach should be reserved for those few
sets of practices that have been internationally repudiated as
distinct, identifiable state policies or practices. 
2. Petitioners must separately prove injury in fact, causation,
imputability, and breach of an international obligation for each of
the protected Convention rights implicated by the challenged
state policy or practice.
10 E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8, para. 21 (emphasis added).
11 E/1992/23, annex III.
12 U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm’n, F o rced Evictions and Human Rights: Fact Sheet No. 25, May 1996, at 7.
13 Id.
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Instructions: The following petition form has been prepared [by the Commission] to
facilitate the work of human rights organizations and others in assisting alleged
victims and their family members in the presentation of petitions to the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights.
Please read the instructions and this form carefully before proceeding. It is very
important that as much factual detail be supplied as possible. Of course, in cases of
emergency, where the alleged victim’s life or health might be in danger, do not
hesitate to file the petition even if certain non-essential information may be lacking.
Petitions may be filed either by mail or facsimile. Incomplete petitions may be
supplemented at a later time. In the event that particular information is simply not
available or does not exist, write “not applicable” or “none” as appropriate.
Petitions may only be brought against member states of the Organization of American






Marital Status:............................Identification Document No........................................
A . .
. . . . . . . . .
Telephone Number: .......................................................................................................
Number of Children:.......................................................................................................
State accused of alleged violation(s)..............................................................................
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1 A copy of this form may be filled out electronically at  <http://www.oas.org/cidh/email.asp>. 
Alleged human rights violation(s). Explain what happened in as much detail as























Names and titles of the persons (authorities) who allegedly committed the
violation(s): 
. . . . . . . . .
Witnesses to the alleged violation(s):.............................................................................
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
Addresses and telephone numbers of witnesses:............................................................
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
Documents/evidence (for example, letters, legal documents, photos, autopsies, tape
recordings, etc.):
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
Domestic legal remedies pursued (e.g., copies of writs of habeas corpus or amparo,
motions for injunctive relief, etc.): 
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
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Domestic legal remedies yet to be pursued:....................................................................
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .








Legal representative, if there is one:.............................................................................
. . . . . . . . .





Attach power of attorney designating legal representative: 
S .
D . . . .
403





Ambassador Santiago A. Canton
Executive Secretary
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
1889 F St., N.W.
Washington, D.C.
USA 20006
REF: complaint regarding labor and other
human rights abuses committed against Maria
Elena Gonzalez and others
Esteemed Ambassador Canton: 
The Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) and the Allard K. Lowenstein
International Human Rights Law Clinic at the Yale Law School, in conjunction with
the National Human Rights Commission of Abusia, present a petition to the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights (hereinafter “Commission”) against the
State of Abusia in accordance with articles 41(f), 44 to 51, and 77 of the American
Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter “Convention”) and article 19(6) of the
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Matter of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereinafter “Protocol”).
The State of Abusia is responsible for numerous violations of the Convention and
Protocol in relation to the conditions of work at the Maquiladora XX and the
summary dismissal of sixteen female workers for union-related activities and other
legitimate exercises of protected rights. The State of Abusia has violated the
following rights guaranteed by the Convention with respect to Maria Elena Gonzalez,
Alicia Tompkin, Greta Johnson, Claudia Sanchéz, Tomasa Franks, Catalina Gómez,
Juliana Rogers, April Menéndez, Marcía Tujoc, Lucía Malena Sanchéz, Cathy Vargas,
Elena Aj, Tomasa Pérez, Juana Estrada, Josefina Calel Saquic, Dolores Samayoa, and
their coworkers at Maquiladora XX: right to humane treatment (art. 5), freedom from
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involuntary servitude (art. 6), right to personal liberty (art. 7), right to a fair trial (art.
8), right to privacy (art. 11), freedom of expression (art. 13), right to assembly (art.
15), freedom of association (art. 16), rights of the child (art. 19), right to property (art.
21), right to equal protection (art. 24), and right to judicial protection (art. 25). The
State has also violated many of the “rights implicit in the economic, social . . . and
cultural standards set forth in the [OAS Charter],” including those to education,
unionization, fair wages, and satisfactory labor conditions (art. 26). The State,
moreover, has violated its general obligations to respect and ensure the above rights
(art. 1.1) and to adopt legislation to give them domestic effect (art. 2). In addition, the
State has violated the rights to unionization (art. 8(1)(a)) and to education (art. 13)
guaranteed by the Protocol.
I. INTRODUCTION
This petition aims to demonstrate how the State of Abusia (hereinafter “State”) has
violated the rights of female workers in the Maquiladora XX by failing to protect
them from systematic human rights abuses by their private employer. Such abuses
include continuous exposure to dangerous work conditions that affect physical and
mental health; severe violations of minimum wage, maximum hour, and overtime
laws; unlawful use of child labor; forced use of contraception; employment retaliation
for attempts to unionize; restrictions on expression and association; and deprivation
of liberty. Although petitioners filed complaints with officials at the local and national
offices of the Government’s Ministry of Labor, the Government took no steps to
remedy the abusive conditions. 
Labor inspectors from the Ministry of Labor visited Maquiladora XX on three
separate occasions from 1996 to 1998. In each instance, they reported full compliance
with state labor laws, declining to fine or sanction the owners of Maquiladora XX for
obvious violations of the Labor Code. These violations have been documented by
current and former workers at the factory in dozens of affidavits filed along with this
petition as well as on a videotape smuggled out of the factory on two occasions.  By
certifying that the labor conditions and practices in Maquiladora XX complied with
state labor standards, in the face of clear evidence that they did not, the State
acquiesced in the systematic violation of the workers’ basic human rights and, as




A. The Maquiladora 
Maquiladora XX began operations in San Ramón, an impoverished district of Abusia,
on February 1, 1996. The factory manufactures designer apparel for export to
international retail corporations under short-term contracts. In early 1996, the factory
began recruiting workers by placing advertisements in and around the local schools,
markets, and churches seeking young female workers with sewing skills. All of the
workers eventually hired were unmarried, between the ages of 12 and 24, and
childless. They were asked to recruit female relatives with similar characteristics.
They had no written employment contract. Most were unaware they had rights under
the national Labor Code.
The work at Maquiladora XX entailed sewing the sleeves, collars, and buttons onto
pre-cut shirt pieces. The workers were paid at a flat rate of U.S.$.10 per completed
shirt. Under the piece-rate system, the average wage in the factory was $2.10 per
hour, i.e., almost half the national minimum wage of $4.05 per hour.1 Although the
Labor Code legally limits the maximum regular work day to eight hours (six hours
for children ages 14 to 16), the workers labored an average of twelve hours per day,
six days per week, at their regular rate of compensation. These already-excessive
hours were further extended when contract deadlines approached, at which time
workers were often locked inside the factory overnight to ensure next-day orders were
filled. National law requires double compensation for overtime work and time-and-a-
half compensation for all work on Sundays. Nevertheless, no overtime compensation
was ever paid at Maquiladora XX. Workers received no paid vacation nor paid
holidays, as required under the Labor Code. Minimum hour laws for minors were not
enforced, although approximately twenty percent of the workers were under age 16. 
Managers enforced long hours with strict controls on the workers’ movements,
continuous surveillance, and constant threats of wage deductions and dismissal. The
managers prohibited the workers from talking to one another or even looking up from
their machines. The workers could not stand or stretch, go to lunch, use the locked
bathroom, or depart at night without express permission from a factory manager. Such
permission was granted only upon completion of a worker’s mid-day or end-day
stitching quota. A surveillance camera monitored the women’s shop-floor activities at
all times, and one of two floor managers was constantly present. Fines, in the form of
wage deductions, were applied to any woman who spoke to a co-worker during non-
1 National labor law allows employers to pay by piece, provided the salary for an eight-hour day
remains above the national minimum wage. See Labor Code of Abusia, art. 85 (“Where salary is
calculated by piece, the remuneration to be paid for a typical eight-hour work day shall not be less
than the minimum wage.”). 
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break work hours or who broke other factory rules. Wage deductions were also
made—in violation of the Labor Code—for stitching mistakes. The floor managers
constantly shouted at the workers to work faster. They repeatedly told the women that
they were expendable, that they would be fired and replaced if they did not work
faster, and that, if they caused trouble, they would be “blacklisted” from other factory
jobs in the region. The managers carried wood batons, which they used to instill fear
in the workers by striking them against the machinery and chairs of the women as
they passed. They used offensive, misogynist language to ridicule and threaten the
workers. Some of this language was recorded by a petitioner, who carried a miniature
recording device on two occasions.  A transcript and copies of the original tapes are
attached.2
The labor conditions in the factory building were dangerous and harmful to the
workers’ physical and mental health. Many women suffered heat stroke in the
confined and crowded factory, in which the temperatures often exceeded 30o C. The
factory had no heating or cooling system, and the windows were permanently locked.
With little ventilation, heavy concentrations of synthetic fiber filled the air, often
making breathing difficult. Diagnosed health problems included bronchial asthma,
temporary blindness, dizzy spells, sore joints, repetitive stress injuries, swollen feet,
headaches, and chronic neck, back, and shoulder pains. These afflictions were caused
largely by the severe restrictions on the workers’movements over prolonged periods
and the repetitive nature of their stitching tasks. The long and uninterrupted hours
operating the antiquated machinery also made the workers more prone to accidents.
Workers commonly suffered anxiety, stress, and depression, caused by their social
isolation, the constant surveillance and harassment to which they were subjected, and
their powerlessness to ask for changes or time off for personal illness or family
emergencies. 
In January 1997, petitioners Claudia Sánchez and Tomasa Franks suffered debilitating
back and neck injuries on the job; they were confined to bed for seven and ten days,
respectively. They were summarily fired two days later when the factory received a
doctor’s report of their condition. Articles 396–99 of the Labor Code prohibit
employers from firing workers for job-related injuries or sickness. Likewise, Articles
495–97 require employers to remunerate workers at their regular rate of pay (not to
fall below the minimum wage) during all absences caused by job-related injuries.
Sánchez and Franks were not only summarily discharged for being injured on the job;
they were denied pay during their incapacitation and denied their last paycheck for
work performed before their incapacitation. The Labor Ministry was made aware of
these illegal actions by petitioners’ representatives, but did nothing to intervene on
behalf of the workers. 
The factory also controlled the family-planning activities of the workers. The factory
managers made clear that pregnancies would not be tolerated. As a condition of work,
2 See Appendix 1. 
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all female employees were required to take oral contraceptives or undergo a factory-
sponsored sterilization procedure. Workers were given a contraceptive pill and small
cup of water upon checking in at the beginning of each shift. A factory floor manager
watched them swallow the pill. Catalina Gómez, a 23-year-old native of San Ramón,
worked at Maquiladora XX from June 3, 1996, to December 27, 1997. She took the
factory-issued contraceptives for sixteen months, until she married in September
1997. She was summarily fired three months later when her pregnancy became
apparent. She never received her last month’s pay check or the accumulated leave to
which she is entitled under the Labor Code. The Labor Ministry was informed of
Gómez’s illegal termination.
In June 1998, María Elena Gónzalez, another factory worker, was approached by a
union organizer, who informed her of the benefits of unionization and offered
assistance in organizing the workers at Maquiladora XX. Gónzalez agreed to invite
several other factory workers to her home to talk about their rights under the Labor
Code. The group decided to pass out fliers to invite more women to a meeting in
which the union organizer would speak. At 8 a.m. on July 5, Gónzalez, Alicia
Tompkin, and Greta Johnson stood at the far outside corner of the factory, handing out
fliers announcing the meeting to arriving workers. Upon sighting the three women
distributing literature, one of the factory managers approached. He fired all three on
the spot. 
Ten workers nonetheless arrived at the proposed meeting the following Sunday:
Juliana Rogers, April Menéndez, Marcía Tujoc, Lucía Malena Sanchéz, Cathy Vargas,
Elena Aj, Tomasa Pérez, Juana Estrada, Josefina Calel Saquic, and Dolores Samayoa.
The union representative discussed the Labor Code, the benefits of unionization, and
the forms of recourse the workers had to abusive treatment in the factory. The
following Monday, all ten workers were terminated in a loud and abusive tirade on
the factory floor, condemning unionization and threatening workers that union
promotion would not be tolerated.  
B. Ministry of Labor
The Ministry of Labor is responsible for certifying that the labor conditions in newly
opened factories comply with the Labor Code and related regulations, for regularly
monitoring those conditions through periodic inspections and recertification
procedures, and for responding to complaints of labor abuses with extraordinary
inspections. The Ministry of Labor certified Maquiladora XX in March 1996. Official
labor inspectors returned to conduct annual inspections in March of 1997 and 1998,
extending labor certification on both occasions. Mysteriously, on all three occasions,
the State labor inspectors found no violations of the Labor Code. The labor inspectors
in 1997 and 1998, respectively, were Maxwell Campbell and Luis Bengochoa.
Evidence suggests that they accepted money from the managers of Maquiladora XX
in exchange for favorable labor reports and Labor Ministry certification. 
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In June 1996, a religious-based NGO working in San Ramón sent a report to the
Ministry of Labor documenting numerous abuses in Maquiladora XX, including the
forced contraception policy, violations of the Labor Code’s maximum hour and
minimum wage provisions, use of surveillance cameras, and heavy reliance on child
labor. It requested a prompt investigation.3 The Ministry of Labor failed to respond. 
In February 1998, the National Human Rights Commission of Abusia, after being
contacted by friends and relatives of several fired workers, including Gómez,
Sánchez, and Franks, filed another informative complaint with the Labor Ministry.4
The complaint again detailed the Labor Code violations committed by Maquiladora
XX and asked for a prompt investigation and the swift imposition of sanctions to
protect the human rights of the approximately 100 workers employed at the factory,
many of them below the age of 16. The complaint provided the names of seven former
workers and two current workers who were willing to talk to labor inspectors,
although the latter requested anonymity. The Ministry responded to the complaint
with a letter stating that a regular inspection was scheduled for March 12, 1998, upon
which date the complaint’s allegations would be fully investigated. 
On March 12, Luis Bengochoa arrived at Maquiladora XX at approximately 10:15
a.m. He quickly circled the factory floor, then entered the office of the managers
behind closed doors. He emerged half-an-hour later, shook the managers’ hands, and
promptly left. He did not interview any of the current workers, did not contact any of
the former workers listed in the February complaint, and never contacted the Human
Rights Commission. The resulting report, appended here, found no violations of the
Labor Code at Maquiladora XX.5
III. EXHAUSTION OF DOMESTIC REMEDIES
In accordance with article 46(1)(a) of the Convention, petitioners have pursued and
exhausted all available domestic remedies. Under the jurisdictional law of Abusia,
alleged Labor Code violations must initially be brought in administrative proceedings
before an administrative law judge (hereinafter “ALJ”) of the Ministry of Labor. If
the ALJ determines there has been a violation of the Labor Code, employer sanctions
and employee reparation may be ordered. If not, the case is dismissed. Adverse
decisions by the Ministry of Labor may be directly appealed to the Court of Appeals,
from which appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court. 
3 See Appendix 2. 
4 See Appendix 3. 
5 See Appendix 4. 
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On July 7, 1998, the Human Rights Commission filed a contentious complaint with
the Ministry of Labor on behalf of Gónzalez, Tompkin, Johnson, Sanchéz, Franks,
Gómez, Rogers, Menéndez, Tujoc, L.M. Sanchéz, Vargas, Aj, Pérez, Estrada, Calel
Saquic, Samayoa, and their coworkers—past and present—at Maquiladora XX.6 The
complaint alleged multiple violations of the Labor Code, including, among others,
failure to pay the minimum wage and overtime compensation (arts. 47–53),
employment of child labor (arts. 73–83), exposure to dangerous irritants in the air
(arts. 304, 323), retaliation for union organizing (arts. 124–27), failure to provide
special conditions during pregnancy (arts. 89–93), and abusive harassment (arts. 207-
–08). As reparation, the complaint sought an immediate injunction against all
violations of the Labor Code, the imposition of sanctions for Labor Code breaches,
reinstatement of unlawfully dismissed workers, and compensation for all regular and
overtime wages unlawfully withheld from current and past employees. 
On July 13, 1998, three days after receiving notice of the complaint, Maquiladora XX
summarily fired all of its employees, closed its doors, and filed its articles of
dissolution, thus terminating its status as a corporate entity. A “new” corporation,
registered as “Millennium,” replaced it five days later. The former employees were
rehired and work resumed under the same conditions. Lawyers for the former
Maquiladora XX then filed a defensive motion with the ALJ urging dismissal either
for lack of jurisdiction or because the controversy was moot since the defendant party
no longer had legal personality in the State of Abusia. The ALJ agreed and dismissed
the petition on January 15, 1999, for lack of jurisdiction.7
The Human Rights Commission, on behalf of the named parties, appealed to the
Second Instance of the Court of Appeals, arguing that jurisdiction existed because
Maquiladora XX and Millennium were factually the same corporation: the
shareholders, corporate directors, managers, and contract partners were identical, and
the abusive conditions of work, including egregious violations of the Labor Code,
remained unchanged. The Commission argued that the court should not permit
foreign-owned corporations to flout the State’s labor laws, then circumvent
accountability simply by reincorporating under a different name when their unlawful
conduct is challenged. Lawyers for Millennium intervened as an interested party.
They argued that the two corporations were legally and factually distinct and, as a
matter of policy, a decision to the contrary would create a strong disincentive for
desperately needed foreign investment in Abusia, particularly in employment-
generating business enterprises. If new employers could be held legally liable for the
abuses of those who preceded them, few would agree to take over risky, poorly
managed businesses and the ailing economy would lose major sources of
employment.  
6 See Appendix 5. 
7 See Appendix 6. 
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The Court of Appeals agreed with Millennium. On February 27, 2000, it issued an
opinion affirming the dismissal on jurisdictional grounds.8 Following a prolonged
discussion on the state’s incorporation procedure, it stated that, if petitioner believes
violations of the Labor Code persist in Millennium, it can always file a new petition
with the Ministry of Labor.
The decision was appealed to the Supreme Court, which summarily affirmed on May
6, 2000.9
Petitioners have exhausted all available remedies under domestic law; they pursued
their claims to the highest level of appeal in the internal jurisdiction. In accordance
with Convention article 46(1)(a), their claims are thus ripe for review by the Inter-
American Commission. This petition was lodged with the Commission on September
3, 2000, within six months from the date on which petitioners were notified of the
final judgment.
Although petitioners do have the formal option of filing a new complaint with the
Labor Ministry against Millennium for violations of the Labor Code as of July 18,
1998, such a course is not required by generally recognized principles of international
law. Indeed, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“Court”) has recognized that
the rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies does not extend to all remedies, but
only to those that are “adequate” and “effective”—that is, those that are “suitable to
address an infringement of a legal right” and “capable of producing the result for
which it was designed.”10 “[W]hen it is shown that remedies are denied for trivial
reasons or without an examination of the merits . . . resort to those remedies becomes
a senseless formality. The exceptions of article 46(2) would be fully applicable in
those situations and would discharge the obligation to exhaust internal remedies since
they cannot fulfill their objective in that case.”11
8 See Appendix 7. 
9 See Appendix 8.
10 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No.4, paras.
63–64, 66; see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of Jan. 20, 1989 (Ser. C)
No.5, paras. 66–67, 69; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Judgment of
Mar. 15, 1989 (Ser. C) No.6, paras. 87–88, 91; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Caballero Delgado and
Santana, Preliminary Objections, Judgment of Jan. 21, 1994 (Ser. C) No.17, para. 63; see also
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Internal Remedies (Art. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and
46(2)(b) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 of Aug. 10, 1990
(Ser. A) No.11, para. 36. 
11 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No.4, para. 68;
see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of Jan. 20, 1989 (Ser. C) No.5, para.
71; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Judgment of Mar. 15, 1989 (Ser. C)
No.6, para. 93; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Internal Remedies (Art. 46(1),
46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 of
Aug. 10, 1990 (Ser. A) No.11, para. 34. 
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Filing a new claim against Millennium would be a “senseless formality” for two
reasons. First, because Millennium did not unlawfully retaliate against Gónzales,
Tompkin, Johnson, Sanchéz, Franks, Gómez, Rogers, Menéndez, Tujoc, Sanchéz,
Vargas, Aj, Pérez, Estrada, Saquic, and Samayoa, all of whom were fired before July
18, 1998, these petitioners are barred from seeking back pay and reinstatement from
Millennium. As the Court has recognized, “as a norm of international law and the
logical correlative of the obligation to exhaust internal remedies, the rule is not
applicable when there are no re m e d i e s. ”1 2 P e t i t i o n e r s ’ claims, which involve
fundamental rights under the Convention, Protocol, and domestic law, have never
been examined on the merits and, under the Supreme Court’s final ruling, are now
barred by principles of res judicata in the domestic jurisdiction.
Second, there is absolutely nothing to stop Millennium from closing shop and
reincorporating under another name should petitioners file a new complaint against
them. The effect of the Appeals Court opinion, as affirmed by the Supreme Court, is
precisely to give a legal stamp of approval to this practice. Nothing in international
law or the Convention requires victims to pursue domestic remedies that are
inexhaustible. Such pursuit would be a “senseless formality.” Petitioners in this case
have been both “denied access to the remedies under domestic law” and “prevented
from exhausting them.”13 The exceptions of article 46(2) are thus fully applicable,
discharging petitioners of their obligation to exhaust internal remedies since they
cannot fulfill their objective. 
The subject of this petition is not pending in any other international proceeding. 
IV. VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
Having satisfied all of the requirements set forth in articles 44–46 of the Convention,
including exhaustion of domestic remedies, the petition will be admissible under
article 47(b) if it states facts that tend to establish a violation of the rights guaranteed
by the Convention. The instant case presents clear evidence establishing multiple
violations of the rights protected under the Convention, each of which is discussed
below.
A. Right to Humane Treatment/Personal
Integrity (art. 5)
Article 5 of the Convention, sections (1) and (2), respectively, establish the right of
every person to respect for their “physical, mental, and moral integrity” and to be free
12 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Judgment of Mar. 15, 1989 (Ser. C)
No.6, para. 110 (emphasis added). 
13 American Convention, art. 46(2)(b). 
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from “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.” All factory workers represented in this
petition were subjected to daily violations of their rights under article 5. Such
violations were effected through the factory’s policy of forced contraception as well
as through the workers’ routine exposure to abusive treatment and inhumane
conditions at Maquiladora XX, which violated workers’“physical, mental, and moral
integrity” and constituted “inhuman” and “degrading treatment.” 
1. Physical Integrity
The right to physical integrity protects against all unauthorized bodily intrusions by
or with the acquiescence of state agents, whether or not visible physical injury
results.14 The Commission has found, for example, that a prison requirement that all
female visitors submit to probing or ocular vaginal inspections as a condition for
being permitted personal contact with prisoners directly violates their right to
physical integrity under article 5.15 It has likewise found that a woman’s right to
physical integrity is violated by the very fact of unwanted insemination caused by
state-sponsored sexual abuse, i.e., independent of the physical injury occasioned by
the offending act.16 Thus, unwanted bodily intrusion, in any form, is the touchstone of
a violation of the right to physical integrity under article 5. 
By requiring women to undergo permanent or temporary sterilization as a condition of
work (under threat of retaliation), Maquiladora XX’s policy of forced
contraception/sterilization entails compulsory intrusions into a woman’s body, with
profound effects on her reproductive system. Such direct bodily intrusions, experienced
by every female worker—child and adult—at Maquiladora XX, constituted per se
violations of the right to physical integrity, protected under article 5.17
14 See Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 49/99, Case 11.610, Loren Laroye Riebe Star et al.(Mex.),
Apr. 13, 1999, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1998,
at 773, para. 91, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, Doc. 6 rev. (1999) (“The right to personal integrity protected
by the American Convention and by other international human rights instruments is much broader
than the absence of blows, physical torture, or other treatment that leaves evidence and visible
marks on the victim.”). 
15 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 38/96, Case 10.506, Ms. X (Arg.), Oct. 15, 1996, in ANNUAL
RE P O RT O F T H E IN T E R- AM E R I C A N CO M M I S S I O N O N HU M A N RI G H T S 1996, at 50, para. 89,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, Doc. 7 rev. (1997) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996].
16 See Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 5/96, Case 10.970, Raquel Martín de Mejía (Peru), in
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1995, at 195, 200,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.91, Doc. 7 rev. (1996) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1995]. 
17 This is not to say that the provision of contraception by an employer is per se illegal. It is the
compulsory aspect that is illegal. In this respect, the Commission has recognized that “any kind of
physical intervention [with] individuals” by or with the acquiescence of the State requires that
procedural safeguards be observed. These include: (1) the prior acquisition of a judicial order; and
(2) the promulgation of guidelines for proper conduct while undertaking the intervention (i.e.,
measure should be performed only by qualified personnel exercising the necessary care to ensure
that no physical, mental or moral harm results from the procedure). See Inter-Am. Comm. H.R.,
Report No. 38/96, Case 10.506, Ms. X (Arg.), Oct. 15, 1996, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-
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Bodily exposure to injurious environmental harms, such as hazardous work
conditions, may also violate the right to physical integrity. The Commission has
expressly recognized that the right to physical integrity “is necessarily related to and
in some ways dependent upon one’s physical environment” and that article 5 is
implicated where environmental contamination poses a persistent threat to human
health—for example, where it tends to cause “serious physical illness, impairment
and suffering.”18
The State had notice of, and an obligation to respond to, the workplace conditions in
Maquiladora XX. These conditions caused the petitioners routine illnesses,
debilitating physical impairments, and persistent suffering. The women regularly
suffered chronic neck, back, and shoulder pains, temporary blindness, bronchial
asthma, dizzy spells, heat stroke, sore joints, repetitive stress injuries, swollen feet,
headaches, anxiety disorders, and frequent injuries from machinery accidents. These
impairments were caused, inter alia, by the maquiladora’s prison-like restrictions on
worker’s physical movements and ability to take breaks, oppressively long work
hours, constant workplace harassment, and lack of ventilation and air conditioning.
All of these conditions are prohibited under the Labor Code, ratified ILO
Conventions, and numerous international human rights instruments,19 all of which are
relevant to the scope of article 5, pursuant to article 29’s interpretative mandate.20 The
Labor Code, for example, specifically prohibits aerial fiber-levels at concentrations
found in Maquiladora XX—recognizing the health hazard as a sanctionable offense
(art. 365(1)(h))—mandates allowance of periodic rest and meal breaks (arts. 129–30),
and prohibits workplace harassment (art. 234). In sum, the work conditions to which
AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1996, at 50, para. 87, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, Doc. 7 rev.
(1997) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996]. As proper procedural safeguards were not
taken in the instant case, the policy of forced contraception necessarily violates the workers’rights
under Article 5.
18 INTER-AM. COMM. H.R., REPORT ON THE SITUATIONOF HUMAN RIGHTS IN ECUADOR 1996, at 88, 92,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.96 Doc. 10 rev. 1 (1997) [hereinafter ECUADOR REPORT 1996].
19 The fundamental right of all persons to just conditions of work, compatible with human dignity, has
been affirmed in numerous international human rights instruments ratified by the State of Abusia.
See, e.g., Protocol of San Salvador, art. 7 (“[E]veryone shall enjoy [the right to work] under just,
equitable, and satisfactory conditions, which the States Parties undertake to guarantee in their
internal legislation . . . .”); OAS Charter, art. 44(b) (“Work is a right . . . and it should be performed
under conditions, including a system of fair wages, that ensure life, health, and a decent standard
of living for the worker and his family . . . .”); American Declaration, art. XIV(“Every person has
the right to work, under proper conditions . . . [to] assure him a standard of living suitable for
himself and his family.”); ICESCR, art. 7 (“The States Parties . . . recognize the right of everyone
to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work which ensure, in particular: . . . [a]
decent living . . . [and] [s]afe and healthy working conditions.”); Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, art. 23 (“Everyone has the right to . . . just and favourable conditions of work . . . [and] to
just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human
dignity . . . .”). 
20 Under Article 29(b), “No provision of th[e] Convention shall be interpreted as . . . restricting the
enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party
or by virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is a party.” (emphasis added).
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the women are subjected in Maquiladora XX are “inconsistent with the right to be
respected as a human being,” the principle which “underlies the fundamental
protections of the right to . . . physical well-being” under article 5.21
Petitioners offer the medical records of Sánchez and Franks, both of whom suffered
disabling back impairments and were treated by a local doctor. These records
demonstrate the actual physical injuries the two women suffered as a result of the
maquila’s oppressive conditions. Because most workers at Maquiladora XX lack
access to medical care, petitioners request that the Commission consider probative the
attached affidavits from 45 untreated workers, which describe in detail the work-
related health problems each has experienced.
Because the right to physical integrity, like all Convention provisions, has a
preventative dimension, petitioners further urge the Commission to find that the right
to physical integrity of all women workers at Maquiladora XX was violated (even
without specific proof of physical symptoms); all of them were subjected to unlawful
and physically dangerous conditions at work on a daily basis. As three prominent
members of the Court have recognized, “the obligation to act with due diligence . . .
imposes on the States the obligation to prevent, within reason, those situations which
. . . could lead, sometimes even by omission, to the denial [of protected rights];”22
thus, violations of the Convention may be found where States fail to “take all
appropriate measures to protect and preserve”23 protected rights and persons are
exposed to systematic threats to their health.  
1. Mental and Moral Integrity
Maquiladora XX’s employment policies also systematically violated the workers’
right to respect for their “mental and moral integrity,” protected under article 5(1).
The factory managers constantly yelled at the workers to work faster, threatened them
with termination and “blacklisting,” terrorized them with threats of physical violence,
and incessantly used obscenities, ethnic slurs, and misogynist language to demean the
women. (See audiotape and affidavits submitted in evidence.) This atmosphere of
harassment created profound anxiety, fear and humiliation in the workers, who felt
powerless to stop the abuse for fear of losing their jobs and the essential income they
provided their families. The stress caused by daily work in Maquiladora XX affected
every part of their lives, provoking constant uncertainty about their future and
degrading them as women. This degradation was amplified by their already
impoverished condition (ninety percent of families in San Ramón do not earn enough
21 ECUADOR REPORT 1996, supra note 18, at vi, 92. 
22 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Dissenting Opinion of Judges Picado Sotela, Aguiar-Aranguren and Cançado
Trindade, Gangaram Panday Case, Judgment of Jan. 21, 1994 (Ser. C) No. 16, para. 4.
23 Id. para. 3. 
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to purchase the basic food basket) and second-class status in the San Ramón
community.24
These conditions plainly violate the right to mental and moral integrity, as interpreted
by the Court and Commission in their article 5 jurisprudence. Both bodies have
interpreted the right broadly. The Commission, for example, has found Convention
violations where acts imputable to States—such as those alleged here—resulted in
“emotional trauma,”25 “trauma and anxiety,”26 “humiliation,”27 and “intimidation” or
“panic.”28 It has specifically found that acts affecting an individual’s “personal self-
esteem . . . translate[] into important damage to his moral integrity.”29 Likewise, an
act that “affects the normal development of daily life and causes great tumult and
perturbation to him and his family,” provoking “constant uncertainty about his
future,” “seriously damages his mental and moral integrity”30 in violation of article
5(1). For its part, the Court has found that, even absent physical mistreatment, the
very fact of being subjected to degrading treatment is a “per se violation of personal
integrity established in the Convention”: it is “clearly contrary to respect for the
24 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Loayza Tamayo Case, Judgment of Sept. 17, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 33, para.
57 (“The violation of the right to physical and psychological integrity of persons is a category of
violation that has several gradations and embraces treatment ranging from torture to other types of
humiliation or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment with varying degrees of physical and
psychological effects caused by endogenous and exogenous factors which must be proven in each
specific situation.”) (emphasis added). 
25 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 47/96, Case 11.436, Survivors of the “13 de marzo”
(Cuba), in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 17, at 132, para. 106 (finding Cuba
responsible for violating personal integrity of 31 survivors in refugee boat fleeing to U.S. as a
consequence of the emotional trauma resulting from the shipwreck caused by Cuba). 
26 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 32/96, Case 10.553, María Mejía (Guate.), Oct. 16,
1996, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 17, at 370, para. 60 (finding Guatemala
responsible for threats by military officials to community members that “caused trauma and anxiety
to the victims and constrained their ability to lead their lives as they desire”).
27 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 43/96, Case 11.430, Gallardo Rodríquez (Mex.), Oct. 15, 1996,
in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 17, at 485, para. 79 (noting “humiliation of being the
target of attacks by military authorities in the Mexican media . . . seriously damages his mental and
moral integrity”).
28 See, e.g., Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 32/96, Case 10.553, María Mejía (Guate.), Oct. 16,
1996, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 17, at 370, para. 61 (finding Guatemala
responsible for violating rights to mental and moral integrity through military attacks intended to
“intimidate” and “sow[] the seeds of panic” among community members); Inter-Am. Comm. H.R.,
Report No. 48/97, Case 11.411, Severiano Santiz Gomez et al. (Mex.), Feb. 18, 1998, in ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1997, at 637, para. 59,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.98, Doc. 7 rev. (1998) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997] (finding Mexico
responsible for infliction of mental damage in violation of Article 5 through “intimidating”
behavior of military officials and “creating panic” in poor, indigenous community). 
29 Id. para. 81 (“[T]he physical deterioration which [the victim] suffers as a result of his wounds has
affected his self esteem. This effect constitutes significant damage to his moral integrity.”). 
30 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 43/96, Case 11.430, José Francisco Gallardo (Mex.), Oct. 15,
1996, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 17, at 485, para. 79.
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inherent dignity of the human person.”31 These conditions of humiliation, trauma,
intimidation, uncertainty, and degradation are plainly present in the instant case.  
The factory’s policy of prohibiting all communication—even eye contact—between
workers likewise violates the workers’ right to respect for their inherent dignity as
human beings (i.e., moral integrity). As the Court has held,  “prolonged isolation and
deprivation of communication are in themselves . . . harmful to the psychological and
moral integrity of the person and a violation of the right [to] . . . inherent dignity as a
human being.”32
2. Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment
The treatment of workers at Maquiladora XX should likewise be found to constitute
“cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment” as proscribed under article 5(2). The term
“degrading treatment” has been defined to include any kind of act “that causes severe
mental or physical suffering which, under those particular circumstances, turns out to
be unjustifiable.”33 The Court has found that certain acts that put an individual “in a
particularly vulnerable position” can be considered cruel and inhuman treatment.34
For its part, the U.N. General Assembly has declared, “The term ‘cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment’ has not been defined by the General Assembly,
but it should be interpreted in such a way as to provide the broadest possible
protection against abuse, be it physical or mental.”35
In this case, the treatment of women by Maquiladora XX caused severe mental and
physical suffering that was unjustifiable under the particular circumstances—indeed,
31 See also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Castillo Páez Case, Judgment of Nov. 3, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 35, paras.
63, 66 (victim stuffed into trunk of a police vehicle). 
32 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez , Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No. 4, para. 156;
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of Jan. 20, 1989 (Ser. C) No. 5, para. 164.
33 See Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 49/99, Case 11.610, Loren Laroye Riebe Star et al. (Mex.),
Apr. 13, 1999, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1998,
at 724, para. 87, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.102, Doc. 6 rev. (1999) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT
1998] (citing European Human Rights Commission expert NIGEL S. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 73–74 (1987)); see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Loayza Tamayo
Case, Judgment of Sept. 17, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 33, para. 57 (“The degrading aspect is characterized
by the fear, anxiety and inferiority induced for the purpose of humiliating and degrading the victim
and breaking his physical and moral resistance. That situation is exacerbated by the vulnerability
of the person . . . .”).
34 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Suarez Rosero Case, Judgment of Nov. 12, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 35, para. 90,
read with Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case , Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No
4, para. 156 and Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case , Judgment of Jan. 20, 1989 (Ser. C) No.
5, para. 164 (referring to prolonged isolation and deprivation of communication with the exterior
world).
35 See Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 49/99, Case 11.610, Loren Laroye Riebe Star et al. (Mex.),
Apr. 13, 1999, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 33, at 724, para. 87.
420
Appendix B
under any circumstances. The treatment had no legitimate business purpose. Rather,
its sole purpose was to induce “fear, anxiety and inferiority . . . for the purpose of
humiliating and degrading the victim and breaking [her] physical and moral
resistance.”36 The factory sought to ensure a compliant workforce whose members,
for fear of losing their jobs, would submit to flagrant violations of their rights, thereby
allowing the factory to increase its profitability. Compared to other forms of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment recognized by the Court,37 the systematic abuse of
women at Maquiladora XX, including daily verbal abuse, restrictions on all
movement and communication, being locked inside the factory, etc., must be found to
violate the express terms of article 5(2) as well as 5(1).  
B. Freedom from Forced Labor (art. 6(2)) 
Article 6 of the Convention provides that “[n]o one shall be required to perform
forced or compulsory labor,” and it expressly proscribes all forms of “involuntary
servitude.” The labor conditions to which the workers are subjected at Maquiladora
XX constitute “forced labor” within the meaning of article 6(2). The ILO Convention
Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, to which Abusia is party, defines “forced
or compulsory labor” as “all work or service which is exacted from any person under
the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself
voluntarily.”38 Similarly, the Commission has recognized forced labor as work that is
(1) executed by the worker against her will; and (2) is unjust or oppressive in and of
itself or involves an unjust or oppressive obligation.39 The attached affidavits from 49
workers at Maquiladora XX show that much of the work in the factory meets both of
these conditions. 
Whether particular work is “unjust and oppressive” should be determined in light of
prevailing domestic and international law governing the performance of that work.
The Labor Code, which is consistent with international law norms, provides the most
concrete and specialized standards governing the performance of work in Abusia; it
should form the basis of the present analysis (particularly since there is no written
employment contract that might establish higher standards). The Labor Code
establishes the legal minimum wage and the maximum hours for workers without an
employment contract.40 It also establishes special conditions for child labor. Thus,
36 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Loayza Tamayo Case, Judgment of Sept. 17, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 33, para. 57.
37 See, e.g., id. para. 58 (“being exhibited through the media wearing a degrading garment”). 
38 Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, Jun. 28, 1930, art. 2 (ILO No. 29).
39 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 32/96, Case 10.553, María Mejía (Guate), Oct. 16, 1996, in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 17, para. 62 n.27 (citing Eur. Ct. H.R., Iversen v.
Norway, App. No. 1468/62, Judgment of Dec. 17, 1963, in 6 Y.B. EUR. CONVENTION ON H.R. 338). 
40 The legal minimum wage is $4.05 per hour, at which an adult worker may lawfully be employed
for 8 hours a day, 6 days per week. Any “overtime” work must be paid at a double wage rate—that
is $8.10 per hour—although no worker may work more than 6 days per week.
421
Model Petition
employment of children under the age of 14 is strictly prohibited in Abusia, as is night
work for any child under age 18. Children aged 14 to 16 may be employed, but only
after official certification from the Ministry of Labor attesting to the compatibility of
the specified work with the particular child’s schooling. Children aged 14 to18 may
work no more than six hours per day and must be afforded a break after three hours. 
Any work that violates these conditions is unlawful, and no child or adult worker may
legally “consent” to perform it. Where such work is required of a child or adult
worker under menace of penalty, it must therefore be considered “unjust and
oppressive” as a matter of law, and thus a violation of article 6(2). Such were the
conditions of work at Maquiladora XX, where the minimum wage/maximum hour
laws were breached on a daily basis, under the constant menace that any refusing
employee would be summarily fired. 
Indeed, all workers (child and adult) were required to work twelve hour days, at least
six days per week. They arrived at 8 a.m. and were not permitted to leave until they
finished their daily stitching quota, at approximately 8 p.m. The workers were afraid
to leave after eight hours for fear of termination, yet no worker was ever paid
overtime compensation. The Commission has affirmed that the article 6(2) right not
to engage in compulsory labor includes the right not to be subjected to reprisals or
punishments for refusing to perform such labor.41 The factory’s constant threat of
dismissal for any worker who refused to work more than the legal maximum
constituted a direct violation of article 6(2). 
As for child labor, the factory employed a total of 56 girls under the age of 18 (over
half the workforce). Six were between the ages of 12 and 14, and fourteen were
between the ages of 14 and 16. All of the children performed night work. None of
them attended school, and none of the 14- to 16-year-olds had received Labor
Ministry certification permitting their employment. Because none of the workers
could consent to these “oppressive” conditions, and because they performed them
under constant threat of reprisal—acquiesced in by state authorities through the Labor
Ministry’s omissions—the workers’ article 6(2) right to freedom from forced labor
was violated. 
The labor conditions at Maquiladora XX reached the level of “involuntary servitude.”
Indeed, on the eve of contractual deadlines for filling overseas orders (approximately
once per month), the managers would lock the factory doors overnight. By physically
trapping the workers inside the factory, forcing them to labor through the night to fill
late orders, the work became nothing less than slave labor.
The American Convention imposes a legal obligation on State Parties to enforce the
minimum wage and labor standards in force in each State and to ensure that public
41 Id. para. 62 (“[T]he exercise of the rights protected in the American Convention can never justify
attacks or reprisals by State agents.”). 
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and private employers do not fall below those minimum standards. Where these
standards are not enforced, or where a State systematically fails to investigate and
sanction complaints of sub-minimum labor conditions, as here, the State should be
held accountable for violating article 6(2). 
C. Right to Personal Liberty and Security (art. 7)
Article 7(1) of the Convention enshrines “the right to personal liberty and security.”
The right to personal liberty and security protects individuals’ right to live without
fear to life, liberty, health, and basic subsistence. Indeed, the Commission has
recognized that article 7(1) encompasses, among other things, the right not to be
deprived of or denied access to basic subsistence needs.42 Through the factory’s state-
ratified employment practices and policies, both the “liberty” and “security” aspects
of the workers’ article 7 rights were violated. 
The Convention proscribes state-ratified acts that restrict “personal liberty” (art. 7(1))
and deprive persons of their “physical liberty” (art. 7(2)). The right of the workers to
physical liberty was systematically violated by the factory’s “lock-in” policy, which
physically prohibited any worker from leaving the building. The lock-ins were the
functional equivalent of imprisonment. Because such gross restrictions on physical
liberty are not permitted under any previously established law in the State of Abusia,
they constitute per se violations of the Convention.43
The workers’ right to personal liberty was also violated by the factory’s stringent
rules restricting the movements and bodily functions of the workers. The workers
were not allowed to stand, stretch or even look up from their machines without
factory permission. Their movements were controlled to such an extent that they
could not use the bathroom (which was locked after every use) or get a drink of water
without express authorization. Such severe restrictions of the workers’ bodily
functions by private employers, enforced with the effective acquiescence of state
officials, constitute plain violations of the right to personal liberty under article 7(1). 
By failing to ensure that the wage rates and hourly-work schedules of employees at
Maquiladora XX conformed to minimum legal standards, the State further incurred
42 See IACHR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1993, at
465–66, 522–23, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.85 Doc. 9 rev. (1994) [hereinafter IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993]
(citing United Nations, El derecho de toda persona a la propiedad individual y colectiva, final
report submitted by Luis Valencia Rodríguez, E/CN.4/1993/15, 18.12.92, pp. 26–27). The
Commission has also recognized this in regard to “personal liberty.” See, e.g., id. (“The freedom of
a person is not only violated if he is attacked physically or morally, but also when he is deprived
of the means to live in dignity and denied the material requisites that are indispensable for a normal
life.”).
43 See Convention, art. 7(2) (“No one shall be deprived of his physical liberty except for the reasons
and under the conditions established beforehand by the constitution of the State Party concerned or
by a law established pursuant thereto.”). 
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violations of workers’ right to personal security under article 7(1). Such standards
were specifically enacted to ensure access by workers and their families to sufficient
resources to secure their basic subsistence needs, including health, nutrition, and
education. “[W]ithout satisfaction of these basic needs,” the Commission has
affirmed, “an individual’s survival is directly threatened . . . [which] obviously
diminishes the individual’s . . . personal security.”44 The Commission has recognized
that States have an obligation to ensure that all people within their jurisdiction are
able to meet their basic social and economic needs and, in so doing, must give
“priority to the basic needs of health, nutrition and education[;] [that priority being] a
natural consequence of the right to personal security,”45 protected under article 7. 
The right to fair wages and satisfactory labor conditions, implicit in articles 33(g) and
44(b) of the OAS Charter, is also protected under Convention article 26.46 Such wages
and conditions must “ensure life, health, and a decent standard of living for the
worker and his family.”47 By failing to take any reasonable steps in response to
knowledge that fair wages were not being paid to workers in Maquiladora XX and
that labor conditions were incompatible with a healthy and decent standard of living
for the worker and her family, the State violated the workers’ article 26 rights.  
The workers at Maquiladora XX were working an average of 27 hours per week in
excess of the legal maximum. Nevertheless, they were earning $40 less than they
would have received had they worked an 8-hour, 6-day work week at the minimum
wage, and $60 less than what was required to purchase the basic food basket for a
family of three to meet its nutritional needs in Abusia. The unlawfully long work
hours also prevented the workers from meeting their health and educational needs.
Indeed, none of the factory’s 56 child workers were attending school, and the workers
were too frightened of losing their jobs to ask for time off to attend to personal/family
illness or regular medical checkups. Given the economic impoverishment that the
workers already suffered—e.g., one hundred percent of the workers lived below the
44 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 42, at 522–23.
45 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1979–1980, at 152,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.50, Doc. 13 rev. 1 (1980) (“[T]he essence of the legal obligation incurred by any
government in [the ESCR] area is to strive to attain the economic and social aspirations of its
people, by following an order that assigns priority to the basic needs of health, nutrition and
education. The priority of the ‘rights of survival’and ‘basic needs’is a natural consequence of the
right to personal security.”); see also ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 1980–1981, at 126, OEA.Ser.L/V/II.54 doc.9 rev. 1 (1981); IACHR, TEN YEARS OF
ACTIVITIES 322 (1982); ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
1988–89, at 195, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.76 Doc. 10 (1989); ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 1989–1990, at 187, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.77 rev. 1 Doc. 7 (1990);
ECUADOR REPORT 1996, supra note 18, at 23. 
46 See OAS Charter, arts. 33(g) (“fair wages, employment opportunities, and acceptable conditions for
all”), 44(b) (“Work . . .should be performed under conditions, including a system of fair wages, that
ensure life, health, and a decent standard of living for the worker and his family.”).
47 Id. art. 44(b). 
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national poverty line—and the difficulty of meeting their basic social and economic
needs in San Ramón, the State’s obligation under articles 7(1) and 26, read with
article 1(1), to step in and enforce the wage and hour laws in Maquiladora XX was
particularly strong. 
D. Right to Privacy (art. 11) and Rights of the
Family (art. 17)
Article 11 of the Convention protects the right to privacy—to freedom from “arbitrary
or abusive interference with [one’s] private life.” The maquiladora’s policy of forcing
the workers to use contraception violates this fundamental right, which “guarantees a
sphere that nobody can invade, an area of activity that belongs entirely to each
individual.”48 This private sphere plainly includes one’s sexual life and family-
planning decisions. Neither private employers nor the State may make these decisions
for private individuals. As the Commission has recognized, the “state has a special
obligation to prevent ‘arbitrary or abusive’ interferences” in the private sphere of the
individual.49 The State was on notice that the factory was forcing its employees to use
contraception as a condition of work. By failing to take reasonable steps to end this
practice, it violated article 11. 
The policy of forced contraception also violated the petitioners’ right to family life,
protected under article 17 of the Convention. Article 17 protects the right of men and
women of marriageable age to have children and to raise a family. It is a right so basic
to the Convention that it is considered to be non-derogable even in extreme
circumstances.50 The forced contraception policy at Maquiladora XX unlawfully
restricted petitioners’ exercise of this right. Petitioners were prevented from having
children under threat of termination. Catalina Gómez suffered unlawful retaliation for
exercising her fundamental right to form a family. By failing to protect petitioners’
prerogative to raise a family, the State of Abusia violated article 17 of the Convention. 
E. Right of Expression (art. 13)
Article 13 of the Convention protects the right of everyone to “seek, receive, and
impart information and ideas of all kinds.” The Court has recognized that the right to
freedom of expression has two distinct dimensions, both of which must be guaranteed
48 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 38/96, Case 10.506, Ms. X (Arg.), Oct. 15, 1996, in IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 17, para 91. 
49 Id. paras. 91-92. 
50 See American Convention, art. 27(2); Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 38/96, Case 10.506, Ms.
X (Arg.), Oct. 15, 1996, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 17, para. 96. 
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simultaneously. The first is an individual’s right to “express and impart” information
and ideas.  The second dimension, no less important, is the collective’s right to “seek
and receive” them.51 The Court has noted, “Hence, when an individual’s freedom of
expression is unlawfully restricted, it is not only the right of that individual that is
being violated, but also the right of all others to ‘receive’ information and ideas.”52
According to the Court, by impairing the right of every person to be well informed,
the violation “affects one of the fundamental prerequisites of a democratic society.”53
The summary dismissal of petitioners Gónzales, Tompkin, and Johnson for
“express[ing] and impart[ing]” information and ideas by distributing fliers advertising
a union meeting constituted a direct violation of the right to freedom of expression.
So did the summary termination of petitioners Rogers, Menéndez, Tujoc, Sanchéz,
Vargas, Aj, Pérez, Estrada, Saquic, and Samayoa for participating in that union
meeting, thereby “seek[ing] and receiv[ing]” ideas and information. The Commission
has repeatedly made clear that “the exercise of the rights protected in the American
Convention can never justify attacks or reprisals by State agents” or with their
acquiescence; where individuals suffer reprisals for the exercise of a right, “a
violation of that right occurs.”54 Although the State did not directly carry out the
reprisal in this case, it became internationally responsible for it when it failed to take
steps to investigate the dismissal, sanction the employer, and reinstate the affected
employees.55 Indeed, because “[r]eprisals are necessarily seen as an attempt to chill or
halt the exercise of the protected rights,”56 the State has an obligation to take swift
action to “send a strong message to society that there will be no tolerance for those
who engage in” violations of the right to freedom of expression.57
51 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice
of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion
OC-5/85 of Nov. 13, 1985 (Ser. A) No. 5, paras. 30, 33 (“The right protected by Article 13 . . . has
a special scope and character, which are evidenced by the dual aspect of freedom of expression. It
requires, on the one hand, that no one be arbitrarily limited or impeded in expressing his own
thoughts. In that sense, it is a right that belongs to each individual. Its second aspect, on the other
hand, implies a collective right to receive any information whatsoever and to have access to the
thoughts expressed by others. . . . The two dimensions . . . must be guaranteed simultaneously.”).
52 Id. para. 30. 
53 Id. para. 54. 
54 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 3/98, Case 11.221, Tarcisio Medina Charry (Colom.), in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT1997, supra note 28, paras. 76–77 (“[T]he Commission has made clear
that, ‘the exercise of the rights protected in the American Convention can never justify attacks or
reprisals by State agents.’Reprisals are necessarily seen as an attempt to chill or halt the exercise
of the protected rights. Where State agents . . . carry out reprisals for the exercise of a right, a
violation of that right occurs.”). 
55 See, e.g. , Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 5/99, Case 11.739, Héctor Félix Miranda (Mex.),
Apr. 13, 1999, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 33, at 783, 798–200, para. 56.
56 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 3/98, Case 11.221, Tarcisio Medina Charry (Colom.), in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 28, paras. 76–77.
57 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 5/99, Case 11.739, Héctor Félix Miranda (Mex.), Apr. 13,
1999, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 33, at 783, 798–200, para. 52.
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F. Right of Assembly (art. 15); Right of
Association (art. 16); Right to Unionization
(art. 26); and Right to Form and Join Trade
Unions (Protocol art. 8(1)(a)).
The right to form and join trade unions, protected under both the Convention and
Protocol, is considered so important in the inter-American system that the right, in its
essential elements, is protected in four different provisions over which the
Commission and Court have jurisdiction. In its most direct form, article 8(1)(a) of the
San Salvador Protocol obligates States Parties to ensure “[t]he right of workers to
organize trade unions and to join the union of their choice for the purpose of
protecting and promoting their interests” as well as to “permit trade unions . . . to
function freely.” Articles 15 and 16 of the Convention also protect the right to
unionization by guaranteeing the rights of workers, respectively, to “peaceful
assembly” and “to associate freely for ideological . . . political, economic, labor,
social . . . or other purpose.” Under Convention article 26, States Parties also
recognize the “rights implicit in the economic, social . . . and cultural standards set
forth in the [OAS Charter],” which includes the right to unionize and strike.58 Under
each of these provisions, a State violates the Convention and Protocol by firing a
worker in retaliation for her participation in any lawful union-related activity—such
as a meeting, strike, or labor demonstration.
The State violated petitioners’ right to form trade unions by failing to take any
preventative or responsive measures when Maquiladora XX engaged in systematic
firing of workers who had any apparent union link. Such terminations were clearly
intended to inhibit union formation at the factory, in violation of article 8(1)(a) of the
Protocol and article 16 of the Convention. Petitioners Gónzales, Tompkin, and
Johnson, for example, sought only to educate other workers about their rights to
unionize, to join together in association for “political, economic, [and] labor”
purposes. The State’s failure to ensure these workers’ ability to freely exercise their
right to promote union formation and/or other association for labor purposes violated
the rights not only of Gónzales, Tompkin, and Johnson, but of all workers at
Maquiladora XX, who were prohibited from gaining the knowledge necessary to
make an informed decision about unionization. The right to trade unionization is
violated no less by forbidding the initial spread of information about unionizing than
it is by retaliating against members once a union is successfully formed. 
58 See OAS Charter, art. 45(c) (“[W]orkers . . . have the right to associate themselves freely for the
defense and promotion of their interests, including the right to collective bargaining and the
workers’ right to strike, and recognition of the juridical personality of associations and the
protection of their freedom and independence . . . .”). This right has been further refined in the
American Declaration and San Salvador Protocol. See American Declaration, art. XXII (“Every
person has the right to associate with others to promote, exercise and protect his legitimate interests
of a . . . labor union or other nature.”); San Salvador Protocol, art. 8(1)(a). 
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The termination of petitioners Rogers, Menéndez, Tujoc, Sanchéz, Vargas, Aj, Pérez,
Estrada, Saquic, and Samayoa for their participation in a union-related meeting also
violated Protocol article 8(1)(a) and Convention articles 15 and 16. The termination
punished these ten women for seeking information on their right to form a trade union
(art. 8), for associating with union-advocates (art. 16), and for assembling for the
purposes of learning their labor rights (art. 15). As such, they were prevented from
exercising their fundamental right to form a trade union in their place of employment
for the protection of their political, economic and labor interests. By failing to take
reasonable measures to prevent, or to respond to, these violations, the State violated
the Convention and Protocol. 
G. Rights of the Child (art. 19) and Right to
Education (art. 26; Protocol art. 13)
Maquiladora XX employed fifty-six girls under the age of 18; sixteen of them were
between the ages of 14 and 16, and six were under the age of 14. By failing to take
any measures to protect the rights of the children employed in Maquiladara XX, the
State became responsible for violations of their rights under article 19 of the
Convention and article 13 of the San Salvador Protocol.
Article 19 of the Convention protects the right of every minor child to “measures of
protection required by his condition as a minor.”  As required by the interpretive
mandate of Convention article 29, these measures of protection must be determined
by reference to prevailing domestic and international law regarding the rights of
children. For persons under the age of 18, the Protocol of San Salvador obligates
States Parties to guarantee “[t]he prohibition of night work or unhealthy or dangerous
conditions and, in general, of all work which jeopardizes health, safety, or morals.”59
With regard to minors under the age of 16, it requires that “the work day shall be
subordinated to the provisions regarding compulsory education and in no case shall
work constitute an impediment to school attendance or a limitation on benefiting from
education received.”6 0 The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights create similar
obligations for the State. 61
59 Protocol of San Salvador, art. 7. 
60 Id.
61 Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 32(1) (“States Parties recognize the right of the child to
be protected from economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be
hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education, or to be harmful to the child’s health or
physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development.”); ICESCR, art. 10(3) (“Children and
young persons should be protected from economic and social exploitation. Their employment in
work harmful to their morals or health or dangerous to life or likely to hamper their normal
development should be punishable by law. States should set age limits below which the paid
employment of child labour should be prohibited and punishable by law.”). 
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In line with these international mandates, the Labor Code of Abusia prohibits all paid
employment of children under the age of 14, allows paid employment of children
between the ages of 14 and 16 only with official certification from the Labor Ministry
attesting to the compatibility of the work with schooling for the particular child, and
restricts paid employment of children between the ages of 14 and 18 to six hours per
day, with a mandatory break after three hours. Reading article 19 of the Convention
so as not to restrict or preclude any of these rights, the State of Abusia violated article
19 by failing to take reasonable steps to guarantee any of the above “measures of
protection required by [a child’s] condition as a minor” in Abusia. 
The State was plainly on notice that Maquiladora XX was employing child labor. It
received at least three complaints from interested parties regarding the use of child
labor, and it conducted “inspections” of the factory on three separate occasions. Its
failure to take any step to ameliorate the situation makes it internationally responsible
for violations of article 19 of the Convention.
The Commission also has direct jurisdiction over violations of article 13 of the San
Salvador Protocol, which protects the right to education. By failing to take any steps
to ensure that children under the age of 14 were in school, rather than gainfully
employed at Maquiladora XX, and that the employment of children between the ages
of 14 and 16 did not interfere with their schooling, the State violated article 13 of the
San Salvador Protocol. 
It also violated Convention article 26. Article 26 protects the right to education, as
defined by the educational standards enshrined in the OAS Charter. These standards,
enumerated in Charter articles 33(h), 48, and 49, identify as priorities the rapid
eradication of illiteracy, the expansion of educational opportunities for all, and steps
to ensure the effective exercise of the right to education.62 By failing to take steps to
ensure that the children employed in Maquiladora XX completed their compulsory
schooling, the State violated the child workers’article 26 right to basic education. 
H. Right to Property (art. 21)
Article 21 of the Convention protects the right to property, which has been described
as an “inalienable right, concerning which no State, group or person may undertake
or carry out activities designed to suppress.”63 A violation of article 21 occurs where
62 See OAS Charter, arts. 34(h), 49, 50; see also American Declaration, art. XII (“Every person has
the right to an education.”). The Court has expressly recognized that the American Declaration
“contains and defines the fundamental human rights referred to in the Charter.” Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within the Framework
of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89 of July
14, 1989 (Ser. A) No. 10, para. 43 (emphasis added). 
63 IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1993, supra note 42, at 467.
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a person demonstrates she has been “damaged in or dispossessed by the State of the
use, enjoyment or interest in an object or thing to which he had acquired legal rights
under domestic law.”64 Under the Labor Code, every petitioner in the instant case has
acquired legal rights to compensation at the legal minimum wage ($4.05/hr) for all
ordinary hours actually worked and at the overtime wage rate ($8.10) for all
extraordinary hours actually worked. By failing to ensure that petitioners were paid
the wage rates to which they were legally entitled under domestic law, the State
“dispossessed” them of “the use, enjoyment or interest in” protected property, thus
incurring a violation of article 21. 
Indeed, despite working an average of 27 hours per week in overtime, none of the
workers in Maquiladora XX received any overtime compensation. Neither did they
receive the minimum wage for actual hours worked—taking home less than half the
legal minimum wage in the country. Because States Parties have an obligation under
article 21 to protect property rights from infringement by third parties, Abusia
violated article 21 by failing to take reasonable measures to ensure that the Labor
Code’s minimum wage and overtime compensation provisions were duly enforced at
Maquiladora XX. 
I. Right to Equal Protection (arts. 1 and 24)
Articles 1 and 24 of the Convention protect the right to non-discrimination and to
equal protection of the law. They prohibit discrimination on the basis of any social
status, including union affiliation, sex, and parenthood, and “should be interpreted . .
. in ways which facilitate the full protection of economic, social and cultural rights.”65
“Discrimination” is defined as “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference
which . . . has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and
64 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 39/96, Case 11.673, Santiago Marzioni (Arg.), in IACHR
ANNUAL REPORT 1996, supra note 17, para. 29. The instant case differs from Marzioni in that the
entitlement to overtime compensation for actual extraordinary hours worked is a legal entitlement
rather than merely a “potential award” over which a judge or administrative panel has discretion.
65 As affirmed by the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, “[g]uarantees of
equality and non-discrimination should be interpreted, to the greatest extent possible, in ways
which facilitate the full protection of economic, social and cultural rights.”The Domestic
Application of the Covenant, General Comment No. 9, U.N. ESCOR, Comm. on Econ., Soc. and
Cultural Rts., 19th Sess., Agenda item 3, para. 15, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1998/24 (1998).
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freedoms.”66 Its touchstone is unequal treatment67—e.g., “the denial of a right to
someone which is accorded to [similarly situated] others.”68
The State of Abusia violated its obligations under articles 1 and 24 by failing to take
any measures to prevent or respond to the summary dismissal of petitioners Gónzales,
Tompkin, Johnson, Rogers, Menéndez, Tujoc, Sanchéz, Vargas, Aj, Pérez, Estrada,
Saquic, and Samayoa, who were fired solely for their union affiliations. Their “union
status” caused the factory to treat them differently than their co-workers, who were
similarly situated in all other respects. Because the right to form and join trade unions
to protect common interests is specifically protected in the Convention and Protocol,
retaliation against workers based on their “union status” is necessarily proscribed
under Convention articles 1 and 24.
The State also violated articles 1 and 24 by failing to take any measure to prevent or
respond to the factory’s discriminatory policy of hiring only childless women as
factory workers or to the retaliatory dismissal of Gómez, who was fired solely on the
basis of her pregnancy. Although not all differences in treatment are “discriminatory,”
such differences must both have a legitimate purpose and be reasonably related to
that legitimate purpose to pass muster under the Convention.69 Because there are no
66 Nondiscrimination, General Comment No. 18, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 37th Sess., Supp.
No. 40, Annex VI, at 174, para. 7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 1 (1989), U.N. Doc. A/45/40
(1990), available at < h t t p : / / w w w. u n h c h r. c h / t b s / d o c . n s f / M a s t e r F r a m e Vi e w / 3 8 8 8 b 0 5 4 1 f 8 5 0 1 c 9 c
12563ed004b8d0e?Opendocument> [hereinafter General Comment No. 18]. This definition, stated
by the U.N. Human Rights Committee, is drawn from Article 1 of both the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 220, 5 I.L.M.
352 (1966) (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969), and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 19 I.L.M. 33 (entered into
force Sept. 3, 1981).
67 See, e.g. , Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 8/98, Case 11.671, Carlos García Saccone (Arg.)
Mar. 2, 1998, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1997, supra note 28, at 193, para. 40 (“[I]t must be
emphasized that article 24 of the American Convention establishes a paradigm whose counterpoint
is unequal treatment.”).
68 See id. para. 40 (citing E.W.V IERDAG, THE CONCEPT OF DISCRIMINATIONIN INTERNATIONAL LAW 44
(1973) (non-official translation)). 
69 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution
of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC-4/84 of Jan. 19, 1984 (Ser. A) No. 4, para. 57 (“[N]o
discrimination exists if the difference in treatment has a legitimate purpose and if it does not lead
to situations which are contrary to justice, to reason or to the nature of things. It follows that there
would be no discrimination in differences in treatment of individuals by a state when the
classifications selected are based on substantial factual differences and there exists a reasonable
relationship of proportionality between these differences and the aims of the legal rule under
review. These aims may not be unjust or unreasonable, that is, they may not be arbitrary, capricious,
despotic or in conflict with the essential oneness and dignity of humankind.”); Inter-Am. Comm.
H.R., Report No. 48/98, Case 11.403, Carlos Alberto Marín Ramírez (Colom.), Sept. 29, 1998, in
IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1998, supra note 33, at 436, para. 50 (“States may establish reasonable
differences in view of different situations. As a result, they may categorize certain groups of
individuals with a legitimate purpose as long as the classification[] has a reasonable connection
with the purpose of the rule in question.”).
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essential functions of a factory stitching job that a childless woman can do better than
a man or better than a woman with children, the difference in treatment cannot be
shown to have a “legitimate purpose.” By failing to take measures to prevent unlawful
discrimination from occurring in Maquiladora XX, the State violated articles 1 and 24
of the Convention with respect to petitioner Gómez and other petitioners wishing to
become parents. 
J. Right to Due Process and Judicial Protection
(arts. 8 and 25)
The Government of Abusia has also violated Convention articles 8 and 25, which
guarantee the right to simple, prompt and effective recourse, with due process
guarantees, to a competent court or tribunal for violations of fundamental rights under
the Convention or domestic law. According to the Commission, “the right to a
recourse set forth in article 25, interpreted in conjunction with article 8(1), must be
understood as the right of every individual to go to a tribunal when any of his rights
have been violated (whether a right protected by the Convention, the constitution or
the domestic laws of the State concerned), to obtain a judicial investigation
conducted by a competent, impartial and independent tribunal that will establish
whether or not a violation has taken place and will set, when appropriate, adequate
compensation.”70 In the instant case, petitioners were denied effective recourse to a
competent tribunal for violations of their fundamental rights. 
1. Right to go to a tribunal
Article 25 protects, first and foremost, the right to a judicial remedy.71 Such judicial
remedies must be “adequate,” “effective,” and  “accessible, simple, and prompt” in
establishing whether or not a human rights violation has occurred and providing
reparation. According to the Court, “adequate” judicial remedies are those that are
“suitable to address an infringement of a legal right.”72 If a formal remedy is not
70 Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 5/96, Case 10.970, Raquel Martín de Mejía (Peru), Mar. 1,
1996, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1995, supra note 16, at 157, 190–91 (emphasis added). 
71 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 y 28 of the
American Convention on Human Rights) , Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of Oct. 6, 1987 (Ser. A) No.
9 (1987), para. 24 (“The absence of an effective remedy to violations of the rights recognized by
the Convention is itself a violation of the Convention by the State Party in which the remedy is
lacking. . . . [This occurs] when, for any reason, the alleged victim is denied access to a judicial
remedy.”).  
72 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No.4, para. 64;
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of Jan. 20, 1989 (Ser. C) No.5, para. 67; Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R., Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Judgment of Mar. 15, 1989 (Ser. C) No.6,
para. 88; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Caballero Delgado and Santana, Preliminary Objections , Judgment
of Jan. 21, 1994 (Ser. C) No.17, para. 63. See also, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Exceptions to the
Exhaustion of Internal Remedies (Art. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) American Convention on
Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 of Aug. 10, 1990 (Ser. A) No.11, para. 36.
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adequate to determine, sanction, and repair an infringement of a legal right given the
particular circumstances of a case, then that remedy is not “adequate” for the purposes
of article 25.73
Petitioners in this case have been denied access to an “adequate” judicial remedy.
Indeed, given the Supreme Court’s final order, the only formal remedy available to
petitioners is to commence a new administrative suit against “Millennium” for abuses
occurring after July 18, 1998. Such a remedy is not suitable to address infringement
of petitioners’ legal rights since most of the violations—and all of the labor abuses
against the named petitioners—occurred before July 18, 1998. As such, the remedy is
not “adequate” for purposes of article 25: It cannot determine, sanction and repair
infringement of legal rights against the petitioners. 
“A remedy must also be effective—that is, capable of producing the result for which
it was designed.”74 The formal remedy of instituting proceedings against Millennium
for “continuing” violations does not meet this standard. Indeed, given the Supreme
Court’s final order, there is nothing to stop Millennium from simply closing shop and
reincorporating under a different name to again avoid domestic accountability for
violations of the Labor Code. Because the only judicial remedy formally available is
neither “adequate” to redress petitioners’ claims against Maquiladora XX nor
“effective” in holding any offending corporate employer accountable, the State has
violated petitioners’ right to judicial recourse under article 25.
2. Right to obtain a judicial investigation of the facts
The State’s judicial conduct also violates the right of petitioners to a judicial
investigation of the facts. Article 25(2)(b) requires States Parties to undertake “to
develop the possibilities of judicial remedy.” The Commission has made clear that
this provision refers to the duty of competent judicial authorities to undertake a
“purposeful investigation” of the facts of every case involving fundamental rights in
order to arrive at a reasoned conclusion. That is, it refers to the State duty, implicit in
article 1(1), to undertake a serious investigation of the events allegedly constituting a
violation of protected rights and to act with “due diligence” in processing the claim
73 See id. 
74 I n t e r-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No.4, para. 66
(emphasis added); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of Jan. 20, 1989 (Ser. C) No.5,
para. 69; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case, Judgment of Mar. 15, 1989 (Ser.
C) No.6, para. 91; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., C a b a l l e ro Delgado and Santana, Pre l i m i n a ry Objections,
Judgment of Jan. 21, 1994 (Ser. C) No.17, para. 63. See also I n t e r-Am. Ct. H.R., Exceptions to the
Exhaustion of Internal Remedies (Art. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) American Convention on Human
R i g h t s), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 of Aug. 10, 1990 (Ser. A) No.11, para. 36. 
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in order to arrive at a decision.75 Absent such conduct on the part of the State, “the
right to obtain effective recourse set forth in Article 25 would be absolutely without
content.”76
By failing to recognize the jurisdiction of any competent tribunal over petitioners’
claims, the Supreme Court’s final order precludes, as a matter of law, any judicial or
administrative investigation of the abusive events occurring before July 18, 1998.
Thus, it violates petitioners’ right to obtain a judicial investigation of the facts under
articles 1(1), 8, and 25.
3. Right to a fair hearing with procedural guarantees
Articles 8 and 25 are integrally intertwined. While article 25 guarantees a result (i.e.,
effective recourse), article 8 guarantees a process (a fair hearing with procedural
guarantees77). In essence, it guarantees the right of every person “to be heard” in the
determination of his rights and duties. Thus, no person may be deprived of rights or
exposed to excessive obligations without the opportunity to tell her side of the story
to a neutral decisionmaker, i.e., by presenting factual evidence and legal arguments in
support of her case. By denying petitioners’ access to any judicial or administrative
proceeding, the State of Abusia violated petitioners’ rights under article 8 as well as
article 25. 
J. Duty to Respect and Ensure Human Rights
(arts. 1 and 2)
The State of Abusia has failed to comply with article 1, which obligates States Parties
to “respect” and “ensure” the full and free exercise of all of the rights and freedoms
75 “Thus, the obligation to investigate purposefully means in practice that the State will act with due
diligence, i.e. with the existing means at its disposal, and will endeavor to arrive at a decision.”
Inter-Am. Comm. H.R., Report No. 5/96, Case 10.970, Raquel Martín de Mejía (Peru), Mar. 1,
1996, in IACHR ANNUAL REPORT 1995, supra note 16, at 157, 190–91 (emphasis added). 
76 Id. at 190.
77 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Arts. 27(2), 25 y 28 of the
American Convention on Human Rights) , Advisory Opinion OC-9/87 of Oct. 6, 1987 (Ser. A) No.
9, para. 27 (“Article 8 does not contain a specific judicial remedy, but rather the procedural
requirements that should be observed in order to be able to speak of effective and appropriate
judicial guarantees under the Convention.”); id. para. 28 (“Article 8 recognizes the concept of ‘due
process of law,’ which includes the prerequisites necessary to ensure the adequate protection of
those persons whose rights or obligations are pending judicial determination.”); Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
Genie Lacayo Case, Judgment of Jan. 29, 1997 (Ser. C) No. 30, para. 74 (“Article 8, which refers
to judicial guarantees, establishes the contours of the so-called ‘due legal process’or ‘the right to
procedural defense,’ which consist in the right of every person to be heard with due process
guarantees and within a reasonable period by a competent, independent, and impartial judge or
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recognized in the Convention. The Court has recognized that Convention article 1
“specifies the obligation assumed by the States Parties in relation to each of the rights
protected [in the Convention]. Each claim alleging that one of those rights has been
infringed necessarily implies that Article 1(1) of the Convention has also been
violated.”78
The State has violated its article 1(1) obligation with respect to articles 5, 6, 7, 8, 11,
13, 15, 16, 19, 21, 24, 25, and 26 of the Convention and articles 8(1)(a) and 13 of the
Protocol by failing to “ensure” the full and free exercise of those rights by petitioners.
Although private actors were immediately responsible for the abuses at Maquiladora
XX, the State incurred international responsibility for them by failing to take
affirmative measures of a judicial, legislative, and executive nature “to organize the
governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which public power
is exercised, so that they are capable of juridically ensuring the free and full
enjoyment of human rights.”79 This obligation requires States Parties to “prevent,
investigate and punish any violation of the rights recognized by the Convention
[committed by private actors] and, moreover, if possible attempt to restore the right
violated and provide compensation as warranted for damages resulting from the
violation.”80
The Court has held that “when the State allows private persons or groups to act freely
and with impunity to the detriment of the rights recognized by the Convention . . . the
State has failed to comply with its duty to ensure the free and full exercise of those
rights to the persons within its jurisdiction.”81 Acts of private persons “lead to
international responsibility of the State, not because of the act itself, but because of
the lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it as required by the
Convention.”82 Most significantly, the Court has concluded, “What is decisive is
whether a violation of the rights recognized by the Convention has occurred with the
support or the acquiescence of the government, or whether the State has allowed the
act to take place without taking measures to prevent it or to punish those
responsible.”83
tribunal, previously established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature
made against him or for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or
any other nature.”).
78 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No. 4, paras.
162, 164; see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Godínez Cruz Case, Judgment of Jan. 20, 1989 (Ser. C) No.
5, para. 171, 173; Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Neira Alegría et al. Case, Judgment of Jan. 19, 1995 (Ser.
C) No. 20, para. 85.
79 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Velásquez Rodríguez Case, Judgment of July 29, 1988 (Ser. C) No. 4, para. 166.
80 Id. 
81 Id. para. 176.
82 Id. para. 172. 
83 Id. para. 173.
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The State of Abusia has willfully allowed systematic human rights violations at
Maquiladora XX to take place, without taking measures to prevent them or to punish
those responsible. The State has been on notice, since at least June 1996, and perhaps
since March 1996, that the rights of workers at the factory under the Labor Code have
been systematically violated. By failing to take any steps to prevent or to respond to
those violations, the State incurred international responsibility for their consequences
under articles 1 and 2 of the Convention. 
V. PETITION
The State of Abusia ratified the Convention on May 25, 1978, thus committing itself
under international law to respect and ensure the rights recognized therein. In view of
this obligation, and considering the seriousness of the alleged facts, petitioners and
their representatives respectfully request that the Commission:
1. Begin to process this case in accordance with articles 46 to 51 of the
Convention and articles 29 to 43 of the Commission’s Rules of
Procedure; and, consequently, transmit the petition to the State in
question in accordance with article 48 of the Convention. 
2. Declare the State of Abusia to be in violation of articles 1, 2, 5, 6,
7, 8, 11, 13, 15, 16, 19, 21, 24, 25 and 26 of the Convention and
articles 8(1)(a) and 13 of the Protocol; and order the State to repair
the consequences of the violation and to pay just compensation in
accordance with article 63 of the Convention.
3. Recommend that the Government effectively investigate the facts
and sanction those responsible.
We take this opportunity to express our highest esteem for the Commission as it
undertakes consideration of the present petition. Petitioners respectfully request that
all future communications be sent to the following address: National Human Rights
Commission of Abusia, 416 Idealista Drive, Office 15, San Marcos, Abusia; and/or
by electronic mail to <justicia@cdha.org>.  
Respectfully,







AMERICAN  CONVENTION  ON  HUMAN  RIGHTS1
Preamble
The American states signatory to the present Convention, 
Reaffirming their intention to consolidate in this hemisphere, within the framework of
democratic institutions, a system of personal liberty and social justice based on
respect for the essential rights of man; 
Recognizing that the essential rights of man are not derived from one’s being a
national of a certain state, but are based upon attributes of the human personality, and
that they therefore justify international protection in the form of a convention
reinforcing or complementing the protection provided by the domestic law of the
American states; 
C o n s i d e r i n g that these principles have been set forth in the Charter of the
Organization of American States, in the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and that they have
been reaffirmed and refined in other international instruments, worldwide as well as
regional in scope; 
Reiterating that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
ideal of free men enjoying freedom from fear and want can be achieved only if
conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social, and cultural
rights, as well as his civil and political rights; and 
Considering that the Third Special Inter-American Conference (Buenos Aires, 1967)
approved the incorporation into the Charter of the Organization itself of broader
standards with respect to economic, social, and educational rights and resolved that
an inter-American convention on human rights should determine the structure,
competence, and procedure of the organs responsible for these matters, 
Have agreed upon the following: 
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1 Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, at 1, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.23 doc. rev. 2, 9 I.L.M.
673 (1970), entered into force July 18, 1978, available at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/Básicos/
basic3.htm>.
PART I – STATE OBLIGATIONS AND RIGHTS PROTECTED
Chapter I – General Obligations
Article 1. Obligation to Respect Rights
1. The States Parties to this Convention undertake to respect the rights and freedoms
recognized herein and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free
and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without any discrimination for
reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition. 
2. For the purposes of this Convention, “person” means every human being. 
Article 2. Domestic Legal Effects
Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in Article 1 is not
already ensured by legislative or other provisions, the States Parties undertake to
adopt, in accordance with their constitutional processes and the provisions of this
Convention, such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to
those rights or freedoms. 
Chapter II – Civil and Political Rights
Article 3. Right to Juridical Personality
Every person has the right to recognition as a person before the law.
Article 4. Right to Life
1. Every person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected
by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his life. 
2. In countries that have not abolished the death penalty, it may be imposed only for
the most serious crimes and pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent
court and in accordance with a law establishing such punishment, enacted prior to
the commission of the crime. The application of such punishment shall not be
extended to crimes to which it does not presently apply. 3. The death penalty shall
not be reestablished in states that have abolished it. 
4. In no case shall capital punishment be inflicted for political offenses or related
common crimes. 
5. Capital punishment shall not be imposed upon persons who, at the time the crime
was committed, were under 18 years of age or over 70 years of age; nor shall it be
applied to pregnant women. 
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6. Every person condemned to death shall have the right to apply for amnesty,
pardon, or commutation of sentence, which may be granted in all cases. Capital
punishment shall not be imposed while such a petition is pending decision by the
competent authority.
Article 5. Right to Humane Treatment
1. Every person has the right to have his physical, mental, and moral integrity
respected. 
2. No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment
or treatment. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with respect for
the inherent dignity of the human person. 
3. Punishment shall not be extended to any person other than the criminal. 
4. Accused persons shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be segregated from
convicted persons, and shall be subject to separate treatment appropriate to their
status as unconvicted persons. 
5. Minors while subject to criminal proceedings shall be separated from adults and
brought before specialized tribunals, as speedily as possible, so that they may be
treated in accordance with their status as minors. 
6. Punishments consisting of deprivation of liberty shall have as an essential aim the
reform and social readaptation of the prisoners. 
Article 6. Freedom from Slavery
1. No one shall be subject to slavery or to involuntary servitude, which are prohibited
in all their forms, as are the slave trade and traffic in women. 
2. No one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labor. This provision
shall not be interpreted to mean that, in those countries in which the penalty
established for certain crimes is deprivation of liberty at forced labor, the carrying
out of such a sentence imposed by a competent court is prohibited. Forced labor
shall not adversely affect the dignity or the physical or intellectual capacity of the
prisoner.
3. For the purposes of this article, the following do not constitute forced or
compulsory labor: 
a. work or service normally required of a person imprisoned in execution of a
sentence or formal decision passed by the competent judicial authority. Such
work or service shall be carried out under the supervision and control of public
authorities, and any persons performing such work or service shall not be
placed at the disposal of any private party, company, or juridical person; 
b. military service and, in countries in which conscientious objectors are




c. service exacted in time of danger or calamity that threatens the existence or the
well-being of the community; or 
d. work or service that forms part of normal civic obligations. 
Article 7. Right to Personal Liberty
1. Every person has the right to personal liberty and security.
2. No one shall be deprived of his physical liberty except for the reasons and under
the conditions established beforehand by the constitution of the State Party
concerned or by a law established pursuant thereto. 
3. No one shall be subject to arbitrary arrest or imprisonment. 
4. Anyone who is detained shall be informed of the reasons for his detention and shall
be promptly notified of the charge or charges against him. 
5. Any person detained shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer
authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a
reasonable time or to be released without prejudice to the continuation of the
proceedings. His release may be subject to guarantees to assure his appearance for
trial. 
6. Anyone who is deprived of his liberty shall be entitled to recourse to a competent
court, in order that the court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his
arrest or detention and order his release if the arrest or detention is unlawful. In
States Parties whose laws provide that anyone who believes himself to be
threatened with deprivation of his liberty is entitled to recourse to a competent
court in order that it may decide on the lawfulness of such threat, this remedy may
not be restricted or abolished. The interested party or another person in his behalf
is entitled to seek these remedies. 
7. No one shall be detained for debt. This principle shall not limit the orders of a
competent judicial authority issued for nonfulfillment of duties of support. 
Article 8. Right to a Fair Trial
1. Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a
reasonable time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously
established by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature
made against him or for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil,
labor, fiscal, or any other nature. 
2. Every person accused of a criminal offense has the right to be presumed innocent
so long as his guilt has not been proven according to law. During the proceedings,
every person is entitled, with full equality, to the following minimum guarantees: 
a. the right of the accused to be assisted without charge by a translator or
interpreter, if he does not understand or does not speak the language of the
tribunal or court; 
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b. prior notification in detail to the accused of the charges against him; 
c. adequate time and means for the preparation of his defense; 
d. the right of the accused to defend himself personally or to be assisted by legal
counsel of his own choosing, and to communicate freely and privately with his
counsel; 
e. the inalienable right to be assisted by counsel provided by the state, paid or not
as the domestic law provides, if the accused does not defend himself personally
or engage his own counsel within the time period established by law; 
f. the right of the defense to examine witnesses present in the court and to obtain
the appearance, as witnesses, of experts or other persons who may throw light
on the facts; 
g. the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself or to plead guilty;
and 
h. the right to appeal the judgment to a higher court. 
3. A confession of guilt by the accused shall be valid only if it is made without
coercion of any kind. 
4. An accused person acquitted by a nonappealable judgment shall not be subjected
to a new trial for the same cause. 
5. Criminal proceedings shall be public, except insofar as may be necessary to protect
the interests of justice. 
Article 9. Freedom from Ex Post Facto Laws
No one shall be convicted of any act or omission that did not constitute a criminal
offense, under the applicable law, at the time it was committed. A heavier penalty
shall not be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offense
was committed. If subsequent to the commission of the offense the law provides for
the imposition of a lighter punishment, the guilty person shall benefit therefrom. 
Article 10. Right to Compensation
Every person has the right to be compensated in accordance with the law in the event
he has been sentenced by a final judgment through a miscarriage of justice. 
Article 11. Right to Privacy
1. Everyone has the right to have his honor respected and his dignity recognized. 
2. No one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life,
his family, his home, or his correspondence, or of unlawful attacks on his honor or
reputation. 




Article 12. Freedom of Conscience and Religion
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience and of religion. This right
includes freedom to maintain or to change one’s religion or beliefs, and freedom
to profess or disseminate one’s religion or beliefs, either individually or together
with others, in public or in private. 
2. No one shall be subject to restrictions that might impair his freedom to maintain or
to change his religion or beliefs. 
3. Freedom to manifest one’s religion and beliefs may be subject only to the
limitations prescribed by law that are necessary to protect public safety, order,
health, or morals, or the rights or freedoms of others. 
4. Parents or guardians, as the case may be, have the right to provide for the religious
and moral education of their children or wards that is in accord with their own
convictions. 
Article 13. Freedom of Thought and Expression
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right includes
freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless
of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any
other medium of one’s choice. 
2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be
subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of
liability, which shall be expressly established by law to the extent necessary to
ensure: 
a. respect for the rights or reputations of others; or 
b. the protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals. 
3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such
as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting
frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any
other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and
opinions. 
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 above, public entertainments may
be subject by law to prior censorship for the sole purpose of regulating access to
them for the moral protection of childhood and adolescence. 
5. Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred
that constitute incitements to lawless violence or to any other similar action against
any person or group of persons on any grounds including those of race, color,




Article 14. Right of Reply
1. Anyone injured by inaccurate or offensive statements or ideas disseminated to the
public in general by a legally regulated medium of communication has the right to
reply or to make a correction using the same communications outlet, under such
conditions as the law may establish. 
2. The correction or reply shall not in any case remit other legal liabilities that may
have been incurred. 
3. For the effective protection of honor and reputation, every publisher, and every
newspaper, motion picture, radio, and television company, shall have a person
responsible who is not protected by immunities or special privileges. 
Article 15. Right of Assembly
The right of peaceful assembly, without arms, is recognized. No restrictions may be
placed on the exercise of this right other than those imposed in conformity with the
law and necessary in a democratic society in the interest of national security, public
safety or public order, or to protect public health or morals or the rights or freedom of
others. 
Article 16. Freedom of Association
1. Everyone has the right to associate freely for ideological, religious, political,
economic, labor, social, cultural, sports, or other purposes. 
2. The exercise of this right shall be subject only to such restrictions established by
law as may be necessary in a democratic society, in the interest of national security,
public safety or public order, or to protect public health or morals or the rights and
freedoms of others. 
3. The provisions of this article do not bar the imposition of legal restrictions,
including even deprivation of the exercise of the right of association, on members
of the armed forces and the police. 
Article 17. Rights of the Family
1. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to
protection by society and the state. 
2. The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to raise a family
shall be recognized, if they meet the conditions required by domestic laws, insofar
as such conditions do not affect the principle of nondiscrimination established in
this Convention. 
3. No marriage shall be entered into without the free and full consent of the intending
spouses. 
4. The States Parties shall take appropriate steps to ensure the equality of rights and
the adequate balancing of responsibilities of the spouses as to marriage, during
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marriage, and in the event of its dissolution. In case of dissolution, provision shall
be made for the necessary protection of any children solely on the basis of their
own best interests. 
5. The law shall recognize equal rights for children born out of wedlock and those
born in wedlock. 
Article 18. Right to a Name
Every person has the right to a given name and to the surnames of his parents or that
of one of them. The law shall regulate the manner in which this right shall be ensured
for all, by the use of assumed names if necessary.
Article 19. Rights of the Child
Every minor child has the right to the measures of protection required by his condition
as a minor on the part of his family, society, and the state. 
Article 20. Right to Nationality
1. Every person has the right to a nationality.
2. Every person has the right to the nationality of the state in whose territory he was
born if he does not have the right to any other nationality.
3. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality or of the right to change it. 
Article 21. Right to Property
1. Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may
subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society.
2. No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just
compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases and
according to the forms established by law.
3. Usury and any other form of exploitation of man by man shall be prohibited by
law.
Article 22. Freedom of Movement and Residence
1. Every person lawfully in the territory of a State Party has the right to move about
in it, and to reside in it subject to the provisions of the law.
2. Every person has the right to leave any country freely, including his own. 
3. The exercise of the foregoing rights may be restricted only pursuant to a law to the
extent necessary in a democratic society to prevent crime or to protect national
security, public safety, public order, public morals, public health, or the rights or
freedoms of others. 
4. The exercise of the rights recognized in paragraph 1 may also be restricted by law
in designated zones for reasons of public interest. 
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5. No one can be expelled from the territory of the state of which he is a national or
be deprived of the right to enter it. 
6. An alien lawfully in the territory of a State Party to this Convention may be
expelled from it only pursuant to a decision reached in accordance with law.
7. Every person has the right to seek and be granted asylum in a foreign territory, in
accordance with the legislation of the state and international conventions, in the
event he is being pursued for political offenses or related common crimes. 
8. In no case may an alien be deported or returned to a country, regardless of whether
or not it is his country of origin, if in that country his right to life or personal
freedom is in danger of being violated because of his race, nationality, religion,
social status, or political opinions. 
9. The collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited. 
Article 23. Right to Participate in Government
1. Every citizen shall enjoy the following rights and opportunities: 
a. to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen
representatives; 
b. to vote and to be elected in genuine periodic elections, which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and by secret ballot that guarantees the free
expression of the will of the voters; and 
c. to have access, under general conditions of equality, to the public service of his
country.
2. The law may regulate the exercise of the rights and opportunities referred to in the
preceding paragraph only on the basis of age, nationality, residence, language,
education, civil and mental capacity, or sentencing by a competent court in
criminal proceedings. 
Article 24. Right to Equal Protection
All persons are equal before the law. Consequently, they are entitled, without
discrimination, to equal protection of the law.
Article 25. Right to Judicial Protection
1. Everyone has the right to simple and prompt recourse, or any other effective
recourse, to a competent court or tribunal for protection against acts that violate his
fundamental rights recognized by the constitution or laws of the state concerned or
by this Convention, even though such violation may have been committed by
persons acting in the course of their official duties. 
2. The States Parties undertake: 
a. to ensure that any person claiming such remedy shall have his rights determined
by the competent authority provided for by the legal system of the state; 
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b. to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; and 
c. to ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when
granted. 
Chapter III – Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
Article 26. Progressive Development
The States Parties undertake to adopt measures, both internally and through
international cooperation, especially those of an economic and technical nature, with
a view to achieving progressively, by legislation or other appropriate means, the full
realization of the rights implicit in the economic, social, educational, scientific, and
cultural standards set forth in the Charter of the Organization of American States as
amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires. 
Chapter IV – Suspension of Guarantees, Interpretation,
and Application 
Article 27. Suspension of Guarantees
1. In time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence
or security of a State Party, it may take measures derogating from its obligations
under the present Convention to the extent and for the period of time strictly
required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not
inconsistent with its other obligations under international law and do not involve
discrimination on the ground of race, color, sex, language, religion, or social
origin. 
2. The foregoing provision does not authorize any suspension of the following
articles: Article 3 (Right to Juridical Personality), Article 4 (Right to Life), Article
5 (Right to Humane Treatment), Article 6 (Freedom from Slavery), Article 9
(Freedom from Ex Post Facto Laws), Article 12 (Freedom of Conscience and
Religion), Article 17 (Rights of the Family), Article 18 (Right to a Name), Article
19 (Rights of the Child), Article 20 (Right to Nationality), and Article 23 (Right to
Participate in Government), or of the judicial guarantees essential for the
protection of such rights. 
3. Any State Party availing itself of the right of suspension shall immediately inform
the other States Parties, through the Secretary General of the Organization of
American States, of the provisions the application of which it has suspended, the




Article 28. Federal Clause
1. Where a State Party is constituted as a federal state, the national government of
such State Party shall implement all the provisions of the Convention over whose
subject matter it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction. 
2. With respect to the provisions over whose subject matter the constituent units of
the federal state have jurisdiction, the national government shall immediately take
suitable measures, in accordance with its constitution and its laws, to the end that
the competent authorities of the constituent units may adopt appropriate provisions
for the fulfillment of this Convention. 
3. Whenever two or more States Parties agree to form a federation or other type of
association, they shall take care that the resulting federal or other compact contains
the provisions necessary for continuing and rendering effective the standards of
this Convention in the new state that is organized. 
Article 29. Restrictions Regarding Interpretation 
No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as: 
a. permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress the enjoyment or
exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in this Convention or to restrict
them to a greater extent than is provided for herein; 
b. restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by
virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of another convention to which
one of the said states is a party; 
c. precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human personality
or derived from representative democracy as a form of government; or 
d. excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man and other international acts of the same nature may have. 
Article 30. Scope of Restrictions
The restrictions that, pursuant to this Convention, may be placed on the enjoyment or
exercise of the rights or freedoms recognized herein may not be applied except in
accordance with laws enacted for reasons of general interest and in accordance with
the purpose for which such restrictions have been established. 
Article 31. Recognition of Other Rights
Other rights and freedoms recognized in accordance with the procedures established
in Articles 76 and 77 may be included in the system of protection of this Convention. 
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Chapter V – Personal Responsibilities 
Article 32. Relationship between Duties and Rights
1. Every person has reponsibilities to his family, his community, and mankind. 
2. The rights of each person are limited by the rights of others, by the security of all,
and by the just demands of the general welfare, in a democratic society.
PART II - MEANS OF PROTECTION
Chapter VI – Competent Organs 
Article 33
The following organs shall have competence with respect to matters relating to the
fulfillment of the commitments made by the States Parties to this Convention: 
a. the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, referred to as “The
Commission;” and 
b. the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, referred to as “The Court.”
Chapter VII – Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
Section 1. Organization 
Article 34
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights shall be composed of seven
members, who shall be persons of high moral character and recognized competence
in the field of human rights. 
Article 35
The Commission shall represent all the member countries of the Organization of
American States. 
Article 36
1. The members of the Commission shall be elected in a personal capacity by the
General Assembly of the Organization from a list of candidates proposed by the
governments of the member states. 
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2. Each of those governments may propose up to three candidates, who may be
nationals of the states proposing them or of any other member state of the
Organization of American States. When a slate of three is proposed, at least one of
the candidates shall be a national of a state other than the one proposing the slate. 
Article 37
1. The members of the Commission shall be elected for a term of four years and may
be reelected only once, but the terms of three of the members chosen in the first
election shall expire at the end of two years. Immediately following that election
the General Assembly shall determine the names of those three members by lot. 
2. No two nationals of the same state may be members of the Commission. 
Article 38
Vacancies that may occur on the Commission for reasons other than the normal
expiration of a term shall be filled by the Permanent Council of the Organization in
accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Commission. 
Article 39
The Commission shall prepare its Statute, which it shall submit to the General
Assembly for approval. It shall establish its own Regulations. 
Article 40
Secretariat services for the Commission shall be furnished by the appropriate
specialized unit of the General Secretariat of the Organization. This unit shall be
provided with the resources required to accomplish the tasks assigned to it by the
Commission. 
Section 2. Functions 
Article 41
The main function of the Commission shall be to promote respect for and defense of
human rights. In the exercise of its mandate, it shall have the following functions and
powers: 
a. to develop an awareness of human rights among the peoples of America; 
b. to make recommendations to the governments of the member states, when it
considers such action advisable, for the adoption of progressive measures in
favor of human rights within the framework of their domestic law and
constitutional provisions as well as appropriate measures to further the
observance of those rights; 
c. to prepare such studies or reports as it considers advisable in the performance
of its duties; 
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d. to request the governments of the member states to supply it with information
on the measures adopted by them in matters of human rights; 
e. to respond, through the General Secretariat of the Organization of American
States, to inquiries made by the member states on matters related to human
rights and, within the limits of its possibilities, to provide those states with the
advisory services they request; 
f. to take action on petitions and other communications pursuant to its authority
under the provisions of Articles 44 through 51 of this Convention; and 
g. to submit an annual report to the General Assembly of the Organization of
American States. 
Article 42
The States Parties shall transmit to the Commission a copy of each of the reports and
studies that they submit annually to the Executive Committees of the Inter-American
Economic and Social Council and the Inter-American Council for Education,
Science, and Culture, in their respective fields, so that the Commission may watch
over the promotion of the rights implicit in the economic, social, educational,
scientific, and cultural standards set forth in the Charter of the Organization of
American States as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires. 
Article 43
The States Parties undertake to provide the Commission with such information as it
may request of them as to the manner in which their domestic law ensures the
effective application of any provisions of this Convention. 
Section 3. Competence 
Article 44
Any person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in
one or more member states of the Organization, may lodge petitions with the
Commission containing denunciations or complaints of violation of this Convention
by a State Party. Article 45 
1. Any State Party may, when it deposits its instrument of ratification of or adherence
to this Convention, or at any later time, declare that it recognizes the competence
of the Commission to receive and examine communications in which a State Party
alleges that another State Party has committed a violation of a human right set
forth in this Convention. 
2. Communications presented by virtue of this article may be admitted and examined
only if they are presented by a State Party that has made a declaration recognizing
the aforementioned competence of the Commission. The Commission shall not
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admit any communication against a State Party that has not made such a
declaration. 
3. A declaration concerning recognition of competence may be made to be valid for
an indefinite time, for a specified period, or for a specific case. 
4. Declarations shall be deposited with the General Secretariat of the Organization of
American States, which shall transmit copies thereof to the member states of that
Organization. 
Article 46
1. Admission by the Commission of a petition or communication lodged in
accordance with Articles 44 or 45 shall be subject to the following requirements: 
a. that the remedies under domestic law have been pursued and exhausted in
accordance with generally recognized principles of international law; 
b. that the petition or communication is lodged within a period of six months from
the date on which the party alleging violation of his rights was notified of the
final judgment; 
c. that the subject of the petition or communication is not pending in another
international proceeding for settlement; and 
d. that, in the case of Article 44, the petition contains the name, nationality,
profession, domicile, and signature of the person or persons or of the legal
representative of the entity lodging the petition. 
2. The provisions of paragraphs 1.a and 1.b of this article shall not be applicable
when: 
a. the domestic legislation of the state concerned does not afford due process of
law for the protection of the right or rights that have allegedly been violated; 
b. the party alleging violation of his rights has been denied access to the remedies
under domestic law or has been prevented from exhausting them; or 
c. there has been unwarranted delay in rendering a final judgment under the
aforementioned remedies. 
Article 47
The Commission shall consider inadmissible any petition or communication
submitted under Articles 44 or 45 if: 
a. any of the requirements indicated in Article 46 has not been met; 
b. the petition or communication does not state facts that tend to establish a
violation of the rights guaranteed by this Convention; 
c. the statements of the petitioner or of the state indicate that the petition or
communication is manifestly groundless or obviously out of order; or 
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d. the petition or communication is substantially the same as one previously
studied by the Commission or by another international organization. 
Section 4. Procedure 
Article 48
1. When the Commission receives a petition or communication alleging violation of
any of the rights protected by this Convention, it shall proceed as follows: 
a. If it considers the petition or communication admissible, it shall request
information from the government of the state indicated as being responsible for
the alleged violations and shall furnish that government a transcript of the
pertinent portions of the petition or communication. This information shall be
submitted within a reasonable period to be determined by the Commission in
accordance with the circumstances of each case. 
b. After the information has been received, or after the period established has
elapsed and the information has not been received, the Commission shall
ascertain whether the grounds for the petition or communication still exist. If
they do not, the Commission shall order the record to be closed. 
c. The Commission may also declare the petition or communication inadmissible
or out of order on the basis of information or evidence subsequently received. 
d. If the record has not been closed, the Commission shall, with the knowledge of
the parties, examine the matter set forth in the petition or communication in
order to verify the facts. If necessary and advisable, the Commission shall carry
out an investigation, for the effective conduct of which it shall request, and the
states concerned shall furnish to it, all necessary facilities. 
e. The Commission may request the states concerned to furnish any pertinent
information and, if so requested, shall hear oral statements or receive written
statements from the parties concerned. 
f. The Commission shall place itself at the disposal of the parties concerned with
a view to reaching a friendly settlement of the matter on the basis of respect for
the human rights recognized in this Convention. 
2. However, in serious and urgent cases, only the presentation of a petition or
communication that fulfills all the formal requirements of admissibility shall be
necessary in order for the Commission to conduct an investigation with the prior
consent of the state in whose territory a violation has allegedly been committed. 
Article 49
If a friendly settlement has been reached in accordance with paragraph 1.f of Article
48, the Commission shall draw up a report, which shall be transmitted to the petitioner
and to the States Parties to this Convention, and shall then be communicated to the
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Secretary General of the Organization of American States for publication. This report
shall contain a brief statement of the facts and of the solution reached. If any party in
the case so requests, the fullest possible information shall be provided to it. 
Article 50
1. If a settlement is not reached, the Commission shall, within the time limit
established by its Statute, draw up a report setting forth the facts and stating its
conclusions. If the report, in whole or in part, does not represent the unanimous
agreement of the members of the Commission, any member may attach to it a
separate opinion. The written and oral statements made by the parties in
accordance with paragraph 1.e of Article 48 shall also be attached to the report. 
2. The report shall be transmitted to the states concerned, which shall not be at liberty
to publish it. 
3. In transmitting the report, the Commission may make such proposals and
recommendations as it sees fit.
Article 51
1. If, within a period of three months from the date of the transmittal of the report of
the Commission to the states concerned, the matter has not either been settled or
submitted by the Commission or by the state concerned to the Court and its
jurisdiction accepted, the Commission may, by the vote of an absolute majority of
its members, set forth its opinion and conclusions concerning the question
submitted for its consideration. 
2. Where appropriate, the Commission shall make pertinent recommendations and
shall prescribe a period within which the state is to take the measures that are
incumbent upon it to remedy the situation examined. 
3. When the prescribed period has expired, the Commission shall decide by the vote
of an absolute majority of its members whether the state has taken adequate
measures and whether to publish its report. 
Chapter VIII – Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
Section 1. Organization 
Article 52
1. The Court shall consist of seven judges, nationals of the member states of the
Organization, elected in an individual capacity from among jurists of the highest
moral authority and of recognized competence in the field of human rights, who
possess the qualifications required for the exercise of the highest judicial functions
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in conformity with the law of the state of which they are nationals or of the state
that proposes them as candidates. 
2. No two judges may be nationals of the same state. 
Article 53
1. The judges of the Court shall be elected by secret ballot by an absolute majority
vote of the States Parties to the Convention, in the General Assembly of the
Organization, from a panel of candidates proposed by those states. 
2. Each of the States Parties may propose up to three candidates, nationals of the state
that proposes them or of any other member state of the Organization of American
States. When a slate of three is proposed, at least one of the candidates shall be a
national of a state other than the one proposing the slate. 
Article 54
1. The judges of the Court shall be elected for a term of six years and may be
reelected only once. The term of three of the judges chosen in the first election
shall expire at the end of three years. Immediately after the election, the names of
the three judges shall be determined by lot in the General Assembly.
2. A judge elected to replace a judge whose term has not expired shall complete the
term of the latter.
3. The judges shall continue in office until the expiration of their term. However, they
shall continue to serve with regard to cases that they have begun to hear and that
are still pending, for which purposes they shall not be replaced by the newly
elected judges. 
Article 55
1. If a judge is a national of any of the States Parties to a case submitted to the Court,
he shall retain his right to hear that case. 
2. If one of the judges called upon to hear a case should be a national of one of the
States Parties to the case, any other State Party in the case may appoint a person of
its choice to serve on the Court as an ad hoc judge. 
3. If among the judges called upon to hear a case none is a national of any of the
States Parties to the case, each of the latter may appoint an ad hoc judge. 
4. An ad hoc judge shall possess the qualifications indicated in Article 52. 
5. If several States Parties to the Convention should have the same interest in a case,
they shall be considered as a single party for purposes of the above provisions. In
case of doubt, the Court shall decide. 
Article 56




The Commission shall appear in all cases before the Court. Article 58 
1. The Court shall have its seat at the place determined by the States Parties to the
Convention in the General Assembly of the Organization; however, it may
convene in the territory of any member state of the Organization of American
States when a majority of the Court considers it desirable, and with the prior
consent of the state concerned. The seat of the Court may be changed by the States
Parties to the Convention in the General Assembly by a two-thirds vote. 
2. The Court shall appoint its own Secretary.
3. The Secretary shall have his office at the place where the Court has its seat and
shall attend the meetings that the Court may hold away from its seat. 
Article 59
The Court shall establish its Secretariat, which shall function under the direction of
the Secretary of the Court, in accordance with the administrative standards of the
General Secretariat of the Organization in all respects not incompatible with the
independence of the Court. The staff of the Court’s Secretariat shall be appointed by
the Secretary General of the Organization, in consultation with the Secretary of the
Court. 
Article 60
The Court shall draw up its Statute which it shall submit to the General Assembly for
approval. It shall adopt its own Rules of Procedure. 
Section 2. Jurisdiction and Functions 
Article 61
1. Only the States Parties and the Commission shall have the right to submit a case
to the Court. 
2. In order for the Court to hear a case, it is necessary that the procedures set forth in
Articles 48 and 50 shall have been completed. 
Article 62
1. A State Party may, upon depositing its instrument of ratification or adherence to
this Convention, or at any subsequent time, declare that it recognizes as binding,
ipso facto, and not requiring special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Court on all
matters relating to the interpretation or application of this Convention. 
2. Such declaration may be made unconditionally, on the condition of reciprocity, for
a specified period, or for specific cases. It shall be presented to the Secretary
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General of the Organization, who shall transmit copies thereof to the other member
states of the Organization and to the Secretary of the Court. 
3. The jurisdiction of the Court shall comprise all cases concerning the interpretation
and application of the provisions of this Convention that are submitted to it,
provided that the States Parties to the case recognize or have recognized such
jurisdiction, whether by special declaration pursuant to the preceding paragraphs,
or by a special agreement. 
Article 63
1. If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by
this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the
enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if
appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the
breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to
the injured party.
2. In cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable
damage to persons, the Court shall adopt such provisional measures as it deems
pertinent in matters it has under consideration. With respect to a case not yet
submitted to the Court, it may act at the request of the Commission. 
Article 64
1. The member states of the Organization may consult the Court regarding the
interpretation of this Convention or of other treaties concerning the protection of
human rights in the American states. Within their spheres of competence, the
organs listed in Chapter X of the Charter of the Organization of American States,
as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, may in like manner consult the Court. 
2. The Court, at the request of a member state of the Organization, may provide that
state with opinions regarding the compatibility of any of its domestic laws with the
aforesaid international instruments. 
Article 65
To each regular session of the General Assembly of the Organization of American
States the Court shall submit, for the Assembly’s consideration, a report on its work
during the previous year. It shall specify, in particular, the cases in which a state has
not complied with its judgments, making any pertinent recommendations. 
Section 3. Procedure 
Article 66
1. Reasons shall be given for the judgment of the Court. 
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2. If the judgment does not represent in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of the
judges, any judge shall be entitled to have his dissenting or separate opinion
attached to the judgment. 
Article 67
The judgment of the Court shall be final and not subject to appeal. In case of
disagreement as to the meaning or scope of the judgment, the Court shall interpret it
at the request of any of the parties, provided the request is made within ninety days
from the date of notification of the judgment. 
Article 68
1. The States Parties to the Convention undertake to comply with the judgment of the
Court in any case to which they are parties. 
2. That part of a judgment that stipulates compensatory damages may be executed in
the country concerned in accordance with domestic procedure governing the
execution of judgments against the state. 
Article 69
The parties to the case shall be notified of the judgment of the Court and it shall be
transmitted to the States Parties to the Convention. 
Chapter IX – Common Provisions 
Article 70
1. The judges of the Court and the members of the Commission shall enjoy, from the
moment of their election and throughout their term of office, the immunities
extended to diplomatic agents in accordance with international law. During the
exercise of their official function they shall, in addition, enjoy the diplomatic
privileges necessary for the performance of their duties. 
2. At no time shall the judges of the Court or the members of the Commission be held
liable for any decisions or opinions issued in the excercise of their functions. 
Article 71
The position of judge of the Court or member of the Commission is incompatible with
any other activity that might affect the independence or impartiality of such judge or
member, as determined in the respective statutes. 
Article 72
The judges of the Court and the members of the Commission shall receive
emoluments and travel allowances in the form and under the conditions set forth in
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their statutes, with due regard for the importance and independence of their office.
Such emoluments and travel allowances shall be determined in the budget of the
Organization of American States, which shall also include the expenses of the Court
and its Secretariat. To this end, the Court shall draw up its own budget and submit it
for approval to the General Assembly through the General Secretariat. The latter may
not introduce any changes in it. 
Article 73
The General Assembly may, only at the request of the Commission or the Court, as
the case may be, determine sanctions to be applied against members of the
Commission or judges of the Court when there are justifiable grounds for such action
as set forth in the respective statutes. A vote of a two-thirds majority of the member
states of the Organization shall be required for a decision in the case of members of
the Commission and, in the case of judges of the Court, a two-thirds majority vote of
the States Parties to the Convention shall also be required. 
PART III - GENERAL AND TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
Chapter X – Signature, Ratification, Reservations,
Amendments, Protocols, and Denunciation 
Article 74
1. This Convention shall be open for signature and ratification by or adherence of any
member state of the Organization of American States. 
2. Ratification of or adherence to this Convention shall be made by the deposit of an
instrument of ratification or adherence with the General Secretariat of the
Organization of American States. As soon as eleven states have deposited their
instruments of ratification or adherence, the Convention shall enter into force.
With respect to any state that ratifies or adheres thereafter, the Convention shall
enter into force on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification or
adherence. 
3. The Secretary General shall inform all member states of the Organization of the
entry into force of the Convention. 
Article 75
This Convention shall be subject to reservations only in conformity with the




1. Proposals to amend this Convention may be submitted to the General Assembly for
the action it deems appropriate by any State Party directly, and by the Commission
or the Court through the Secretary General. 
2. Amendments shall enter into force for the States ratifying them on the date when
two-thirds of the States Parties to this Convention have deposited their respective
instruments of ratification. With respect to the other States Parties, the
amendments shall enter into force on the dates on which they deposit their
respective instruments of ratification. 
Article 77
1. In accordance with Article 31, any State Party and the Commission may submit
proposed protocols to this Convention for consideration by the States Parties at the
General Assembly with a view to gradually including other rights and freedoms
within its system of protection. 
2. Each protocol shall determine the manner of its entry into force and shall be
applied only among the States Parties to it. 
Article 78
1. The States Parties may denounce this Convention at the expiration of a five-year
period from the date of its entry into force and by means of notice given one year
in advance. Notice of the denunciation shall be addressed to the Secretary General
of the Organization, who shall inform the other States Parties. 
2. Such a denunciation shall not have the effect of releasing the State Party concerned
from the obligations contained in this Convention with respect to any act that may
constitute a violation of those obligations and that has been taken by that state prior
to the effective date of denunciation. 
Chapter XI – Transitory Provisions 
Section 1. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
Article 79
Upon the entry into force of this Convention, the Secretary General shall, in writing,
request each member state of the Organization to present, within ninety days, its
candidates for membership on the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
The Secretary General shall prepare a list in alphabetical order of the candidates
presented, and transmit it to the member states of the Organization at least thirty days




The members of the Commission shall be elected by secret ballot of the General
Assembly from the list of candidates referred to in Article 79. The candidates who
obtain the largest number of votes and an absolute majority of the votes of the
representatives of the member states shall be declared elected. Should it become
necessary to have several ballots in order to elect all the members of the Commission,
the candidates who receive the smallest number of votes shall be eliminated
successively, in the manner determined by the General Assembly.
Section 2. Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
Article 81
Upon the entry into force of this Convention, the Secretary General shall, in writing,
request each State Party to present, within ninety days, its candidates for membership
on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The Secretary General shall prepare a
list in alphabetical order of the candidates presented and transmit it to the States
Parties at least thirty days prior to the next session of the General Assembly.
Article 82
The judges of the Court shall be elected from the list of candidates referred to in
Article 81, by secret ballot of the States Parties to the Convention in the General
Assembly. The candidates who obtain the largest number of votes and an absolute
majority of the votes of the representatives of the States Parties shall be declared
elected. Should it become necessary to have several ballots in order to elect all the
judges of the Court, the candidates who receive the smallest number of votes shall be
eliminated successively, in the manner determined by the States Parties.
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Appendix D
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE  AMERICAN
CONVENTION  ON  HUMAN  RIGHTS  IN  THE
AREA OF  ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND  CULTURAL
RIGHTS,  “PROTOCOL OF  SAN  SALVADOR”1
Preamble 
The States Parties to the American Convention on Human Rights “Pact San José,
Costa Rica,” 
Reaffirming their intention to consolidate in this hemisphere, within the framework
of democratic institutions, a system of personal liberty and social justice based on
respect for the essential rights of man; 
Recognizing that the essential rights of man are not derived from one’s being a
national of a certain State, but are based upon attributes of the human person, for
which reason they merit international protection in the form of a convention
reinforcing or complementing the protection provided by the domestic law of the
American States; 
Considering the close relationship that exists between economic, social and cultural
rights, and civil and political rights, in that the different categories of rights constitute
an indivisible whole based on the recognition of the dignity of the human person, for
which reason both require permanent protection and promotion if they are to be fully
realized, and the violation of some rights in favor of the realization of others can
never be justified; 
Recognizing the benefits that stem from the promotion and development of
cooperation among States and international relations; 
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1 Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69 (1988), 28 I.L.M. 156 (1989), entered into force Nov. 16, 1999,
available at <http://www.cidh.oas.org/Básicos/basic5.htm>.
Recalling that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
American Convention on Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying
freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby
everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights as well as his civil and
political rights; 
Bearing in mind that, although fundamental economic, social and cultural rights have
been recognized in earlier international instruments of both world and regional scope,
it is essential that those rights be reaffirmed, developed, perfected and protected in
order to consolidate in America, on the basis of full respect for the rights of the
individual, the democratic representative form of government as well as the right of
its peoples to development, self-determination, and the free disposal of their wealth
and natural resources; and 
Considering that the American Convention on Human Rights provides that draft
additional protocols to that Convention may be submitted for consideration to the
States Parties, meeting together on the occasion of the General Assembly of the
Organization of American States, for the purpose of gradually incorporating other
rights and freedoms into the protective system thereof, 
Have agreed upon the following Additional Protocol to the American Convention on
Human Rights “Protocol of San Salvador:” 
Article 1.  Obligation to Adopt Measures
The States Parties to this Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human
Rights undertake to adopt the necessary measures, both domestically and through
international cooperation, especially economic and technical, to the extent allowed by
their available resources, and taking into account their degree of development, for the
purpose of achieving progressively and pursuant to their internal legislations, the full
observance of the rights recognized in this Protocol. 
Article 2.  Obligation to Enact Domestic Legislation
If the exercise of the rights set forth in this Protocol is not already guaranteed by
legislative or other provisions, the States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance
with their constitutional processes and the provisions of this Protocol, such legislative
or other measures as may be necessary for making those rights a reality.
Article 3.  Obligation of nondiscrimination
The State Parties to this Protocol undertake to guarantee the exercise of the rights set
forth herein without discrimination of any kind for reasons related to race, color, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinions, national or social origin, economic
status, birth or any other social condition. 
Article 4.  Inadmissibility of Restrictions
A right which is recognized or in effect in a State by virtue of its internal legislation
or international conventions may not be restricted or curtailed on the pretext that this
Protocol does not recognize the right or recognizes it to a lesser degree. 
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Article 5.  Scope of Restrictions and Limitations
The State Parties may establish restrictions and limitations on the enjoyment and
exercise of the rights established herein by means of laws promulgated for the
purpose of preserving the general welfare in a democratic society only to the extent
that they are not incompatible with the purpose and reason underlying those rights. 
Article 6.  Right to Work
1. Everyone has the right to work, which includes the opportunity to secure the means
for living a dignified and decent existence by performing a freely elected or
accepted lawful activity.
2. The State Parties undertake to adopt measures that will make the right to work
fully effective, especially with regard to the achievement of full employment,
vocational guidance, and the development of technical and vocational training
projects, in particular those directed to the disabled. The States Parties also
undertake to implement and strengthen programs that help to ensure suitable
family care, so that women may enjoy a real opportunity to exercise the right to
work. 
Article 7.  Just, Equitable, and Satisfactory Conditions of Work
The States Parties to this Protocol recognize that the right to work to which the
foregoing article refers presupposes that everyone shall enjoy that right under just,
equitable, and satisfactory conditions, which the States Parties undertake to guarantee
in their internal legislation, particularly with respect to: 
a. Remuneration which guarantees, as a minimum, to all workers dignified and
decent living conditions for them and their families and fair and equal wages for
equal work, without distinction; 
b. The right of every worker to follow his vocation and to devote himself to the
activity that best fulfills his expectations and to change employment in
accordance with the pertinent national regulations; 
c. The right of every worker to promotion or upward mobility in his employment,
for which purpose account shall be taken of his qualifications, competence,
integrity and seniority; d. Stability of employment, subject to the nature of each
industry and occupation and the causes for just separation. In cases of
unjustified dismissal, the worker shall have the right to indemnity or to
reinstatement on the job or any other benefits provided by domestic legislation; 
d. Safety and hygiene at work; 
e. The prohibition of night work or unhealthy or dangerous working conditions
and, in general, of all work which jeopardizes health, safety, or morals, for
persons under 18 years of age. As regards minors under the age of 16, the work
day shall be subordinated to the provisions regarding compulsory education and
in no case shall work constitute an impediment to school attendance or a
limitation on benefiting from education received; 
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f. A reasonable limitation of working hours, both daily and weekly. The days shall
be shorter in the case of dangerous or unhealthy work or of night work; 
g. Rest, leisure and paid vacations as well as remuneration for national holidays. 
Article 8.  Trade Union Rights
1. The States Parties shall ensure: 
a. The right of workers to organize trade unions and to join the union of their
choice for the purpose of protecting and promoting their interests. As an
extension of that right, the States Parties shall permit trade unions to establish
national federations or confederations, or to affiliate with those that already
exist, as well as to form international trade union organizations and to affiliate
with that of their choice. The States Parties shall also permit trade unions,
federations and confederations to function freely; 
b. The right to strike. 
2. The exercise of the rights set forth above may be subject only to restrictions
established by law, provided that such restrictions are characteristic of a
democratic society and necessary for safeguarding public order or for protecting
public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others. Members of the armed
forces and the police and of other essential public services shall be subject to
limitations and restrictions established by law.
3. No one may be compelled to belong to a trade union. 
Article 9.  Right to Social Security
1. Everyone shall have the right to social security protecting him from the
consequences of old age and of disability which prevents him, physically or
mentally, from securing the means for a dignified and decent existence. In the
event of the death of a beneficiary, social security benefits shall be applied to his
dependents. 
2. In the case of persons who are employed, the right to social security shall cover at
least medical care and an allowance or retirement benefit in the case of work
accidents or occupational disease and, in the case of women, paid maternity leave
before and after childbirth. 
Article 10.  Right to Health
1. Everyone shall have the right to health, understood to mean the enjoyment of the
highest level of physical, mental and social well-being. 
2. In order to ensure the exercise of the right to health, the States Parties agree to
recognize health as a public good and, particularly, to adopt the following
measures to ensure that right: 
a. Primary health care, that is, essential health care made available to all
individuals and families in the community; 
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b. Extension of the benefits of health services to all individuals subject to the
State’s jurisdiction; 
c. Universal immunization against the principal infectious diseases; 
d. Prevention and treatment of endemic, occupational and other diseases; 
e. Education of the population on the prevention and treatment of health problems,
and 
f. Satisfaction of the health needs of the highest risk groups and of those whose
poverty makes them the most vulnerable. 
Article 11.  Right to a Healthy Environment 
1. Everyone shall have the right to live in a healthy environment and to have access
to basic public services. 
2. The States Parties shall promote the protection, preservation, and improvement of
the environment. 
Article 12.  Right to Food
1. Everyone has the right to adequate nutrition which guarantees the possibility of
enjoying the highest level of physical, emotional and intellectual development. 
2. In order to promote the exercise of this right and eradicate malnutrition, the States
Parties undertake to improve methods of production, supply and distribution of
food, and to this end, agree to promote greater international cooperation in support
of the relevant national policies. 
Article 13.  Right to Education
1. Everyone has the right to education. 
2. The States Parties to this Protocol agree that education should be directed towards
the full development of the human personality and human dignity and should
strengthen respect for human rights, ideological pluralism, fundamental freedoms,
justice and peace. They further agree that education ought to enable everyone to
participate effectively in a democratic and pluralistic society and achieve a decent
existence and should foster understanding, tolerance and friendship among all
nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups and promote activities for the
maintenance of peace. 
3. The States Parties to this Protocol recognize that in order to achieve the full
exercise of the right to education: 
a. Primary education should be compulsory and accessible to all without cost; 
b. Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational
secondary education, should be made generally available and accessible to all
by every appropriate means, and in particular, by the progressive introduction
of free education; 
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c. Higher education should be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of
individual capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular, by the
progressive introduction of free education; 
d. Basic education should be encouraged or intensified as far as possible for those
persons who have not received or completed the whole cycle of primary
instruction; 
e. Programs of special education should be established for the handicapped, so as
to provide special instruction and training to persons with physical disabilities
or mental deficiencies. 
4. In conformity with the domestic legislation of the States Parties, parents should
have the right to select the type of education to be given to their children, provided
that it conforms to the principles set forth above. 
5. Nothing in this Protocol shall be interpreted as a restriction of the freedom of
individuals and entities to establish and direct educational institutions in
accordance with the domestic legislation of the States Parties.
Article 14.  Right to the Benefits of Culture
1. The States Parties to this Protocol recognize the right of everyone: 
a. To take part in the cultural and artistic life of the community; 
b. To enjoy the benefits of scientific and technological progress; 
c. To benefit from the protection of moral and material interests deriving from any
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to this Protocol to ensure the full
exercise of this right shall include those necessary for the conservation,
development and dissemination of science, culture and art. 
3. The States Parties to this Protocol undertake to respect the freedom indispensable
for scientific research and creative activity.
4. The States Parties to this Protocol recognize the benefits to be derived from the
encouragement and development of international cooperation and relations in the
fields of science, arts and culture, and accordingly agree to foster greater
international cooperation in these fields. 
Article 15.  Right to the Formation and the Protection of Families
1. The family is the natural and fundamental element of society and ought to be
protected by the State, which should see to the improvement of its spiritual and
material conditions. 
2. Everyone has the right to form a family, which shall be exercised in accordance
with the provisions of the pertinent domestic legislation. 
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3. The States Parties hereby undertake to accord adequate protection to the family
unit and in particular: 
a. To provide special care and assistance to mothers during a reasonable period
before and after childbirth; 
b. To guarantee adequate nutrition for children at the nursing stage and during
school attendance years; 
c. To adopt special measures for the protection of adolescents in order to ensure
the full development of their physical, intellectual and moral capacities; 
d. To undertake special programs of family training so as to help create a stable
and positive environment in which children will receive and develop the values
of understanding, solidarity, respect and responsibility.
Article 16.  Rights of Children
Every child, whatever his parentage, has the right to the protection that his status as a
minor requires from his family, society and the State. Every child has the right to
grow under the protection and responsibility of his parents; save in exceptional,
judicially-recognized circumstances, a child of young age ought not to be separated
from his mother. Every child has the right to free and compulsory education, at least
in the elementary phase, and to continue his training at higher levels of the
educational system. 
Article 17.  Protection of the Elderly
Everyone has the right to special protection in old age. With this in view the States
Parties agree to take progressively the necessary steps to make this right a reality and,
particularly, to: 
a. Provide suitable facilities, as well as food and specialized medical care, for elderly
individuals who lack them and are unable to provide them for themselves; 
b. Undertake work programs specifically designed to give the elderly the opportunity
to engage in a productive activity suited to their abilities and consistent with their
vocations or desires; 
c. Foster the establishment of social organizations aimed at improving the quality of
life for the elderly.
Article 18.  Protection of the Handicapped
Everyone affected by a diminution of his physical or mental capacities is entitled to
receive special attention designed to help him achieve the greatest possible
development of his personality. The States Parties agree to adopt such measures as
may be necessary for this purpose and, especially, to: 
a. Undertake programs specifically aimed at providing the handicapped with the
resources and environment needed for attaining this goal, including work
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programs consistent with their possibilities and freely accepted by them or their
legal representatives, as the case may be; 
b. Provide special training to the families of the handicapped in order to help them
solve the problems of coexistence and convert them into active agents in the
physical, mental and emotional development of the latter; 
c. Include the consideration of solutions to specific requirements arising from
needs of this group as a priority component of their urban development plans; 
d. Encourage the establishment of social groups in which the handicapped can be
helped to enjoy a fuller life. 
Article 19.  Means of Protection
1. Pursuant to the provisions of this article and the corresponding rules to be
formulated for this purpose by the General Assembly of the Organization of
American States, the States Parties to this Protocol undertake to submit periodic
reports on the progressive measures they have taken to ensure due respect for the
rights set forth in this Protocol. 2. All reports shall be submitted to the Secretary
General of the OAS, who shall transmit them to the Inter-American Economic and
Social Council and the Inter-American Council for Education, Science and Culture
so that they may examine them in accordance with the provisions of this article.
The Secretary General shall send a copy of such reports to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights. 
2. The Secretary General of the Organization of American States shall also transmit
to the specialized organizations of the inter-American system of which the States
Parties to the present Protocol are members, copies or pertinent portions of the
reports submitted, insofar as they relate to matters within the purview of those
organizations, as established by their constituent instruments. 
3. The specialized organizations of the inter-American system may submit reports to
the Inter-American Economic and Social Council and the Inter-American Council
for Education, Science and Culture relative to compliance with the provisions of
the present Protocol in their fields of activity.
4. The annual reports submitted to the General Assembly by the Inter-American
Economic and Social Council and the Inter-American Council for Education,
Science and Culture shall contain a summary of the information received from the
States Parties to the present Protocol and the specialized organizations concerning
the progressive measures adopted in order to ensure respect for the rights
acknowledged in the Protocol itself and the general recommendations they
consider to be appropriate in this respect. 
5. Any instance in which the rights established in paragraph a) of Article 8 and in
Article 13 are violated by action directly attributable to a State Party to this
Protocol may give rise, through participation of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights and, when applicable, of the Inter-American Court of Human
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Rights, to application of the system of individual petitions governed by Article 44
through 51 and 61 through 69 of the American Convention on Human Rights. 
6. Without prejudice to the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights may formulate such observations and
recommendations as it deems pertinent concerning the status of the economic,
social and cultural rights established in the present Protocol in all or some of the
States Parties, which it may include in its Annual Report to the General Assembly
or in a special report, whichever it considers more appropriate. 
7. The Councils and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, in
discharging the functions conferred upon them in this article, shall take into
account the progressive nature of the observance of the rights subject to protection
by this Protocol. 
Article 20.  Reservations 
The States Parties may, at the time of approval, signature, ratification or accession,
make reservations to one or more specific provisions of this Protocol, provided that
such reservations are not incompatible with the object and purpose of the Protocol. 
Article 21.  Signature, Ratification or Accession. Entry into Effect
1. This Protocol shall remain open to signature and ratification or accession by any
State Party to the American Convention on Human Rights. 
2. Ratification of or accession to this Protocol shall be effected by depositing an
instrument of ratification or accession with the General Secretariat of the
Organization of American States. 
3. The Protocol shall enter into effect when eleven States have deposited their
respective instruments of ratification or accession. 
4. The Secretary General shall notify all the member states of the Organization of
American States of the entry of the Protocol into effect. 
Article 22. Inclusion of other Rights and Expansion of those
Recognized
1. Any State Party and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights may
submit for the consideration of the States Parties meeting on the occasion of the
General Assembly proposed amendments to include the recognition of other rights
or freedoms or to extend or expand rights or freedoms recognized in this Protocol. 
2. Such amendments shall enter into effect for the States that ratify them on the date
of deposit of the instrument of ratification corresponding to the number
representing two thirds of the States Parties to this Protocol. For all other States
Parties they shall enter into effect on the date on which they deposit their
respective instrument of ratification.
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